Sleiman v State Parole Authority
[2017] NSWSC 1184
•25 August 2017
|
New South Wales |
Case Name: | Sleiman v State Parole Authority |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2017] NSWSC 1184 |
Hearing Date(s): | 25 August 2017 |
Decision Date: | 25 August 2017 |
Jurisdiction: | Common Law |
Before: | McCallum J |
Decision: | Orders as sought in consent orders |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 |
Category: | Procedural and other rulings |
Parties: | Emad Sleiman (plaintiff) |
Representation: | N Hanna (solicitor for the plaintiff) |
File Number(s): | 2017/00212417 |
Publication Restriction: | None |
Judgment
HER HONOUR: This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the State Parole Authority. The first defendant is the State Parole Authority. In accordance with the appropriate procedure in such applications it has filed a submitting appearance. The second defendant is the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales. The Attorney is the active defendant to the proceedings.
The summons filed 12 July 2017 raises three grounds for review. The Attorney, having considered the submissions put on behalf of the plaintiff, accepts that the ground articulated as ground 2 in the summons is made out and accordingly indicates that he would consent to orders that the decision be quashed and that the proceedings be remitted to the Parole Authority to be dealt with according to law. The proposed consent order also addresses the question of costs.
The proceedings have been referred to me as duty judge in circumstances where the Registrar, in my respectful opinion appropriately, took the view that where the proposed consent orders entailed acceptance of the proposition that the decision-maker fell into error, the question whether those orders should be made should be considered by a judge.
Ground 2 is:
That the Parole Authority denied the plaintiff procedural fairness by denying him access to material relied upon by the Parole Authority in the absence of a judicial member holding any opinion that the material should not be supplied, as required by s 194(1A) of the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999.
In brief summary, the circumstances in which the application came before the Parole Authority were that the plaintiff's parole was revoked after he was the victim of a shooting whilst at liberty on parole. The Parole Authority refused to rescind that revocation. Police obtained information, evidently in connection with that event, which prompted them to communicate confidential concerns to the Parole Authority as to whether the plaintiff was appropriately at liberty on parole. The content of that document was not provided to the plaintiff and he was accordingly constrained in addressing it.
It should be noted that the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 does contemplate the possibility that a person in Mr Sleiman's position will be precluded from seeing important material relevant to an application to the Parole Authority. However, in order for the hearing to proceed in that manner, it is necessary for the decision-maker to form the opinion which is the jurisdictional fact referred to in ground 2.
The brief reasons for decision of the decision maker make no reference to his Honour having formed that opinion. Further, I am told by the legal representatives appearing today that there is no reference in the transcript of the proceedings preceding the publication of those reasons to indicate his Honour formed the necessary opinion.
In the circumstances I am persuaded that the second defendant has appropriately consented to the orders proposed, which will see the matter remitted to the Parole Authority to be dealt with according to law. In reaching that conclusion I have had regard to the careful written submissions dated 20 July 2017 prepared by Mr Lange of counsel on behalf of the plaintiff.
For those reasons I make orders 1 to 4 in the consent orders dated 21 August 2017 provided by the parties. I will initial those orders and keep them with the file.
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