Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2023] FedCFamC2G 278
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 278
File number(s): SYG 190 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 17 April 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Whether change in Minister invalidates instrument of delegation – alleged duty to inquire to disprove handwriting assessment in relation to bogus document Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 101, 103, 109, 140, 375A, 376, 496
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 9.03
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.41
Cases cited: Aban v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 93
EXP17 v Minister for Immigration , Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 502
Johnson v Veterans’ Review Board (2002) 71 ALD 16
Kelly v Watson (1985) 10 FCR 305
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sandhu [2016] FCA 130
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590
SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 475
Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 17 April 2023 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr Ahmadzai of Crystal Migration Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr Goodwin of Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
SYG 190 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: NIRMAL SINGH
First Applicant
SARABJIT KAUR
Second Applicant
NANVEET KAUR KAJAL
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
17 APRIL 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 25 January 2019 is dismissed.
2.The first and second applicants must pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the amount of $6,000.
3.Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), orders 1 and 2 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)JUDGE GIVEN:
On 25 January 2019, an application to show cause was filed with the Court seeking review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), made on 3 January 2019, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to cancel the applicant’s Employer Nomination Scheme (Subclass 186) visa (visa). The visa was cancelled pursuant to s 101(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) because the applicant had given an incorrect answer in relation to his visa application form, and pursuant to s 103 of the Act, because he had provided a bogus document. The first applicant was the primary visa applicant (applicant). The second and third applicants are the applicant’s wife and daughter (respectively).
Background
On 19 November 2015, the applicant applied for the visa by completing an application form and submitting supporting documents, including an IELTS test report form dated 5 December 2014 and a certificate dated 18 July 2000 in relation to a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering issued by the State Board of Technical Education and Training in Hyderabad, India. On 19 November 2015, the applicant (and consequently the second and third applicants) was granted the visa.
On 2 November 2017, a delegate sent the applicants a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation (NOICC) on the basis that the applicant had falsely stated that he had achieved the required level of English in his visa application. Handwriting analysis was said to show that the writing on the IELTS test was not the applicant’s handwriting. Additionally, he was said to have submitted a bogus document being a Diploma which, based on integrity checks, was concluded to be counterfeit (CB 4 to 10).
On 7 November 2017, the applicants’ representative responded to the NOICC, refuting matters therein and asking for more time and further information to respond (CB 18). The applicants’ representative also explained that the handwriting on the IELTS test was not the applicant’s, stating that a friend of the applicant’s completed it for because he had a hand injury on the day of the form’s completion. The response also asserted that the integrity test in relation to the Diploma was “infected by a lack of forensic skill”.
On 30 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent (CB 38 to 49) cancelled the visa.
On 6 December 2017, the applicants filed an application for review in the Tribunal (CB 50 to 52), following which there ensued a long series of emails between the applicants’ representative and the Tribunal about 375A certificates and potential hearing dates. The applicants’ representative ultimately stated that the applicants elected to have the matter determined “on the papers”, because the Tribunal had allegedly failed to give material particulars about the information covered by the s 375A certificates.
The s 375A certificates were later withdrawn, and a s 376 certificate issued instead on 19 October 2018 (CB 135). A further s 376 certificate was issued on 27 November 2018 (CB 181).
On 8 November 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the applicants to inform them of the revocation of the s 375A certificates and issuance of the s 376 certificate (CB 133 to 134). The Tribunal provided a copy of the s 376 certificate and explained the nature of the information covered by it, being checks undertaken in relation to the applicant’s qualifications, concluding that a Diploma had not been issued to the applicant. The letter informed the applicants that a summary of the information covered by the certificate had already been released to the applicants in December 2017 by an application under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act). The 8 November 2018 letter invited the applicants to comment on the validity of the s 376 certificate by 16 November 2018, and to reconsider whether they still wanted a hearing on the papers.
