Singh v Police - [2013] SASC 155

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
SINGH v POLICE
[2013] SASC 155
Judgment of The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis
15 October 2013
INSURANCE - MOTOR VEHICLES - COMPULSORY THIRD PARTY INSURANCE AND LIKE SCHEMES - OFFENCES - DRIVING, USE OR CAUSING OR PERMITTING USE OF UNINSURED VEHICLE - DRIVING OR USE OF UNINSURED VEHICLE
TRAFFIC LAW - REGISTRATION AND LICENSING OF PRIVATE VEHICLES - UNREGISTERED VEHICLES
The appellant, Mr Singh, appeals against the convictions and penalty imposed in the Magistrates Court for driving uninsured and unregistered. The appellant also makes an application for an extension of time.
The offences alleged against Mr Singh occurred when, in the course of inspecting a vehicle for purchase, he was stopped by police whilst driving. The vehicle was unregistered and uninsured. Police issued an expiation notice for both offences. The appellant subsequently elected to be prosecuted in relation to both offences.
The record of the Magistrates Court show that on 4 March 2010 the appellant pleaded guilty to both offences. The Magistrate recorded convictions for both offences, imposed a fine and made an order against Mr Singh for court fees. In relation to the offence of driving uninsured, the Magistrate disqualified Mr Singh from driving until the rising of the court.
Mr Singh’s grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows. First, there was a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea by the Magistrate. That is, Mr Singh contends that he did not enter a plea of guilty before the Magistrate and the record of the Magistrates Court is inaccurate. Second, the Magistrate proceeded on an incorrect factual basis and the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive.
Held:
(1) It is improbable that a plea of guilty would have been recorded if Mr Singh had not so pleaded (at [15]-[16]).
(2) In any event, the fact that the Mr Singh, on appeal, admitted the essential allegations against him, in conjunction with the strict liability nature of the offences, means that there is no reason to set aside the findings of guilt (at [17] and [24]).
(3) The application for an extension of time to appeal against the adjudication of guilt is refused (at [25]).
(4) The application for an extension of time to appeal on the ground that the Magistrate proceeded on an incorrect factual basis is refused. The delay revealed a confusion of findings and evidence which cannot now be satisfactorily resolved (at [32]).
(5) There is no reason to interfere with the pecuniary order of the Magistrate (at [34]).
(6) The imposition of the licence disqualification and the perfunctory manner in which the order recording convictions was made show that the Magistrate did not take into account the altered legislative context in which offences of this kind fall to be penalised. The licence disqualification and convictions are affected by error (at [35]-[36] and [41].
(7) An extension of time to appeal against the licence disqualification and the recording of convictions is granted. Appeal on those grounds allowed and the orders imposing a licence disqualification and recording convictions are quashed. On the adjudications of guilt, no conviction be recorded or licence disqualification imposed (at [45]).
Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 9, s 102, s 141, s 141(1)(e), s 142, s 142(d) and s 143B; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 5; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 43, s 43(1) and s 43(4); Statutes Amendment (Budget 2010) Act 2010 (SA) s 18; Criminal Law Sentencing Act 1988 (SA) s 16; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 168, referred to.
Franklin v Stacey (1981) 27 SASR 490; Henderson v O'Connell [1937] VLR 171; Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; R v Wilton (1981) 28 SASR 362; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; Ly v Glover (1996) 150 LSJS 449; Hemming v Neave & Anor (1989) 51 SASR 427, considered.

SINGH v POLICE
[2013] SASC 155
Magistrates Appeal: Criminal

KOURAKIS CJ: This is an appeal against the convictions and penalty imposed in the Magistrates Court for driving unregistered and uninsured.
The record of the Magistrates Court shows that on 4 March 2010 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Adelaide Magistrates Court to offences of driving a motor vehicle unregistered and uninsured.[1] The offences alleged against the appellant occurred on 11 November 2009 when he was stopped by police whilst driving a motor vehicle on Luhrs Road, Payneham South.
[1] Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 9 and s 102.
