Singh and DHL Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (Compensation)

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Singh and DHL Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2024] AATA 317 (1 March 2024)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2023/0895

Re:Paramjit Singh

APPLICANT

AndDHL Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd

RESPONDENT

INTERLOCUTORY DECISION

Tribunal:Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

Date:1 March 2024  

Place:Melbourne

The application under s 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 is refused.

.....................[sgd]...................................................

Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – failure to undertake rehabilitation program – suspension of employee’s right to institute proceedings under s 37(7) Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 – new claim for compensation – further applications for review lodged with Tribunal – Tribunal’s jurisdiction following suspension decision considered

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a stay of the implementation of decision – effect of stay of implementation, public interest, consequences for parties considered – stay refused

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

CASES

Australian Postal Corporation v Forgie [2003] FCAFC 223
Australian Postal Corporation v Sinnaiah [2013] FCAFC 98
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v PTLZ [2008] FCAFC 164
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2009] FCAFC 185
Birdseye v Tax Practitioner’s Board [2020] FCA 1235
Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47
Mihaljcic and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2010] AATA 599
Re Pescott and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2013] AATA 680
Re Repatriation Commission and Delkou (1985) 8 ALD 454
Re Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798
Re Trewin and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 31 ALD 629
Trajkovski v Telstra Corporation Limited [1998] FCA 169

REASONS FOR INTERLOCUTORY DECISION

Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

1 March 2024

BACKGROUND

  1. This matter concerns a number of decisions made under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act) in respect of an injury, or injuries, Mr Singh suffered at work in March 2022. More particularly, it concerns the interaction of provisions of the SRC Act, and the procedural powers of the Tribunal under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act).

  2. The claims and associated matters are as follows:

    (a)2023/0895: an application lodged on 15 February 2023 for review of a decision of the Respondent dated 19 January 2023 purporting to suspend Mr Singh’s right to compensation under the SRC Act, pursuant to s 37(7) of that act;

    (b)2023/4470: an application lodged on 22 June 2023 for review of a decision of the Respondent dated 15 June 2023 denying liability for a subsequent claim made by Mr Singh for psychological injury in respect of the same workplace circumstances; and

    (c)2023/4471: an application lodged on 22 June 2023 for review of a decision of the Respondent dated 15 June 2023 in which it denied any ongoing liability for compensation in respect of Mr Singh’s back condition, for which the Respondent had originally accepted liability, in respect of the same workplace circumstances.

  3. The Respondent lodged documents pursuant to s 37 of the AAT Act (T documents) in matter 2023/0895.…

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Details
Case
[2024] AATA 317
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Singh against DHL Supply Chain (Australia) Pty Ltd before Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member of the Tribunal. The dispute arose from Mr Singh's failure to undertake a rehabilitation program, which the respondent argued suspended his right to institute proceedings under section 37(7) of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (SRC Act). Mr Singh had lodged new claims for compensation, and further applications for review had been filed with the Tribunal. The core issue was the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear these subsequent applications in light of the alleged suspension.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether Mr Singh's right to institute proceedings was lawfully suspended under section 37(7) of the SRC Act, and consequently, whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider his new claims for compensation. Additionally, the Tribunal considered an application by the respondent for a stay of the implementation of any decision, weighing the public interest and consequences for the parties.

The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the interpretation of section 37 of the SRC Act, drawing on the Full Court's decision in *Forgie*. It was held that a formal determination must be made before an employee's rights can be suspended under section 37(7). The Tribunal found that the applicant's primary contention that his rights were not lawfully suspended until his refusal was evaluated was fundamentally flawed, as the decision in *Forgie* merely reinforced the necessity of an initial determination. The Tribunal also addressed the respondent's submissions regarding *Sinnaiah*, concluding that section 37 needed to be read as a whole, and the rehabilitation program referred to in section 37(7) was specific to the injury for which a determination had been made under section 37(1). The Tribunal emphasised that the words "under this act" in section 37(7) did not extend the suspension beyond the injury for which the program was ordered, and that each claim lodged by an employee is treated as a claim for a separate injury, citing the High Court in *Canute*.

Consequently, the Tribunal refused the respondent's application for a stay of implementation under section 41(2) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975*. The Tribunal found it unnecessary to make any specific orders as sought by the respondent, based on its interpretation of section 37(7) of the SRC Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows from the above that the summary I provided above at [30] should guide the further management of Mr Singh’s applications. I also do not consider it necessary to make any specific order as originally sought by the Respondent, given my interpretation of s 37(7) of the SRC Act.INTERLOCUTORY DECISION For the reasons given above, the Tribunal refuses to grant the application under s 41(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Respondent submits that the various authorities cited in the Applicant’s submissions are distinguishable on a range of grounds [15]-[19]. After further detailed consideration of specific authorities, the Respondent contends that no reasoning can be identified that supports the joint hearing of all applications [33]. Finally, it is contended that, self-evidently again, the most practical action is for Mr Singh to take steps to engage with his rehabilitation program [34].CONSIDERATION The decision in Forgie clarified a matter of jurisdiction that had arisen in respect of s 37 of the SRC Act. The Full Court confirmed that a determination must be made in order for an employee’s rights to be suspended as set out in s 37(7) [40], [56], [63], and such decisions are thereby within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction [24]. For this reason, the Applicant’s primary contention is fundamentally flawed. The Full Court makes reference to rights not being lawfully suspended until an employee’s refusal has been evaluated, but this is merely to reinforce the need for a determination to be made in the first instance. To give this reasoning greater force is to misread the decision. While the Respondent sought to grapple with Sinnaiah in its submissions, those submissions, too, appear to contain a fundamental misreading of the decision. The Full Court identified that s 37 needs to be read as a whole, and the rehabilitation program referred to in s 37(7) is the one in respect of which a determination will have been made under s 37(1) [26]. It then goes on to state explicitly that the words ‘under this act’ in s 37(7) operate to distinguish rights accruing elsewhere, and ‘were not inserted to extend the suspension beyond the injury for which the rehabilitation program is ordered’ [30]. This reading is reinforced by the preservation in s 37(7A) of the entitlement to the cost of medical treatment [31]. The Full Court then further stressed the importance of placing limits on the potentially draconian effect of a wide interpretation [32]. In short, the court noted that ‘[t]he subsection does not speak of all rights, nor does it speak of rights in respect of all injuries’. This paragraph might suggest that a suspension may affect injuries that have a relationship to the determination giving rise to the suspension, however this – with respect – appears to misapply the logic being applied. That is, simply identifying a link between Mr Singh’s later claim for psychological injury to the rehabilitation program, does not lead to the conclusion for which the Respondent contends. This is due to the nature of decision-making under the SRC Act. As the Applicant has essentially submitted, each claim lodged by an employee is treated as a claim for a separate injury. The High Court addressed this succinctly in Canute [10]. Plainly, in circumstances where a rehabilitation program has been prepared in respect of only one accepted (physical) injury, it is not realistic to argue that a later claim for a separate injury cannot be dealt with.