Further correspondence took place between the applicants’ representative and the Tribunal about the documents released under the FOI Act, the s 376 certificate, the qualifications of the delegate to issue the certificate and seeking more time to respond. Relevantly, the applicants’ representative wrote to the Tribunal on 3 December 2018 and submitted that the instrument of delegation of the delegate who issued the certificates was (CB 182):
…infected by a latent defect. The instrument is signed by the former Minister under the name of a now defunct Department. The instrument purports to delegate his personal powers which cannot be delegated by him if he is no longer the Minister. The appointment of a new Minister and the creating of a new department extinguishes the previous instrument…
Tribunal Decision
On 3 January 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review and found that it had no jurisdiction in relation to the second and third applicants (CB 195). The Tribunal noted that the only visa decision before it related to the applicant. As the second and third applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled by operation of s 140(1) of the Act, the Tribunal found that this involved no ‘decision’, and therefore that there was no Tribunal-reviewable ‘decision’ in relation to the second and third applicants (CB 196 at [3]).
The Tribunal recounted the background of the matter (CB 196 to 198 at [5] to [15]), its procedural history and the substantial correspondence which had passed between it and the applicants’ representative (CB 198 to 203 at [16] to [44]). In relation to the submission that the delegation to issue a s 376 certificate was invalid because of a defect in the delegation, the Tribunal found the delegation to be valid and referred to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and the fact that Mr Peter Dutton had signed the instrument of delegation at a time when he was the relevant Minister (CB 203 at [44]).
From [45] (CB 203) of its reasons for decision, the Tribunal turned to consider whether the visa should be cancelled.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the IELTS test was not undertaken by the applicant and that his responses on the visa application form that he had superior English based on the IELTS test were not correct (CB 204 at [50]).
In relation to the Diploma document, the Tribunal found that there was nothing to suggest that the verification process (which had found the document to be counterfeit) had not been properly conducted. The Tribunal expressed having a reasonable suspicion that the document was a bogus document as defined in s 5(1) of the Act. The Tribunal concluded that there had been non-compliance with both ss 101(b) and 103 of the Act, in the manner described by the NOICC (CB 204 to 205 at [51] to [53]).
In considering whether the visa should be cancelled, the Tribunal applied the considerations in r 2.41 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), accepting that those considerations were not exhaustive. After consideration of each matter, it concluded that the visa should be cancelled, noting that it had limited information before it by reason of the applicant’s election to have the matter heard on the papers (CB 205 to 208 at [57] to [77]).
Current Proceedings
At the time that the proceedings were commenced, the applicants were represented by a solicitor. That solicitor had also been the applicants’ representative before the Tribunal. The matter was initially docketed to another Judge of the Court. On 19 February 2019, a Registrar made orders by consent for the preparation of the matter. By those orders, the applicant was appointed as the litigation guardian for the third applicant, who (with a birth year of 2010) remains a minor as at the time of these reasons for judgment.
It was submitted to the Court today that the third applicant has, during the life of the proceeding, attained Australian citizenship. The Minister’s solicitor has indicated at hearing that, as is the Minister’s usual practice with children, no cost orders will be sought against the third applicant. No formal application was made to remove the third applicant from the proceedings, and I do not see a particular need for that to occur.
The orders made by the Registrar in February 2019 also included a grant of leave to the applicants to file and serve any amended application on or by 30 May 2019. No such document was filed within time, or at all.
On 24 November 2022, the applicants’ current solicitor filed a Notice of Address for Service with the Court consequent upon the applicants’ first solicitor having withdrawn from the proceedings in accordance with r 9.03 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules).
On 7 December 2022, this matter was brought into my docket, on which date, I also made orders listing the matter for hearing before me at 2.15 pm today, with consequential orders for the preparation by the parties of the matter for hearing. Among those orders was an additional grant of leave to the applicants to amend their application, on or by 20 March 2023. No amended application was filed in time, or at all, pursuant to that grant of leave. By the 7 December 2022 orders, the applicants’ written outline of submissions was due to be filed 14 days before the hearing, namely, on or by 3 April 2023.
On 5 April 2023, a document was filed for the applicants purporting to be a written submission. That “submission” is in the form of a letter to the Court, and was prepared by the applicants’ solicitor. Under a heading “Summary of Argument” the document simply repeats the grounds of review and does not make any other submissions. A list of authorities and some legislation was included, and the document concludes with “kind regards.”
The Minister filed written submissions on 11 April 2023 within the time ordered. Unsurprisingly, in the absence of there having been any amendment to the originating application, and given the fact that the submission document which was filed for the applicants on 5 April 2023 did not further address the grounds of review, the Minister’s submissions have attempted to meet that ground, as raised in the originating application.