The offences were committed by the appellant in the course of inspecting a motor vehicle (“the vehicle”) that he was thinking of buying. The registration of the vehicle had expired on 6 October 2009. Therefore, the vehicle was also uninsured. Police issued an expiation notice for both offences.[2] The appellant subsequently elected to be prosecuted in relation to both offences. The appellant appeared before the Magistrate, as he does on appeal, without the benefit of legal representation.
[2] The expiation fee for driving unregistered was $250.00 and the expiation fee for driving uninsured was $500.00. The levy for each offence was $30, totalling $60.
The Magistrate’s sentencing remarks are brief. I set them out in full:
1.You have pleaded guilty to offences of driving an unregistered and uninsured motor vehicle.
2. The allegations against you are that on 11 November last year you were picked up by police driving a car on Luhrs Road, Payneham South.
3.You are 26 years of age, a student and your home country is India. You have been in South Australia for two years and you are engaged in a commercial cooking course.
4.You depend on the financial support of your parents in India for the purposes of your studies. You also work part-time as a chef.
5.These two offences were committed by you when you were inspecting a motor vehicle for the purpose of purchasing it from a friend. The owner of the vehicle told you he did not have the funds to pay for the registration and the third party insurance on this vehicle but, nevertheless, had invited you to test drive the vehicle to see whether you would want to buy it.
6.You have told me that you took up your friend’s offer to test drive the vehicle and drove it for a short distance when you were both picked up by the police.
7.The owner of the car is with you. There is no objection from prosecution that I deal with you in a manner that would allow me to exercise a discretion in finding that your offending was at the lower end of the scale.
8.On that basis I will record convictions for both offences.
9.I impose one fine of $100. I order that you pay court fees of $216.25, a levy of $160 and a prosecution fee of $25.
10.In relation to the offence of driving the vehicle without a policy of insurance, I will disqualify you from driving until the rising of the court and I will have it noted on the court file that, in your case, the rising of the court will be 11.30am.
The Magistrate proceeded to record convictions for both offences, imposed a single fine of $100.00 and made an order against the appellant for court fees in the sum of $216.25.[3] In relation to the offence of driving a motor vehicle uninsured, the Magistrate disqualified the appellant from driving until the rising of the court.[4]
[3] And a levy of $160.00 and a prosecution fee of $25.00.
[4] The rising of the court being 4 March 2010 at 11.30am.
Appeal
The appellant now appeals against the convictions and penalty imposed by the Magistrate. The appellant also makes an application for an extension of time within which to appeal.
The appellant’s grounds of appeal can be grouped under two headings – the first is procedural irregularity in the taking of his plea and the second is a claim that the sentence is excessive.
The appellant’s primary complaint of procedural irregularity is that he did not plead guilty at all. The appellant also contends that there were a number of factual errors in the Magistrate’s remarks. The appellant has filed an affidavit on this appeal setting out his version of the circumstances of the offence as follows.
At the time of the offending the appellant had been in Australia for a matter of months, not two years as stated by the Magistrate.[5] He was looking to purchase a car, and first became aware of the vehicle in question when he saw it advertised in the newspaper. The appellant called the owner, who was not a friend of his, and organised a time to inspect the vehicle. The appellant had never met the owner of the vehicle prior to the inspection.
[5] The appellant was granted his Australian Visa on 24 April 2009. The offending occurred on 11 November 2009 and the matter came before the Magistrate on 4 March 2010.
When the appellant arrived to inspect the vehicle he noted that it was in good condition. The owner of the vehicle moved it from the garage to the road prior to the appellant taking the car for a test drive.
The appellant was unaware that the vehicle was unregistered or uninsured. He was never told of this by the owner, and he deposes that he would not have taken the risk of driving if that was the case. He said that prior to inspecting the vehicle he had made inquiries to find out about the rules and regulations involved in purchasing a car because the registration process is different from that in India.
The appellant’s independent complaint that the penalty is excessive focuses on the recording of the convictions. In particular, he is concerned that he will find it difficult to obtain a United States of America Visa.
Plea of guilty
The record of the Magistrates Court shows that, on 4 March 2010, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to both of the offences charged. That record has been signed by the presiding Magistrate. Furthermore, the Magistrate’s remarks on penalty make explicit reference to the appellant’s plea of guilty to driving uninsured and unregistered.[6]
[6] SA Police v Singh AMC-10-1050 (Remarks on Penalty of Mr Y F Chin SM dated 4 March 2010), at [1].
