Slade & Wen

Case

[2008] FMCAfam 706

11 July 2008


FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SLADE & WEN [2008] FMCAfam 706
FAMILY LAW – Property – non-disclosure from both parties – credibility of evidence from both parties – evidence of significant gambling by wife.
Family Law Act 1975, ss.75(2), 79
Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143
Norbis & Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Pierce v Pierce (1998) FLC 92-844
Weir (1993) FLC 92-338
Williams & Williams [2007] FamCA 313
Applicant: MR SLADE
Respondent: MS WEN
File Number: SYC 45 of 2007
Judgment of: Altobelli FM
Hearing date: 22 May 2008
Date of Last Submission: 22 May 2008
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 11 July 2008

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor-Advocate for the Applicant: Mr Mockler
Solicitors for the Applicant: Stewart Cuddly & Mockler
Solicitor-Advocate for the Respondent: Ms Duffy
Solicitors for the Respondent: Voros Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The Wife pay to the Husband the sum of $47,500 within 60 days of the making of these orders.

  2. The Wife forthwith do all things necessary to recover payment of the loan owed to her by Mr W.

  3. Each party otherwise be declared to be the sole owner at law and in equity of all other property in their possession or control.

IT IS NOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ORDERS that the judgment of Federal Magistrate Altobelli delivered this day will for all publication and reporting purposes be referred to as Slade & Wen.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYC 45 of 2007

MR SLADE

Applicant

And

MS WEN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for alteration of property interests, commonly known as a property settlement. Whilst both parties were represented at the final hearing it is clearly apparent from the evidence that for most of the proceedings they were representing themselves. The affidavits, in particular, often lack coherence. The wife needed a translator in order to give her evidence. The husband seemed to struggle sometimes to understand what was going on. Both the parties made serious and extreme allegations about each other, their contributions during the marriage or lack thereof, and their conduct insofar as it was relevant to the contributions. Most of the significant alleged transactions were in cash, often in substantial amounts. Mysterious third parties were alleged to be involved in some of these transactions. Vast amounts of cash money are alleged to have been gambled at casinos, or sent overseas, or carried in purses. Both parties seem to currently be in poor health due to both physical, psychological and possibly psychiatric problems. The truth is “out there somewhere” and the court was left with the task of somehow exercising its judicial omniscience, sorting through all the evidence, and attaining a just and equitable outcome. The court is most grateful to the two solicitors who represented the parties at the final hearing. One wonders whether they will be paid and if so whether it will be proportionate to their efforts in trying to sort out seeming nonsense. In any event they have converted the court’s task from being an impossible one, to a nearly impossible one.

Background

  1. The husband is the applicant. He is 52 years old and due to poor health receives Centrelink benefits. He was previously married and divorced his first wife in 2000. He was at all times and remains an Australian citizen and has lived in Australia.

  2. The wife is the respondent. She is 45 years old and as a result of an employment related injury is in receipt of worker’s compensation payments as well as some Centrelink benefits. She has two children from previous marriages. Her first child is 19 years old and was born to her first husband who she divorced in 1990. Her second child is 12 years old and was born to her second husband who she divorced in 1999. Both children remained in her care. She first came to Australia in 1995, then again in 1997, and at some time thereafter she was granted a business visa to remain here.

  3. The parties to this case met either in late 2000 or early 2001 (nothing turns on this) and seem to have commenced cohabiting later that year. They married in Sydney in August 2002 and separated in June 2006. The period of cohabitation was thus about four and a half years.

  4. The husband commenced proceedings in the Family Court of Australia in Sydney sometime in 2006. Interim restraining orders against the wife were made by Judicial Registrar Loughnan on 25 October 2006. These prevented the wife from leaving Australia. The matter was transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court on 13 December 2006.


    On 5 September 2007 I declined the wife’s application to vary or vacate the injunctions made by Judicial Registrar Loughnan. The court’s file indicates that many, many directions were made for the preparation of this case, including disclosure. When the matter was first listed for hearing on 27 November 2007, FM Lucev adjourned it to 22 May 2008 as it was clearly not ready for hearing. The matter came before me on that date for hearing and I have already recorded some preliminary observations about the case. At the hearing the husband sought an order that the wife pay him $47,500, and the wife an order that each retain what they already have.

