Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 222

Citation: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 222
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2672
Parties: AMARJIT SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: SAD 287 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION -  Where applicant seeks an extension of time to seek leave to appeal under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – Where, if an extension is granted, applicant would seek leave to appeal against default judgment made in applicant’s absence – Where no error apparent in the decision of the Court below – Where applicant has not satisfied essential criterion for grant of Subclass 485 visa
Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.03C, 16.05
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) r 35.13, 35.14
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 31(1), 65, 362B
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15I, 2.03, 2.26B, Sch 2: cl 485.214
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Legislative Instrument IMMI 12/023 Specification of Skilled Occupations, Relevant Assessing Authorities and Countries for General Skilled Migration Visas
Cases cited: BZACZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1230; (2013) 139 ALD 140
BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499
Khondoker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 654
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417
SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship  [2011] FCA 756
SZSPR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109
Date of hearing: 24 February 2015
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P d’Assumpcao (solicitor)
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 287 of 2014

BETWEEN:

AMARJIT SINGH
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to appeal is dismissed with costs fixed in the sum of $1756.00.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 287 of 2014

BETWEEN:

AMARJIT SINGH
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE:

16 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant, Mr Amarjit Singh, seeks an extension of time within which to seek leave to…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 222
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Amarjit Singh, an Indian citizen, applied for an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed his application for leave to appeal against a default judgment made in his absence by the Migration Review Tribunal. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for an extension of time on the ground that it was devoid of merit. The primary issue the Court had to decide was whether to grant an extension of time to the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the default judgment. The Court also had to consider whether, if the extension were granted, the applicant would have a reasonably arguable case. The Court held that the application for an extension of time was devoid of merit. The Court found that the applicant had failed to satisfy the essential criterion for the grant of a Subclass 485 visa, which required the applicant to apply for an assessment of his skills for the nominated skilled occupation by a relevant assessing authority. The Court also found that the applicant had not satisfied the essential criterion for the grant of a skilled visa, which required the applicant to have applied for an assessment of his skills for the nominated skilled occupation by a relevant assessing authority at the time of the application. The Court held that the applicant had not provided any evidence of a skills assessment for any occupation. The Court concluded that the applicant had failed to satisfy the criteria for the grant of a Subclass 485 visa. The Court held that even if an extension of time were granted, the applicant would not have a reasonably arguable case because he had not satisfied the essential pre-condition of the grant of the visa in question, namely satisfactory proof that he had the skills relevant to the visa for which he had applied and that these skills had been independently assessed. The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time within which to appeal, with costs fixed in the sum of $1756.00.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to appeal is dismissed with costs fixed in the sum of $1756.00.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application for an extension of time must be dismissed on the ground that the application is devoid of merit. 2. BACKGROUND Mr Amarjit Singh is an Indian citizen. He applied for the skilled visa on 8 May 2012. His nominated occupation for the purpose of the visa application was “Nurseryperson, ANZSCO code 362411”. One of the primary criteria for the grant of a skilled visa is the requirement in cl 485.214 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) that the Minister be satisfied that the applicant has applied for an assessment of the applicant’s skills for the nominated skilled occupation by a relevant assessing authority. That criterion must be satisfied at the time of the application: see s 31(1) of the Act and reg 2.03 of the Regulations. A “skilled occupation” is defined in reg 1.15I in relation to a person to mean:… an occupation of a kind:(a)that is specified by the Minister in an instrument in writing to be a skilled occupation; and(b)if a number of points are specified in the instrument is being available – for which the number of points are available; and(c)that is applicable to the person in accordance with the specification of the occupation. The phrase “relevant assessing authority” is defined in reg 2.26B which relevantly reads:(1)Subject to subregulation (1A), the Minister may, by an instrument in writing for this subregulation, specify a person or body as the relevant assessing authority for:(a) a skilled occupation; and(b) one or more countries;for the purposes of an application for a skills assessment made by a resident of one of those countries. The applicant’s application was denied by the Minister’s delegate on 8 March 2013. