Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 611

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3486
File number(s): SAD 457 of 2015
Judge(s): CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 31 May 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION– application for judicial review dismissed by Federal Circuit Court on a show cause application made pursuant to r 44.12(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules – where an administrative tribunal arguably afforded insufficient weight to a relevant factor – whether such an error arguably constitutes a jurisdictional error– arguable basis for relief identified – arguable matter remitted to Federal Circuit Court
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 44.12, 44.13(1)

Federal Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 1.34, 26.01

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24(1)(d), 24(1)(1A), 28(1)(b), 31A

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116(1)(b), 119, 476(1),

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cll 572.223(1)(a), 573.223(1A), 573.231, 573.611, Item 8516, reg 1.40A

Cases cited:

BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

SZLSI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1052

Tran v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297

Date of hearing: 4 May 2016
Date of last submission: 13 May 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L Helsdon
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance
Table of Corrections
15 August 2016 In the second sentence of paragraph 33 a pinpoint reference has been inserted for General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW)
15 August 2016 In the first sentence of paragraph 34 “sort” has been replaced with “sought”
15 August 2016 In the second sentence of paragraph 40 “insufficient” has been replaced with “sufficient”

ORDERS

SAD 457 of 2015
BETWEEN:

GURPREET SINGH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.

2.The application for leave to appeal is allowed.

3.The appeal is allowed in…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 611
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court, the applicant, Mr. Singh, sought judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal to cancel his 573 Visa on the basis that he had failed to comply with the conditions of that visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review. The appeal to the Federal Court challenges the correctness of that decision. The appeal raises a single issue: whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to identify any jurisdictional errors that had been raised in the grounds of review before that Court. In addressing this issue, the Court examined the principles governing the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant leave to appeal under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court had failed to adequately consider whether the Migration Review Tribunal had afforded insufficient weight to the fact that, and the circumstances in which, the applicant had previously applied for a subclass 572 visa. This failure arguably constituted a jurisdictional error.

The Court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court should have considered whether the Tribunal had failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that, and the circumstances in which, the applicant had previously applied for a subclass 572 visa, so as to commit a jurisdictional error in the manner identified in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [72]. The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to consider this fact and its associated circumstances. The Court found that this failure arguably constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court should have identified this error and remitted the matter to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination. The Court held that the appeal should be allowed in part and that the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review should be set aside. The Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.

2. The application for leave to appeal is allowed.

3. The appeal is allowed in part.

4. The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) is set aside.

5. Subject to the order in paragraph 6, the applicant’s cause is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for final hearing and determination.

6. The first respondent is to show cause at a final hearing why an order for the relief claimed by the applicant should not be made on the ground that the Migration Review Tribunal failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that, and the circumstances in which, the applicant had previously applied for a subclass 572 visa, so as to commit a jurisdictional error in the manner identified in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [72].

