Singh v State of New South Wales (Campbelltown Hospital)
[2021] NSWPIC 225
•5 July 2021
| CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER | |
| CITATION: | Singh v State of New South Wales (Campbelltown Hospital) [2021] NSWPIC 225 |
| APPLICANT: | Nazneen Singh |
| RESPONDENT: | State of New South Wales (Campbelltown Hospital) |
| MEMBER: | Cameron Burge |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 5 July 2021 |
| CATCHWORDS: | WORKERS COMPENSATION- Claim for psychological injury; whether applicant suffered injury; if so, whether whole or predominant cause was the reasonable action of the respondent with respect to discipline; Held- the applicant suffered a workplace injury to which her employment was the main contributing factor; the applicant’s injury was not wholly or predominantly caused by the reasonable actions of the respondent with respect to discipline; the causes of the workplace injury were multi-factorial; matter remitted to the President for referral to a Medical Assessor to assess permanent impairment; respondent to pay the applicant’s reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses. |
| DETERMINATIONS MADE: | 1. The applicant suffered a psychological injury in the course of her employment with the respondent, with a deemed date of injury of 22 October 2019. 2. The injury referred to in (1) above was not caused by the respondent’s reasonable actions in relation to discipline. 3. The claim for permanent impairment compensation is remitted to the President for referral to a Medical Assessor for determination of the permanent impairment arising from the following: Date of injury: 22 October 2019 (deemed) Body system referred: Psychological injury Method of assessment: Whole person impairment. 4. The following documents are to be referred to the Medical Assessor to assist with their determination: (a) Application to Resolve a Dispute and attached documents; (b) Reply and attached documents; (c) respondent’s Application to Admit Late Documents dated 7 April 2021; (d) applicant’s Application to Admit Late Documents dated 12 April 2021, and (e) handwritten question and answer report of treating psychiatrist Dr Kumagaya admitted without objection and marked exhibit A. 5. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses. |
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND
Nazneen Singh (the applicant) was an enrolled nurse at Campbelltown Hospital (the respondent), where she worked for approximately 11 years. In or about 2011, she obtained a permanent part-time role working three days per week in the day surgery department.
The applicant alleges that during her time working in that department, she experienced bullying and harassment, primarily at the hands of her managers Ms Celan and Ms Devine, which has caused her psychological injury. The respondent denies the applicant suffered any workplace injury, and also alleges that if she did, the injury was wholly or predominantly caused by its reasonable actions with regards to discipline.
These proceedings originally encompassed claims for permanent impairment compensation, payment of medical expenses and weekly benefits. At the hearing, the applicant discontinued her claim for weekly compensation.
ISSUES
The parties agree the following issues remain in dispute:
a. whether the applicant suffered an injury (sections 4, 4(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), and
b. if the answer to (a) above is in the affirmative, whether that injury was wholly or predominantly caused by the reasonable actions of the respondent in relation to discipline.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The parties attended a conference and hearing on 13 April 2021 and 25 May 2021. I am satisfied the parties to the dispute understand the effect of the representations made in the pleadings and, after a period of attempted conciliation, that they are unable to resolve their differences despite my best endeavours to facilitate a resolution of the proceedings.
At the hearing, Mr P Perry of counsel appeared for the applicant instructed by
Mr S Matthews, solicitor. Mr D Adhikary of counsel instructed by Ms S Watts appeared
for the respondent.
EVIDENCE
Documentary evidence
The following documents were in evidence before the Commission and considered in making the determination:
(a) Application to Resolve a Dispute (the Application) and attached documents;
(b) Reply and attached documents;
(c) respondent’s Application to Admit Late Documents (AALD) dated 7 April 2021;
(d) applicant’s AALD dated 12 April 2021, and
(e) question and answer report of treating psychiatrist Dr Kumagaya admitted without objection and marked exhibit A.
Oral evidence
There was no oral evidence called at the hearing.
FINDINGS AND REASONS
Injury
To establish a worker has suffered psychological injury, it is not enough that they endure an emotional response, frustration or upset, even to a high degree. It is necessary there be a physiological effect and a recognised psychological or psychiatric disorder, not mere emotional impulse: Thazin-Aye v WorkCover Authority (NSW) (1995) 12 NSWCCR 340.
