FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2020] FCA 213
Judge(s): WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 27 February 2020 Category: No catchwords Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AM(1), 37AO(2) and 37AT(4)
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 21, r 1 and r 5
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.27(e)
Cases cited: Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398
Re Singh [2012] FCA 322
Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2014] FCA 76
Singh v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2009] HCASL 194
Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 850; 114 ALD 178
Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 833; 282 ALR 56
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers Registry: Victoria Division: General Division Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 16 ORDERS
IN THE MATTER OF SINGH, IN THE APPLICATION OF MOHINDER SINGH
MOHINDER SINGH
Applicant
JUDGE:
WHEELAHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) it is directed that the Registry shall not accept for filing the documents lodged by the applicant on 22 November 2019, and the amended draft notice of appeal lodged by the applicant on 25 November 2019.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHEELAHAN J:
Introduction
On 22 November 2019, the applicant, who is self-represented, lodged an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of Bromberg J made on 27 July 2011 in Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 833; 282 ALR 56. By that decision, Bromberg J dismissed the applicant’s application to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Singh v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 850; 114 ALD 178, in which the Tribunal had refused him leave to institute other proceedings in the Tribunal. Bromberg J also found that the applicant had engaged in a long history of vexatious litigation (see [26]-[68]), and made an order that –
The Respondent, Mohinder Singh, may not institute any proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia without leave of the Court.
Since then, the applicant has made numerous applications for an extension of time and leave to appeal from Bromberg J’s decision. His applications have been rejected on more than 30 occasions by judges of the Court. There are published reasons for rejecting two of the applicant’s earlier applications: Re Singh [2012] FCA 322 (North J); and Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2014] FCA 76 (Mortimer J).
Rule 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that a document will not be…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 213
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the validity of the earlier order made by Bromberg J, which was made pursuant to O 21, r 1 of the Federal Court Rules 1979. The court found that the order remained valid and in force, and was not affected by the transitional provisions of the Access to Justice (Federal Jurisdiction) Amendment Act 2012. The court also considered the legislative and factual context in which the order was made, and found that the applicant had failed to satisfy the court that the present application was not an abuse of process and had a reasonable prospect of success.
The present application was the latest in a series of applications by the applicant to re-litigate matters that had already been determined. The court had previously held the applicant's series of applications to be repetitive, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The court found that the applicant had not established any arguable basis for alleging error in the earlier decision, and that the application was therefore vexatious. The court directed that the Registry shall not accept the application for filing.
In summary, the court found that the applicant's grounds for appeal were extravagant and unfounded, and that the application was vexatious. The court directed that the Registry shall not accept the application for filing. The applicant's application was considered to be the latest in a series of repetitive and vexatious proceedings, and the court found that the applicant had not satisfied the burden of establishing that the application was not an abuse of process and had a reasonable prospect of success.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) it is directed that the Registry shall not accept for filing the documents lodged by the applicant on 22 November 2019, and the amended draft notice of appeal lodged by the applicant on 25 November 2019.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Rule 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that a document will not be accepted for filing if the Court has given a direction that it not be accepted. For the following reasons, I shall direct the Registry not to accept the application and associated documents for filing.The operation of the order requiring leave to institute proceedings The order of Bromberg J referred to at [1] above was made pursuant to O 21, r 1 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), which were repealed by the Federal Court Rules 2011, r 1.03. The order remains valid and in force because all orders made by a superior court of record are valid unless and until set aside: State of New South Wales v Kable [2013] HCA 26; 252 CLR 118, at [32] and the authorities cited therein. Further and for the sake of completeness, the order is also subject to the transitional provisions of the Access to Justice (Federal Jurisdiction) Amendment Act 2012 (Cth), which inserted Part VAAA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which relates to vexatious proceedings orders. The amending Act includes a savings provision, at item 12(4) of schedule 3, which provides –The amendments made by this Schedule do not affect the validity of any orders that were made before the commencement of this item under rules of court made under the Family Law Act 1976, the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 or the Judiciary Act 1903 (to the extent the rules relate to vexatious proceedings). Bromberg J’s order must be understood in the legislative and factual context in which it was made. The legislative context included that, pursuant to O 21, r 5 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 as then in force, the Court could only grant leave if it was satisfied that the proceeding was not an abuse of process and there was prima facie grounds for the proceeding. The factual context included the applicant’s long history of vexatious litigation, which Bromberg J reviewed in detail. With regard to that context, I consider that the burden on the applicant in seeking leave to institute a proceeding is to satisfy the Court that the proposed application is not an abuse of process and that it has a reasonable prospect of success, before the Court would grant leave for the applicant to institute the proceeding. This supports the purpose of Bromberg J’s order, which was to prevent the applicant from instituting further vexatious proceedings. For the following reasons, the applicant has failed to satisfy the Court that the present application is not an abuse of process and that it has a reasonable prospect of success.The present application The present application is difficult to follow. It is the latest in a series of applications by the applicant that seek to re-litigate matters that have already been determined. The Court has previously held the applicant’s series of applications to be repetitive in both the subject matter and nature of the allegations that they make, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process: Singh, in the application of Mohinder Singh [2014] FCA 76 at [11]-[12].