Sladden v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sladden v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 122

Appeal from: Julie Ann Sladden v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] AATA 3815
File number(s): QUD 560 of 2023
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN, HESPE AND NESKOVCIN JJ
Date of judgment: 19 September 2024
Catchwords: TAXATION — appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Taxation to disallow the applicant’s objection to an income tax assessment — where claim made by applicant for future income protection benefit entitlements under a policy of insurance which also included provision for Life Insurance — where applicant receives sum in settlement of claim for income benefits — where the AAT found the settlement sum is characterised as assessable ordinary income — where the settlement also included a component for the Life Insurance — whether AAT erred in determining the nature of the settlement sum other than entirely by the terms of the deed of release — whether the AAT erred in characterising the settlement sum as being entirely income in character by reference to parties’ subjective state of mind — lump sum settlement in satisfaction of the applicant’s claim for income benefits under the policy — appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), ss 6-5, 15-30, 118-300(1)

Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth), Part 9

Cases cited:

AAI Ltd v Technology Swiss Pty Ltd (2021) 286 FCR 208; [2021] FCAFC 168

Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 FCR 288; (1989) 20 ATR 457

Allsop v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 113 CLR 341; [1965] HCA 48

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v CSR Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 44; [2000] FCA 1513

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spedley Securities Ltd (1988) 19 ATR 938; (1988) 88 ATC 4126

GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 124; [1990] HCA 25

Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; [2015] FCAFC 92

Julie Ann Sladden v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] AATA 3815

McLaurin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1961) 104 CLR 381; [1961] HCA 9

Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 256; (1993) 93 ATC 5030

Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 514; [1966] HCA 48

Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1995) 59 FCR 6; [1995] FCA 707

Sommer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 102; [2002] FCA 1205

YCNM v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 110 ATR 151; [2019] AATA 1592

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 75
Date of hearing: 29 August 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M O’Meara SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: BLW Partners Pty Limited
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Davies KC with Mr R Minson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Taxation Office

ORDERS

QUD 560 of 2023
BETWEEN:

JULIE ANN SLADDEN

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dr Sladden appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Taxation to disallow the applicant’s objection to an income tax assessment. The central issue in the appeal was whether the settlement sum received by Dr Sladden, in full and final settlement of her claim for income protection benefits under an insurance policy, was assessable as ordinary income. The appeal hinged on the characterisation of the settlement sum and whether the AAT erred in determining the nature of the settlement sum and in characterising it as income.