Issues

  1. Doing the best one is able to under the circumstances the issues in this case appear to be:

    a)What were the assets of the parties as at the commencement of cohabitation?

    b)What were the assets of the parties as at the date of separation?

    c)What was the pool of assets as at the date of the hearing?

    d)What contributions were made by the husband and the wife during the relevant periods? And how should those contributions be assessed for the purposes of s.79(4)?

  2. The parties agreed that any s.75(2) factors were equal. The evidence before me indicates that is clearly so. Permeating all these issues were significant questions about the credibility of both parties, and whether each had made proper disclosure. I record this observation – this is a case where the only reliable evidence is found in corroborating documents that were either produced by the parties in their evidence or were tendered as business records produced to the court on subpoena. There were also some uncontested facts that I could rely on. In all other respects the evidence of both parties was to varying degrees unreliable, and specific findings need to be made about relevant facts.

Applicable law

  1. The preferred approach to the determination of an application under s.79 of the Family Law Act is set out in a passage found in the Full Court’s decision in Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143 at 39.

  2. The Full Court states that there are four inter-related steps:

    a)Identify and value the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties; and

    b)Identify and assess the contributions of the parties and express them as a percentage of the net value of the property; and

    c)Identify and assess the other facts relevant under s.79(4)(d)-(g) including s.75(2) and determine the adjustment (if any) to be made to the contribution entitlements at step two; and

    d)Consider the effect of the above and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances.

  3. One of the legal issues that arises is whether I should adopt a global or asset-by-asset approach to contribution. The authority in this regard is the High Court’s decision in Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 per Wilson and Dawson JJ at 534-5. It is clear from this statement of the law that either approach is available to me, in part or in whole.


    My discretion in this regard should be exercised having regard to the facts of this case.

  4. Another issue in this case is how, precisely, I should weigh and assess the initial contribution made to the marriage by the parties. In this regard, I need to consider the decision of the Full Court in Pierce v Pierce (1998) FLC 92-844. A useful recent decision of the Full Court examines its earlier decision in Pierce v Pierce together with a later case. In Williams & Williams [2007] FamCA 313 the Full Court states as follows at paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and 32:

    27. In Pierce v Pierce when speaking of the relevance to be paid to initial contributions the Full Court (Ellis, Baker and O’Ryan JJ) …28.…said at [28]:

    In our opinion it is … a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contributions.  It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife.  In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution.

    29. Pierce v Pierce was a case in which the husband brought in $200,000 cash into the relationship.  He applied that money towards the purchase of a matrimonial home.  He was employed throughout the marriage and supported the wife who, whilst in some paid employment primarily attended to domestic tasks and taking care of the children.  The Full Court assessed the parties’ respective contributions to a pool of $320,000 as 70 per cent in favour of the husband and 30 per cent in favour of the wife at the end of a 10 year relationship.

    32. In Hunt v Zuryn (2005) FLC 93-226; (2005) 34 Fam LR 169 the Full Court (Kay, May and Boland JJ) allowed an appeal in a property case where a pool of assets of $1.12million had been assessed for contribution purposes as 75 per cent in favour of the husband and 25 per cent in favour of the wife.  The Court in allowing the appeal indicated that an assessment of 75:25 fell outside the realms of an acceptable range…

  5. Accordingly, I must not only identify the contributions of each party, but also assess the weight to be attributed to these contributions having regard to many factors including what has occurred afterwards.

  6. A significant issue in this matter was the alleged non-disclosure of both parties. Attempting to deal with non-disclosure often puts the other spouse, to considerable difficulty with regards to investigating their financial affairs. The Full Court in Weir (1993) FLC 92-338 at 79,593–4 made the following statement regarding the duty to disclose and the Court’s powers where non-disclosure has been found:

    This Court has pointed out in a line of cases leading up to the recent decision of the Full Court in Black and Kellner (1992) FLC  92-287, that it is the duty of a party involved in property proceedings in this jurisdiction to make a full disclosure of their financial affairs. See also Giunti and Giunti (1986) FLC  91-759, and Mezzacappa and Mezzacappa (1987) 11 Fam LR 957; (1987) FLC  91-853. It is clear enough from his Honour's findings in the present case that the husband had not done so and had in fact pocketed the proceeds of a substantial number of cash sales. It is obvious that in most cases of this nature it is difficult enough for the other party to establish that fact let alone establish the quantum of what has been taken. 

