Singh, A v The Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs
[1985] FCA 601
•04 DECEMBER 1985
Re: ANITA SINGH by her next friend ENDER GEETI KAUR SINGH; RANBIER SINGH and
ENDER GEETI KAUR SINGH
And: THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
No. G 156 of 1985
Immigration
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Wilcox J.
CATCHWORDS
Immigration - Applications for entry permits by parents of child born in Australia - Alleged denial of natural justice - Whether reference of applications to Immigration Review Panel created obligation of natural justice - Relevance of interests of infant daughter - Whether Panel was required to consider the precise nature and extent of the disadvantages faced by daughter if parents denied right of residence in Australia - Extent of obligation by decision maker to enquire as to the facts of a relevant matter for consideration - Extent of obligation of Panel to consider economic and social conditions prevailing in India.
Migration Act 1958 ss. 6, 6A, 7.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s. 5.
Salemi v. MacKellar (1977) 137 C.L.R. 396, Queen v. MacKellar; ex parte Ratu (1977) 137 C.L.R. 461, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Gaillard (1983) 49 A.L.R. 277, Kioa v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1984) 4 F.C.R. 40, Karunakaran v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Full Court, 22 February 1985, not reported), Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B. 223, Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1977) A.C. 1014, Peko-Wallsend Limited v. Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1985) 59 A.L.R. 51 applied.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Haj-Ismail (1982) 40 A.L.R. 341, Queen v. Vestry of St. Pancras (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 371, Prasad v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Wilcox J., 26 February 1985, not reported) referred to.
HEARING
SYDNEY
#DATE 4:12:1985
ORDER
The Application be dismissed.
The applicants pay to the respondent his costs of the proceedings.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
The first applicant, Anita Singh, is a two year old child born in Australia during the time that her parents, Ranbier Singh and Ender Geeti Kaur Singh, have been unlawfully resident here. By virtue of her birth in this country she is an Australian citizen: see s. 10 of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948. Although Anita's father and mother have joined in the proceedings, as the second and third applicant respectively, the emphasis in the argument has been upon the manner in which Anita would be affected by decisions relating to her parents.
The applicants seek review, pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, of the conduct of the Immigration Review Panel in recommending to the delegate of the respondent Minister the refusal of applications by the second or third respondents for the grant to them of resident status. I understand them to mean by "resident status" the grant to them of temporary and permanent entry permits under ss. 7 and 6 respectively of the Migration Act 1958.
Mr. Singh is a Sikh. He was born in Punjab State, India in 1956. In 1981 he went to Malaysia where he met and married his wife, a citizen of Malaysia who was born in 1959. Mr. and Mrs. Singh entered Australia on 29 July 1981, as visitors pursuant to temporary entry permits which were extended until 29 October 1981. They made friends in Sydney and decided to stay in Australia. After 29 October 1981, as Mr. Singh put it in his affidavit in these proceedings, the couple "remained incognito" until, on 2 September 1983, they were arrested by officers of the Australian Federal Police. At that time the birth of Anita was imminent, so neither Mr. or Mrs. Singh was taken into custody. Each applied to be allowed to remain permanently in Australia but, by a letter dated 7 February 1984, the Regional Director of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs advised that this application had been refused. The letter referred to the possibility of review of the decision by the Immigration Review Panel and enclosed a leaflet identifying 12 "review rights". They included "review right 4", which applied to the refusal of permanent residence to a person illegally in Australia who is eligible for consideration under s. 6A of the Migration Act, and "review right 11", which applied to a person who had been located as a prohibited immigrant and as such is deportable under s. 18 of the Act but is eligible for consideration for resident status under s. 6A(1)(b) of the Act.
On 21 February 1984 Mr. and Mrs. Singh applied for review by the Panel, claiming that the decision to be reviewed fell within review rights 4 and 11. In response to an invitation, on the application form, to set out any aspects of the case which they felt had been not considered by the Department, or insufficiently considered, they said:
"Mr. Singh is an Indian national and unable to return to India because of political differences in his state.
