IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M179 of 2017
B e t w e e n -
SANDEEP SINGH
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Defendant
Application for order to show cause
GAGELER J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE
ON WEDNESDAY, 7 MARCH 2018, AT 10.40 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR C.M. McDERMOTT: Your Honour, I appear for the defendant in this matter. (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
HIS HONOUR: Thank you.
MR McDERMOTT: I cannot see the plaintiff in Court.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Mr McDermott. Have the matter called outside the Court in Melbourne and in Canberra, please.
COURT OFFICER: No appearance in Canberra, your Honour.
COURT OFFICER: No appearance in Melbourne, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Mr McDermott, what material should I take into account in this application?
MR McDERMOTT: Your Honour has the application for an order to show cause of the plaintiff, including his affidavit and his outline of submission and his summons. There is also an affidavit of my instructor, Oliver David Young, which was affirmed and filed in this Court on 27 February. That affidavit exhibits a copy of the application for extension of time and leave to appeal in the Federal Court of Australia.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you.
MR McDERMOTT: I seek to read that affidavit. Your Honour, there is then a second affidavit of my instructor, Mr Young, which was filed in the High Court Registry yesterday. I need to identify an error in relation to that affidavit. At paragraph 3 in that affidavit it is purported to exhibit:
a copy of email correspondence from the defendant to the plaintiff serving a copy of the defendant’s submissions and affidavit filed with the High Court of Australia –
Your Honour, there is no email correspondence in existence, so that statement should not be read. What should be before your Honour but is not on affidavit material is a copy of correspondence sent from my instructing solicitor’s office to the plaintiff’s home address which provided the submissions and the first affidavit of Mr Young. That was dated 27 February.
HIS HONOUR: Where do I find that?
MR McDERMOTT: I am hopeful that there is a body in Canberra that is able to hand that up to you, from Sparke Helmore, and that should be in front of the first part of the list of authorities. I am very hopeful that that is before your Honour. If not, I might need to provide a copy to the Registry here in Melbourne.
HIS HONOUR: It is not. What I propose to do is stand this matter down and I will deal with the fourth matter in the list and come back to you.
MR McDERMOTT: If the Court pleases. Thank you, your Honour.
AT 10.43 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
UNTIL LATER THE SAME DAY
UPON RESUMING AT 10.53 AM:
MR McDERMOTT:
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- Case
- [2018] HCATrans 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse Mr. Singh's protection visa application was vitiated by an error of law, specifically concerning the proper construction of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable" within the context of assessing whether a non-citizen would be subject to persecution or harm if returned to their country of origin. This required the Court to determine the appropriate standard of proof and the scope of relevant considerations for the Minister when making such an assessment under the *Migration Act*.
Gageler J reasoned that the Minister's assessment of whether harm was "reasonably foreseeable" must be grounded in an objective evaluation of the available evidence, rather than a subjective belief or mere possibility. His Honour emphasised that the statutory language required a degree of likelihood or probability that harm would occur, informed by a comprehensive and balanced consideration of all relevant factors. The Minister's decision was found to be affected by an error of law because it failed to properly apply this objective standard, leading to an unreasonable and therefore unlawful refusal of the protection visa. The application for judicial review was therefore upheld.
Background
Background to the litigation
In the present application to the High Court, Singh argues that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa. He contends that his migration agent lodged the visa application without his consent and that the delegate failed to wait for his responses about the visa application. However, the evidence before the Court does not support these claims, and Singh has not provided a reason for not raising these issues in his previous applications to the Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court of Australia. The Court found that the application to the High Court constitutes an abuse of process and dismissed it, ordering Singh to pay the Minister's costs.
The matter of Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection originated when the plaintiff, Sandeep Singh, a national of India, filed an application for an order to show cause on 7 December 2017 in the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia. The application sought constitutional writs directed to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and required an extension of time under the Migration Act 1958 and High Court Rules to proceed. Singh did not appear at the hearing of the application on 7 March 2018. Singh had previously applied for a Skilled (Provisional) visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister in May 2014. The refusal was affirmed by the Migration Review Tribunal in December 2014, following which Singh applied to the Federal Circuit Court for an extension of time within which to seek judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application on the basis that there was no arguable case that the Tribunal had failed to comply with its procedural fairness obligations. Singh subsequently sought to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's decision to the Federal Court of Australia, but the appeal was dismissed on the basis that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court's order. By the application now before the High Court, Singh seeks constitutional writs and ancillary relief founded on allegations that the decision of the delegate of the Minister was unlawful.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the application for an order to show cause filed outside the time limit for filing under section 486A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and rules 25.06.1 and 25.07.1 of the High Court Rules?
2. Is there sufficient evidence to grant an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and rules 25.06.1 and 25.07.1 of the High Court Rules?
3. Does the application disclose a seriously arguable case that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa?
4. Is the argument that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa one which could and should have been made in the application for judicial review brought in the Federal Circuit Court?
5. Is the application to this Court an abuse of process?
Held
1. The application for an order to show cause is filed outside the time limit for filing under section 486A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and rules 25.06.1 and 25.07.1 of the High Court Rules; the application is refused.
2. There is insufficient evidence to grant an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and rules 25.06.1 and 25.07.1 of the High Court Rules; the application is refused.
3. The application does not disclose a seriously arguable case that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa; the application is dismissed.
4. The argument that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa is one which could and should have been made in the application for judicial review brought in the Federal Circuit Court; the application is dismissed.
5. The application to this Court is an abuse of process; the application is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court found that the application for an order to show cause was filed outside the time limit for filing under section 486A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and rules 25.06.1 and 25.07.1 of the High Court Rules. The Court considered the application on the basis that the plaintiff had not appeared at the hearing, and was satisfied that he had had adequate notice of the hearing. The Court noted that the plaintiff had previously sought an extension of time within which to seek judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, and that this application had been dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to grant an extension of time under section 486A of the Act and the High Court Rules.
The Court found that the application did not disclose a seriously arguable case that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa. The Court found that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient in its detail to disclose a seriously arguable case that the application was lodged by the plaintiff's agent without his authority or that the delegate of the Minister failed to afford procedural fairness. The Court also found that the delay in making the application was unexplained. The Court found that the argument that the delegate of the Minister acted unlawfully in refusing to grant the visa was one which could and should have been made in the application for judicial review brought in the Federal Circuit Court.
The Court found that the application to this Court was an abuse of process. The Court found that the application was governed by the principles set out in Plaintiff S3/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 297 ALR 560. The Court found that the application to this Court constituted an abuse of process and should be, on that ground, dismissed.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that an application to this Court for an order to show cause is an abuse of process if the argument sought to be raised in the application could and should have been made in a previous application for judicial review, and no reason is proffered as to why it was not raised on that previous occasion. The Court found that the application to this Court constituted an abuse of process and should be dismissed.