SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: | Slater v The Queen |
Citation: | [2014] ACTCA 33 |
Hearing Date(s): | 13 February 2014 |
DecisionDate: | 18 August 2014 |
Before: | Refshauge, Penfold and Burns JJ |
Decision: | The appeal is dismissed |
Category: | Principal Judgment |
Catchwords: | APPEAL – sentencing – offender appeal – relevance of weight given to particular sentencing considerations in appeal from sentence – the totality principle – whether insufficient weight given to sentences of co-offenders – whether sufficient weight given to the age of appellant at the time of offences – whether discount for guilty plea was sufficient – whether weight was given to materials not before the court – ride/drive motor vehicle without consent – theft – damage motor vehicle – assault – attempted aggravated robbery – aggravated robbery – appeal dismissed |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes (Sentencing) Act2005 (ACT), ss 33, 35, 63(1) |
Cases Cited: | Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 |
Texts Cited: | DA Thomas, Principles of Sentencing, (2nd ed, 1979) |
Parties: | Christopher Slater (Appellant) The Queen (Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr Livingston (Appellant) Ms Jones (Respondent) |
| Solicitors Craig Lynch & Associates (Appellant) ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) | |
File Number(s): | ACTCA 44 of 2013 |
Decision under appeal: | Court/Tribunal: ACT Supreme Court Before: Acting Justice Nield Date of Decision: 27 June 2013 Case Title: R v Christopher Slater Court File Number(s): SCC 153 of 2012; SCC 154 of 2012 |
THE COURT:
On 27 June 2013, the appellant was sentenced by Nield AJ for eleven offences to an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years and six months commencing 10 April 2012 and expiring on 9 October 2017 with a non-parole period of three years and six months also commencing 10 April 2012 and expiring on 9 October 2015. The offences and sentences imposed by Nield AJ were as follows:
(a)For an offence of ride/drive motor vehicle without consent, the appellant was sentenced to one year nine months’ imprisonment to commence on 10 April 2012 and end on 9 January 2014.
(b)For an offence of theft, the appellant was sentenced to one year nine months’ imprisonment to commence on 10 June 2012 and end on 9 March 2014.
(c)For an offence of drive motor vehicle without consent, the appellant was sentenced to two years eight months’ imprisonment to commence on 10 June 2012 and end on 9 February 2015.
(d)For an offence of damage motor vehicle, the appellant was sentenced to two years eight months’ imprisonment to commence on 10 August 2012 and end on 9…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the sentencing judge had given insufficient weight to various sentencing considerations. These included the totality principle, the sentences imposed on co-offenders, the appellant's age at the time of the offences, and the discount afforded for his guilty pleas. The appellant also contended that the sentencing judge had improperly considered materials not before the court.
The Court of Appeal considered the statutory regime in the ACT, specifically sections 33 and 35 of the *Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005* (ACT), which govern relevant sentencing considerations and reductions for guilty pleas. The court noted that the appellant's guilty pleas were not entered early in the proceedings, and the sentencing judge had found the Crown's case to be strong, even overwhelming. Consequently, a 10% discount for the guilty pleas was considered appropriate, as a greater reduction would be unreasonable given the strength of the prosecution's case. The court found no error in the sentencing judge's approach to the totality principle or the other grounds of appeal.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The statutory regime in the ACT is relevant to considering this ground of appeal. Section 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act2005 (ACT) relevantly provides:33Sentencing – Relevant Considerations(1)In deciding how an offender should be sentenced (if at all) for an offence, a court must consider whichever of the following matters are relevant and known to the court:...(j)a plea of guilty by the offender (see section 35);...(w)whether the offender has demonstrated remorse. Section 35 of the Sentencing Act specifically deals with the reduction of a sentence for a guilty plea:35Reduction of sentence – guilty plea(1)This section applies if – (a)an offender pleads guilty to an offence; and(b)based on the information currently available to the court, the court considers that there is a real likelihood that it will sentence the offender to imprisonment.(2)In deciding how the offender should be sentenced (if at all) for the offence, the court must consider the following matters:(a)the fact that the offender pleaded guilty;(b)when the offender pleaded guilty, or indicated an intention to plea guilty;(c)whether the guilty plea was related to negotiations between the prosecution and defence about the charge to which the offender pleaded guilty;(d)the seriousness of the offence;(e)the effect of the offence on the victims of the offence, the victims’ families and anyone else who may make a victim impact statement.Note For who may make a victim impact statement, see s 49.(3)The court may impose a lesser penalty (including a shorter nonparole period) on the offender than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offence.(4)However, in deciding any lesser penalty, the court must not make any significant reduction for the fact that the offender pleaded guilty if, based on established facts, the court considers that the prosecution’s case for the offence was overwhelmingly strong.(5)For subsection (2)(b), the earlier in the proceeding that the guilty plea is made, or indication is given that it will be made, the lesser the penalty the court may impose.(6)A lesser penalty imposed under this section must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence.(7)In this section:“available documents”, in relation to the offence, means any of the following:(a)any written statements or admissions made for use as evidence at a trial that would have been admissible as evidence at the trial for the offence;(b)depositions taken at any committal proceeding for the offence;(c)any written statements or admissions used as evidence in any committal proceeding for the offence;(d)any other relevant written documents.“defence” means – (a)the offender; or(b)any lawyer representing the offender.“established facts” means facts established by – (a)evidence given at the trial; or(b)available documents; or(c)admissions by the offender; or(d)submissions made by the prosecution or defence. Concerning the appellant’s pleas of guilty, Nield AJ said in his sentencing remarks (at [37]–[40]):I note that the offender was extradited from New South Wales to the ACT on 10 April 2012 and that he has been in custody, bail refused, since 10 April 2012.On 11 April 2012, the offender appeared before a magistrate in the Magistrates Court in relation to the subject offences. Thereafter, he appeared before a magistrate in the Magistrates Court on five further occasions before 5 July 2012, when he was committed to this court to stand his trial for the offences, other than [an offence of attempted aggravated robbery and an offence of theft] to which he had earlier pleaded guilty.On 12 July 2012, the offender appeared in this court for the first time. Thereafter, he appeared before a judge of this court on a further 17 occasions before 26 April [2013], when he pleaded guilty to the various offences, in addition to the offences to which he had earlier pleaded guilty.It cannot be said that the offender entered early guilty pleas to the offences other than those to which he had earlier pleaded guilty. I do not know why, in view of his admissions to police when interviewed on 22 October 2010, he did not enter guilty pleas earlier than when he did. However, his guilty pleas have value. They have confirmed the Crown’s cases. They have saved the time and costs of the trial. They show that he has accepted responsibility for what he did. They have facilitated the course of justice. However, the value to be given to his guilty pleas must be assessed having regard to the strength of the Crown’s cases, and I think that the Crown’s cases are strong, even to the point of being overwhelming. I intend [to] discount the sentences that I will determine to be appropriate by 10% on account of the offender’s guilty pleas.