Mrs. Singh is a Malaysian national. Mr. Singh is unable to live in Malaysia and has no residential right as in Australia in addition he is a Hindu and the Moslem majority discriminate in permits of employment for non Moslem Malays. Mrs. Singh may not be eligible for residence in India and in any event her husband is unable to return."
They went on to state:
"We are able to support ourselves and our baby born in Australia. We regard ourselves as political refugees, my wife by marriage to me."
In a covering letter addressed to the Minister, forwarding the application, the solicitors for Mr. and Mrs. Singh expanded upon the matter of hardship:
"They inform us that Mr. Singh who comes from Bihar State was virtually a refugee in Malaysia from troubles in his own country although he did not take part in any political matters but suffered loss and hardship. In Malaysia he is an alien and without passing comment about the attitude of the Malaysian Government which is nationalistic and supportive of its main racial stock it nevertheless is a fact of life that he would be unalbe to obtain any status for work or otherwise in Malaysia. Mrs. Singh who is a highly literate person and well educated in English and well able to express herself has indicated her readiness to approach the minister to make a special plea and give all undertakings for herself and husband not to present any burden or charge upon the system. Their only wish is to intergrate (sic) into this country."
In view of the reliance placed upon s. 6A by Mr. and Mrs. Singh it is desirable to set out the relevant provisions of that section:
"6A (1) An entry permit shall not be granted to a non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless one or more of the following conditions is fulfilled in respect of him, that is to say -
(a) he has been granted, by instrument under the hand of a Minister, territorial asylum in Australia;
(b) he is the spouse, child or aged parent of an Australian citizen or of the holder of an entry permit;
(c) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and the Minister has determined, by instrument in writing, that he has the status of refugee within the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 or of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at New York on 31 January 1967;
(d) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force, is authorized to work in Australia and is not a prescribed non-citizen; or
(e) he is the holder of a temporary entry permit which is in force and there are strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of an entry permit to him.
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
(4) In sub-section (1) -
(a) a reference to an aged parent shall be read as a reference to a parent who has attained the age upon the attainment of which an age pension might be granted to him under the Social Services Act 1947;
(b) a reference to a child of a person shall be read as a reference to a child of the person who is not married and -
(i) has not attained the age of 18 years; or
(ii) has attained the age of 18 years but has not attained the age of 21 years and has been determined by the Minister to be an integral part of the family of that person; and
(c) a reference to a prescribed non-citizen shall be read as a reference to -
(i) the holder of a temporary entry permit who, in connection with his application, or last application, for a visa in respect of his travel to Australia acknowledged, in writing, that he understood and accepted that he would leave Australia on the completion of his studies or training in Australia;
(ii) the holder of a temporary entry permit who is the spouse or a child of a person referred to in sub-paragraph
(i) and was granted a temporary entry permit permitting him to enter Australia only by reason that he was the spouse or child of that person; or
(iii) the holder of a temporary entry permit who, immediately before the grant of that temporary entry permit, was a person referred to in paragraph 8(1)(b) or the spouse or dependent relative of such a person.
(5) . . .
(6) . . .
(7) . . .
(8) In this section, a reference to an entry permit shall be read as a reference to an entry permit other than a temporary entry permit."
Officers of the Department prepared a report upon the application for review. This report, which was dated 30 April 1985, dealt with the case at some length. Reference was made to the government policy of preventing circumvention of migrant entry policy by temporary entrants. It was pointed out that mere compliance with the conditions of s. 6A of the Migration Act did not ensure approval, that
"the grant of resident status is approved only after all the merits of the case have been considered and policy requirements have been taken into account."
