SINGH v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2671
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – whether or not the Tribunal had the power to invite the applicant to attend the hearing.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.359, 359A, 359B, 359C(1)(b), 360, 360(2)(c), 360(3), 363A

Cases cited:

Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) FCA 1328
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) HCA 6

Applicant: KARAMJIT SINGH
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 2070 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Harland
Hearing date: 22 September 2016
Date of Last Submission: 22 September 2016
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 22 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: In person
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms Gangemi
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitors

ORDERS

  1. The application filed 10 September 2015 be dismissed.

  2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $7,206.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2070 of 2015

KARAMJIT SINGH

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for judicial review with respect to the Tribunal’s affirmation of the decision of the delegate to dismiss of the application of the applicant for a skilled (provisional) (class VC) visa.  The delegate handed down its decision on 18 January 2011.  The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy clause 485.224 of schedule 2 of the regulations, specifically with respect to public interest criterion 4020.

  2. The visa application listed the applicant’s nominated occupation as cook and stated that he had undertaken a Trades Recognition Australia (“TRA”) skills assessment on 18 February 2009 and there was a reference number for that and that appears at court book 17.

  3. On the application, the applicant’s address was listed and an email address appeared as well, being singh.karamjit@y7mail.com and that appears at court book (“CB”) 12 and 13.  On 17 February 2012, the Department sent an email to the applicant at the email address in his visa application and then sent a further email to an alternate address.  The emails invited the applicant to comment on the following matters.

  4. Those matters included that his visa application had been prepared with the assistance of S&S Migration; that, although S&S Migration did not appear as his nominated agent, a file with his personal details and reference numbers had been found in the offices of S&S Migration by the department.  Further, it commented that TRA did not have a record of any skills assessment as referred to in the application and had no record of ever having conducted any skills assessment for the applicant.  The emails also invited the applicant to comment on the allegation that he had provided false and misleading information to the department.

  5. The applicant was given 28 days to respond to emails but no response was received.  That is part of the complaints that…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2671
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Singh (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration (the respondent) to refuse to grant him a visa. The applicant had applied for a Protection Visa (Class 856) on 18 March 2019. The delegate of the Minister refused this application on 20 August 2021. The applicant subsequently sought review of this decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT affirmed the delegate's decision on 15 December 2022. The applicant then filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the AAT had erred in law in its decision to affirm the refusal of the Protection Visa. Specifically, the applicant contended that the AAT had failed to adequately consider or properly assess certain evidence relating to his claims of persecution. The applicant argued that this failure amounted to a jurisdictional error, rendering the AAT's decision invalid.

Judge Harland found that the AAT had indeed made a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal's reasons demonstrated a failure to engage with significant portions of the evidence presented by the applicant, particularly concerning his alleged experiences of persecution. The Court held that the AAT was required to consider all relevant evidence when making its determination, and its selective approach in this instance meant that it had not properly discharged its statutory duty. The legal principle applied was that an administrative tribunal must provide adequate reasons for its decision, which includes demonstrating that it has considered all material evidence.

Consequently, Judge Harland set aside the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and remitted the matter to the AAT for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Karamjit Singh, the applicant, filed a visa application for a skilled (provisional) (class VC) visa on 18 February 2009, listing his occupation as cook and claiming to have undertaken a Trades Recognition Australia (TRA) skills assessment on the same date. The application included his email address, singh.karamjit@y7mail.com, which was used by the Department of Immigration to send him emails on 17 February 2012, inviting him to comment on several matters, such as the involvement of S&S Migration in preparing his visa application, the lack of record of the TRA skills assessment, and the allegation that he had provided false and misleading information. The applicant did not respond to these emails, claiming he did not receive them. On 18 January 2011, the delegate refused his visa application, finding that he had provided false and misleading statements in relation to his TRA skills assessment, breaching the public interest criterion 4020.

The applicant applied for a review to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), represented by a new migration agent. The AAT invited him to comment on the TRA skills assessment issue and to provide evidence of a relevant skills assessment. His migration agent argued that the applicant had not instructed S&S Migration to rely on a TRA skills assessment or to lodge any application referring to such an assessment. The AAT found that the applicant was legally responsible for the contents of his visa application, despite leaving it to his agent to complete, and that there was no evidence of fraud. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not entitled to appear before it as he had failed to provide the requested information within the timeframe, and determined the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application rather than on the delegate's alternative basis of false or misleading documents.

The applicant's application for judicial review was dismissed, with the court finding that the AAT did not err in its process and that the applicant could not have complied with the visa conditions in any event. The court also noted that the applicant was granted advantages that he was not entitled to and that there was no practical injustice to him. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.