The Magistrates Court, pursuant to s 5 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), is a Court of Record. The production of an order of the court is therefore conclusive evidence of its contents.[7] Furthermore, s 43(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides that any court order made by a court of summary jurisdiction, certified by a clerk of the court, is sufficient to prove the conviction.[8] Of course, the records of the court may be corrected on an appeal provided for by statute. However, the Record of the Magistrates Court signed by the presiding Magistrate should not be amended absent any convincing evidence to the contrary.
[7] Henderson v O'Connell [1937] VLR 171, 174.
[8] The Magistrates Court is a court of summary jurisdiction because it has jurisdiction to try offences summarily; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 43(4).
On this appeal the appellant claims that he did not enter a plea of guilty in the Magistrates Court and that the Record of the Magistrates Court is inaccurate. In his submissions the appellant disputes the Court Record on the basis that it is improbable that he would attend court, given that he had the option to expiate the charges, to merely enter a guilty plea. Notwithstanding the force of the submission in the generality of cases, there are many reasons why a person who has failed to pay an expiation may nonetheless plead guilty when summoned to court. Not everyone has the funds to pay an expiation fee within the time allowed and others may simply fail to attend to the payment in time.
After the first day of the hearing of this appeal I requested the Magistrate to provide a report on this matter.[9] In that report the Magistrate outlined the usual procedure undertaken in cases such as the appellant’s. Given the significant delay in bringing the appeal, the Magistrate’s recall is, understandably, limited. However, it is clear that the Magistrate’s practice is to ensure that persons in the appellant’s position understand the charges, their right to legal representation and the consequences that follow a guilty plea. The Magistrate noted that he would have enquired of the appellant whether he had any language issues and ensured that he understood the proceedings. The Magistrate outlined the process involved with respect to the appellant’s guilty plea. The appellant would have reported to the Sheriff’s Officer and been asked what he intended to do with his matter. The Sheriff’s Officer would note down the response on a slip which would be handed to the Court Clerk. The Court Clerk would provide the slip to the Magistrate when calling on the matter. The Magistrate reported that he would have ensured that the appellant understood the charge before taking the appellant’s plea. The Magistrate noted that if the appellant had informed him that he was not guilty, he would, of course, not have proceeded to sentence him. It is therefore most improbable that a plea of guilty would have been recorded if the appellant had not so pleaded.
[9] Magistrate's Report, FDN 9.
The appellant’s claim that he did not plead guilty is also inconsistent with the fact that he paid the fines imposed under a time payment arrangement made with the Magistrates Court, completing payment of the fine (in addition to an expiation for a separate matter) on 20 October 2010.[10] Also inconsistent with the appellant’s claim is the significant delay in bringing this appeal.
[10] Affidavit of Stephen Robert Brady signed 28 June 2013, FDN 5.
In any event, the appellant admitted on this appeal the essential allegations against him and, for that reason as well, there is no reason to set aside the findings of guilt.
The appellant admits that on 11 November 2009 he was the driver of the vehicle. It is not in dispute that the registration of the vehicle had expired on 6 October 2009,[11] and the vehicle was therefore also uninsured. In any case, as the respondent submits, the proof of these matters is easily established. A certificate signed by the registrar of Motor Vehicles is sufficient to prove that the vehicle registration expired on 6 October 2009.[12] Moreover, the allegation in the Complaint, that the vehicle was uninsured, is, absent any proof to the contrary, sufficient proof of that allegation.[13]
[11] A registration label affixed to the vehicle indicated the registration expired on 6 October 2006; Affidavit of John Frederick Clover JFC-1, FDN 4.
[12] Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 141(1)(e).
[13] Ibid, s 142(d).
Pursuant to s 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (“MVA”) a person must not drive an unregistered vehicle on a road. Section 9 of the MVA, as it was in force at the time of the relevant time, is as follows.[14]
[14] Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 9: Amended by the Statutes Amendment (Budget 2010) Act 2010 (SA), s 18.