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court should be allowed, and the appeal allowed in part.Background The 573 Visa had been granted to the applicant on 25 April 2014, that is, prior to his arrival in Australia. In support of his application for the 573 Visa, the applicant provided confirmation of his enrolment in a Diploma of Information Technology and a Bachelor of Information Technology at Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Brisbane. The applicant never commenced his studies at QUT. QUT cancelled the applicant’s enrolment on 12 May 2014. It subsequently refunded the applicant’s tuition fees. On 13 June 2014, the applicant applied for another visa. That application was for a Vocational Education and Training Sector (subclass 572) visa (572 Visa). In that application, he stated that he intended to study a Diploma of Website Development through a training provider trading as Institute of Technology Australia, situated in Adelaide. A delegate of the first respondent refused the applicant’s application for the 572 Visa. The application was refused on the basis that the applicant did not meet the criteria for the 572 Visa because the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student: see subclause 572.223(1)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). The delegate placed significant weight on the applicant’s “changes of migration and study intent”. The applicant did not make any application for review of the delegate’s decision to refuse his application for the 572 Visa. The subsequent and separate decision to cancel the applicant’s 573 Visa was made pursuant to s 116(1)(b) of the Act. It provides:116 Power to cancel(1)Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:…(b) its holder has not complied with a condition of the visa; … The Delegate determined that the applicant had not complied with a condition of the 573 Visa that required that he continue to be a person who would satisfy the criteria for the grant of that visa. The relevant condition is specified in Item 8516 of Schedule 8 to the Regulations. It applies to the 573 Visa by virtue of subclause 573.611 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations. I will refer to it as condition 8516. The Delegate held that the applicant did not comply with condition 8516 because he was no longer enrolled in the QUT courses or any course that would satisfy the criteria for the grant of a 573 Visa. At the time of the Delegate’s decision, and at the time of the Tribunal’s decision there was evidence demonstrating that the applicant retained a certificate of enrolment in the Diploma of Website Development that had formed the subject matter of his unsuccessful 572 Visa application. That enrolment forms an important part of the background to this appeal.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal noted that prior to cancelling the 573 Visa, the Delegate had issued the applicant with a notice pursuant to s 119 of the Act dated 5 September 2014. The notice invited the applicant to respond to a number of issues, including the question of whether or not he had complied with condition 8516. The applicant did not respond to the notice. He told the Tribunal that he did not appreciate he was required to respond.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the time of the Delegate’s decision, and at the time of the Tribunal’s decision there was evidence demonstrating that the applicant retained a certificate of enrolment in the Diploma of Website Development that had formed the subject matter of his unsuccessful 572 Visa application. That enrolment forms an important part of the background to this appeal.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal noted that prior to cancelling the 573 Visa, the Delegate had issued the applicant with a notice pursuant to s 119 of the Act dated 5 September 2014. The notice invited the applicant to respond to a number of issues, including the question of whether or not he had complied with condition 8516. The applicant did not respond to the notice. He told the Tribunal that he did not appreciate he was required to respond. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not, at the time of its decision, satisfy the criteria specified in cl 573.223(1A) or cl 573.231 to Schedule 2 of the Regulations. Those subclauses provide (emphasis added):573.223 (1)The Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:….(1A)If the applicant is, and was, at the time of application, an eligible higher degree student who has a confirmation of enrolment in each course of study for which the applicant is an eligible higher degree student:(a)the applicant gives the Minister evidence that the applicant has:(i)a level of English language proficiency that satisfies the applicant’s eligible education provider; and(ii)educational qualifications required by the eligible education provider; and(b)the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, having regard to:(i)the stated intention of the applicant to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted; and(ii) any other relevant matter; and(c)the Minister is satisfied that, while the applicant holds the visa, the applicant will have sufficient funds to meet:(i)the costs and expenses required to support the applicant during the proposed stay in Australia; and(ii)the costs and expenses required to support each member (if any) of the applicant’s family unit.…573.231If subclause 573.223(1A) does not apply:(a)the applicant is enrolled in, or is the subject of a current offer of enrolment in, a course of study that is a principal course; and(b)the principal course is of a type that was specified for Subclass 573 visas by the Minister in an instrument:(i) made under regulation 1.40A; and(ii) in force at the time the application was made. As I have mentioned, at the time of the Tribunal’s decision, the applicant was enrolled in a Diploma of Website Development. It is implicit in the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal did not consider that course to be a “higher education course” for the purpose of cl 573.231 of the Regulations. The Tribunal noted that, as a result of the applicant not being enrolled in a “higher education course” the applicant was in breach of condition 8516, and that a ground therefore existed for the cancellation of 573 Visa. It went on to find that:(1)the breach of condition 8516 occurred in circumstances where the applicant had been lonely and homesick, and had relocated from Brisbane to Adelaide on the advice of friends who were “worried about him”;(2)the applicant was aware that the condition attached to his visa, but did not seek professional advice from the Department before withdrawing from the QUT courses and relocating to Adelaide;(3)the applicant had not sought to enrol in a higher education course after relocating to Adelaide, which would have been consistent with the requirements of condition 8516;(4)if the Delegate’s decision was set aside, the applicant would remain in breach of condition 8516;(5)the applicant’s non-compliance with condition 8516 did not occur in circumstances that were beyond the applicant’s control and there were no extenuating or compassionate circumstances.The proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances, I have proceeded on the basis that the permissible ground of appeal before this Court is that specified in paragraph 2 of the grounds, understood narrowly to allege that the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to identify any jurisdictional errors that had been raised in the grounds of review before that Court.Consideration In determining whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave, careful attention should be given to the requirements of r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules and the high threshold an applicant for relief under that rule must overcome. The test in the Federal Circuit Court was not so much whether the alleged errors of the Tribunal had been made and were properly described as jurisdictional errors. Rather, the test was whether it was arguable that the errors had been made arguable that they could be so described. The power conferred under r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules is similar to the power of this Court to enter summary judgment against a party pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act or r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Such a power is to be “sparingly employed”: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129 (Barwick CJ). The power should only be exercised in cases that are so obviously groundless that they could not, on any reasonable view, succeed: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 90-92 (Dixon J). As I have said, in determining the first respondent’s application made pursuant to r 44.12 of the FCCA Rules, the Federal Circuit Court was confined to considering the relief sought by the applicant and the grounds mentioned in his application: see r 44.13(1) of the FCCA Rules. Further, as Logan J recently explained in BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569 (BHK) (at [15]):… it was not, under our system of justice, the function of the learned Federal Circuit Court judge himself to identify the jurisdictional error. It was his Honour’s function, as I have already mentioned, fairly to read the grounds of alleged jurisdictional error. Were there an arguable ground revealed, it was then his Honour’s function to hear and determine whether that ground was made out. It was not though his Honour’s function to go looking for a ground of review. The task of fairly reading the grounds of alleged jurisdictional error may be one attended with considerable difficulty, particularly (but not exclusively) in cases where the grounds are drafted by an unrepresented litigant. As the learned Federal Circuit Court Judge in the present case recognised, the task is one concerned with substance and fairness rather than form. Nothing said by Logan J in BHK precludes a court, on judicial review, from paraphrasing with the concurrence of the parties, its own fair reading of a poorly-cast ground of review, to distil the substance of the applicant’s case from the form of words that the applicant has employed. Ordinarily, the Court may readily infer that the errors alleged by the applicant are intended to be read as allegations of the kind of errors that would sound in a remedy that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant. The very making of the application by the applicant in that particular Court may support such an inference in any given case.