Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 162

Appeal from: Binu Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 381
File number(s): NSD 329 of 2018
Judge(s): GREENWOOD ACJ, CHARLESWORTH AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 27 September 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Tribunal – decision not to revoke cancellation of appellant’s Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa following a “dob in” letter from a sponsor employer – whether Tribunal erred by failing to comply with s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to communicate certain information in dob in letter – where evidence that appellant knew contents of dob in letter and gave evidence in reply to delegate and Tribunal – where the information in dob in letter not conveyed to appellant was exculpatory and would not have been a reason to affirm the decision of the delegate – finding that Tribunal had no obligations under s 359A in relation to the dob in letter – appeal dismissed

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Tribunal – decision not to permit appellant’s husband to be joined as a party to proceedings – where husband granted visa as part of appellant’s family unit – where husband’s visa automatically cancelled with appellant’s visa under s 137T of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the delegate’s decision to cancel the appellant’s visa gave husband rights under s 338(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – finding that the husband’s visa was cancelled by force of statute – no administrative decision had been made with respect to husband – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 137T, 137Q, 338(3), 347(2), 359A, 360

Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth), rr 11.01, 11.02

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2

Cases cited:

Bull v The Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 17 CLR 370

Farah v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 185

Shao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 157 FCR 300

SZGSI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 160 FCR 506

Date of hearing: 27 August 2018
Date of last submissions: 17 September 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Godwin
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 329 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BINU SINGH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

GREENWOOD ACJ, CHARLESWORTH AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 162
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court considered an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had upheld a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had decided not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant's visa and to deny the application for her husband to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The appellant, a Nepalese citizen, had been granted a subclass 187 visa, which allowed her to work as a hairdresser for Bathurst Hair and Beauty Pty Limited. The appellant's husband also held a subclass 187 visa as part of her family unit. The sponsor later wrote a letter to the Minister's department alleging that the appellant had not commenced employment and had no intention of doing so, which led to the appellant's visa being cancelled.