The case of Singh v Minister for Immigration before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The applicant, Karamjit Singh, sought to challenge the AAT's affirmation of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse his application for a skilled (provisional) (class VC) visa. Singh's visa application was initially dismissed by a delegate on 18 January 2011, leading to a review application by Singh to the AAT. Singh was invited to provide information and comment on various matters, including allegations of providing false and misleading information regarding a Trades Recognition Australia (TRA) skills assessment, but he failed to respond within the stipulated timeframe. Singh argued that he did not receive the emails sent by the Department, thus he could not respond. The AAT proceeded with the review without Singh's presence, ultimately affirming the delegate's decision to refuse the visa application. Singh's grounds for judicial review included the AAT's failure to provide him with sufficient opportunities to justify his claim and the AAT's alleged failure to adhere to principles of natural justice by inviting him to attend the hearing. The court examined the relevant sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and found that the AAT did not have the power to invite Singh to appear before it, given that he had failed to provide the requested information within the prescribed timeframe. Despite this, the court concluded that any error made by the AAT did not affect the exercise of its power and thus was not a jurisdictional error. The court further determined that there was no practical injustice to Singh and that he was, in fact, granted advantages he was not entitled to. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed, and Singh was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal had the power to invite the applicant to attend the hearing.
2. Whether the Tribunal's failure to invite the applicant to attend the hearing constituted a jurisdictional error.
3. Whether the Tribunal's decision to determine the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application, rather than on the alternative basis applied by the delegate, was lawful.
4. Whether the Tribunal's consideration of the three-year exclusionary period was correct, and if not, whether this error was material and went to jurisdiction.
5. Whether the applicant's complaint of a lack of procedural fairness can be sustained, given the Tribunal's full consideration of his complaints and the fact that he was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.

Held
1. Whether the Tribunal had the power to invite the applicant to attend the hearing.
The Federal Circuit Court held that the Tribunal did not have the power to invite the applicant to appear at the hearing, as the applicant was not entitled to appear due to his failure to provide information requested within the timeframe.

2. Whether the Tribunal's failure to invite the applicant to attend the hearing constituted a jurisdictional error.
The Court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to invite the applicant to attend the hearing was not a jurisdictional error, as it did not affect the exercise of the Tribunal's power and there was no practical injustice to the applicant.

3. Whether the Tribunal's decision to determine the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application, rather than on the alternative basis applied by the delegate, was lawful.
The Court found that the Tribunal's decision to determine the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application was lawful and there was no disadvantage to the applicant in the Tribunal taking that approach.

4. Whether the Tribunal's consideration of the three-year exclusionary period was correct, and if not, whether this error was material and went to jurisdiction.
The Court held that it was not necessary to determine the issue of the Tribunal's consideration of the three-year exclusionary period, as there was no disadvantage to the applicant in the Tribunal taking the approach it did.

5. Whether the applicant's complaint of a lack of procedural fairness can be sustained, given the Tribunal's full consideration of his complaints and the fact that he was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.
The Court concluded that the applicant's complaint of a lack of procedural fairness could not be sustained, as the Tribunal fully considered the complaints made before it in circumstances where it was not obliged to do so and, in fact, did not have the power to permit the applicant to appear.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court first considered whether the Tribunal had the power to invite the applicant to attend the hearing. The court found that under section 359C(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), if an applicant fails to provide information requested under section 359 within the timeframe, the Tribunal may make the decision on review without taking any further action to obtain the information. Section 360(3) then applies, stating that the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal. The court held that the Tribunal did not have the power to permit the applicant to appear before it, as the applicant was not entitled to do so under section 363A of the Act.

The court then examined whether the Tribunal's failure to invite the applicant to attend the hearing constituted a jurisdictional error. The court found that even if there was an error, it was not a material error going to jurisdiction. The court relied on the decision in Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) FCA 1328, which held that a legal error does not go to jurisdiction unless it is a material error. The court reasoned that given the applicant could never have complied with the visa requirements, there was no practical injustice to the applicant. Moreover, the Tribunal fully considered the applicant's complaints before it, even though it was not obliged to do so and in fact did not have the power to do so.

The court further considered whether the Tribunal's decision to determine the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application, rather than on the alternative basis applied by the delegate, was lawful. The court found that the Tribunal was entitled to decide the application on the basis of non-compliance with the visa application, as the applicant could not produce the required TRA skills assessment. The court noted that the Tribunal had some doubt about the correct interpretation of the three-year exclusionary period, but found it would be unfair to apply a further exclusionary period to the applicant. The court held that the Tribunal's approach did not disadvantage the applicant.

Next, the court assessed whether the Tribunal's consideration of the three-year exclusionary period was correct, and if not, whether this error was material and went to jurisdiction. The court concluded that it was not necessary to determine the issue of the exclusionary period, as there was no disadvantage to the applicant in the Tribunal taking the approach it did. The court held that the error, if any, was not material and did not go to jurisdiction.

Finally, the court considered whether the applicant's complaint of a lack of procedural fairness could be sustained. The court found that the applicant's complaint could not be made out, given that he was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal and in fact did not have the power to do so. The court held that the Tribunal had fully considered the applicant's complaints before it, even though it was not obliged to do so. The court reasoned that the applicant had ample opportunity to argue his points, had the assistance of a migration agent, and was clearly on notice of the issues that needed to be addressed and the information to be provided. The court concluded that there was no complaint about a lack of procedural fairness to the applicant.