The respondent relies on the opinion of Dr Newlyn, independent medical examiner (IME), who has provided three reports to counter the opinion of the applicant’s IME, Dr Rastogi whose opinion is the applicant suffers from a work-related major depressive disorder. The views of Dr Rastogi are probably consistent with those of treating psychiatrist Dr Kumagaya.
Mr Adhikary submitted the Commission would accept Dr Newlyn’s view that the applicant is suffering emotional response to workplace events, but that this response was insufficient to ground a finding of injury.
Consistent with the line of authority in Attorney General’s Department v K [2010] NSWWCCPD 76 and the Court of Appeal decision in State Transit Authority NSW v Chemler [2007] NSWCA 249 (18 September 2007), is settled law but if events which actually occurred in the workplace were perceived as creating an offensive or hostile working environment, and a psychological injury followed, it is open to the Commission to conclude that causation is established and an injury can be found. So long as the events within the workplace were real rather than imaginary, it does not matter that they affected the worker’s psyche because of a flawed perception of events.
On balance, the medical evidence in this matter supports a finding of work-related psychological injury. Each of the applicant’s treating psychiatrist Dr Kumagaya, her IME Dr Rastogi, her general practitioner and Ms Zowiscz, her treating psychologist all diagnosed her as suffering a depressive condition caused by her employment.
I make that finding notwithstanding the applicant’s prior history of upset and distress caused through the breakdown of her marriage and involvement in an abusive relationship. There is no suggestion by any of the treating doctors or indeed by the respondent through the views of Dr Newlyn or otherwise that the applicant’s marriage breakdown was a causative factor of any psychological or psychiatric injury.
The opinion of Dr Newlyn as to the lack of injury stands in contrast to the views of no fewer than two general practitioners, a treating psychiatrist, a treating psychologist and the applicant’s IME. These practitioners not only all indicate the applicant suffered work-related injury, they each diagnose a major depressive condition.
Dr Vincent, general practitioner wrote a report to the respondent’s insurer dated 31 October 2019 in which he diagnosed anxiety and depression due to work-related bullying and harassment, which had taken place from March 2018.
Ms Zowiscz, treating psychologist likewise diagnosed a depressive condition brought about by conflict in the workplace, whilst Dr Lim, general practitioner, referred to anxious, stressed, depressed, insomnia, nightmares, impeded concentration and role motivation as symptoms which he attributed to depressed mood and an adjustment disorder. Dr Lim, based upon the history given to him by the applicant, attributed that injury to harassment in the workplace.
Treating psychiatrist Dr Kumagaya took a detailed history from the applicant setting out her feelings of the workplace being unfair, invalidating and unsupportive. She felt she had been belittled and harassed by her manager who micromanaged, verbally harassed and frequently criticised her. Dr Kumagaya set out examples of statements made by the applicant’s managers to her in his report. Having taken the applicant’s history and noted her attendance on a general practitioner in July 2019 at which time she was diagnosed with a depressive syndrome, Dr Kumagaya diagnosed the applicant with major depressive disorder with anxious stress. In any series of reports from 19 February 2020 to 18 April 2021, Dr Kumagaya consistently expressed that diagnosis with respect to the applicant, and maintained she was unfit for employment.
For her part, IME Dr Rastogi set out a detailed history of the events which the applicant says gave rise to her injury. They included feeling unsupported when she applied for flexible working hours in the aftermath of her marriage breakup, such that she ultimately approached the Union and Industrial Relations Commission which gave rise to a temporary individual roster arrangement for 12 months in order to accommodate her childcare needs.
Subsequent to that arrangement being put in place in November 2018, there was a meeting arranged with the applicant’s colleagues, nursing unit manager and official from the hospital to question why the applicant was being favoured with her shifts. The applicant alleged she was alienated from the meeting, at which she was shocked to find her co-workers all knew about her shift arrangements. The applicant alleged she was ostracised and denigrated by her co-workers as a result of her shift arrangement being entered into. The applicant told Dr Rastogi false allegations have been made against her and that there were numerous occasions when her nursing unit manager was rude, patronising and belittled her.
After taking a detailed outline of the applicant’s current symptoms, functioning and treatment, Dr Rastogi also diagnosed major depressive disorder with anxious distress.