The report expressed the view - a view which has never been challenged - that Mr. and Mrs. Singh did not fulfil the conditions of s. 6A(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Act and proceeded to discuss whether the case fell within para. (e). Paragraphs 13-15 of the report were as follows:-
"13. Subsequently the couple were interviewed at the Sydney office on 7 December 1983 at which it was established:
- both came to Australia with the intention of seeking resident status if they felt happy here,
- Mr. Singh was ineligible for residence in Malaysia despite marriage to a Malaysian citizen,
- there was no impediment to both living in India, although Mrs Singh preferred not to, considering that she and her child would have no future prospects there,
- Mr Singh claimed to be a Sikh and his return to India would involve him with local religious disputes,
- both admitted working illegally, Mr Singh for two years, Mrs Singh for a few weeks only. (From September 1983 they lived off savings, and had cashed in their airline tickets in July 1982),
- both denied receiving instructions to depart in 1981,
- Mrs Singh claimed that if she were denied the right of residence in Australia, she would return to Malaysia, as she was not prepared to live in India, but Mr Singh and their daughter would live in India.
14. It was confirmed with the Malaysian Consulate in Sydney that Mr. Singh has no right of residence in Malaysia.
15. In the light of all available information their application was refused by an authorised officer on 22 December 1983 on the grounds that entry to Australia had been as visitors with the intention of permanent residence, and whilst sympathy was expressed in their not being allowed joint residence in Malaysia, they held right of return to Mr Singh's country of origin, India. No strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of residence status under Section 6A(1)(e) had been established. The couple were informed by letter of their refusal on 7 February 1984."
The report then dealt with the review by the Department of the case in the light of the request submitted on 21 February 1984. The claim made on behalf of the applicants were summarized, particular mention being made of the fact that Anita was born in Australia. Reference was made to the claim for political refugee status:
"19. Because of the claims for political refugee status, the case was reviewed by D.O.R.S. section in Sydney, and Status and Protection Section of Refugees and International Branch of the Department in Canberra.
These reviews resulted in the following comments:
'If he (Mr Singh) is a Sikh from the Punjab, we can advise that the DORS Committee has recently assessed the claims of several Sikh applicants for refugee status. The applicants were rejected following advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs which although recognising the general civil disorder in the Punjab, this situation could not be described as persecution. If there had been no engagement in illegal activities, such as participation in illegal demonstrations there would be no police interest in a particular individual. In any case, DFA advised Sikhs were free to settle in any part of India and thereby escape civil disorder in the Punjab'
'In the the circumstances we see no grounds to recommend any change to the decision of the Sydney Office'
20. Refugees Branch further commented:-
'From the information on file, it is my view that Mr and Mrs Singh do not qualify for change of status under any of the guidelines relevant to Section 6A(1)(e) of the Migration Act. In particular there is no evidence that Mr and Mrs Singh would be singled out by the Indian authorities to receive any undue attention amounting to a gross violation of human rights'.
21. There are a number of discrepancies in the available information, e.g. whether Mr Singh is a Sikh or a Hindu; his appeal claims his residence was in Bihar, but his application for change of status indicated residence in Punjab from 1956 until 1980; a number of suggested alias have also been reported for both Mr and Mrs Singh. These may have been for the purpose of obtaining illegal work in Australia. A member of the Sikh community in a letter to the Regional Director Sydney, also made certain uncorroborated allegations concerning the activities of Mr and Mrs Singh in Australia. These matters, however have not been relevant to or influenced the decision of refusal by the Sydney office."
The report concluded:
"23. It is necessary to adjudge Mr and Mrs Singh's claims against the policy principles that underlie the grant of resident status to temporary entrants. For social, economic and humanitarian reasons the Government has a program of planned immigration and people intending settlement in Australia are expected to apply for migrant entry while still overseas. The provision of grant of resident status is intended for people whose circumstances have changed materially while in Australia. It is not intended for people who avoid migrant entry processing overseas by meeting the relatively easy requirements for entry as visitors or temporary residents and then seek to change their status in Australia. It follows that visitors and other temporary entrants who fail to comply with the conditions of their entry prejudice community interests and the fair and efficient administration of Government policies which are designed to facilitate the entry of people seeking genuine temporary stay.
24. The claims made in the appeal have been fully taken into account in reviewing this case including the fact that Mr and Mrs Singh's daughter was born in Australia, but it is evident that there are no impediments to the family taking up residence in India. It is equally evident from the outset that Mr and Mrs Singh entered Australia as visitors with the intention of remaining for permanent residence. Because Mr and Mrs Singh's resident status application and subsequent appeal lack demonstrable strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds, it has been decided to maintain the decision of refusal."