The Full Court found that the AAT did not err in its determination of the nature of the settlement sum. The Court held that the characterisation of the receipt is determined by the quality of the receipt in the hands of the recipient and that an undissected lump sum received in settlement of claims is considered a capital receipt. However, this characterisation requires an examination of the entirety of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement, not merely the terms of the settlement. The Court found that the surrounding circumstances, including the objective facts and the circumstances known to both parties, supported the conclusion that the settlement sum was intended to be a commutation of Dr Sladden’s income protection benefits.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that Dr Sladden pay the respondent's costs, to be agreed upon or taxed if agreement could not be reached.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be agreed or to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, Dr Sladden has not established that the Tribunal made an error of law and the appeal should be dismissed.BACKGROUND The background facts are set out at T [5] to [56]. For the purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts are as follows. On 13 April 1999, Dr Sladden entered into two linked policies of insurance (Policy) with National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (collectively issued under the policy number P700129518): T [5]. The Policy provided the following cover (T [6]):(a)a Life Protection Plan:(i)with a commencement date of 13 April 1999;(ii)with an expiry date of 3 April 2068; and(iii)for a sum insured payable on death or trauma which sum diminished over time and was $27,471.96 when the deed of release was entered into.(b)a Professional Income Protection Plan:(i)with a commencement date of 13 April 1999;(ii)with an expiry date of 3 April 2038;(iii)for a sum insured which varied over time and was $2,979.21 per month when the deed of release was entered into; and (iv)for a benefit period to age 65 for injury or sickness. In February 2013, Dr Sladden was diagnosed with breast cancer: T [7]. On about 4 March 2013, Dr Sladden made a claim for an income protection benefit under the Income Protection Plan, following which Dr Sladden received monthly benefits under the Income Protection Plan: T [8]. On 1 January 2017, the life insurance business of National Mutual (which at that stage was owned by the Axa Group) was transferred to AMP in accordance with Part 9 of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth): T [12]. On 9 May 2019, Dr Sladden appointed Mr Colin Fullagar, of Integrity Resolutions, to negotiate with AMP on her behalf “re a possible commutation of [her] income protection insurance benefit”: T [14]. On 9 May 2019, Mr Fullagar emailed a contact of his at AMP “in regard to [Dr Sladden’s] income protection insurance policy and claim.” On 10 May 2019, Mr Fullagar asked Dr Sladden’s case manager, to whom he had been directed, to “undertake the necessary calculations and come back with the amount [AMP] would be willing to offer Ms Sladden in exchange for future income protection benefit entitlements”: T [17]. On 26 June 2019, Mr Fullagar informed Dr Sladden that AMP was willing to offer $1,000,000 in full and final settlement of her claim, with the Policy to be surrendered: T [19]. On 1 July 2019, Mr Fullagar called the case manager about AMP’s offer and was advised that, whilst calculated on a “commercial basis”, “[b]asically, it is determined on PD M/B currently paid, reserve on the claim, life expectancy & receiving the lump sum now as opposed to payment being monthly till policy expiry”: T [24]. To assist in assessing AMP’s offer, Dr Sladden engaged an actuary to calculate “the present value of [her] income benefits”, which on 5 July 2019 the actuary estimated at between about $1.78 million and $1.94 million, depending on the assumed inflation and discount rates: T [25]. On 11 July 2019, Mr Fullagar informed AMP that Dr Sladden would accept the offer of $1,000,000 and asked for the necessary documentation to be drawn up and sent to him: T [32].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At about the same time, AMP wrote to Dr Sladden in the following terms (at T [56]):TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Before the Tribunal, it was not in dispute that the monthly benefits that Dr Sladden was receiving under the Income Protection Plan was assessable income. However, Dr Sladden contended that the settlement sum was not assessable as ordinary income because it was an undissected lump sum comprising capital and income and, as such, it was all on capital account, relying on McLaurin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1961) 104 CLR 381; [1961] HCA 9 and Allsop v Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 113 CLR 341; [1965] HCA 48. The Tribunal rejected Dr Sladden’s submission that the nature of the consideration for which the settlement sum was to be paid was to be determined entirely by the terms of the deed of release: T [63]. The Tribunal stated (at [64]):The terms of the deed are not determinative of the issue. Instead regard may be had to the facts and circumstances that led to the deed being executed, notwithstanding the deed is not a sham, so as to determine the true nature of the settlement sum including whether it was income according to ordinary concepts [Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spedley Securities (1988) 19 ATR 938; (1988) 88 ATC 4126; Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 20 FCR 288; (1988) 20 ATR 