FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 611
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3486 File number(s): SAD 457 of 2015 Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 31 May 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION– application for judicial review dismissed by Federal Circuit Court on a show cause application made pursuant to r 44.12(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules – where an administrative tribunal arguably afforded insufficient weight to a relevant factor – whether such an error arguably constitutes a jurisdictional error– arguable basis for relief identified – arguable matter remitted to Federal Circuit Court Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 44.12, 44.13(1)
Federal Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 1.34, 26.01
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24(1)(d), 24(1)(1A), 28(1)(b), 31A
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116(1)(b), 119, 476(1),
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cll 572.223(1)(a), 573.223(1A), 573.231, 573.611, Item 8516, reg 1.40A
Cases cited: BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SZLSI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1052
Tran v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297
Date of hearing: 4 May 2016 Date of last submission: 13 May 2016 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L Helsdon Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance Table of Corrections 15 August 2016 In the second sentence of paragraph 33 a pinpoint reference has been inserted for General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) 15 August 2016 In the first sentence of paragraph 34 “sort” has been replaced with “sought” 15 August 2016 In the second sentence of paragraph 40 “insufficient” has been replaced with “sufficient” ORDERS
SAD 457 of 2015 BETWEEN: GURPREET SINGH
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.
2.The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
3.The appeal is allowed in…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 611
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court should have considered whether the Tribunal had failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that, and the circumstances in which, the applicant had previously applied for a subclass 572 visa, so as to commit a jurisdictional error in the manner identified in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [72]. The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to consider this fact and its associated circumstances. The Court found that this failure arguably constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court should have identified this error and remitted the matter to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination. The Court held that the appeal should be allowed in part and that the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review should be set aside. The Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.
2. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.
3. The appeal is allowed in part.
4. The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) is set aside.
5. Subject to the order in paragraph 6, the applicant’s cause is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination.
6. The first respondent is to show cause at a final hearing why an order for the relief claimed by the applicant should not be made on the ground that the Migration Review Tribunal failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that, and the circumstances in which, the applicant had previously applied for a subclass 572 visa, so as to commit a jurisdictional error in the manner identified in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [72].
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the circumstances, I have proceeded on the basis that the permissible ground of appeal before this Court is that specified in paragraph 2 of the grounds, understood narrowly to allege that the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to identify any jurisdictional errors that had been raised in the grounds of review before that Court.Consideration In determining whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave, careful attention should be given to the requirements of r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules and the high threshold an applicant for relief under that rule must overcome. The test in the Federal Circuit Court was not so much whether the alleged errors of the Tribunal had been made and were properly described as jurisdictional errors. Rather, the test was whether it was arguable that the errors had been made arguable that they could be so described. The power conferred under r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules is similar to the power of this Court to enter summary judgment against a party pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act or r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Such a power is to be “sparingly employed”: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129 (Barwick CJ). The power should only be exercised in cases that are so obviously groundless that they could not, on any reasonable view, succeed: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 90-92 (Dixon J). As I have said, in determining the first respondent’s application made pursuant to r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules, the Federal Circuit Court was confined to considering the relief sought by the applicant and the grounds mentioned in his application: see r 44.13(1) of the FCCA Rules. Further, as Logan J recently explained in BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569 (BHK) (at [15]):… it was not, under our system of justice, the function of the learned Federal Circuit Court judge himself to identify the jurisdictional error. It was his Honour’s function, as I have already mentioned, fairly to read the grounds of alleged jurisdictional error. Were there an arguable ground revealed, it was then his Honour’s function to hear and determine whether that ground was made out. It was not though his Honour’s function to go looking for a ground of review. The task of fairly reading the grounds of alleged jurisdictional error may be one attended with considerable difficulty, particularly (but not exclusively) in cases where the grounds are drafted by an unrepresented litigant. As the learned Federal Circuit Court Judge in the present case recognised, the task is one concerned with substance and fairness rather than form. Nothing said by Logan J in BHK precludes a court, on judicial review, from paraphrasing with the concurrence of the parties, its own fair reading of a poorly-cast ground of review, to distil the substance of the applicant’s case from the form of words that the applicant has employed. Ordinarily, the Court may readily infer that the errors alleged by the applicant are intended to be read as allegations of the kind of errors that would sound in a remedy that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant. The very making of the application by the applicant in that particular Court may support such an inference in any given case.