FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 1694 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application in a case – proceeding discontinued by the applicant filing a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 – proceeding terminated at that point – nothing to resurrect – no basis for the grant of any leave – application wholly devoid of merit – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 |
| Applicant: | JASPREET SINGH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 1003 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Wilson |
| Hearing date: | 6 May 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 May 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 6 May 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| No appearance by the Applicant |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T. Smyth |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
///ORDERS
The name of the second respondent be amended to ‘Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ and the title of the proceeding herein be amended accordingly.
The application in a case filed by the applicant on 26 April 2016 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $2,000.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1003 of 2014
| JASPREET SINGH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)
Introduction
On 26 April 2016, Jaspreet Singh (“the applicant”) filed an application in a case in this proceeding in which he sought the following orders -
1. The Migration Application filed on 29 June 2014 and discontinued by the Applicant on 3 July 2015 be reinstated and allowed to continue and proceed on such terms as the Honourable Court orders.
2. That a final hearing date be set for the Migration Application.
3. That the Honourable Court do hear the Migration Application and if satisfied there has been a procedural error on review, remit the matter back to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a new hearing.[1]
[1] Application in a Case filed by the applicant on 26 April 2016 at p.2.
The first respondent (“the Minister”) opposed the application on two main grounds -
a)no factual basis had been demonstrated for the grant of the orders sought having regard to the fact the applicant was required but failed to show exceptional circumstances; and
b)any grant of the orders sought would be futile as the application was devoid of merit.
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 1694
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had properly considered and assessed the applicant's claims for protection, particularly in light of the evidence presented regarding the situation in the applicant's country of origin. This involved determining whether the delegate had applied the correct legal principles in assessing the credibility of the applicant's claims and the objective reasonableness of his fear of persecution.
Wilson J found that the delegate had failed to adequately consider crucial aspects of the applicant's evidence, specifically concerning the alleged persecution based on his membership of a particular social group. The Court held that the delegate's assessment was flawed because it did not engage with the specific details of the applicant's experiences and the broader context of the social group's vulnerability. The legal principle applied was that a decision-maker must genuinely consider all relevant evidence and provide adequate reasons for their findings, particularly when assessing claims for protection under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
Singh did not attend the scheduled hearing on 8 April 2014, leading the AAT to uphold the delegate's decision on 10 April 2014. Singh was dissatisfied with the AAT's decision and applied to the Federal Circuit Court on 29 May 2014 for judicial review under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case progressed, with directions made for a hearing on 10 August 2015. However, on 3 July 2015, Singh filed a notice of discontinuance, effectively ending the proceedings. Nearly a year later, on 26 April 2016, Singh filed an application to reinstate the case, seeking to have the AAT's decision reviewed and for a new hearing to be set.
Singh's application to reinstate the case was opposed by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, who argued that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the reinstatement and that the application was devoid of merit. Singh asserted in his affidavit that he sought reinstatement because the Minister had refused to intervene in his case, leaving him with no alternative but to pursue the judicial review application, or risk being sent home. The Court found that the notice of discontinuance had been properly and voluntarily filed by Singh, and there was no basis for setting it aside. The application for judicial review was dismissed as it did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error by the AAT and was largely a plea for a rehearing on compassionate grounds.
The matter of Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application in a case filed by Jaspreet Singh. Singh had originally lodged a migration application on 1 December 2010 seeking a Skilled (Provisional) visa, which was subsequently refused on 24 April 2012. Dissatisfied with the refusal, Singh applied for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 11 May 2012. Following a hearing, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Minister’s delegate on 10 April 2014. Singh then applied to the Federal Circuit Court on 29 May 2014 for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The case progressed with directions made by a Registrar on 19 August 2014, leading to a scheduled hearing on 10 August 2015. However, Singh voluntarily discontinued the proceeding by filing a notice of discontinuance on 3 July 2015. Subsequently, on 26 April 2016, Singh filed an application seeking to reinstate the discontinued proceeding, which was the matter heard on 6 May 2016. The Minister opposed Singh's application, arguing it was devoid of merit and futile. Judge Wilson dismissed Singh's application, finding it to be without merit and refusing to set aside the notice of discontinuance.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 valid and binding, and does it preclude the reinstatement of the proceeding?
2. Are there any grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, such as fraud, duress, lack of knowledge, or other invalidating factors?
3. Did the Tribunal commit any jurisdictional error in its decision, such as identifying a wrong issue, asking the wrong questions, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, or making an erroneous finding?
4. Does the applicant's narrative in the application for judicial review point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrates jurisdictional error by the Tribunal?
5. Is the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake?
Held
1. The applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 was valid and binding, and it precludes the reinstatement of the proceeding.
2. There are no grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, as there is no evidence of fraud, duress, lack of knowledge, or other invalidating factors.
3. The Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error in its decision.
4. The applicant's narrative in the application for judicial review does not point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrates jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
5. The applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds is akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by addressing the validity and binding nature of the applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015. The court found that the notice was validly and properly filed by the applicant, with no evidence of fraud, duress, or lack of knowledge affecting the voluntariness of the act. The authorities on the effect of these factors were surveyed, leading the court to conclude that the applicant is bound by the decision to discontinue the proceeding. Consequently, the court held that there is no basis for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, as there was no evidence that the notice was procured under invalidating circumstances. This conclusion aligns with the legal principles established in SZFOZ v Minister of Immigration and Citizen and Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
Next, the court examined whether there were any grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance. The applicant argued that the Minister's refusal to intervene necessitated the continuation of the case. However, the court found that the filing of the notice of discontinuance terminated the proceeding, and without leave, there was no case to continue. The court was not willing to grant the applicant the leave he sought. To reinstate the proceeding, the court would need to set aside the discontinuance, but the applicant's affidavit did not provide sufficient grounds for doing so. The court found that the notice of discontinuance was regular, voluntary, and properly filed, and there was no evidence of any invalidating factor.
The court then turned to whether the application for judicial review had any merit. The applicant's narrative in the application failed to point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrated jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The court highlighted that to attract the doctrine of jurisdictional error, a claim must point to the Tribunal committing an error such as identifying the wrong issue, asking the wrong questions, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, or making an erroneous finding. The applicant's grounds of review did not meet these criteria, and the applicant seemed to be pleading for a rehearing on compassion grounds, which is akin to merits review and outside the court's jurisdiction. The court cited higher authority in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd to support this point.
The court also examined whether the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds was akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake. The court found that the applicant's final sentence in his grounds of application, asking for a new student visa to help achieve his career goals, highlighted the lack of jurisdictional error in the application. The court concluded that the application was devoid of merit and dismissed the applicant's application in a case.
In summary, the court applied the principles of voluntary discontinuance and jurisdictional error in dismissing the applicant's application. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that a voluntary and properly filed notice of discontinuance terminates a proceeding, and without leave, there is no basis for reinstating the proceeding. The court followed prior authority in determining the effect of voluntary discontinuance and the criteria for setting aside such a notice. The court distinguished the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds from jurisdictional error, finding that such a request is akin to merits review, which the court is not permitted to undertake.