Skyring, A.G. v Telecom Australia

[1994] FCA 66

JUDGMENT No. ........ ......,... ,.,. , 66 ,9Y , ,

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	) No. QG 217 of 1993
GENERAL DIVISION	1

BETWEEN :  ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

Applicant

AND :  TELECOM AUSTRALIA

Respondent

J U D G E R :	Spender J.
DATE OF ORDER:	18 February 1994
WHERE MADE:	Brisbane
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

- NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in 0. 36
of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
DUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	1 NO. QG 217 of 1993
GENERAL DIVISION

BETWEEN: ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

Applicant

AND:  TELECOM AUSTRALIA

Respondent

CORM:	Spender J.
PLACE :	Brisbane
DATE :	18 February 1994

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I am dealing now with an application filed 21 December 1993 by Mr Alan George Skyring, being proceedings No. QG217 of 1993. The respondent is Telecom Australia. The application seeks an order that Telecom Australia be restrained from disconnectingthe telephone service to the premises at 9 Alkina Street, Kenmore, for apparent failure of the applicant to pay an outstanding account, "pending a definitive determination by the High Court

the Crown issue purporting to be, and of issue of others	constitutionality of the instruments presently in circulation of of Australia in the action presently before it of the
apparently widely accepted by the community at large as being, legal tender. "
In the affidavit in support of the application, Mr Skyring in paragraph 2 says:

" I make this application as part of my ongoing efforts seeking to remedy massive errors of law that have been perpetrated against me by this

Court at first instance on 18th October 1984 - with its refusal to grant the relief I sought in my applications G104/1984 and G105/1984 to it, brought against the Commissioner of Patents and Telecom Australia respectively under the A.D.J.R. Act 1977, when this vital matter of the constitutionality of the Australian currency was formally raised, in effect, on 'directions' given on how this question should be resolved, by the Full Court of this Court on 18th April 1384 in Skvrinq -v- Commission of ~axation of the Commonwealth of Australia - and continued by

everv court in the land ever since to mv areat - <

and bite unjustified detriment, despite my most concerted efforts over the intervening years to have the courts at all levels in this land 'see reason' and respond accordingly to effectively remedy the appalling situation confronting this nation in respect of 'matters financial' which I pointed up thereby. "

Further on in his affidavit, at paragraph 5, M r Skyring

refers to a matter which he says is a recent discovery. That
paragraph says:

" The crucial point on which the whole argument now swings is the statement made in Art. 178 of Quick and Garran 'S still celebrated 1901 text The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth - touching upon the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament under S. 51 (xii) , Currency, Coinage and Legal Tender - wherein, at p.575, it is quite unequivocally stated:

' but if a state endeavoured to compel a

person to accept anything but gold or silver as a legal tender, the person aggrieved could appeal to the Courts of ther (sic) Commonweal (sic) for relief'. "

As Mr Skyring has correctly indicated, the matters raised in the application and affidavit have been before the courts on many previous occasions. In particular, I refer to

Skvrins's Awwlication 59 ALJR 123, which was an application

before Brennan J for quo warrant against the Federal Government;

and Re Skvrina's ADDlication (No. 21 59 ALJR 561, which was an application before Deane J with respect to the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to legal tender. As Mr Skyring has indicated in his submissions, I was one of a number of respondents to that application, along with five Ministers of the Crown.

Deane J, in chambers, observed that the Commonwealth Parliament is empowered to legislate with respect to 'currency, coinage, and legal tender' by S. 5l(xii) of the Commonwealth Constitution, and with respect to banking (with an exception) and

'the issue of paper money' by S. 51 (xiii) thereof. Under S . 115

it is provided that a State shall not make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts. The Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth), S. 36(1) provides that 'Australian notes are to be a legal tender throughout Australia."

His Honour held at p. 561:

" I have come to a clear conclusion that there is no substance in the argument that there is a	constitutional bar against the issue by the
Commonwealth of paper money as legal tender. Nor, in my view, would there be any substance in an argument that the provisions of 3 6 ( l ) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 are invalidated or overruled by the provisions of the Currencv Act 1965. "

Many proceedings have occurred since then.