The Immigration Review Panel considered the matter on 15 May 1985. The documents before it included the applicants' request for review and the departmental report of 30 April. In its decision the Panel referred to the circumstances, including the fact that Anita is an Australian citizen and the hardship alleged by Mr and Mrs Singh if refused residence in Australia. The Panel specifically accepted that Mr Singh is not likely to be admitted to Malaysia for residence. The decision concluded:
"7. The Panel also noted the statement in their appeal that they regard themselves as political refugees, "my wife by marriage to me", was reviewed by the Determination of Refugee Status Section in Sydney and the Status and Protection Section of Refugees and International Branch in Central Office. The Panel has considered the comments made by these Sections as set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the attached statement. It is satisfied that these claims have received proper consideration and accepts the conclusions reached.
8. The Panel has some sympathy for the couple and the dilemma faced by them having regard to their situation and their child's entitlement to live in Australia because of her citizenship, but agrees with the Department's view that there is no substantiated evidence that the couple is likely to be subjected to a gross violation of human rights if obliged to leave Australia and settle in India (where it is noted two brothers of Mrs Singh reside). It also supports the view that an authorised visit for a strictly limited period should not be used as a means to circumvent normal migrant entry procedures, to which on the evidence available to it, the Panel does not believe they would be entitled.
9. The Panel finds that the legislation, policy and criteria relevant to this appeal have been correctly applied.
10. After considering the matters raised by the applicant the Panel has concluded that the circumstances of this case are not such as to warrant special treatment and recommends that the departmental decision be maintained and explained."
The recommendation of the Panel was adopted by a delegate of the Minister, Mr. J.B. Machin, Senior Assistant Secretary of the Review Branch of the Department. On 31 May 1985 Mr. Machin wrote to Mr. and Mrs. Singh advising them of the recommendation of the Panel, that - at the direction of the Minister - he had studied the report of the Panel, that he agreed with the recommendation and that the applications for the grant of resident status had not been approved. Reasons were given. Mr. Machin concluded by suggesting that Mr. and Mrs. Singh make arrangements to leave Australia within 28 days and by stating that their failure to depart within that time could result in deportation action.
On 27 June 1985 an Application was filed in this Court seeking review of the Panel's decision. Two grounds were specified in the Application and have been argued: that the Panel failed to have due regard to the position of the child, Anita; and that the Panel failed to have due regard to the economic and social conditions prevailing in India.
The argument in respect of the first ground, the position of Anita, is couched in terms of natural justice. It is said that the creation of the Immigration Review Panel, and the reference by departmental officers on behalf of the Minister of the case to that Panel, created in Anita a legitimate expectation that her position would be fully considered. It is said that, in breach of the duty of natural justice thus created, the Panel gave merely token consideration to the effect upon Anita of the denial of resident status to her parents.
Counsel for the applicant concede that, upon the present state of the authorities, the requirements of natural justice do not usually apply to decisions to refuse entry permits under ss. 6 or 7 of the Migration Act and to deport prohibited non-citizens pursuant to s. 18 of the Act: see Salemi v. MacKellar (1977) 137 CLR 396; Queen v. MacKellar; ex parte Ratu (1977) 137 CLR 461, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Gaillard (1983) 49 ALR 277, Kioa v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1984) 4 FCR 40, Karunakaran v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Full Court, 22 February 1985, not reported). But they point to the reservation, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Haj-Ismail (1982) 40 ALR 341 at p 348, of the possibility that there may arise an exceptional case in which the principles of natural justice do apply to a decision to deport. They contend that such a possibility extends equally to applications for permits under ss. 6 and 7 and that the present case is exceptional because of the action of the Minister in creating the Immigration Review Panel, and thus subjecting the applications to review by a quasi-judicial body.
