Skipworth v State of Western Australia & Ors

[2007] FMCA 1730

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SKIPWORTH v STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA & ORS [2007] FMCA 1730

BANKRUPTCY– Vesting order – bankrupt’s share of property disclaimed by trustee in bankruptcy – property vests in the State – rights of mortgagee – rights of other joint registered proprietor of land – rights under caveat – whether vesting order should issue – just and equitable requirement.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s.133(1), (1AA), (2), (9) and (12)
Transfer of Land Act 1892 (WA), ss.68 and108

Citi Nominees Pty Ltd v Skipworth & Another [2007] WASC 145
Clay v Clay (1999) 20 WAR 427; [1999] WASC 427
Leros Pty Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 407
RAMS Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Skipworth & Anor [2007] WASC 24
RAMS Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Skipworth & Anor (No. 2) [2007] WASC 75
Re Tulloch Limited (in liq) and the Companies Act (1978) 3 ACLR 808
Re Wakefield and Another, ex parte Fitzroy Finance Co Pty Ltd (1989) Q Conv
R 54
Re Woo, National Australia Bank Limited v Leroy [2003] FCA 862
Sandhurst Trustees Limited v 72 Seventh Street Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) (1998) 45 NSWLR 556

Applicant: JANET-JANE SKIPWORTH

First Respondent: STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent:	RAMS MORTGAGE CORPORATION LIMITED
Third Respondent:	CITI NOMINEES PTY LTD

Fourth Respondent:	PMB PLASTERBOARD PTY LTD
Fifth Respondent:	HURBERT HORACE DUFALL

Sixth Respondent:	HARRY ROBINSON
Seventh Respondent:	CHEQUECASH PTY LTD

Eighth Respondent: KIM DAVID HOLBROOK

File Number: PEG 47 of 2007

Judgment of: Lucev FM

Hearing date: 11 October 2007

Date of Last Submission: 11 October 2007

Delivered at: Perth

Delivered on: 18 October 2007

REPRESENTATION

Applicant:	Mrs J-J Skipworth in person
Counsel for the First Respondent:	Ms K Pedersen

Solicitors for the First Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr D H Solomon and Mr M Procopio

Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Solomon Brothers

Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents: Mr N Marsh

Solicitors for the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents: Julienne Penny & Associates

Fifth Respondent:  Mr H H Dufall in person

Eighth Respondent:   No appearance

ORDERS

1. The interest held by the State of Western Australia, formerly held by Mr Jeffrey Donald Skipworth, in the property situated at 15 Park Lane, Kardinya, Western Australia (“Property”), be vested in the second named respondent, RAMS Mortgage Corporation Limited, under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), subject to the following conditions:

   (a)That RAMS Mortgage Corporation Limited sell the Property under its powers as registered mortgagee under Mortgage H989743 and s.108 of the Transfer of Land Act 1892 (WA) (“Mortgage”) by no later than 9.00am on 18 October 2008;

   (b)After payment of the expenses of and incidental to and consequent on that sale and the monies due or owing under the Mortgage, RAMS Mortgage Corporation Limited commence interpleader proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia to determine the person entitled to distribution of any surplus under s.109 of the Transfer of Land Act 1892 (WA) and condition (c) below; and

   (c)Any portion of any such surplus which, but for the disclaimer by the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Jeffrey Donald Skipworth (“Trustee”) of any interest in the Property, would have been payable to the Trustee be paid from such surplus to the Trustee for the benefit of the creditors of that bankrupt estate.

2. All other extant applications be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of each of the respondents which, if not agreed, are to be taxed under Order 62 of the Federal Court Rules by a Registrar of this Court.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
PERTH

PEG 47 of 2007

JANET-JANE SKIPWORTH

Applicant

And

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND ORS

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. Mr and Mrs Skipworth were the joint registered proprietors of land at 15 Park Lane, Kardinya.[1]

   [1] “Kardinya Property”.

