Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1558

MIGRATION – protection visa – application for review by Refugee Review Tribunal – application accepted within time by Hobart office of DIMA “on behalf of RRT” – application forwarded by Hobart office via Canberra – received at RRT office in Sydney out of time – whether Hobart office agent for RRT – implied agency

WORDS AND PHRASES – “registry”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 412(1), 476(1)(e)
Migration Regulations, reg 4.31(3)

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308 applied
Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead [1968] 1 QB 549 at 584 cited
Zachariassen v The Commonwealth (1917) 24 CLR 166 at 179-180 applied

Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (16th ed, 1996) Article 8 (p 51) applied

DALJEET SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NO. T11 OF 1999

HEEREY J
11 NOVEMBER 1999
SYDNEY (HEARD IN HOBART)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

T11 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DALJEET SINGH
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY  (HEARD IN HOBART)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is allowed.

2.        The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 3 May 1999 is set aside.

3.        The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

4.        The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, including reserved costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

T11 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DALJEET SINGH
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE:

11 NOVEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN HOBART)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant Mr Daljeet Singh was refused a protection visa.  The last day for lodging an application for review to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) was Wednesday 24 March 1999.  On the preceding Friday, 19 March, he took to the office of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in Hobart a correctly completed application form in an envelope correctly addressed to the RRT at its Sydney office.  An officer of the Department took the application and gave Mr Singh an official receipt stating that it was received “on behalf of” the RRT and would be sent “by internal bag to Sydney office”. 

  2. Mr Singh’s application was forwarded by the Hobart office of the Department via Canberra and did not reach the Sydney office of the RRT until 26 March.  On 3 May 1999 the RRT ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the refusal decision. 

    Factual background

  3. Mr Singh’s language is Punjabi.  He speaks no English.  He came to Australia on 25 December 1998 on a visitor visa.  On 19 January 1999 he applied for a protection visa.  He has not been in immigration detention.  His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 17 February.  On that date a letter…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Mr Singh, a Punjabi speaking individual who entered Australia on a visitor visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) that it lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal of his application. Mr Singh's application for review of the refusal decision was submitted to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) in Hobart, where an officer accepted it on behalf of the RRT. However, the RRT later ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the refusal decision as the application was received outside the mandatory time limit. The central legal issue in this case was whether the RRT had jurisdiction to review the refusal of Mr Singh’s application for a protection visa. The court had to determine whether the RRT was correct in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision because Mr Singh’s application was not properly lodged within the required timeframe.

The Federal Court found that the RRT's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction was not supported by the evidence. The Court accepted Mr Singh's evidence that the DIMA officer in Hobart accepted his application on behalf of the RRT and issued a receipt, indicating that the application was being forwarded to the RRT. The Court held that the RRT's finding was at odds with the evidence presented by the Department. The Court also noted that the DIMA officer’s acceptance of the application and the issuance of a receipt suggested that the application was being treated as properly lodged. The Court concluded that the RRT's decision was incorrect and remitted the matter back to the RRT for reconsideration according to law.

The Court's decision in this case highlights the importance of clear communication and procedural adherence in the immigration review process, particularly for applicants who may face language and other barriers. By setting aside the RRT's decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration, the Court ensured that Mr Singh's application would be properly assessed, providing him with a fair opportunity to challenge the refusal of his protection visa application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated 3 May 1999 is set aside.

3. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs, including reserved costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Singh’s application was forwarded by the Hobart office of the Department via Canberra and did not reach the Sydney office of the RRT until 26 March. On 3 May 1999 the RRT ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the refusal decision. Factual background Mr Singh’s language is Punjabi. He speaks no English. He came to Australia on 25 December 1998 on a visitor visa. On 19 January 1999 he applied for a protection visa. He has not been in immigration detention. His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 17 February. On that date a letter advising of the refusal was sent by the Department to Mr Singh at an address in Hornsby, New South Wales. The letter stated, amongst other things,“You may apply to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) for review of the refusal to grant you a Protection Visa (866) …. If you decide to apply for review, you must lodge your application with the RRT within 35 days of the date of this letter.” The letter enclosed an RRT brochure dated May 1997. The brochure, which is only in English, provides information about the RRT and its procedures. Under the heading “When must I make my application for review?” the brochure states:“APPLY AS SOON AS YOU CAN. THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT EXTEND THE APPLICATION PERIOD.If you are not in immigration detentionThe Tribunal must get your application within 35 calendar days of the date of the letter from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs telling you of the decision ….” Under the heading “Where must I send my application?” it is stated:“If you live in Victoria, please give your application to the Melbourne office of the Tribunal. If you live elsewhere in Australia, please give your application to the Sydney office of the Tribunal. You may hand-deliver, post or fax the application to the Tribunal. The addresses and numbers are listed on the back of this pamphlet.”The offices of the Tribunal are open from 9.30 am to 4.30 pm Monday to Friday, except public holidays.” On the back of the brochure the addresses and postal addresses of offices of the RRT in Sydney and Melbourne are given, together with telephone and fax numbers. On a date which does not emerge in the evidence, the Department’s letter reached Mr Singh. He had moved to Tasmania and was living in Lenah Valley and working at an Indian restaurant in Hobart. He prepared an application for review and put it in an envelope correctly addressed to the RRT’s Sydney office. It is reasonable to infer that in doing this he was assisted by an English speaking friend. On Friday 19 March, in the company of a friend Mr Harbinder Singh (who is now back in India), Mr Singh set off for the Hobart Post Office to post his application. On the way he went to the office of the Department in Hobart to enquire about visa conditions stamped on his passport. An officer at the front counter told him that “the visa stamp is fine and I can take this letter if you have come to give this also”. Mr Singh’s friend told the officer that Mr Singh was going to post the letter to the RRT for a review of the decision not granting a protection visa. The officer said that the Department could take and forward the correspondence on behalf of the RRT. She assured Mr Singh (through his friend) that the Department could send the correspondence to the RRT by internal mail. Mr Singh’s friend told the officer that the application was urgent because the expiry date for review was 24 March. The officer gave Mr Singh a receipt. Mr Singh deposed:“11. I left the letter with the DIMA officer, believing that it may be as [sic] a matter of routine to take the application on behalf of RRT.12. At the first place [sic], I had no intention of leaving my application with DIMA Hobart, it became irrefutable [sic] that it was o.k. for the officer to take my application. At the time of giving the receipt she stressed that ‘yes, we do it all the time’.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY J
The RRT is established by s 457 of the Act. It is to consist of a Principal Member, a Deputy Principal Member and such number of Senior Members and other members as are appointed in accordance with the Act: s 458. Members are appointed by the Governor-General: s 459. The Principal Member is the executive officer of the Tribunal and is responsible for the overall operation and administration of the Tribunal: s 460(1). The Act makes provision for the period of appointment of members, remuneration, leave and other matters. By s 471 the Minister “is to cause a Registry of the Tribunal to be established”. The Registrar and other officers of the Tribunal are to be appointed by the Minister: s 472(2). There appears to be no provision constituting the RRT as a body corporate. Conclusion In its reasons for holding that it lacked jurisdiction, the RRT said:“The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant, his adviser and DIMA staff in Hobart and Sydney have proceeded on the basis that the application was properly lodged in the DIMA Hobart office and did not require urgent transfer to the RRT. Unfortunately, that is not the case. As the review application was received by the Tribunal outside the mandatory time limit, it is not a valid application and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the Delegate’s decision.” This finding of the Tribunal is at odds with the evidence presented by the Department to this Court. If the evidence of Mr George and Ms Duharte is to be accepted, the receipt of the application “on behalf of the RRT” was contrary to a “standing instruction” and was therefore not properly lodged in the Hobart office. The explanation proffered by Ms Duharte, that she was “uncomfortable and unwilling” to accept the document, and only did so on the insistence of Mr Singh and his friend, does not make sense. What possible power did Mr Singh and his friend have to make her do something which she did not want to do? All she had to do was to tell them to take the envelope to the Post Office which, according to Mr Singh, whose evidence I accept, was what he was going to do anyway. Moreover, if Ms Duharte wanted to receive the document under protest, or to warn that it was not to be treated as lodged with the RRT, she only had to note this on the receipt. The statement in the receipt that the document “will not be held in the Hobart office” does not, on an objective reading, suggest any unwillingness in accepting it. Rather it is informing the applicant that the document will be sent to Sydney and that any further dealings should be with the Sydney office of the RRT – as would in fact be the case. The expression “on behalf of RRT” is the quintessential language of agency. Further, the giving of a receipt, which indicates that another copy is to be kept in the Department’s book and a copy is to be kept on the Departmental file, indicates that it is being received and recorded in the Department as a properly received document. Further, the issue of a receipt seems to have been done pursuant to “guidelines”. These were not produced, but presumably they deal with the receipt of documents properly receivable in the Hobart office.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY J

The court reviewed the decision of the RRT, which held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the refusal decision. The court found that the RRT's conclusion was at odds with the evidence presented. The court accepted the evidence of Mr George and Ms Duharte that the receipt of the application "on behalf of the RRT" was contrary to a "standing instruction" and was therefore not properly lodged in the Hobart office. The court reasoned that the explanation proffered by Ms Duharte, that she was "uncomfortable and unwilling" to accept the document, and only did so on the insistence of Mr Singh and his friend, did not make sense. The court found that the expression "on behalf of RRT" was the quintessential language of agency, and the giving of a receipt indicated that it was being received and recorded in the Department as a properly received document. However, the court held that the Department officer in Hobart did not have the authority to accept and forward Mr Singh's application on behalf of the RRT. The court found that the application for review was received by the RRT outside the mandatory time limit, and therefore, it was not a valid application. The court concluded that the RRT had no jurisdiction to review the Delegate's decision. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the RRT has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Minister, but the application for review must be properly lodged within the mandatory time limit, and the Department officer in Hobart did not have the authority to accept and forward Mr Singh's application on behalf of the RRT.