There is a consistency of diagnosis and attributability across the applicant’s treating and
IME evidence which I find compelling. The opinion of Dr Newlyn that there is no psychological/psychiatric injury in the applicant is contrary to the overwhelming balance of the medical evidence, and I do not prefer it. Dr Newlyn noted the applicant’s symptoms on presentation as irritability, anxiety and a sense of worthlessness which “could be a response to workplace bullying and discrimination or an emotional response to workplace events that were not bullying or discrimination.” Dr Newlyn then proceeded to indicate there was no diagnosable psychiatric disorder, but rather “an emotional response to workplace events.”
As Mr Perry noted, the presence of a psychological or psychiatric condition is not mutually exclusive from the presence of an emotional response to workplace events. I do not prefer Dr Newlyn’s opinion, because he sets out a number of symptoms which the applicant exhibited upon presentation, then appears to not consider whether those symptoms were signs of a psychological injury, rather he simply dismisses the prospect of such a condition being present in a one sentence paragraph.
In particular, difficulty with Dr Newlyn dismissing concerns of the presence of the psychological injury are exacerbated by his setting out at page 12 of his report, a number of entries of clinical notes from the applicant’s then general practitioner which referred to her presenting on 10 July 2019 being bullied at work specifically being harassed about shifts to accommodate her family situation as a single mother, an attendance on 22 October 2019 where she reported being abused at work and a Certificate of Capacity was written, a further presentation on 24 October 2019 and another on 14 November 2019 in which it was stated her work situation had not resolved.
For these reasons, I find the applicant suffered a psychological injury in the course of her employment with the respondent, with a deemed date of injury of 22 October 2019.
Section 11A
Section 11A (1) of the 1987 Act notes that no compensation is payable in respect of a psychological injury if that injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken on behalf of the employer with respect to (relevantly) discipline.
It is settled law than an employer which seeks to make out of defence pursuant to section 11A carries the onus of establishing that defence (see Pirie v Franklins Ltd [2001] NSWCC 167 and Department of Education and Training v Sinclair [2005] NSWCA 465.
It must also be noted that “wholly” and “predominantly” are separate concepts, and defining one or the other needs to be considered: see Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2008] NSWWCCPD 130.
The phrase “wholly or predominantly caused” has been held to mean “mainly or principally caused”. The test of causation to be applied is that described in Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452.
Consistent with the decision in Hamad v Q Catering Ltd [2017] NSWWCCPD 6, the respondent has provided medical evidence dealing with the question of causation. This is a necessary step to take if the respondent is to discharge its onus in proving the applicant’s injury resulted wholly or predominantly from its reasonable action with respect to discipline.
In this matter, as in most involving psychological injury, there are a number of potentially causative factors which arise in the applicant’s statement and the various medical histories. Proof of whether the factors which potentially provide a defence under section 11A were the whole or predominant cause of the psychological injury require medical evidence on that topic.
In order to successfully raise a defence under section 11A, the respondent must not only show the requisite causal connection between its actions concerning discipline and the applicant’s injury, it must also satisfy the Commission its actions were reasonable. There is a long line of authority commencing with the decision of Geraghty J in Irwin v Director General of Education NSWCC 14068/97, 18 June 1998 and including the Court of Appeal decision in Commissioner of Police v Minahan [2003] NSWCA 239, which establish the question of reasonableness to be given a broad construction. The test of reasonableness is an objective one where it is necessary to weigh the consequences of the respondent’s conduct against the reasons given for it. Reasonableness is always just having regards to fairness appropriate in the circumstances, including what went before or after a particular action (see Burke J in Melder v Ausbowl Pty Ltd [1997] 15 NSWCCR 454). It is necessary to balance the employer’s actions and the context against their effect on the worker.
In this matter, the respondent alleges that its reasonable actions with respect to disciple wholly or predominantly caused the applicant’s injury. Mr Adhikary took the Commission at length to the lay evidence surrounding the interactions between the applicant and Ms Celan and Ms Devine. Those witness statements deal with a number of meetings held between the applicant and her managers and her behaviour at them. There is little doubt, in my opinion, that those meetings at times became heated, and the applicant herself was at times responsible for them developing in that way.