At the hearing before me today, each of the parties was represented by their respective solicitors.
In the absence of the applicants having amended or having availed themselves of either of the grant of leave to amend their application for review, the ground arising for consideration is that contained in the originating application, as follows:
The Second Respondent fell into jurisdictional error in the decision of 3 January 2019.
Particulars
a) The Second Respondent was satisfied that the purported instrument of delegation grounding the purported exercise of powers under section 376 was a valid exercise of power.
b) The Second Respondent upon receiving advice to the effect that the sample handwriting relied upon to ground the finding that the Applicant had not undertaken the IELTS test was unsustainable and the failure to initiate additional checks to wither confirm or deny the allegation is indicative of second respondent acting as a contradictor and not as an inquisitor and this infected the failure to enquire a jurisdictional error by reason of the failure of the Second respondent to be seized of its jurisdiction.
At the hearing before me today, when asked to make submissions to elucidate the ground of review and its particulars, in respect of the particulars to ground 1, the solicitor for the applicants commenced by making submissions which seemed to assert a denial of procedural fairness to the applicants in respect of documents provided which were covered by a s 376 certificate, and purporting to allege that there had been some sort of denial of procedural fairness to the applicants. Namely, the applicants’ (then) solicitor had not been given a sufficient amount of time to consider the documents once provided. It was observed by the Court that this ground seemed to go beyond the scope of the first particular to the ground of review in the originating application.
Despite a submission by the solicitor for the applicants that this was merely an extension of the grounds as raised, it was clear (not only from the fact that that is not an express ground which is included in the originating application but also) from the fact that the Minister, having attempted to meet the grounds as pleaded, had not understood the ground in the way now sought to be advanced, that it was not a variation to an existing ground. The Court observed that if it was a ground which the applicants wished to pursue, they likely require leave of the Court to amend. I indicated that, if such an application was made, the Minister may require additional time in order to ameliorate any prejudice which might be caused.
The solicitor for the Minister indicated that the ground as now sought to be advanced was certainly not an interpretation of the first particular to ground 1 that the he had apprehended. As such, the Minister’s solicitor said he was taken by surprise. When asked whether or not the applicants wished to seek to amend their application in order to raise such a ground, the solicitor for the applicants declined to make such an application.
As noted earlier, the applicants’ written submission does not go beyond repeating the ground of review with its particulars and no detail was placed before the Court in advance of the hearing to explain how the applicants contend the Tribunal erred, or how that error was material. The applicants bear the onus of establishing both matters: se MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590 at [39].
Ground 1, particular 1
The first particular to ground 1 takes issue with an instrument of delegation, which was signed on 16 September 2015 by the relevant Minister at the time of its signing, Mr Peter Dutton. The applicants seem to contend that because there had been a change of Minister (and possibly of portfolio), that by the time that the delegate and/or the Tribunal came to make their decisions, the delegation to issue a s 376 certificate was invalid and therefore so too were any certificates themselves. When asked to speak to this ground, as I have already indicated, the solicitor for the applicants initially proposed to address a different ground.
Thereafter, and in the absence of an amendment application being made, the only submission made in respect of the first particular to ground 1 was that the applicants did not have anything further to say, other than that the delegation was invalid.
I find that in this case, it is irrelevant to the validity of a delegation of a statutory power that the identity of the delegator has changed. Contrary to the applicants’ assertion, an instrument of delegation (which in the applicants’ case was executed pursuant to the power under s 496 of the Act) did not cease to have effect merely because there is a change in the identity of the person who is the delegator: see Kelly v Watson (1985) 10 FCR 305 at 317 to 318, Aban v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 93 at 98 to 99 and Johnson v Veterans’ Review Board (2002) 71 ALD 16 at 26 to 27. Provided the delegator had authority at the time of the delegation (and the delegation was properly made) the instrument continued to have force.
The law in relation to this area is well settled. In circumstances where the first particular to ground 1 has not been developed as at hearing, or at all such that no further arguments were made on behalf of the applicants in order to persuade the Court that there was some other basis or to counter the matters raised by the Minister’s written submissions in respect of which the applicants have had notice for some weeks, the ground must fail.