9—Duty to register
(1)A person must not drive an unregistered motor vehicle, or cause an unregistered motor vehicle to stand, on a road.
Maximum penalty: $2 500.
(2)It is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (1) to prove, in a case where the registration of the motor vehicle was not in force by reason of suspension and the defendant was not a registered owner or the registered operator of the vehicle, that—
(a) a registration label was affixed to the vehicle indicating that the vehicle was registered; and
(b) the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that the registration of the vehicle was suspended.
(3)If an unregistered motor vehicle is found standing on a road, the owner of the vehicle is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty: $2 500.
(4)It is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (1) or (3) to prove that the motor vehicle was driven or left standing on a road in circumstances in which this Act permits a motor vehicle without registration to be driven on a road.
(5)It is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (3) to prove that, in consequence of some unlawful act, the vehicle was not in the possession or control of the defendant at the time it was left standing on the road.
(6)It is a defence to a charge of an offence against subsection (3) where the defendant is the last registered owner or last registered operator to prove that the defendant was not the owner or the operator of the motor vehicle, as the case may be, at the time of the alleged offence.
(7)In this section—
owner, in relation to a motor vehicle, includes the last registered owner and the last registered operator of the vehicle;
unregistered motor vehicle means a motor vehicle without registration in force under this Act.
Section 9(1) of the MVA creates an offence of strict liability for which no mens rea need be proved. As the Full Court found in Franklin v Stacy,[15] driving an unregistered vehicle is an offence of absolute liability. There is no Proudman v Dayman[16] defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact.[17]
[15] (1981) 27 SASR 490.
[16] (1941) 67 CLR 536.
[17] Franklin v Stacey (1981) 27 SASR 490.
Therefore, the only defences available to the appellant are those provided by the statute. Pursuant to s 9(2) of the MVA, it is a defence to that charge if the defendant was not a registered owner of that that vehicle. However, for that defence to stand, the registration must not have been in force by reason of suspension, a registration label must have been affixed to the vehicle indicating that it was registered, and the defendant must not have known, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that the registration of the vehicle was suspended. That defence is not available to the appellant on the facts of this case. The vehicle displayed a registration label, affixed to the vehicle,[18] indicating the registration had expired on 6 October 2009.[19]
[18] The offending occurred prior to the abolition of the requirement to affix a registration label to a vehicle.
[19] A registration label affixed to the vehicle indicated the registration expired on 6 October 2006; Affidavit of John Frederick Clover JFC-1, FDN 4.
The offence of driving uninsured contrary to s 102 of the MVA is also an offence of strict liability for which no mens rea need be proved and there is no defence of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact.[20] The statutory defences to an offence against s 102 of the MVA do not apply to the facts and are not available to the appellant. The vehicle was not driven in circumstances permitted under s 102(3), and the defences created by sections 102(3a) and 102(3b) apply only to a vehicle standing on the road.
[20] Franklin v Stacey (1981) 27 SASR 490;
In addition, none of the general defences provided by s 143B of the MVA are available to appellant in the circumstances of this case.
In conclusion, the appellant’s claimed lack of knowledge that the registration and insurance had expired is of no consequence. By virtue of the strict liability nature of the offences charged, in conjunction with the undisputed facts,[21] the appellant is guilty of driving unregistered and uninsured contrary to s 9 and s 102 of the MVA respectively.
[21] That is, the appellant was driving the vehicle, and the vehicle was unregistered and uninsured.
The appellant’s appeal has been instituted three years after the 21 day period allowed for appeals from the Magistrates Court. There is a strong public interest in the finality of the orders disposing of criminal proceedings. The prospects of success should an extension of time be granted are very poor. For these reasons, I would refuse to grant the appellant an extension of time to appeal against the adjudication of guilt.
Factual basis of sentence

The appellant also appeals against the recording of a conviction and the penalty imposed by the Magistrate.
I turn first to the factual basis on which the appellant was sentenced. According to the Magistrate’s Remarks on Penalty the appellant was sentenced on these facts: the owner of the unregistered and uninsured vehicle was a friend of the appellant; the appellant was aware that the vehicle was not registered or insured; nevertheless, the appellant took up the offer to take the vehicle for a test drive. The Magistrate noted the personal circumstances of the appellant.