However, it is also apparent that these meetings were not the only matters which were causative of the applicant’s injury. In her statement, the applicant noted:
“15. Whilst working in the ward, I experienced bullying and harassment which was primarily inflicted on me by my managers, Rebecca Celan and Sandra Devine.
16. The bullying and harassment came about after I went to the union for assistance about a change in my hours at work. I tried to change my working hours so that I could care for her children, as I am a single mother.
17. By way of background, In 2016 I was separated with my husband. During this time I had difficulties organising care for my children.
18. Consequently, in or around July 2016 I applied with Campbelltown Hospital to change my hours, asking for day shifts only, so that I was able to drop off and pick up my kids from school.
19. However, the hospital was not flexible and did not offer to help me during this time. I felt stressed out and did not know what to do as I could not care for my children.
20. After this, since Campbelltown Hospital was not willing to assist me, I approached the Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation Union and the Anti-Discrimination Board asked them to assist me. This was around August 2016.
21. In September 2016, the Anti-Discrimination Board organised a meeting with my union, the Directors of Nursing (DON's) at Campbelltown Hospital and myself to discuss the issues surrounding my employment. This meeting was organised by the Anti-Discrimination Board and members of the board were present.
22. During this meeting the DON's at the hospital agreed to settle this matter in the meeting as they did not want this dispute to last any longer or to go any further.
23. Consequently, the board and I agreed with the hospital that I would work from 6:30am to 6pm for 3 days a week.”
The applicant then recounted another matter regarding rostering which concerned her in or about March 2017. From [27] of her statement, the applicant said:
“I asked my manager if I could work from 8:30am-5pm, 3 days a week instead of 6:30am-6pm in order to accommodate for the care of my two children.
28. My children at the time were both under the age of 11.
29. My manager, Ms Celan said that I was able to work from 8:30am-5pm for 3 months until I sorted out the care of my children as she required me to work for longer periods including afternoon shifts. I felt unsupported by my manager.
30. I had to reduce my hours to two days a week which put an immense financial strain on me especially after my husband left. I was beginning to get really stressed out.
31. Prior to my separation with my husband, my husband took care of the finances in the house, paid for groceries and helped with any fees associated with our two children. However, after my separation I was responsible for everything and had a lot of trouble coping with it all.
32. Ms Celan would refuse to give me shifts from 8:30am-5:30pm and instead would roster me on afternoon shifts between 1 pm-9pm knowing that this was impossible for me.
33. I panicked because this was not on my contract and if l was only rostered on these days then I would not be able to work at all. This stressed me out more and made me very anxious as I needed to work especially after my husband left.
34. Ms Celan said that I was no different to anyone else and needed to work afternoon shifts, despite this not being the arrangement with the Anti-Discrimination Board. I felt personally targeted. I was made to feel unwanted which unleashed my depression and anxiety.
35. Ms Celan would give 8:30am-5pm shifts to other people in front of me. These staff members did not need nor want these shifts and they would always try and swap shifts with me, knowing I needed that shift. However, Ms Celan would instruct other staff members to not swap with me so that I would struggle. I felt this was intentional and it made me feel worse.
36. Following this, in November 2018 I approached the union and Industrial Relations Commission and was offered a TIRA (temporary individual roster arrangement) for 12 months. l was offered three days a week from 8.30 to 5pm to accommodate with my childcare needs.”
I have little difficulty in accepting these issues with her roster were causative factors in the onset of the applicant’s injury. It should be noted that these are not matters relied on by the respondent in its section 11A defence. At the hearing, the respondent solely relied upon its actions associated with discipline, rather than other categories available under section 11A [transcript day one, page19]
In my view, however, the matters which gave rise to the applicant’s injury were multifactorial.
On balance, the applicant has established that her perception of real events has given rise to her injury, and that a number of those events were not matters which could be said to fall within the ambit of section 11A. These include, her interpersonal relationships with her managers, and discussion surrounding her work rosters, the latter of which she had to take formal action to address.
The respondent, in relying on the report of Dr Newlyn, has made the point in its submissions [Transcript 6.9] that the first clinical entry in which mention is made of a psychological condition is on 10 Jul 2019, which was after the applicant became aware of disciplinary action against her. As such, the applicant submits the clinical material supports a finding the injury was wholly or predominantly caused by the respondent’s actions with regards to discipline.
