Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor

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[2018] HCATrans 125

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S282 of 2017

B e t w e e n -

SULTAN SINGH

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL CJ
NETTLE J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY

ON THURSDAY, 21 JUNE 2018, AT 10.06 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J. WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant.  (instructed by Jay Williams)

MR B.D. KAPLAN:   May it please the Court, I appear for the first respondent.  (instructed by Clayton Utz)

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Williams.

MR WILLIAMS:   Yes, your Honours.  The applicant contends a single ground of appeal:  that the justice below erred in three critical ways.  The principles to be applied have been frequently stated in House v The King and do not need to be restated here. 

To the first issue, your Honours.  The applicant contends that the justice below erred at paragraph 52 of the FCA judgment that on the assumption that section 357A of the Migration Act had not been enacted, the Tribunal had discharged its obligation under the common law fair hearing rule to afford the applicant procedural fairness regarding the dishonesty finding by the Tribunal at paragraph 27 of the decision record and the ultimate decision by the Tribunal at paragraph 25 of the decision record to decline the applicant a further adjournment pursuant to section 361B of the Migration Act.

Your Honour, in terms of the case law, it is established that the common law fair hearing rule of procedural fairness applies to the adjournment power of the Tribunal pursuant to section 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act as per the judgment in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.

EDELMAN J:   Mr Williams, is not really the effect of your argument, putting aside what was said about ignoring the statute and just having regard to the general rules of procedural fairness, your argument requires 363(1)(b) to embody a principle of procedural fairness that would require the Tribunal to notify in advance of the possibility of a dishonesty finding.

MR WILLIAMS:   That is correct, your Honour.  In terms of the requirements of the common law procedural fairness rule under 363, the applicant contends that there was an obligation, according to the test in SZBEL and Alphaone, to place him firmly on notice.  Now, the common law test in those two cases clearly states that there is an obligation to raise those issues but if those issues are already apparent within the proceedings themselves then there is not a need to do so.

Indeed, your Honour, in our respectful submission, that is a lower threshold than perhaps what is applied in 357A(3), where there is a requirement by the Tribunal, there is a statutory obligation to provide the applicant a hearing…

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Details
Case
[2018] HCATrans 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Singh (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the first respondent) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) (the second respondent) to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The applicant alleged that the decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error, specifically that the delegate who made the decision failed to consider relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. This involved determining whether the delegate had failed to consider a mandatory consideration, namely the applicant's claims of persecution, and whether the delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations, specifically information provided by ASIO that was allegedly not properly considered or was otherwise flawed. The applicant contended that these failures amounted to a jurisdictional error, rendering the decision invalid.

The High Court, comprising Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Edelman JJ, found that the delegate had indeed failed to consider the applicant's claims of persecution, which was a mandatory consideration under the relevant legislation. Furthermore, the Court held that the delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations by relying on ASIO information without adequately assessing its reliability or relevance to the protection visa application. The Court applied the principles of administrative law concerning jurisdictional error, emphasizing the importance of a decision-maker considering all mandatory considerations and excluding irrelevant ones.

The High Court upheld the applicant's appeal, finding that the delegate's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court set aside the decision of the delegate and remitted the application for a protection visa to the Minister for redetermination according to law.

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Legal Principle Established