    It seems to us that once it has been established that there has been a deliberate non-disclosure, which follows from his Honour's findings in this case, then the Court should not be unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the innocent party. To do otherwise might be thought to provide a charter for fraud in proceedings of this nature…

    We appreciate that this is something of a broad brush approach, but, as we have said, where there is clear evidence of non-disclosure as there was here, the Court should not be unduly cautious about making findings in favour of the other party. It has been said by one commentator (O'Ryan and Broadfoot, 5th National Family Law Conference Handbook, p 249) the failure to disclose undermines the whole process of adjudication of proceedings for a settlement of property in that the court is unable to identify the property of the parties, to properly assess contribution, or to properly assess s 75(2) factors. 

Assets at commencement of cohabitation

  1. The parties commenced cohabitation at the end of 2001 or early 2002. The husband alleges that he had, at this time, $60,000 being his share of the property settlement with his first wife. It was held for him by his mother. The wife strongly disputes that he had any money at cohabitation. The onus of proof was at all times on the husband to prove that he had these monies and he has failed to do so. I cannot accept his assertions by way of affidavit or oral evidence for the reasons I set out below under the sub-heading “Credit of the parties”.


    I observe that if the husband’s assertions were correct he could easily have proved this by way of subpoena to a financial institution. He is clearly familiar with the process of issuing subpoena as he has issued several in this case.

  2. The wife asserts that by the time she married the husband in August 2002 she had the assets set out in paragraph 20 of her affidavit filed 26 March 2008:

    At the time of my marriage to the Applicant in August 2002, I had the following assets:

    (1)Cash from my previous marriage settlement (I deposited the cash in a safe deposit box):  $100,000

    (2)My Bank of China account:  $50,000

    (3)Furniture home contents:  $2,000

    (4)My new Volvo car  $58,500

    (5)Property in [N], China  $100,000

    (6)Debt owed by Mr W (my ex-husband)                 $400,000

    Total:  $710,500

  3. Nowhere in the husband’s affidavits does he challenge this evidence of the wife. The cross-examination of the wife was not conducted on the basis that her evidence was incorrect, though some attempt was made to cast doubt on the existence of the cash deposited in the safe deposit box. In cross-examination there was reference to a Bank of China statement, though it was strangely not put into evidence. I can only infer that it would have corroborated the existence of that account. There are independent documents supporting the purchase of the Volvo car. There is also some later evidence, which I accept, that supports the existence of property owned in China, and a debt owed by the wife’s ex-husband Mr W. Even the husband agrees that there was substantial cash in their marriage, so I am inclined to accept the wife’s assertion about cash held. The documents produced on subpoena by [X] Casino Sydney indicate that in August 2002 the wife had spent at least $73,950 at gaming tables to buy gaming chips, though in that period she appears to have won $22,900. During the same month, August 2002, she spent $50,000 buying gaming chips at [Y] Casino Melbourne, with winnings of $71,900. These transactions, whilst clearly pointing to another issue in this case, do tend to corroborate the wife’s evidence about her assets at marriage, a relatively short period of time after cohabitation. I accept the wife’s evidence in this regard. Clearly she was in a much stronger financial position as compared to the husband, as at the time of cohabitation and marriage.

Assets at separation

  1. The parties separated in June 2006. The husband asserts that it was about that time that he received the final instalment of his share from his mother’s inheritance which totalled $180,000. He says that all of this was “contributed….to matrimonial funds” (paragraph 11(b) affidavit filed 31 January 2008). However he asserts that he personally retained $43,688 at separation which he later expended on general living expenses. In an earlier affidavit filed 4 September 2007 the husband says his inheritance was in fact $108,000. The husband produced no documents in support of these assertions. His affidavit evidence about this is strangely silent at times, and inconsistent at other times. Nonetheless in her affidavit the wife admits (paragraphs 40 and 41) that the husband had access to $70,000 in 2004 which, she says, he borrowed against his entitlement in the estate, and then received $116,000 in June 2006. Her evidence is that she saw none of this money at all. Indeed the wife’s case was run on the basis that she did not deny that he received an inheritance from his mother, but she received no benefit from it i.e. he did not contribute same. Were it not for the wife’s admissions I would have held that the husband had failed to prove the receipt of the inheritance. In view of the admission, however, I find that at separation he had at least $43,668 and possibly as much as $116,000.

