Skyring v Australian Electoral Commissioner

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Skyring v Australian Electoral Commissioner [1999] FCA 113

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING V AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER
QG 148 OF 1998

SPENDER, COOPER & TAMBERLIN JJ
16 FEBRUARY 1999

BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QG 148 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, COOPER & TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 FEBRUARY 1999

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave for an extension of time within which to appeal is refused.

2.The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QG 148 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING
Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSIONER
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, COOPER & TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

16 FEBRUARY 1999

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. On 14 September 1998, Mr Skyring filed an application for an order of review to review a decision of the Australian Electoral Commissioner to accept the nomination payments of candidates in the seat of Ryan for the federal election to be held on 3 October 1998.

  2. A notice of motion was filed by the Australian Electoral Commissioner on 20 October 1998 - that is to say, after the election had been held - which sought to have Mr Skyring's application for an order of review dismissed pursuant to O 20, r 2 of the Federal Court Rules on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed, the proceeding was frivolous or vexatious, or was an abuse of process.  Mr Skyring today says that it was as a response to this notice of motion that he filed his notice of motion with which this present application for leave to appeal is concerned.

  3. On 21 October 1998, Mr Skyring filed a notice of motion seeking orders first, that counsel for the respondent, a Mr M. Hanson “be not heard further in the course of deliberations to determine the course that further action in this matter overall should take”; and secondly, that the Australian Electoral Commissioner “similarly not be heard further on these matters, in deliberations to determine the course that further action in this matter overall should take”.  On 23 October 1998, Dowsett J dealt with Mr Skyring's motion.

  4. It seems to me that the present application for leave to appeal from the orders of Dowsett J on 23 October 1998, wherein he dismissed the motion and ordered Mr Skyring to pay the respondent's costs of that motion, is based on a misconception.  In essence, what Mr Skyring is centrally concerned about depends on his appeal from the decision made by his Honour on 4 December 1998, and that his application for leave to appeal from the orders made on 23 October 1998 is simply misconceived.

  5. On 23 October 1998 Mr Skyring initially said…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Skyring, sought leave to appeal against the Federal Court’s decision in relation to an electoral matter, which was dismissed on the grounds of lateness. The respondent, Australian Electoral Commissioner, opposed the application on the basis of the lateness of the application for an extension of time to appeal. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia. The central legal issue in this case was whether the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal was made within a reasonable time and whether the application for leave to appeal should be granted. The Court examined the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal, the importance of timeliness, and the discretion of the Court in considering applications for extensions of time.

The Court held that the principles of judicial review and the importance of adherence to statutory time limits were paramount in this context. The Court found that the applicant's application for an extension of time was not made within a reasonable time and that the application for leave to appeal was therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court emphasised the importance of strict compliance with statutory time limits and the necessity for applicants to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time. The Court concluded that the application for leave to appeal was not made within a reasonable time and that the application should be refused. The Court further ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave for an extension of time within which to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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