I am not satisfied that there is any error of the kind alleged by particulars 1 to the ground of review. Even if I am wrong in that regard, the applicants have not established that such an error would be material and, on the material before the Court today the relevant counterfactual does not bear out that it could be.
For an error to go to jurisdiction, and enliven the Court’s jurisdiction to grant constitutional writ relief, the error must be material: see MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590 at [31] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ where the Court said:
…that a statute conferring decision-making authority is not ordinarily to be interpreted as denying legal force to every decision made in breach of a condition which the statute expressly or impliedly requires to be observed in the course of a decision-making process. The statute is instead “ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non-compliance.
The Minister posits two counterfactuals in relation to particular 1. The first is to ask what the position would have been had the statutory condition been complied with such that the delegation would then have been validly made. If that were the case, then the delegation, and the certificates, would have been consequentially valid. As such, there is no material error.
The second counterfactual continues to assume that there was no valid delegation. Were that the case, and the certificate had been invalid, then the relevant information would have been required to have been given to the applicants. However, and as I explored in relation to the second particular of the solicitor for the applicants, the Tribunal in this matter exercised its discretion in respect of s 376 of the Act to, in any event, provide the applicants with the relevant information from the folios to which the certificate applied.
The only part of the information covered by the certificates which does not appear to have been released to the applicants was the name of the relevant officer. It has not been suggested that, absent the name of the officer, the applicants could not deal with or understand that information given to them. As such, I find that the applicants were in no materially different position, even on their own case. I am not satisfied that, based on either of the aforementioned counterfactuals of the alleged error, that there was a realistic possibility that the outcome for the applicants could have been different had the alleged error (which I do not accept) not been made. The applicants have therefore established neither the error nor that any such error, could be material. As such, I find that there is no basis to the first particular to ground 1.
Ground 1, particular 2
The second particular to the ground of review alleges that the Tribunal “failed to initiate additional checks to either confirm or deny the allegation”. This is to be taken as reference to the allegation that the handwriting contained in the applicant’s IELTS test was not that of the applicant, when contrasted to the handwriting in the Form 1023 submitted as part of the applicant’s visa application. When asked to speak to this ground, the applicants’ solicitor submitted that the Tribunal had not taken into consideration, or “taken into fact” the applicant’s explanation that his friend allegedly completed the Form 1023 because the applicant had allegedly injured his hand.
The allegation appears to be that the Tribunal had a duty to inquire and as such, needed to undertake additional checks to confirm or deny the explanation as given by the applicant or to confirm or deny the validity of the assessment in relation to the IELTS test handwriting not being that of the applicant.
It is well established that there is no general duty to inquire imposed upon the Tribunal. Having made such an allegation, the applicants are required to establish that there was an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertainable: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429 (SZIAI), Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [43] per Gummow and Hayne JJ and SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 475 at [21] per Bennett J.
While addressed for the applicants at hearing, their written submission document cites the decision of Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22 (Wei). In Wei, the High Court applied SZIAI in circumstances where the issue was whether or not the applicant was enrolled in a course of study. In that case, the enrolment was a critical fact to the determination of whether that applicant’s visa should be cancelled, at [51], Nettle J said:
As already mentioned, there was nothing in the relevant legislation that provided that PRISMS was to be treated as a conclusive record of enrolment. Hence, one obvious way of ensuring, or at least being more certain, that the plaintiff had ceased to be enrolled was to make a telephone inquiry of the University, the direct and authoritative source of confirmation of the plaintiff’s enrolment, just as the delegate had done on 20 February 2014 to check the plaintiff’s address. Given the criticality of the fact that the plaintiff was enrolled at the University, the relative ease with which that fact could have been ascertained, the obviousness of the means of doing so — by picking up the telephone and requesting the University to check whether the plaintiff’s enrolment status as shown in PRISMS was in fact correct — and the clear link between the delegate’s failure to make that inquiry and the delegate’s determination to cancel the visa, I consider this to be a case in which the delegate’s failure amounted to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and therefore a jurisdictional error.