2. The Kardinya Property was subject to a mortgage, and the Skipworths fell behind in their payments under a loan agreement and credit facility with the mortgagee, RAMS.[2]  RAMS issued default notices under the mortgage. Mr Skipworth was declared bankrupt shortly thereafter. RAMS commenced and obtained judgment for possession of the Kardinya Property. Mr Skipworth’s trustee in bankruptcy[3] disclaimed the Kardinya Property. RAMS obtained a Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order, but execution of the judgment for possession and the Property (Seizure and Delivery) Order were stayed because no vesting order under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)[4] had been obtained in relation to the interest in the Kardinya Property disclaimed by the trustee in bankruptcy.[5]

   [2] Rams Mortgage Corporation Limited, the Second Respondent.

   [3] Kim David Holdbrook, the Eighth Respondent.

   [4] “Bankruptcy Act”.

   [5] RAMS Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Skipworth & Anor (No. 2) 2007 75 at para. 30 per EM Heenan J (“RAMS (No2)”).

3. Mrs Skipworth has now applied to this Court for a vesting order to vest the Kardinya Property in her. That is opposed by RAMS, and also by Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard.[6] Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard have, or had, the benefit of several caveats over the Kardinya Property.

   [6] Citi Nominees Pty Ltd and PMB Plasterboard Pty Ltd the Third and Fourth Respondents respectively.

Issues

1. The issues in this case are:

   a)whether a vesting order ought to be issued under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act; and

   b)if such an order is to issue whether it ought be in the favour of:

   (i)Mrs Skipworth; or

   (ii)RAMS; or

   (iii)Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard.

The disclaimer and its effect

1. The trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to disclaim the Kardinya Property if the trustee in bankruptcy was of the view that it was burdened with onerous covenants or was unsaleable or not readily saleable.[7] The trustee in bankruptcy’s decision is presumed to have been properly and regularly made in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[8]

   [7] Bankruptcy Act, s.133(1) and (1AA).

   [8] Clay v Clay (1999) 20 WAR 427 at 449 per Wallwork, Owen and Parker JJ; [1999] WASC 427 at para. 56 per Wallwork, Owen and Parker JJ.

2. If there is no vesting order made under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, disclaimed freehold title automatically vests in the State, subject to a mortgagee’s rights. The charges over the land do not disappear, and the reversion of the land to the State is subject to those charges.[9]

   [9] Re Tulloch Limited (in liq) and the Companies Act (1978) 3 ACLR 808 at 813 per Needham J (“Tulloch”); Sandhurst Trustees Limited v 72 Seventh Street Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) (1998) 45 NSWLR 556 at 564 per Bryson J (“Sandhurst Trustees”).

3. The effect of the disclaimer is that Mrs Skipworth and the State of Western Australia are currently tenants in common in equal shares of the Kardinya Property.[10] The rights of the State in the land are subject to rights accrued by a mortgagee under mortgage prior to the disclaimer, those rights surviving the disclaimer.[11]  The default under the mortgage in this case, namely the failure to make repayments, and the power of sale under the mortgage, were rights accrued before the trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed the property on 11 October 2006.[12]

   [10] Tulloch at 812-813 per Needham J; RAMS Mortgage Corporation Limited v Skipworth and Another [2007] WASC 24 at paras. 80-82 per EM Heenan J (“RAMS (No. 1”)).

   [11] Tulloch at 814 per Needham J.

   [12] Baxter Affidavit at paras. 10-14.

Application for vesting order

1. Section 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act allows the Court to make an order for the vesting of the property in, or the delivery of the property to, a person entitled to it, or a person in or to whom the Court considers it just and equitable that it should be vested or delivered, or a trustee for that person.