The appellant has deposed that he was not a friend of the owner of the car and that he was not told that the registration had expired. The appellant claims that he was unaware, until he was pulled over by police, that the vehicle was unregistered or uninsured. That claim is consistent with the police allegations made in the sentencing hearing. Mr Clover, the police prosecutor at first instance,[22] whilst being unable to specifically recall how he informed the court of the facts, indicates that it was his usual practice, upon a defendant pleading guilty to offences of this nature, to read from the Expiation Notice and provide a summary of the main facts to the court. The particulars of the offence, as recorded in the Expiation Notice, exhibited to Mr Clover’s affidavit, state, inter alia, the following facts:
·The appellant did not know that the vehicle was unregistered (and subsequently uninsured).
·The appellant did not know the owner of the vehicle. He had contacted the owner as a result of seeing an advertisement in the newspaper.
[22] Affidavit of John Frederick Clover affirmed on 27 June 2013, FDN 4.
The court file records that the allegations were admitted.
The facts as recorded in the Expiation Notice and the allegations made by the police prosecutor contrast with those expressed in the Magistrate’s remarks. The police allegations correspond with the factual basis now put forward by the appellant on this appeal. If the facts as recorded in the Expiation Notice were read to, and subsequently admitted by the appellant, there is an inconsistency with the circumstances recited in the Magistrate’s remarks.
Furthermore, the owner of the vehicle,[23] Mr Pawlowski, deposed that he was not a friend of the appellant and he did not attend court on 4 March 2010 when the appellant appeared before the Magistrate. Although the affidavit evidence of Mr Pawlowski supports the appellant’s version with respect to the “friend” issue, it is contradictory, and consistent with the Magistrate’s Remarks on Penalty, with respect to the appellant’s knowledge of the vehicle being uninsured and unregistered. Mr Pawlowski deposed that he told the appellant, prior to the test drive, that the car was not insured or registered because he did not have the money to do so. Mr Pawlowski also deposed that he told the appellant that he would reduce the purchase price of the vehicle to cover the registration costs. Mr Pawlowski was not called and therefore was not cross-examined on his evidence.
[23] Mr Pawlowski was the owner of the vehicle, however, the vehicle had been registered in his partner’s name.
The material before this Court reveals a confusion of findings and evidence which cannot now be satisfactorily resolved given the delay in bringing the appeal. Moreover, the mitigatory circumstances which the appellant urges on this Court are of marginal significance. The public interest in the finality of litigation stands squarely as an insurmountable obstacle to the appellant’s appeal on this ground. I refuse the application to extend the time in which to appeal on the ground that the Magistrate mistook the factual basis of the plea.
Manifestly excessive
It is a well established principle that on appeal it is not enough that this Court would have taken a different view of the offender and the offending. Rather, the appellant must show that the sentencing judge acted upon a wrong principle, taken into account an extraneous or irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account a material consideration, acted upon a mistaken view of the facts or passed a sentence which was manifestly excessive.[24]
[24] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-5; R v Wilton (1981) 28 SASR 362, 363; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, 324-325, 329 and 339-340.
The fine recorded on the Expiation Notice, issued on the day of the offending, was in the sum of $810.00. Evidently, had the appellant decided not to prosecute the charges, he would have been liable for $810.00. Instead, the Magistrate imposed one fine of $100.00 and ordered the appellant to pay court fees of $216.25, a levy of $160 and prosecution fee of $25. As a result, the appellant’s total liability ($501.25) arising from the prosecution was well below the total cost of expiating the notice. There is no reason to interfere with the Magistrate’s pecuniary order.
The Magistrate imposed a licence disqualification until the rising of the court. The appellant contends that the Magistrate did not have the power impose a disqualification. That submission is unfounded. Section 168 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (“the RTA”) confers such a power. However, it is difficult to see any justification for a period of licence disqualification at all in the circumstances of this case. The Magistrate does not appear to have thought so either, having imposed a disqualification which was calculated not to inconvenience the appellant at all. The practice of imposing a disqualification until the rising of the Court arose when the penalty for the offence of driving uninsured included a period of mandatory licence disqualification.[25] The continuation of the practice now that s 102 of the MVA provides for a fine only is archaic. That is not to say that the exercise of the power in s 168 of the RTA might not be justified in an egregious case but the appellant’s offending was certainly not of that kind.