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review. On 6 January 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it was unable to make a favourable decision on the material before it without more, and invited him to give evidence and present arguments by telephone at a hearing on 5 February 2014. The applicant was advised that if he did not attend the hearing and a postponement was not granted, the Tribunal may make a decision on his case without further notice. On 5 February 2014, with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter, the Tribunal attempted to contact the applicant a number of times but these calls rang out to an unidentified voice mail. In those circumstances, the Tribunal decided to make its decision on the review pursuant to s 362B of the Act without taking any further action to enable the applicant to appear before it. On 11 February 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the visa. The Tribunal found that the applicable instrument for the purposes of Regulations 1.15I and 2.26B is “IMMI 12/023”. That instrument was signed by the Minister on 12 June 2012 and expressed to apply from that date. However, the applicant’s nominated skilled occupation (“Nurseryperson, ANZSCO code 362411”) was not a specified skilled occupation for the purposes of a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) visa under the applicable instrument. The Tribunal therefore found that at the time of the application the applicant had not applied for skills assessment for the nominated skilled occupation by the relevant assessing authority and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of cl 485.214. It further found that the applicant had not submitted any evidence of a skills assessment for any occupation. Accordingly the Tribunal found that the applicant had failed to satisfy the criteria for the grant of a Subclass 485 visa.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, even if an extension of time were granted, I do not consider that Mr Singh would have a reasonably arguable case. As the primary judge held at [47], “[i]t remains the case that he has not satisfied an essential pre-condition of the grant of the visa in question, namely satisfactory proof that he has the skills relevant to the visa for which he has applied and these skills had been independently assessed.” 4. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the application for an extension of time within which to appeal must be dismissed with costs fixed in the sum of $1756.00.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the first of these considerations, the applicant had provided a brief affidavit in support of his application in which he had deposed only that “I was sick on the day of hearing. I was unable to attend hearing because of sickness. I want to appear in court and present my arguments” (reasons of the Court below at [34]). However, the Court below found that:[35] Mr Singh has still not specified what the nature of his illness was on the earlier occasion. It is his position that he was sick. This afternoon I have asked him, in effect, what his arguments are as to why the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal is vitiated by legal error.[36] I appreciate the issue of jurisdictional error is a complicated one and difficult to explain to a layperson. However, apart from the fact that Mr Singh has agreed that he did not attend the hearing before the Migration Review Tribunal, to which he was invited and the telephone call which was made to him fell through, he has not specified any other arguments.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles As I have explained, the present application is for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal against the decision of the Court below made on 3 October 2014. Rule 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) requires any application for leave to appeal to be filed within 14 days of the date on which judgment was delivered, i.e., by 17 October 2014 in the present case. Accordingly, as the application was filed on 29 October 2014, it is necessary for the applicant to seek an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal under r 35.14. In determining whether to grant an extension of time in the exercise of discretion, the Court will consider such matters as the length of delay, any explanation offered for the delay, whether the respondent would be prejudiced by the grant an extension and the merits of the proposed appeal: e.g. SZSPR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109 at [16] (Farrell J); BZACZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1230; (2013) 139 ALD 140 at [23] (Rangiah J). Notwithstanding that the respondent accepts that he would not suffer any significant prejudice if an extension of time were granted, an extension of time should be refused if there is no merit in the proposed appeal: SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 756 at [24] (Flick J). In turn, if an extension of time is granted, leave to appeal against the decision refusing to set aside the default judgment given under r 16.05 of the FCC Rules would then be required by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) because that decision was interlocutory in nature: see e.g. Perera v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1417 at [4]-[5] (Bromberg J); BZADA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1062 at [3] (Rangiah J). In determining whether or not to grant leave to appeal, the Court must first consider whether the decision at first instance is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration and secondly whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court). The onus of satisfying these matters lies upon an applicant: Khondoker v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 654 at [56] (Foster J).3.2 Application of those principles to the present case