The legal issues in the case were whether the Tribunal had erred in not complying with section 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to communicate certain information in the "dob in" letter to the appellant, and whether the Tribunal should have permitted the appellant's husband to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The court held that the Tribunal was not obliged to provide the appellant with information from the "dob in" letter as it was information she had already given during the process that led to the decision to cancel her visa. The court also held that the appellant's husband's visa was cancelled by force of statute and that no administrative decision had been made with respect to him.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its decision and that the appellant's arguments did not have prospects of success. The Federal Court upheld the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister objected to leave being granted to raise (proposed) ground 5 because it had not been raised before, was not developed in argument, and had no prospects of success. THE FACTS The appellant is a citizen of Nepal. On 18 January 2013, she applied for the visa. It was granted on 20 June 2013, which permitted her to commence employment as a hairdresser with her sponsor, Bathurst Hair and Beauty Pty Limited (the sponsor). The appellant’s husband, Mr Dhaubhadel, was the holder of a subclass 187 (Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme) visa. As the regulation under which the visa was granted makes clear, family members do not need to meet the primary criteria for a visa in circumstances where their visa is dependent on their familial relationship with the primary visa holder. The description in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) of the Regulation Subclass 187 – Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme provides (and provided at the relevant time) as follows:187.1 Interpretation…187.2 Primary criteriaNote: The primary criteria for the grant of a Subclass 187 visa include criteria set out in streams.If an applicant applies for a Subclass 187 visa in the Temporary Residence Transition stream, the criteria in Subdivisions 187.21 and 187.22 are the primary criteria for the grant of the visa.If an applicant applies for a Subclass 187 visa in the Direct Entry stream, the criteria in Subdivisions 187.21 and 187.23 are the primary criteria.… The primary criteria must be satisfied by at least one member of a family unit. The other members of the family unit who are applicants for a visa of this subclass need satisfy only the secondary criteria.All criteria must be satisfied at the time a decision is made on the application.(Emphasis added.) On 19 December 2013, the director of the sponsor wrote an email to the Minister’s department in these terms (the dob in letter): Business Name: BATHURST HAIR AND BEAUTY PTY LIMITEDNomination Application ID: EGO1SREV89File number: BCC2013/1351Client Name: BINU DHAUBHADEL SINGHDate of birth: 27 July 1984Date of Visa Application: 18 January 2013File number: BCC2013/94780Transaction Reference Number: EGO0NN9EEGVisa Application Receipt Number: 130118166761Please note the employment for Mrs Binu Singh has been terminated due to non-compliance with terms and conditions of the employment contract. Binu has not joined the company and had no intention of joining. She is not responding to directors call to join and is not communicating. She has been advised by someone in DIAC that she does not have to join or is compelled to work in the region. Company has terminated her employment. Thanks & regardsPriya SDirectorBathurst Hair & Beauty Pty Ltd131a Howick St, Bathurst NSW 2795.(Errors in original.) On 26 May 2014, a representative of the department sent to the appellant a Notification of Intention to Consider Cancellation (NOICC) informing her, among other things, that “[i]t has come to my attention that you never commenced your employment with your nominating sponsor for your … [visa]”, and that she had 28 days to respond, and to provide reasons as to why the visa should not be cancelled.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant does not challenge these findings, nor any of the Tribunal’s findings on issues of discretion, which are set out at [138]–[150] of the Tribunal’s reasons, and to which it is unnecessary to make any reference. The decision of the primary judge The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for review and refused an application that the appellant’s husband, Mr Dhaubhadel, been included as a party to the proceeding pursuant to rr 11.01 and 11.02 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth). The primary judge dismissed the joinder application. The sole ground of appeal was that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 359A of the Migration Act because it “failed to invite the [appellant] to comment on the information in the [dob in letter]… that would have been a reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision of the delegate to cancel the [appellant’s] visa.” Section 359A of the Migration Act provides:Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must: (a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and (b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and (c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. (2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant: (a) except where paragraph (b) applies--by one of the methods specified in section 379A; or (b) if the applicant is in immigration detention--by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person. (3) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 359AA. (4) This section does not apply to information: (a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or (b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or (ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or(c) that is non-disclosable information. (5) A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 362B(1F). The primary judge held that, in substance, given that the Tribunal member told the appellant at the outset of the hearing that she accepted what the appellant said namely: that the appellant had, despite what the dob in letter alleged, in fact commenced work at the salon in July 2013; that she was no longer employed there; and that she and the sponsor had colluded to defraud the Minister’s department, then the “information” contained in the dob in letter was information that the appellant “gave for the purpose the application for review” and information that she gave “during the process that led to the decision that is under review” within the meaning of s359A (4)(b) and (ba) (see the decision of the primary judge at [107]-[112]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 338(3) of the Migration Act, at the relevant time, provided for certain “decisions,” as defined, to be reviewable by the Tribunal under Part 5 Division 2 of the Migration Act, subject to various exclusions. It provides as follows: Decisions reviewable by Migration Review Tribunal…(3) A decision to cancel a visa held by a non-citizen who is in the migration zone at the time of the cancellation is an MRT-reviewable decision unless the decision:(a) is covered by subsection (4); or(b) is made at a time when the non-citizen was in immigration clearance; or(c) was made under subsection 134(1), (3A) or (4) or section 501; or(d) was made personally by the Minister under section 109 or 116 or subsection 140(2).” [sub-section (d) was added on 11 December 2014 by the Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Act 2014 (Cth) (No. 129, 2014)]. The appellant contends that the cancellation of the appellant’s visa by the delegate involved one decision which “by direct finding and by consequence, encompassed” her husband. It was also contended that s 137T (and presumably s 338(3)) of the Migration Act) constitute “remedial” provisions, which should be construed beneficially, such that they “should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow” (citing Bull v The Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 17 CLR 370, 384 per Issacs J). The appellant also pointed to the different language used in a related provision contained in s 137J of the Migration Act, which deals with the automatic cancellation of visas of non-complying students. In particular, s 137J(2) speaks of relevant visas being cancelled “by force of this section” – language which the appellant accepts makes clear that the provision cancels the visa by conduct of the applicant without any “decision” being made by anybody to effect that cancellation: see Shao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 157 FCR 300. In our view, however, the reasoning in Shao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 157 FCR 300 does not assist the appellant. In that case, Lander J at [8] and [9] said:Section 137J of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) applies if a notice is sent to a non-citizen under s 20 of the ESOS Act. The giving of a notice under s 20 of the ESOS Act activates the provisions of s 137J(2) of the Migration Act, which has the effect of cancelling the student’s visa by force of the section at the end of the 28th day after the day that the notice specifies as the date of the notice unless the student complies with one or other of paragraphs (a) or (b) of subsection (2) of s 137J. Section 137J(2) provides:(2) The non-citizen’s visa is cancelled by force of this section at the end of the 28th day after the day that the notice specifies as the date of the notice unless, before the end of that 28th day:(a) the non-citizen complies with the notice; or(b) the non-citizen, while attending in person at an office of Immigration (within the meaning of the regulations) that is either:(i) in Australia; or(ii) approved for the purposes of this paragraph by the Minister by notice in the Gazette;makes himself or herself available to an officer for the stated purpose of explaining the breach alleged in the notice.It is the subsection itself which cancels the non-citizen’s visa. Nothing needs to be done by the Minister or any other party to effectuate the cancellation of the non-citizen’s visa.