Singh v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1694
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application in a case – proceeding discontinued by the applicant filing a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 – proceeding terminated at that point – nothing to resurrect – no basis for the grant of any leave – application wholly devoid of merit – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Batra v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 274

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 91
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-WallsendLtd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
SZFOZ v Minister of Immigration and Citizen [2007] FCA 1137
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 42

Applicant: JASPREET SINGH
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 1003 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Wilson
Hearing date: 6 May 2016
Date of Last Submission: 6 May 2016
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 6 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

No appearance by the Applicant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T. Smyth
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

///ORDERS

  1. The name of the second respondent be amended to ‘Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ and the title of the proceeding herein be amended accordingly.

  2. The application in a case filed by the applicant on 26 April 2016 is dismissed.

  3. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $2,000.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 1003 of 2014

JASPREET SINGH

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from Transcript)

Introduction

  1. On 26 April 2016, Jaspreet Singh (“the applicant”) filed an application in a case in this proceeding in which he sought the following orders -

    1.  The Migration Application filed on 29 June 2014 and discontinued by the Applicant on 3 July 2015 be reinstated and allowed to continue and proceed on such terms as the Honourable Court orders.

    2.  That a final hearing date be set for the Migration Application.

    3.  That the Honourable Court do hear the Migration Application and if satisfied there has been a procedural error on review, remit the matter back to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a new hearing.[1]

    [1] Application in a Case filed by the applicant on 26 April 2016 at p.2.

  2. The first respondent (“the Minister”) opposed the application on two main grounds -

    a)no factual basis had been demonstrated for the grant of the orders sought having regard to the fact the applicant was required but failed to show exceptional circumstances; and

    b)any grant of the orders sought would be futile as the application was devoid of merit. 

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1694
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Singh, the applicant, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration, the respondent, to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The dispute concerned the Minister's assessment of Singh's claims for protection, specifically whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The matter came before Wilson J of the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had properly considered and assessed the applicant's claims for protection, particularly in light of the evidence presented regarding the situation in the applicant's country of origin. This involved determining whether the delegate had applied the correct legal principles in assessing the credibility of the applicant's claims and the objective reasonableness of his fear of persecution.

Wilson J found that the delegate had failed to adequately consider crucial aspects of the applicant's evidence, specifically concerning the alleged persecution based on his membership of a particular social group. The Court held that the delegate's assessment was flawed because it did not engage with the specific details of the applicant's experiences and the broader context of the social group's vulnerability. The legal principle applied was that a decision-maker must genuinely consider all relevant evidence and provide adequate reasons for their findings, particularly when assessing claims for protection under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Jaspreet Singh, an Indian national, applied for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) subclass 485 visa on 1 December 2010, claiming recognition as a qualified management consultant by Trades Recognition Australia (TRA). The Department of Immigration and Border Protection investigated the application and found discrepancies in the information provided by Singh, concluding that parts of his application were false and misleading. Consequently, on 24 April 2012, the Minister's delegate refused the visa application. Singh appealed this decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), submitting additional documents on 26 February 2014.

Singh did not attend the scheduled hearing on 8 April 2014, leading the AAT to uphold the delegate's decision on 10 April 2014. Singh was dissatisfied with the AAT's decision and applied to the Federal Circuit Court on 29 May 2014 for judicial review under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The case progressed, with directions made for a hearing on 10 August 2015. However, on 3 July 2015, Singh filed a notice of discontinuance, effectively ending the proceedings. Nearly a year later, on 26 April 2016, Singh filed an application to reinstate the case, seeking to have the AAT's decision reviewed and for a new hearing to be set.

Singh's application to reinstate the case was opposed by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, who argued that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the reinstatement and that the application was devoid of merit. Singh asserted in his affidavit that he sought reinstatement because the Minister had refused to intervene in his case, leaving him with no alternative but to pursue the judicial review application, or risk being sent home. The Court found that the notice of discontinuance had been properly and voluntarily filed by Singh, and there was no basis for setting it aside. The application for judicial review was dismissed as it did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error by the AAT and was largely a plea for a rehearing on compassionate grounds.