457; Sommer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 102; [2002] FCA 1205; Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 256; (1993) 93 ATC 5030; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v CSR Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 4; (2000) 45 ATR 559; [2000] FCA 1513 at [61]]. In having regard to the facts and circumstances that led to the execution of the deed of release, the Tribunal found that:(a)as at 11 July 2019, when Dr Sladden expressed her willingness to accept AMP’s offer of $1,000,000, both Dr Sladden and AMP considered, and had communicated, that what became the settlement sum represented what AMP would pay for the commutation or settlement of Dr Sladden’s income protection benefits: T [65];(b)it was only later, when the draft deed of release was drawn up and Dr Sladden sought taxation advice, that any consideration was given to the life cover or other matters. Although Dr Sladden agreed under the deed of release to surrender the life cover, and release AMP from any claims she may at any time have or have had against it, the settlement sum remained $1,000,000: T [66]; and(c)Dr Sladden engaged an actuary to value the income protection benefits for the purpose of gauging AMP’s offer of $1,000,000. However, she did not take any similar steps to value the life cover before entering into the deed of release. The latter had only occurred when Dr Sladden engaged an actuary for the purpose of providing a report in the proceeding before the Tribunal: T [67]. The Tribunal observed (at T [68]), using the expression in Sommer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 51 ATR 102; [2002] FCA 1205 at [18] (Merkel J), that there was “an air of unreality and artificiality” about Dr Sladden’s contention that there was a capital element involved in the settlement sum. Instead, the Tribunal found that “[t]he reality was that [Dr Sladden] and AMP negotiated and resolved to commute [Dr Sladden’s] entitlements in respect of the income protection claim in consideration of payment of the settlement sum. No other claim or entitlement was considered by either party in reaching agreement on the amount AMP was to pay”: T [69].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the event that the settlement sum was not assessable as ordinary income pursuant to s 6-5 of the 1997 Act, Dr Sladden submitted that s 15-30 of the 1997 Act did not apply to include the settlement sum in her assessable income because no amount was received “by way of insurance”. Furthermore, Dr Sladden submitted that, because a CGT event occurred upon the entry into the deed of release, any capital gain she may have made from the happening of the CGT event was disregarded by reason of s 118-300(1) of the 1997 Act.CONSIDERATION For the reasons set out below, we reject the submission made on behalf of Dr Sladden that the Tribunal erred in law by not confining itself to the deed of release or in having regard to the parties’ subjective state of mind. In our view, the former submission is unsustainable as a matter of law and the latter submission is unsustainable having regard to the Tribunal’s findings of fact. The character of a receipt is to be determined by the quality of the receipt in the hands of the recipient: GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 124; [1990] HCA 25 at 136 (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), citing Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 514; [1966] HCA 48 at 526 (Windeyer J). An undissected, undifferentiated lump sum received by a taxpayer in settlement of claims, some of which are on revenue account and some of which are on capital account, is a capital receipt: McLaurin at 391, Allsop at 351 and CSR at [68]-[71]. However, whether a receipt is to be characterised as an undissected lump sum in the hands of the recipient is not determined exclusively by reference to the terms of settlement pursuant to which it has been received, but requires an examination of the entirety of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spedley Securities Ltd (1988) 19 ATR 938; (1988) 88 ATC 4126 at 942-943 (Fox, Fisher and Sheppard JJ). In Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 FCR 288; (1989) 20 ATR 457, the Full Court (Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Foster JJ) said (at 309):In characterising payments made under an agreement, the terms of the agreement must, of course, be examined; but so must the whole of the circumstances surrounding its execution, its operation and the receipt of the money in question: Federal Coke Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1977) 34 FLR 375 at 385; 7 ATR 519 at 526, per Bowen CJ.See also Reuter v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 256; (1993) 93 ATC 5030 at 261 (Jenkinson, Lee and O’Loughlin JJ); AAI Ltd v Technology Swiss Pty Ltd (2021) 286 FCR 208; [2021] FCAFC 168 at [43] (Perram J) and [209] (Sarah Derrington J, with whom Jagot J agreed at [68]). The surrounding circumstances include the objective facts and the circumstances known to both parties. The surrounding circumstances do not extend to uncommunicated reasoning which led the payer to agree to pay it (McLaurin at 391) or to the payee agreeing to accept it. Where the surrounding circumstances support the existence of a number of causes of action for unliquidated damages (regardless of whether proceedings are threatened or not), a lump sum of damages accepted in full satisfaction of the entirety of the taxpayer’s claims may be characterised as an undissected lump sum and in such circumstances the course of negotiation is not particularly probative: McLaurin at 391.