Rights under the mortgage

1. Under the terms of the mortgage and loan agreement entered into between Mrs Skipworth (as one borrower, her husband being the other borrower) and RAMS, the minimum payment specified in a monthly statement of account forwarded by RAMS was to be payed within 20 days. If not paid the borrowers defaulted in their obligations and RAMS were entitled to serve notice of default. If the borrowers failed to remedy default within 31 days of service of a default notice then:

   a)the balance of the credit facility, interest and other monies secured under the mortgage became immediately due for payment;

   b)RAMS was entitled to take possession of the Kardinya Property; and

   c)the borrowers were liable to pay RAMS reasonable expenses in enforcing the loan agreement and mortgage.[13]

   [13] Baxter Affidavit at para. 9.

2. Effectively, the mortgagee has done all things required to take possession of the land other than obtaining a vesting order under the Bankruptcy Act.

3. An order has been obtained from the Family Court of Western Australia which does not prohibit RAMS exercising its rights as mortgagee.[14]

   [14] Skipworth Affidavit, sworn 20 March 2007, Annexure JJTS 15.

4. In RAMS No. 2 the Supreme Court of Western Australia in an erudite judgment dealt with the earlier circumstances of this case, and refused RAMS application for enforcement of judgment for recovery and possession of the Kardinya Property because of the absence of a vesting order under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act.[15] The Supreme Court summarised the legal position as follows:

   “Both the course of established authority dealing with the position of mortgagees of land which has been disclaimed by a trustee of bankruptcy, or a liquidator of an insolvent company, and these considerations of principle, point to the need for a mortgagee seeking to exercise its powers in respect of property over which it has security, but where one or more of the mortgagors has become bankrupt and his or her trustee has disclaimed the property, to obtain a vesting order under s 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, or await the vesting of the property in some other person who can then be joined in the enforcement of proceedings, before steps can be taken to obtain possession of the property, or to sell it under the provisions of the mortgage or, where action for the possession of a sale has already been commenced, before that can be continued.”[16]

   [15] RAMS No. 2 at para. 30 per EM Heenan J.

   [16] RAMS No. 2 at para. 29 per EM Heenan J.

5. In relation to the legal effect of a vesting order under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act the Supreme Court observed in RAMS No. 2 that:

   a)pre-disclaimer default by a mortgagor allows accrued rights under the mortgage to be asserted and vindicated;[17]

   b)a vesting order is preferable to accepting relegation to unsecured creditor status by proving loss suffered as a debt in bankruptcy under s.133(12) of the Bankruptcy Act.[18]

   c)the conclusion that accrued rights under the mortgage maybe asserted and vindicated “can be reconciled with the statutory force given in covenants in a registered mortgage by the Torrens legislation, and the provisions of s.133 of the Bankruptcy Act, if the view taken is that the termination of the mortgagees rights, except for rights which have accrued prior to the disclaimer, are not necessarily final because they are capable of being, in effect, reinstated on a successful application by the mortgagee (or by others) for a vesting order under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act”, and that application, grantable on terms, “is the occasion where these rights can be adjusted and preserved in a manner … conformable to the interests of third persons including the mortgagee”, as contemplated in the Bankruptcy Act;[19] and

   d)the entity, and in this case the State, taking or receiving the bankrupt’s former property in the disclaimed asset, takes subject to obligations the bankrupt had to third parties.[20]

   [17] RAMS No. 2 at para. 17 per EM Heenan J.

   [18] RAMS No. 2 at para. 18 per EM Heenan J.

   [19] RAMS No. 2 at para. 19 per EM Heenan J, referring latterly to s.133(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.

   [20] RAMS No. 2 at para. 19 per EM Heenan J.

6. Under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act a mortgagee is one person entitled to make application for and receive the benefit of a vesting order.[21]

   [21] Tulloch at 814 per Needham J; Re Wakefield and Another, ex parte Fitzroy Finance Co Pty Ltd (1989) Q Conv R 54 – 328 per Pincus J (“Wakefield”); Re Woo, National Australia Bank Limited v Leroy [2003] FCA 862 at para. 7 per Madgwick J (“Woo”).

