Slinn v Nominal Defendant - [1964] HCA 72

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan and Taylor JJ.

SLINN v. NOMINAL DEFENDANT

(1964) 112 CLR 334

17 November 1964

Insurance

Insurance—Third party—Action against Nominal Defendant—Unidentified vehicle—"Due inquiry and search"—"Due"—Motor Traffic Ordinance, 1936-1959 (A.C.T.) s. 41 AO (3)*.

Decisions

November 17.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. In this action, which was brought in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for damages for personal injury sustained in a road accident, judgment was entered for the defendant. The appellant appeals to this Court seeking the entry of judgment for the plaintiff and the remission of the action to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to assess the damages. (at p336)

2. The facts of the matter as found by the learned trial judge were that on the day in question at about 11 a.m. the plaintiff was driving a Holden station wagon from Cooma towards Canberra, her husband sitting beside her and her two young children in the rear seat. The day was bright and sunny. When the plaintiff was some six miles short of Canberra on a portion of the road which was straight, with a dry bitumen surface and reasonably free from traffic, she observed a car approaching some two hundred yards away from her. It was "a medium-sized car, light grey or fawny-grey", as she said (which was all she could tell about it), and was travelling about two feet on its incorrect side of the road. The speed of the Holden station wagon at this time was some forty-five to fifty miles per hour, and the estimated speed of the approaching vehicle some seventy miles per hour. The oncoming vehicle did not alter its course and when it was a hundred yards or so away from her the plaintiff reduced the speed of the station wagon to some forty to forty-five miles per hour and gradually moved further to her left. However, the oncoming car still held on its course and passed her very closely. As the plaintiff said, "There was like a rush of wind and I thought I felt a slight thump on the side at the back and the tail of my car swung round." This movement of the Holden caused it to travel partly outside the bitumen on the gravel shoulder for some distance. It then got out of control, skidded across the road from one side to the other and eventually turned over on its side. The plaintiff was shocked and dazed and was taken to the Canberra Community Hospital where she remained for some two weeks. Her husband crawled out of the car through the broken windscreen. All that he could remember of the passing vehicle was that it was a sedan, greyish in colour and of a medium size. He had no idea how many persons were in it, but rather felt that the driver had been a woman. The two vehicles did not come into contact. It would seem that the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Slinn v Nominal Defendant

Details

AGLC: Slinn v Nominal Defendant [1964] HCA 72
Case: [1964] HCA 72
Decision Date: 17 November 1964

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Slinn v Nominal Defendant*, the plaintiff, Slinn, brought proceedings against the Nominal Defendant in the High Court of Australia. The dispute concerned a claim for damages arising from injuries sustained by Slinn in a motor vehicle accident. Slinn alleged that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle, who was unidentified at the time of the proceedings.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of the relevant legislation to bring a claim against the Nominal Defendant. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to identify the driver of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, as mandated by the legislation governing claims against the Nominal Defendant.

The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to identify the unknown driver. Barwick C.J., McTiernan and Taylor JJ. considered the evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding the steps taken to locate the driver. They applied the principle that the "reasonable steps" requirement is an objective one, requiring a diligent and thorough investigation, rather than merely a perfunctory or superficial effort. The court found that the plaintiff had not discharged this onus, as the steps taken were insufficient to constitute all reasonable efforts to identify the driver.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, upholding the decision that the plaintiff had failed to meet the statutory preconditions for pursuing a claim against the Nominal Defendant.

Orders