In Jones v. Skvrinq 66 ALJR 810 before Toohey J in the
High Court in Brisbane in 1992, the Registrar of the High Court

sought an order that:

"	[Mr Skyring] shall not, without the leave o f the
Court or a Justice, begin any action, appeal or other proceeding i n the Court other than an
appeal against t h i s order. "

His Honour ( a t p . 810) recited some o f the history o f

these very lengthy attempts by Mr Skyring t o agitate the question

o f the val id i ty o f legal tender, starting with the application i n 1984 before me. Having referred t o the passage i n Deane J 's judgment, which i s set out above, Toohey J said ( a t 811):

"	To anticipate what i s t o follow, it i s f a i r t o say that the a i m o f a l l subsequent proceedings brought or attempted t o be brought b y Mr Skyring has been t o debate the correctness o f Deane J. 's
conclusions. For th i s reason it i s unnecessary t o set out i n great detail each step i n those proceedings. "

His Honour then continued t o summarise the history o f
those e f f o r t s by M r Skyring i n the subsequent pxoceedings. For

present purposes, I need not detail that history. His Honour

concluded at 814 by saying:

" The overall picture i s one o f persistent attempts by M r Skyring t o argue questions which the Court has determined against him. Mr Skyring contended that Deane J . ' S judgment o f 6 February 1985 contained no reasons and was not

a final judgment i n that it d i d not ultimately

define the r ights o f the parties. "

Toohey J rejected that submission and said:

" ...	the fact i s that the Court d i d determine those questions against him. Once those questions had been determined by Deane J and a
F u l l Court, there was no reasonable ground for
employing a variety o f mechanisms t o get the questions before the Court again. The absence o f any reasonable ground for employing these
mechanisms and the p e r s i s t e n t i n s t i t u t i o n o f
proceedings f o r the purpose o f r e - a g i t a t i n g the
q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y de termined p o i n t u n e q u i v o c a l l y
t o a s i t u a t i o n i n which M r S k y r i n g h a s ,
f r e q u e n t l y and w i t h o u t r easonab l e ground,
i n s t i t u t e d v e x a t i o u s l e g a l proceedings i n the
Court . S u b j e c t t o one m a t t e r , w i t h which I now
d e a l , the a p p l i c a t i o n mus t succeed . "

And he ultimately gave an order in terms of the Registrar's notice of motion, the effect of which was to require the leave of the Court before any action, appeal, or other proceeding in the High Court might be initiated.

Conscious as I am of my position in the hierarchy of things and of my involvement in the matters since 1984, in my opinion, this is a case where, in defence of the court's own process, the court should order that the application be struck out. In so doing, I have had regard to 0. 11 r. 16 of the Federal Court Rules which provide:

"	Where a p l e a d i n g -
( a ) d i s c l o s e s n o r easonab l e cause o f a c t i o n o r

d e f e n c e o r o t h e r c a s e appropr ia t e t o the

n a t u r e o f the p lead ing;

(b) h a s a t e n d e n c y t o cause p r e j u d i c e ,

embarrassment o r d e l a y i n the proceeding;	o r
( c ) i s o t h e r w i s e an abuse o f the process	o f the

Cour t ,

the Court may a t a n y s t a g e	o f the proceeding
o rder t h a t the whole o r a n y p a r t	o f the p l ead ing

be s t r u c k o u t . "

The matters which Mr Skyring wishes to agitate have been authoritatively determined against him, and there have been repeated attempts to re-agitate those matters which are truly res

j u d i c a t a . This is yet a further attempt and I will not

countenance it. Mr Skyring of course may take whatever steps he

might wish concerning the view that I have just expressed, but for these reasons, proceedings No. Q6217 of 1993 is dismissed, with costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that this and the preceding

five (5) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of the

Honourable M r Justice Spnder. A

y* l f \

Ass cl te

Date: 18 February 1994

The applicant appeared in person.

Solicitor for the respondent:	Mr R. Owbridge of Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:	18 February 1994