7. Woo was a case where the facts were very similar to this case. The registered proprietors of the property were joint tenants in equal shares who defaulted in their loan obligations. One proprietor was subsequently made bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed the bankrupt’s interest in the property. National Australia Bank was a first ranking registered mortgagee in relation to the property. There was also another lender with an equitable mortgage over the property protected by way of caveat.[22]

   [22] Woo at paras. 2 and 6 per Madgwick J.

8. In Woo the Federal Court found no reason to exercise its discretion against making a vesting order sought by the mortgagee. The Federal Court found that it was right and proper that where a significant sum of money was outstanding under the mortgage that the mortgagee ought have the opportunity to take reasonable steps to recover the outstanding sum.[23]

   [23] Woo at para. 11 per Madgwick J.

Rights under the caveats

1. The extended operation of caveats over the Kardinya Property in favour of Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard[24] were discharged by order of the Supreme Court of Western Australia on 29 June 2007.[25]  The Supreme Court however restrained Mrs Skipworth by injunction from dealing with the Kardinya Property, other than as security for funds to discharge the RAMS mortgage.[26]  The injunction does not affect RAMS rights under the mortgage. The injunction is arguably an unregistered equitable interest, which would not ordinarily have priority over RAMS registered interest under the mortgage.[27] That priority, and the otherwise indefeasible real interest created by registration of the mortgage,[28] are otherwise subject, for the reasons set out above by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in RAMS No. 2,[29] to the terms of a vesting order made by a federal court under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act. However, in this case, Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard do not assert priority over RAMS in the terms of any vesting order which this Court might make.[30]

   [24] The rights of the six and seventh respondents, Robinson and Chequecash Pty Ltd, under caveats have been assigned to Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard: Boccamazzo Affidavit, paras. 3-6.

   [25] Citi Nominees Pty Ltd v Skipworth & Another [2007] WASC 145 at paras. 45 and 51-54 per Le Miere J (“Citi Nominees”).

   [26] Citi Nominees at para 50 per Le Miere J.

   [27] Leros Pty Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 407 at 418-419 per Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ.

   [28] Transfer of Land Act 1892 (WA), s.68.

   [29] See paras. 12-13 above.

   [30] See the submissions of Counsel for Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard: Transcript at 30-31.

2. It nevertheless remains the case that the State has taken the Kardinya Property subject to the obligations the bankrupt had to third parties, including Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard.

Rights of the State

1. The State filed written submissions in this matter indicating that it did not oppose any of the applications for vesting orders made in this matter.[31] The State indicated that its submissions were filed to assist the Court, particularly in circumstances where Mrs Skipworth was no longer represented by Counsel. As indicated to Counsel for the State in the course of the hearing,[32] the State submissions were of assistance to the Court on the law, as were the oral submissions of Counsel for the State as to possible alternative vesting orders that the Court may make.

   [31] State’s Submissions, 5 October 2001, para. 1 (“State’s Submissions”).

   [32] Transcript, at 22.

2. Ultimately, the State accepts that it takes its interest in the disclaimed portion of the Kardinya Property subject to the interests of RAMS under the mortgage and the interests of Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard under the caveats or injunction.[33]

   [33] State’s Submissions at para. 34.

Mrs Skipworth’s rights

1. Upon Mr Skipworth’s bankruptcy the trustee in bankruptcy took possession of Mr Skipworth’s interest in the Kardinya Property.  From that date Mrs Skipworth and the trustee in bankruptcy were tenants in common in one undivided half share of the Kardinya Property. The interest of the trustee in bankruptcy reverted to the State upon the trustee in bankruptcy’s disclaimer. Mrs Skipworth does not have an exclusive right of possession of the Kardinya Property.[34]

   [34] RAMS No. 2 at para. 25 per EM Heenan J.

Just and equitable requirement

1. Under s.133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act the Court can make a vesting order in terms it considers just and equitable, the property to vest in a person entitled to it or a person in whom or to whom it seems to the Court to be just and equitable that it should be vested or delivered.