[25] South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 9 April 2008, 2917-2922 (P.F. Conlon, Minister for Transport, Minister for Infrastructure, Minister for Energy): The lack of utility in a brief period of licence disqualification was mentioned by the Honourable P.F. Colon in the second reading speech of the Statutes Amendment (Transport Portfolio) Bill 2008 (which preceded the removal of the power for licence disqualification from s102) who said at 2917:
The average fine imposed by the courts has tended to be low in relation to the maximum penalty - around $240 for driving an unregistered vehicle and around $300 for driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle. In addition, an average driver's licence disqualification of 2 days (usually of the driver’s choice) is imposed for uninsured offences in most circumstances.
…
As a licence disqualification is more appropriately associated with offences related to licensing matters, the Bill removes the licence disqualification penalty for the offence of driving an uninsured vehicle. South Australia is the only State to apply a licence disqualification for the offence.
I grant the appellant an extension of time in which to appeal on this ground. I set aside the disqualification penalty even though it had probably been served in the time it took the appellant to walk out of the court building.
Finally, I turn to the issue of whether a conviction should have been recorded for the appellant’s offending.
Pursuant to s 16 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) the court may exercise its discretion, on the satisfaction of certain preconditions, to impose a penalty without recording a conviction. To exercise that discretion I would need to be satisfied that the appellant is unlikely to commit such an offence again and good reason exists, having regard to a number of factors, for not recording a conviction. Section 16 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) is as follows.
16—Imposition of penalty without conviction
Where a court finds a person guilty of an offence for which it proposes to impose a fine, a sentence of community service, or both and the court is of the opinion—
(a) that the defendant is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and
(b) that, having regard to—
(i)the character, antecedents, age or physical or mental condition of the defendant; or
(ii)the fact that the offence was trifling; or
(iii)any other extenuating circumstances,
good reason exists for not recording a conviction,
the court may impose the penalty without recording a conviction.
The MVA is regulatory legislation. The preventative and deterrent aspects of punishment generally assume relatively greater importance in sentencing for offences against such legislation.[26] However, the force of this consideration is much reduced in the case of offences which can be expiated. It is difficult to see why a conviction is generally necessary in the case of the few offenders who, for whatever reason, fail to take advantage of the expiation process, pursuant to which the great preponderance of offenders escape convictions without jeopardising the integrity of the registration and insurance scheme.
[26] Ly v Glover (1996) 150 LSJS 449, 454; Hemming v Neave & Anor (1989) 51 SASR 427, 429.
The imposition of the period of disqualification in this case and the perfunctory manner in which the order recording convictions was made satisfies me that the Magistrate did not take into account the changed legislative context in which offences of this kind fall to be penalised. I find that the sentence is affected by error which requires the question of recording convictions to be considered afresh by me.
The appellant has made submissions regarding the personal impact and significance of having a conviction recorded against him. Those factors include his ability to receive a United States Visa, the affect on his future, the consequence of increased car insurance premiums, and also the impact on his mental state. I also note the appellant’s age, his recent arrival in Australia relative to the commission of the offences and his cultural background.
It is significant that the appellant’s offence was committed in the course of inspecting a vehicle for purchase.
Given the appellant’s lack of any antecedent history, his understanding of the consequence of such offending and his future aspirations I am satisfied that he is unlikely to commit such an offence again.
Having regard to the purpose and effect of the recording of a conviction, the considerations outlined in s 16 of the Sentencing Act and the circumstances of the offending, I find that good reason exists to not record a conviction in the appellant’s case.
Conclusion
I grant the appellant an extension of time in which to appeal against the licence disqualification and the recording of convictions. I allow the appeal on those grounds and quash the orders imposing a licence disqualification and recording convictions and make instead orders pursuant to s 16 of the Sentencing Act not recording convictions on the adjudications of guilt.
I will hear the parties as to costs.