  2. The wife’s evidence about her assets at separation is, again, unclear but it was not challenged by the husband except in the broader context that she had understated her real position. She asserts that she requested her former husband Mr W to repay the $200,000 he owed her from their property settlement. It should be noted that her evidence was that he owed her $400,000 as at the date of her marriage to the husband in these proceedings. Moreover, her unchallenged evidence is that in October 2002 Mr W repaid her about $230,000. In response to the request for repayment in May 2006, shortly before separation, she says that Mr W gave her a Mercedes Benz and a Ford Falcon motor vehicle in part payment. Paragraphs 38 and 39 of her affidavit set out that she sold the Mercedes Benz for $65,000 in June 2006, used $22,000 to pay tuition fees for her son at [Z] College Sydney, repaid $20,000 in unspecified loans, and spent the rest as living expenses. She deposes to the fact that he still owes her $90,000 to $100,000. In cross-examination she said this amount was $105,000. I have no evidence about what happened to the Ford Falcon and no evidence about these personal loans and living expenses.

  3. In June 2006 a company entity solely controlled by the wife, [S] Pty Ltd sold a property at Property C for $630,000. This had been purchased during the marriage. She asserts in her affidavit that she received net of expenses of sale $600,000 and that she repaid $450,000 owed to various lenders in China (in respect of which she offers no details), and retained $150,000 herself. She then asserts that she spent this money on living expenses, travel to China, and on gambling.

  4. There are a few objective difficulties with the wife’s evidence about how she used the sale proceeds of the property at Property C. The Land Titles Office documents establish that she caused the property to be purchased in April 2003, and in November 2003 the company borrowed $444,000 from the Bank of China who took a mortgage over the property. That mortgage was discharged on settlement of the sale. There is no indication about how much was repaid to the Bank of China and this was relevant evidence plainly available to the wife if she had chosen to adduce it. It casts a doubt on her assertions that $450,000 was repaid to certain unspecified lenders in China.

  5. The documents produced by [X] Casino Sydney indicate that between 28 June 2006 and 4 October 2006 the wife expended a total of $117,050 in purchasing gaming chips. Her winnings totalled $65,075. The wife’s assertion as to expenditure of $150,000 on gambling and personal expenses is thus possible.

  6. Having regard to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence I find that at the time of separation the wife had the following assets:

    a)Debt owed to her by Mr W:     $105,000

    b)Ford Falcon motor vehicle           (value unknown)

    c)Volvo motor vehicle  (value unknown)

    d)As least $150,000 in cash from the sale proceeds of the Property C property, and probably more as I do not accept the wife’s evidence about repaying $450,000 to unspecified lenders in China.

Pool of assets at date of hearing

  1. I was presented with the following agreed list of assets at the hearing, without prejudice of course to each party’s allegation that the other had not properly disclosed their assets to the court:

1.   Motor Vehicle (Reg. [1]) 1994 Toyota Camry Sedan

Husband

$500.00

Agreed

2.   Home contents

Husband

$1,000.00

Agreed

3.   Bank account balance

Husband

$10.00

Agreed

4.   Motor Vehicle (Reg. [2] 2002 Volvo

Wife

$9,000.00

Agreed

5.   Home contents

Wife

$2,000.00

Agreed

6.   Bank account balance (as at 17/03/08)

Wife

$1,045.00

Agreed

  1. To this list I add the debt owed to the wife by Mr W in the sum of $105,000. She admitted this amount was still payable in cross-examination, but expressed doubts as to whether it would ever be paid. I do not share her doubts. Mr W was able to reduce his debt to the wife from $400,000 in August 2002 to about $105,000 in June 2006.


    She offered no reason for her scepticism about repayment. There is a certain fluidity in the wife’s financial circumstances that makes me quite reluctant to accept her evidence in this regard.

  2. Thus the total assets of the parties add up to $118,555 of which $1,510 is held by the husband and $117,045 by the wife, subject of course to financial non-disclosure.

Contributions during the marriage

  1. Because of the very poor state of the husband’s affidavit evidence it is difficult to discern what, precisely, the husband says he contributed. The focus here is on financial contribution. I have already rejected his assertion that he had $60,000 at the time cohabitation commenced. He therefore was unable to support his assertion that he contributed to the purchase of the wife’s Volvo car.