2. Mrs Skipworth asserted an entitlement to a vesting order on the basis that she had always intended to, and had the capacity to, re-finance and pay out the RAMS mortgage and any remaining caveats on the Kardinya Property.

3. Mrs Skipworth produced a one page letter from Ranges Home Loans dated 24 January 2007 indicating approval for first mortgage finance of $225,000.[35]  Mrs Skipworth asserted that she had a later approval from Ranges Home Loans for first mortgage finance for the entire amount outstanding under the RAMS mortgage, and also said this approval was for $350,000.[36] No documents were produced to support that claim. The amount outstanding under the RAMS mortgage was $348,624.28 as at 20 June 2007.[37]

   [35] Exhibit 2R1.

   [36] Transcript at 7 and 22.

   [37] Baxter Affidavit at para. 17.

4. In cross-examination Mrs Skipworth conceded that:

   a)there was no signed loan or finance document with Ranges Home Loans;[38]

   b)that the mortgage finance was presently only for her share of the property;[39]

   c)that costs owing under the mortgage arising from various legal proceedings had not yet been taxed, and were therefore of an uncertain amount;[40]

   d)no guarantees or guarantors were in place;[41] and

   e)that no money had been paid off the RAMS mortgage by her for many months.[42]

   [38] Transcript at 14.

   [39] Transcript at 14.  Mrs Skipworth’s share being as a tenant in common in one undivided half share with the State.

   [40] Transcript at 13-14.

   [41] Transcript at 9.

   [42] Transcript at 5-6.

5. Mrs Skipworth is on Centrelink benefits of about $900 a fortnight. [43] From this income, together with her father’s undisclosed income as a cleaner,[44] she says she proposes to service a refinancing loan of $330,000 from Ranges Home Loans.[45]  Mrs Skipworth was vague, but ultimately not much pressed, about her weekly expenses, and therefore how much income she would have available to meet repayments on a re-financed loan.[46]

   [43] Transcript at 10.

   [44] Transcript at 9.

   [45] There is some inconsistency in Mrs Skipworth’s evidence about the amount to be financed: compare para. 24.

   [46] Transcript at 10.

6. The Court notes that it appears that as far back as 8 February 2007 Mrs Skipworth told the Supreme Court of Western Australia that she would be able to re-finance and pay out the RAMS mortgage.[47]  Mrs Skipworth says that re-financing did not occur because of the difficulties in having various unlawful caveats removed from the property, those caveats attaching as a consequence, she alleges, of her husband having forged her signature on various documents.[48] The Court further notes however that even when what remained were caveats Mrs Skipworth viewed as lawful, and which she said she would be able to payout under the Ranges Home Loans re-financing arrangements, she did not do so.[49]  She says she preferred to await the outcome of these proceedings.[50]

   [47] Skipworth Affidavit sworn 20 March 2007, annexure JJTS 18, transcript of proceedings before the Supreme Court at 6.

   [48] Transcript at 11.

   [49] Transcript at 11.

   [50] Transcript at 11.

1. In re-examination Mrs Skipworth again adverted to a further letter from Ranges Home Loans, dated March 2007 for an amount of $350,000.

2. Evidence was also adduced in cross-examination of a bankruptcy notice issued against Mrs Skipworth by the Official Receiver on 19 July 2007 for a debt of $22,560.14 allegedly owing to Chequecash.[51]  Mrs Skipworth said that the bankruptcy notice was null and void because it was not stamped, but ultimately accepted that it was stamped (with the seal of the Official Receiver).[52]  Mrs Skipworth also asserted that the judgment upon which the bankruptcy notice was founded had been set aside. But the evidence before the Court is of a valid Certificate of Judgment from the Magistrates Court of Western Australia in relation to the Chequecash debt.[53]

   [51] Chequecash Pty Ltd, the seventh respondent.

   [52] Transcript at 20-22.

   [53] Exhibit 3R1.