I reject that submission on two bases.
Firstly, the clinical entry of 10 July 2019 itself reads:
“Surgery consultation
Recorded by: Dr Elaine Hoang Visit date: 10/07/2019
Recorded on: 10/07/2019
History:
alledgedly [sic] bullied at work
depressed, anxious
being harassed [sic] for doing shifts to accommodate her family
single mother
not given extra hours
being accused of following co - workers
insomnia, hyperventilating
counselling”It is apparent on the face of this clinical entry that the applicant recounted to her general practitioner her concerns regarding rostering issues at her work, and that they were a stressor for her. True it is the record coincides with disciplinary issues being raised concerning secondary employment, however, the question of rostering was plainly an important one to the applicant and had been for some time. This is self-evident from her having taken the issue to a tribunal on more than one occasion. That entry is also consistent with the histories given to treating and IME practitioners, in which the applicant recounted not only her version of the matters relied on by the respondent in support of its section 11A defence, but also her perception of the evets surrounding rostering in general.
The respondent also submitted, appropriately in my view, that the meeting between the applicant and Ms Celan on 22 October 2019 was an informal one at which there was no evidence to “suggest that action or formal disciplinary action was going to be taken against the applicant as a result of the meeting.” [T24.4 et seq]. That submission was made with respect to the question of reasonableness, however, the fact the applicant had already consulted her general practitioner complaining of depression and anxiety three months earlier obviates the October meeting being a causative factor to the development of the injury. It may well have contributed to a degree of incapacity; however, the applicant had plainly complained of her psychological condition months before that interaction.
Moreover, I accept Mr Perry’s submission that the respondent’s position the 22 October 2019 meeting was not disciplinary in nature removes it as a potential section 11A matter. The respondent cannot have it both ways in seeking to downplay the seriousness of the
meeting and submit it was not disciplinary in nature on the one hand, and to rely on it as a section 11A disciplinary matter on the other.Secondly, in Baker v Southern Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust [2015] NSWWCCPD 56 (Baker), Deputy President Roche made it clear that the absence of complaint to a treating practitioner is not itself the sole factor in determining whether an applicant has suffered a psychological injury. The Deputy President noted:
“80. It was correct that Mr Baker did not complain to his general practitioner of bullying until 26 September 2013. However, that fact was not determinative of whether Mr Baker suffered a psychological injury as a result of events that were up to and including that date. The lack of complaint to a general practitioner is a factor an Arbitrator is entitled to take into account in considering whether to accept a worker’s assertion that certain events occurred and that they affected the worker in a certain way.
81. However, on its own, the absence of such a complaint to Mr Baker’s general practitioner until 26 September 2013 was not decisive of whether the events complained of caused a psychological injury and the arbitrator erred in treating it as if it was. That is especially so in circumstances where there is evidence not referred to by the Arbitrator, that Mr Baker had complained to the respondent’s representatives of bullying and harassment from as early as July 2012.
82. Whether Mr Baker suffered a psychological injury as a result of the events at work up to 26 September 2013 depended on an assessment of all the evidence. This included the evidence of the co-workers that there were significant issues between them and Mr Baker that created conflicts at work, … and the evidence from Dr Stevens. In the circumstances, it was not appropriate to conclude that Mr Baker suffered no injury solely because he did not complain of bullying to a general practitioner until 26 September 2013.
83. The Arbitrator’s conclusion, on this issue, really amounts to a finding that he did not accept Mr Baker suffered a psychological injury because there was no corroboration of his complaints, from a general practitioner, until 26 September 2013. There is no requirement for corroboration in a civil case (Chanaa v Zarour [2011] NSWCA199 at [86]) and, to the extent that the Arbitrator thought that such corroboration was necessary, he erred.
84. Moreover, as Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) (Campbell and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) explained in Patrech v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 118 at [77], [91] and [105], it is unlikely that it is necessary (or even a relevant consideration) that a person must identify themselves as psychologically ill (that is, to have understood or believed his or her symptoms to constitute a mental illness) to find a psychological illness. The true question is whether the person was suffering symptoms, which properly diagnosed, constitute an illness.”
At [85], the Deputy President did, however, note that absence of complaints to a general practitioner may be entitled to significant weight if a worker fails to complain of bullying and harassment for several months after they ceased work, however, that is not what happened in Mr Baker’s case.