  2. I accept that throughout the marriage he was either in receipt of Centrelink benefits or working. He was able to produce payslips for the periods 29 February 2004 to 6 June 2004 establishing that he earned $6,140 working for a telemarketing company. He says he contributed towards the parties weekly living expenses, but the wife strongly denies this. As will be seen below, the wife was spending significant amounts of money at casinos during the relevant periods and cannot satisfactorily explain the source of these funds. Having regard to this and to the adverse findings of credit I make against her, I choose to accept the husband’s evidence about contributing to weekly living expenses.

  3. The husband also asserts that he applied $180,000 from his mother’s inheritance towards matrimonial funds, but provides no particulars whatsoever about this. I am incredulous that he could provide no documents to establish this. In any event this money clearly came in late in the marriage, shortly before or at about the time of separation, so in the absence of further particularising or corroborating evidence he has not established this contribution on the balance of probabilities.

  4. In another affidavit the husband asserts that he gave to the wife $50,000 “as estimated by me approximately including my contribution to the motor vehicle” (paragraph 5, affidavit filed 25 August 2006). The wife denies this. The husband advances no corroborating or supporting evidence in circumstances where I believe it was possible for him to do so. He has not discharged the onus of proof that he bears.

  5. However the fact is that even the wife gives evidence of the husband having $70,000 that he borrowed against his entitlement from his mother’s estate (wife’s affidavit paragraph 40). What she does contest, however, is that he contributed this in any way to the marriage. She says he received this in January 2004. The husband makes the broad allegation that he contributed this to the relationship, and the totality of the evidence leads me to conclude that this was probably the case, for reasons that will shortly become apparent.

  6. The wife’s evidence about contribution is also quite confusing. The thrust of her evidence is that she, in effect, made all of the financial contribution during the marriage and, in effect, completely supported the husband who often asked her for more money. She asserts that she paid the rent, the utilities, groceries and living expenses. In short:


    “[Mr Slade] did not contribute anything to the household and he never spent any money on me” (paragraph 19, wife’s affidavit). I find her evidence in this regard quite implausible, particularly when she herself concedes that he was in receipt of Centrelink benefits at various times during the marriage. She strenuously denied that he ever worked, even when confronted with clear evidence that he had worked.

  7. The wife asserts that in April 2003 she caused her company, [S] Pty Ltd to purchase a property at Property C for $670,000 plus expenses resulting in a total purchase price of $700,000. She explains how this was financed at paragraph 27 of her affidavit:

    In about April 2003, I purchased a property at Property C (“the Property C property”) in the name of the company [S] Pty LTD for $670,000, plus stamp duty and legal cost, the total amount was around $700,000. The amount was made up as follows:

    (1)   $100,000 from my safe deposit box (which I had before my marriage);

    (2)   $50,000 from my Bank of China account (which I had before my marriage);

    (3)   $440,000 borrowed from friends and relatives in China

    (4)   I used some of the money Mr W repaid to me towards the balance of 110,000.

  8. As I noted above, however, the objective evidence indicates that in November 2003 she caused the company to borrow $440,000 from the Bank of China. She is not able to offer any explanation for this discrepancy. I have discussed above how the wife asserts the sale proceeds of the property were utilised.

  9. Having regard to the wife’s evidence about how she funded the purchase of the Property C property, how then did the wife financially support the family? She explains this at paragraph 45 of her affidavit:

    From we got married [sic] in August 2002 to January 2007, I had never worked. All the living expenses for the whole family, the education costs for my two children, travelling costs back and forth between China and Australia for myself and my children, medical cost for myself and my children as well as the legal cost incurred previously in these preceedings [sic] come my savings of past years [sic] before my marriage and money I borrowed from my friends.

  10. On top of all this, of course, she asserts that she was supporting the husband financially whilst he was making no contribution at all to the family. On her own evidence the “savings” that she refers to were used to purchase the Property C property, so how could they be used for living expenses? She provides no particulars at all of the “money I borrowed from my friends”.

  11. Perhaps a more realistic insight into the wife’s financial circumstances during the marriage is provided by referring to the documents produced on subpoena by the casinos. Between July 2002 and April 2006 the wife purchased gambling chips at [Y] Casino Melbourne in the amount of $572,300. Between August 2002 and June 2006 the wife purchased gambling chips at [X] Casino Sydney to the value of $2,366,500. The records indicate that during this period the wife went to [X] Casino over 200 times. It is unclear from the records how much the wife won during this period. On one interpretation it was as little as about $173,000. On another interpretation it was about $1.4 million. The wife does not disclose anything in this regard. When one considers how much she clearly spent at the casino, even if she won $1.4 million it does not change my final conclusion in this case.