3. On the evidence before the Court the Court considers it unlikely that Mrs Skipworth will be able to obtain finance to allow her to re-finance and pay out the RAMS mortgage. There was a lack of specificity about and inconsistencies in crucial aspects of her evidence, for example, in relation to her weekly expenses and the amount required to re-finance and then pay out the RAMS mortgage. Further it would appear that, even after many months of asserting that she is in a position to re-finance, that Mrs Skipworth is not in that position: and she told the Court so in her final submissions.[54] The Court’s conclusions is supported by the failure after so much time has passed for even the most basic of loan and mortgage documentation to have been prepared. On the available evidence the Court could do no more than conclude that Ranges Home Loans may have given approval for a loan of $225,000, a sum far short of that required for Mrs Skipworth to re-finance and pay out the RAMS mortgage.

   [54] Transcript at 33.

4. In any event, the Court was left with the impression that even if Mrs Skipworth obtained the re-financing that she would not be able to service a loan for the required amount on the basis she suggested in evidence. To some extent that is confirmed by her failure to pay any amount at all off the RAMS mortgage for many months past. It is also suggested by her unchallenged evidence that apart from her Centrelink benefits she has “no other source of income or financial support from any other person” and that she has “suffered financial hardship attempting to meet” the required mortgage repayments on the Kardinya Property.[55]

   [55] Skipworth Affidavit, sworn 20 March 2007, paras. 21 and 25.

5. Mrs Skipworth also made some attempt to argue that a vesting order would be just and equitable because of her family circumstances. There is however either no evidence of those matters (for example, her mother’s health) or the evidence is not sufficiently substantial[56] to draw the conclusion that to make an order on the basis of her family circumstances would be just and equitable.

   [56] See for example the evidence about her support for her children: Skipworth Affidavit, sworn 20 March 2007, paras. 20-22.

6. The Court has therefore come to the view that no vesting order ought to be made in favour of Mrs Skipworth.

7. Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard no longer seek a vesting order in their favour, and they agree to the orders sought by RAMS.[57]

   [57] Transcript, at 30-31.

8. The question therefore becomes should a vesting order issue in favour of RAMS? The short answer is that a vesting order ought issue. In principle this case is sufficiently similar to Woo for this Court to follow the reasoning in that case, namely that where a significant sum of money is outstanding on a first registered mortgage it is right and proper that the mortgagee have opportunity to take reasonable steps to recover the outstanding sum, absent competing claims.[58] By reason of the Court’s findings above concerning Mrs Skipworth’s application for a vesting order, and the position adopted by Citi Nominees and PMB Plasterboard, there are no remaining competing claims for a vesting order. The arrears and total amount owing to RAMS as mortgagee are significant: amounting to $348,624.78 as at 20 June 2007.[59]

   [58] Woo at para. 11 per Madgwick J.

   [59] Baxter Affidavit, at para. 17.

9. The vesting order proposed by RAMS is to be granted upon conditions which avoid giving profit or unnecessary advantage to RAMS as mortgagee,[60] namely sale, followed by Supreme Court interpleader proceedings and distribution of any surplus to the Trustee for the benefit of creditors of the bankrupt estate. It is just and equitable that a vesting order be made in favour of RAMS as mortgagee subject to the conditions proposed.[61]

   [60] RAMS No. 2 at para. 27 per EM Heenan J.

   [61] RAMS No. 2 at para. 27 per EM Heenan J; Wakefield.

10. The Court has considered whether any vesting order that might issue in favour of RAMS ought be conditional upon terms which provide time for Mrs Skipworth to refinance to pay out RAMS mortgage. In view of the conclusions reached above it suffices for these purposes for the Court to say that it does not consider any such terms would be efficacious.

Conclusions

1. For the reasons set out above the Court concludes that:

   a)no vesting order ought issue in favour of Mrs Skipworth;

   b)a vesting order ought to issue in favour of RAMS, on the conditions proposed by RAMS; and

   c)all other extant applications ought to be dismissed.

2. The applicant must pay the costs of each of the respondents.

I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lucev FM

Associate:  M Hewitt

Date:  18 October 2007