Accordingly, to the extent there is any suggestion a lack of complaint of psychological injury before 10 July 2019 is anyway suggestive of such a condition being present before that time, I reject that submission. Although the decision in Baker dealt with the question of injury rather than causative factors relating to section 11A, in my view it is relevant when the absence of earlier complaints by workers is sought to be used against them.
It is also noteworthy that the investigation report of New South Wales Health dated 19 June 2019 which comprise 44 pages and to which Dr Newlyn’s refers in his report (Reply page 190), indicates that the circumstances of the applicant’s complaints and allegations of inappropriate behaviour by Ms Celan and Ms Devine where “a direct result of her failure to maintain open communication with her manager.”
With respect, the question of the applicant’s communication skills and her relationship with her managers cannot be said to be a matter sought to be relied on in support of a defence under section 11A.
It is not, of course, necessary for the applicant to prove that the events of which she complained were as she said they were, rather, her perception of a real event is sufficient to ground an injury: see State Transit Authority of NSW v Chemler [2007] NSWCA 249 (18 September 2007). The interpersonal problems were plainly real – they are referred to in departmental reports and the lay evidence in this matter provides sufficient basis for me to find there were problems between the applicant, some of her co-workers and her managers. As already noted, I find those causative factors predate the matters relied upon by the respondent in its defence pursuant to section 11A.
In his report at page 192 of the Reply, Dr Newlyn also notes:
“Mrs Singh states that workplace bullying and discrimination caused her injury. The symptoms noted on presentation were irritability, anxiety and a sense of worthlessness. These symptoms could be a response to workplace bullying and discrimination or an emotional response to workplace events that were not bullying or discrimination.”
It is not necessary for a finding that the applicant was bullied and discriminated against to be made in order for her to succeed in establishing injury. To the extent the above paragraph by from Dr Newlyn goes to the question of section 11A, it is instructive that the applicant’s relationships with her managers and co-workers were plainly considered by Dr Newlyn as capable of being a cause of the applicant’s symptoms.
In his supplementary report, Dr Newlyn provided the view that in the event the applicant suffered an injury, if had wholly or predominantly arisen because of the action taken by the respondent commencing in July 2019 and culminating in notification and a further investigation regarding the applicant’s conduct in the workplace on 22 October 2019.
I do not prefer that opinion. Dr Newlyn had the benefit of a lengthy history, including but not limited to the knowledge of the applicant having difficulties in her interpersonal relationships at work, and problems with rostering as far back as 2016, which the applicant identified in her mind as the seat of her problems. Although he mentions those issues, Dr Newlyn effectively pays them lip service, instead focusing on matters arising only in and from July 2019. His failure to take into account longstanding interpersonal and rostering issues as causative factors is, in my view, problematic and I do not prefer his opinion.
In determining the cause of an injury, the Commission must apply a common-sense test of causation. In the workers compensation context, the appropriate test for causation was set out by Kirby P (as he then was) in Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452 (Kooragang) where his Honour said:
“The result of the cases is that each case where causation is in issue in a workers compensation claim, must be determined on its own facts. Whether death or incapacity results from a relevant work injury is a question of fact. The importation of notions of proximate cause by the use of the phrase ‘results from’, is not now accepted. By the same token, the mere proof that certain events occurred which predisposed a worker to subsequent death or injury or death, will not, of itself, be sufficient to establish that such incapacity or death ‘results from’ a work injury. What is required is a common-sense evaluation of the causal chain. As the early cases demonstrate, the mere passage of time between a work incident and subsequent incapacity or death, is not determinative of the entitlement to compensation.” (at 810; emphasis added)
In this matter, having regard to the totality of the lay and expert evidence, I find the causes of the applicant’s injury were multi-factorial. They include long standing rostering issues, interpersonal relationships and the applicant’s perception of real events in the workplace. Some of those factors were indeed disciplinary in nature, however, I am not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that those disciplinary matters were either the whole or predominant cause of the applicant’s injury.
SUMMARY
For the above reasons, the claim for permanent impairment compensation will be remitted to the President for referral to a Medical Assessor. The respondent will also be ordered to pay the applicant’s reasonably necessary medical and treatment expenses.
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