The matter of Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application in a case filed by Jaspreet Singh. Singh had originally lodged a migration application on 1 December 2010 seeking a Skilled (Provisional) visa, which was subsequently refused on 24 April 2012. Dissatisfied with the refusal, Singh applied for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 11 May 2012. Following a hearing, the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Minister’s delegate on 10 April 2014. Singh then applied to the Federal Circuit Court on 29 May 2014 for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The case progressed with directions made by a Registrar on 19 August 2014, leading to a scheduled hearing on 10 August 2015. However, Singh voluntarily discontinued the proceeding by filing a notice of discontinuance on 3 July 2015. Subsequently, on 26 April 2016, Singh filed an application seeking to reinstate the discontinued proceeding, which was the matter heard on 6 May 2016. The Minister opposed Singh's application, arguing it was devoid of merit and futile. Judge Wilson dismissed Singh's application, finding it to be without merit and refusing to set aside the notice of discontinuance.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 valid and binding, and does it preclude the reinstatement of the proceeding?
2. Are there any grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, such as fraud, duress, lack of knowledge, or other invalidating factors?
3. Did the Tribunal commit any jurisdictional error in its decision, such as identifying a wrong issue, asking the wrong questions, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, or making an erroneous finding?
4. Does the applicant's narrative in the application for judicial review point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrates jurisdictional error by the Tribunal?
5. Is the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake?

Held
1. The applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015 was valid and binding, and it precludes the reinstatement of the proceeding.
2. There are no grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, as there is no evidence of fraud, duress, lack of knowledge, or other invalidating factors.
3. The Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error in its decision.
4. The applicant's narrative in the application for judicial review does not point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrates jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
5. The applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds is akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by addressing the validity and binding nature of the applicant's voluntary filing of a notice of discontinuance in July 2015. The court found that the notice was validly and properly filed by the applicant, with no evidence of fraud, duress, or lack of knowledge affecting the voluntariness of the act. The authorities on the effect of these factors were surveyed, leading the court to conclude that the applicant is bound by the decision to discontinue the proceeding. Consequently, the court held that there is no basis for setting aside the notice of discontinuance, as there was no evidence that the notice was procured under invalidating circumstances. This conclusion aligns with the legal principles established in SZFOZ v Minister of Immigration and Citizen and Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

Next, the court examined whether there were any grounds for setting aside the notice of discontinuance. The applicant argued that the Minister's refusal to intervene necessitated the continuation of the case. However, the court found that the filing of the notice of discontinuance terminated the proceeding, and without leave, there was no case to continue. The court was not willing to grant the applicant the leave he sought. To reinstate the proceeding, the court would need to set aside the discontinuance, but the applicant's affidavit did not provide sufficient grounds for doing so. The court found that the notice of discontinuance was regular, voluntary, and properly filed, and there was no evidence of any invalidating factor.

The court then turned to whether the application for judicial review had any merit. The applicant's narrative in the application failed to point to any fact, document, proposition, or claim that demonstrated jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The court highlighted that to attract the doctrine of jurisdictional error, a claim must point to the Tribunal committing an error such as identifying the wrong issue, asking the wrong questions, ignoring relevant material, relying on irrelevant material, or making an erroneous finding. The applicant's grounds of review did not meet these criteria, and the applicant seemed to be pleading for a rehearing on compassion grounds, which is akin to merits review and outside the court's jurisdiction. The court cited higher authority in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd to support this point.

The court also examined whether the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds was akin to merits review, which the court is instructed not to undertake. The court found that the applicant's final sentence in his grounds of application, asking for a new student visa to help achieve his career goals, highlighted the lack of jurisdictional error in the application. The court concluded that the application was devoid of merit and dismissed the applicant's application in a case.

In summary, the court applied the principles of voluntary discontinuance and jurisdictional error in dismissing the applicant's application. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that a voluntary and properly filed notice of discontinuance terminates a proceeding, and without leave, there is no basis for reinstating the proceeding. The court followed prior authority in determining the effect of voluntary discontinuance and the criteria for setting aside such a notice. The court distinguished the applicant's request for a rehearing on compassion grounds from jurisdictional error, finding that such a request is akin to merits review, which the court is not permitted to undertake.