The duty to apply the requirements of natural justice, in exercising power under a statute to make a decision affecting the rights of an individual, is imposed by the common law but that imposition is subject to any indication of a contrary legislative intention. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to see how the existence of the duty - as distinct from any breach of duty - may be affected by action taken by the decision maker in relation to the making of a particular decision. If the law imposes upon the Minister no duty to give natural justice, no such duty can arise because, as a matter of administrative convenience, the Minister chooses to establish a non-statutory mechanism for review. It is not clear to me what type of case may have been envisaged in Haj-Ismail as exceptionally attracting the requirements of natural justice but, in principle, this cannot be such a case. In my opinion the authorities to which I have referred compel me to hold that the Immigration Review Panel, and the delegate of the respondent Minister in adopting the recommendations of the Panel, were not bound by the rules of natural justice.
However, that conclusion does not dispose of the substance of the first ground of challenge to the Panel's recommendation. Whether or not the rules of natural justice applied to the decision, the Panel was bound to take into account the position and interests of Anita, an Australian citizen: see Kioa at p. 49 and the cases cited therein. Any failure to take those matters into account, in a real and not merely in a perfunctory manner, must vitiate in law the decision of the Panel: see s. 5(2)(b) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act.
I have already mentioned that Anita's position was in fact referred to in the departmental report. In para. 13 the writer reported Mrs. Singh's claim that, if she were denied the right to reside in Australia, she would return to Malaysia and Mr. Singh and Anita would live in India; a clear intimation of the prospect of the separation of Anita from her mother. In the summary in para. 24 reference was made to the fact that Anita was born in Australia; a reference that might be expected to convey to the members of the Panel that Anita was an Australian citizen. So the gravity of the situation facing Anita was clearly expressed.
The Panel did understand the point of the reference to Anita being born in Australia. In para. 8 of their decision they referred to:
"the dilemma faced by (Mr. and Mrs. Singh) having regard to their situation and their child's entitlement to live in Australia because of her citizenship."
But it is said on behalf of the applicants that it is not enough that the Panel appreciated the existence of a dilemma, and that any solution would be disadvantageous to Anita. It is argued that, having been alerted to Anita's status, it was encumbent upon the Panel to consider with precision the nature and extent of those disadvantages.
At the interview of 7 December 1983, referred to in the departmental report, Mrs. Singh stated that Anita would live in India with her father. In evidence before me Mrs. Singh said that, if she and her husband were forced to leave Australia, Anita would remain here. Mr. and Mrs. Singh would go to Malaysia, where Mr. Singh can only stay for a month at a time, and from Malaysia the couple would again seek entry permits to allow them to rejoin Anita in Australia. However, it is obvious that Mr. and Mrs. Singh would not need to take a final decision on their course of action until the time came to leave Australia. They might change their minds again. One further possibility is that Anita would be taken to live in Malaysia with her mother, perhaps temporarily, perhaps permanently. But even this does not exhaust the possibilities; the family may go elsewhere. Under these circumstances, any obligation upon the Panel to make a detailed assessment of the disadvantages which Anita would face, under each of the avaiable possibilities, would be onerous indeed.