  12. By any measure these are truly staggering figures. Having regard to the financial circumstances of the wife as she presents to me I can only infer during this entire period the wife suffered an unfortunate gambling addiction.

  13. It is very difficult, therefore, to accept the wife’s assertion that the husband made no financial contribution to their living expenses, and that she, in effect, supported him financially.

  14. The evidence about the wife’s gambling activities also casts real doubt on any assertion by the wife that she repaid loans to various people during the marriage. It is more likely than not that this money was dissipated on her gambling addiction. It is also highly likely that she has not disclosed her true financial situation.

Conclusions about contribution

  1. Whilst the husband failed to discharge the onus of proof that rested on him about alleged significant financial contributions that he made during the marriage, I am satisfied that he did contribute to the living expenses of the family and that $70,000 of the inheritance from his mother was used for the benefit of the marriage.

  2. Whilst the wife probably made the greatest financial contributions to the marriage, she clearly also made the greatest negative contributions through her enormous gambling losses. If she has little or nothing today, it has nothing to do with the husband.

  3. Assessing contribution in a case like this is highly problematic, and very artificial. The pool of assets is small, possibly illusory, and probably incomplete in the sense that there may well be other undisclosed assets and liabilities of the wife which may even be domiciled overseas.

  4. Under the circumstances, the best the court can do is treat contribution as equal.

Findings about credit

  1. I have expressed my reservations about the credit of both the husband and the wife in this case at several points in my reasons. In this section I propose to briefly explain why.

  2. So far as the husband is concerned I draw a distinction between evidence which I simply do not accept from him, and evidence he adduces which fails to satisfy me of the existence of the asserted fact on the balance of probabilities. For example his denial in cross-examination that he had a drinking problem was plainly a false denial which he had to reluctantly confront when presented with his own doctor’s evidence that in February 2007 he was suffering from alcohol dependence and major depression. His evidence that he spent $12,000 in personal living expenses from the date of separation to the date of commencement of these proceedings is simply implausible.

  3. By contrast, the problem with the husband’s evidence about his asserted financial contribution to the marriage is that with respect to almost every fact he alleged there should have been corroborating evidence that was easily available but not produced. I make allowances for the fact that he was representing himself, but he still bears the forensic onus of proof. He was quite adept at marshalling the evidence to devastatingly prove the wife’s gambling addiction – why could he not do the same as regards his mother’s inheritance? I could not make findings in his favour under the circumstances.

  4. So far as the wife was concerned, her evidence plainly lacked credibility even without the evidence about her gambling activities. She was evasive in cross-examination. Her evidence was inconsistent. She steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the husband had undertaken paid work during the marriage even though there was documentary evidence to prove this. She denied in cross-examination that she was a “fairly heavy gambler”. She tried to explain her gambling activities by reference to the unhappy marriage to the husband in these proceedings even though the casino documents establish that she had been gambling since 1998 at [X] Casino. She failed to disclose the debt owed to her by Mr W in her financial statement. She continued to gamble after separation even though her evidence on cross-examination was that she had not been to a casino once after separation. She failed to provide details of personal loans borrowed from friends.

Conclusion

  1. The most likely scenario in this case is that the vast majority of the wife’s assets, and a considerable number of the assets brought into the marriage by the husband, were used by the wife to feed her addiction to gambling. It destroyed her life, and has certainly damaged the life of the husband in these proceedings. It is unlikely that the husband did not know of the wife’s problem, though possibly he was unaware of its extent. He seeks an order for payment of $47,500 which together with his own assets amounts to $49,010 or 41 percent of the known pool of assets. I believe that on the facts of the case this is a just and equitable order to make. In order to give effect to the order, however, I will require the wife to do all things to recover payment of the loan to


    Mr W. As I have indicated above, however, I am not satisfied that the wife has fully disclosed either the true extent of her assets or liabilities. Enforcement of this order may be problematic, but that is a separate issue.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Altobelli FM

Associate: 

Date: 

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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

2

Statutory Material Cited

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Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17
Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17
Williams & Williams [2007] FamCA 313