The first respondent says that in the instant case, there was no duty to search out additional information to contradict an extant handwriting assessment. I agree. Based on the assessment provided, the Tribunal was entitled to consider the handwriting assessment without the need to go and obtain a second opinion for itself, much less to undertake inquiries to seek to disprove the assessment (if by particular 2 and the use of the words “confirm or deny”, that is what the applicants are asserting).
Next, the applicant did not dispute that there was a discrepancy in the handwriting between the IELTS test form and the form 1023. Rather, the applicant accounted for the discrepancy in the following way. By an email sent to the Tribunal by his then solicitor, the applicant asserted that the Form 1023 was not completed by the applicant, where it was submitted that:
The form was completed by a friend as my client had an injury to his hand when that form was completed. Thank you for confirming the provenance of the handwriting sample.
It fell to the applicants thereafter to make good that assertion. Even if evidence from the applicant’s alleged friend could be accepted as being an obvious inquiry about a critical fact in issue, I find that it was not easily ascertainable in contrast to the situation in Wei (supra). As I observed in EXP17 v Minister for Immigration , Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 502, the nature of a request and the context in which it is made is relevant to assessing whether a denial to accede to it by a decision-maker constitutes a denial of procedural fairness: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 per Gleeson CJ at [4] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sandhu [2016] FCA 130 per Siopis J.
Contrary to what was asserted from the Bar table for the applicants today, the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s explanations. The Tribunal observed in its reasons for decision, in particular at [50], that the applicants provided no evidence from the alleged friend to corroborate the applicant’s version of events. Nor did the applicants provide details as to the identity of the friend, let alone contact details for said person. The applicants did not request that the Tribunal take any evidence from the friend, and they themselves proffered none.
I accept the submission made for the Minister that (from both the delegate’s decision and the correspondence between the Tribunal and the applicants by their authorised recipient (who is also a solicitor) prior to having made its decision) that the applicants were sufficiently on notice of the issues dispositive of the review. The applicants were clearly aware of the issues pertaining to the handwriting discrepancy. If they wished to establish that it was the Form 1023 which was anomalously not the applicant’s own handwriting (so as to demonstrate that he had completed the IELTS test himself) then there were myriad ways in which that could have been done by them.
I am not satisfied that there fell to the Tribunal any duty to inquire beyond the handwriting assessment before it, which had already been put to the applicants for comment.
In any event, the Minister submits that any error in a failure to exercise its powers was immaterial. This is because the applicant admitted, by the email of his representative on 7 November 2017 (CB 18), that the handwriting was not his. Therefore, any inquiries made about the handwriting would have led the Tribunal to the same conclusion it eventually reached, namely that the information provided on his visa application was incorrect, in contravention of s 101(b) (CB 204 at [50]).
Further, no error alleged in particular 2 affects the Tribunal’s finding that the Diploma document was a bogus document in contravention of s 103 of the Act (CB 204 to 205 at [51] to [53]). The Minister submits (and I agree) that the provision of the bogus document alone would have been sufficient for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion under s 109 of the Act to cancel the visa. At [76], the Tribunal demonstrated how seriously it considered this contravention to be when it said:
The provision of false information to obtain visas is of grave concern and impacts on the integrity of the migration and visa system in place in Australia. While it is unclear that the documents regarding his diploma qualification were directly relied upon to grant the Subclass 186 visa, the provision of bogus documents is also serious and is a breach of s.103 of the Act.
For the foregoing reasons, I am not satisfied that the ground of review by reference to particulars 1 or 2, is made out. I am satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is free from jurisdictional error. Being free from jurisdictional error, the decision is therefore a privative clause decision and must be dismissed. I will so order.
Consequent upon my dismissal of the application, the Minister’s solicitor seeks an order that the first and second applicants only (being the adult applicants in these proceedings) pay the Minister’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,000. I note that the current scale is presently $8,371.30. When asked to make any submissions in relation to costs, the solicitor for the applicants indicated that the applicants consented to the costs order being made in the sum of $6,000.
In these proceedings, I am satisfied that costs ought follow the event. I am further satisfied that the amount sought is reasonable, having regard to the relative complexity of the matter, the nature of the application and the Court’s current costs scale for migration proceedings which conclude at hearing.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given. Associate:
Dated: 28 April 2023
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