It is clear law that a decision maker is bound to take into consideration all matters relevant to the decision to be made which, at the time the decision is to be made, are before him or her, whether actually - see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223 at p 228, Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (1977) AC 1014 especially at pp 1064-1065 - or constructively - see Peko-Wallsend Limited v. Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1985) 59 ALR 51 and Tameside at p 1076. There may be occasions when the adequate consideration of a relevant matter necessarily involves the making of some inquiry as to the facts. Such a case may arise where the material before the decision maker indicates cause for concern about a relevant matter but where a person who would be affected by an adverse decision - and who might normally be expected to put his case to the decision maker - had no reasonable opportunity to put the full facts relating to that concern before the decision maker. An example is furnished by this very case. Mr. and Mrs. Singh alleged the recent persecution in India - and particularly in the Punjab - of members of the Sikh community. In the light of notorious events this was plainly a matter of concern, but it was a matter about which they necessarily had no direct knowledge. Under those circumstances, the matter could be adequately considered only with the benefit of better information than Mr. and Mrs. Singh might be expected to provide. That information was likely to be obtainable through official channels. Reasonableness required that such information be available to the Panel. The Department recognized that fact in placing before the Panel the information upon the situation in India which it had recently obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
However, the matter of Anita's future contact with, and support by, her parents is different in character from the situation of the Sikh community in India. That was not a matter in relation to which Mr. and Mrs. Singh lacked the opportunity to put the full facts. They knew better than anyone else both their intentions and their circumstances. The Department did obtain confirmation of one specific assertion, the claim that Mr. Singh would not be able to reside in Malaysia. It is difficult to see what other steps could have been taken, by either the Department or the Panel, to assess the nature or extent of the disadvantage to Anita which would flow from any deportation of her parents from Australia. Everything depended upon the course finally chosen by Mr. and Mrs. Singh. All that could be said, and this was well understood by both the departmental officers and the Panel, was that, in that event, Anita would face the disadvantage of being taken from the country of which she was a citizen, and where she might expect to enjoy certain advantages in relation to education, social security and standard of living, or alternatively of suffering a separation from her parents.
I am not aware of any authority which supports the proposition that, in relation to matters within the knowledge of an affected person, the decision maker is bound to embark upon an independent inquiry as to the facts. As a matter of principle such a proposition cannot be sustained. The foundation of the rules in relation to consideration of relevant matters, and ignoring irrelevant matters, is the duty to exercise a statutory discretion fairly: see The Queen v. Vestry of St. Pancras (1890) 24 QBD 371 at p 375. In the situation postulated, fairness requires no more than that the decision maker fully consider the material actually or constructively before him or her at the time of making the decision.
In Prasad v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (26 February 1985, not reported) I discussed the question whether an administrative decision could be regarded as invalid because unreasonable - see s. 5(2)(g) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act - in circumstances where the conclusion was not unreasonable upon the material before the decision maker but where it might properly be characterized as unreasonable if there was taken into account evidence subsequently adduced to a court. I expressed the tentative view that the material relevant for determining the matter of reasonableness should be confined to the information which was in fact before the decision maker, actually or constructively, together with such additional facts as the decision maker would have ascertained but for any unreasonable failure by him to make inquiries. That approach is, I think, equally apposite to a challenge to a decision upon the closely related ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration. In the present case, it is impossible to characterize as unreasonable the failure of the Panel to undertake further inquiries as to Anita's way of life under each of the available possibilities. It follows that the first ground of challenge must be rejected.
The second matter relied upon by the applicants is the allegation that the Panel failed to have due regard to the economic and social conditions prevailing in the country - India - to which Mr. Singh would be obliged to return if deported from Australia. The suggestion is that, although the Panel recognized the existence of civil disorder in the Punjab and obtained some information upon that matter, it did not consider the situation in that State, or in India as a whole, in respect of other considerations relevant to Anita's welfare; such as the extent and merit of health, education and communication services and the standard of living which she would be likely to have.
Although this submission is presented to the Court as being an alternative to the first ground of challenge, it is, I think, but a more specific application of that ground. Whereas the first ground contemplates a variety of situations, this ground assumes a decision by her parents that Anita would be taken to live in India. That certainly is a possibility and any specific matter of concern arising out of that possibility - such as current civil unrest or persecution - needed to be investigated. But I do not see how more could reasonably be expected. The Panel must have been aware, in a general way, of differences between living conditions in India and in Australia. No particular problem was called to its attention by Mr. and Mrs. Singh. Mr. Singh lived in India until 1981 and I think that it was not unreasonable for the Panel to assume that he would have referred to any specific matter, adversely affecting Anita, which resulted from the difference in living standards. No matter having been raised, and none appearing in the material before it, the Panel was not obliged to initiate its own investigation, which could only have been of the most general kind.
In my opinion it is not demonstrated that the Immigration Review Panel or the delegate of the Minister erred in law in the decisions which they made in relation to the applications for entry permits. The Application for review should be dismissed, with costs.
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