FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sinergia Construction Project Management Pty Ltd v Clear Interiors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 1308
File number: SAD 182 of 2016 Judge: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 7 November 2016 Catchwords: COSTS – application for an order for costs against a non-party — non-party the sole director and sole shareholder of plaintiff company – non-party granted leave to represent plaintiff company – circumstances not sufficient to justify non-party costs order Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459G
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 4.01, 4.04, 4.05
Cases cited: Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429
Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCAFC 5
Knight v FP Special Assets Limited (1992) 174 CLR 178
Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 661
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 26 October 2016 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Plaintiff: The Plaintiff did not appear Counsel for the Defendant: The Defendant did not appear ORDERS
SAD 182 of 2016 BETWEEN: SINERGIA CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND: CLEAR INTERIORS PTY LTD
Defendant
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The defendant’s application for an order that the plaintiff and Mr Desmond Struck be jointly and severally liable to pay the defendant’s costs is dismissed.
2.Subject to the order in paragraph 3, the plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the action.
3.The defendant is to pay the costs of Mr Struck of and incidental to the defendant’s application for an order for costs against him personally.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
On 7 October 2016, I made an order dismissing the plaintiff’s application to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). I published reasons for making that order on 24 October 2016.
The defendant applies for an order that the plaintiff and its sole director and shareholder, Mr Desmond Struck, be jointly and severally liable to pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings.
For the reasons given below, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to make an adverse costs order against Mr Struck.
PRINCIPLES
This Court has the power to award costs against a non-party: s 43(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FC Act). In respect of an equivalent power conferred upon the High Court, Gageler J said in Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 661 (at [43]):
In Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd, this Court held that its discretionary power to make orders against non-parties extends to the circumstance ‘where…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1308
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue centred on whether Mr Struck should be personally liable for costs against him, given his dual role as the sole director and shareholder of the plaintiff and his representation of the plaintiff in the proceedings. The court considered the principles established in Knight v Simmons, which highlight the distinction between a party's personal involvement in proceedings and their corporate capacity. The court also examined whether Mr Struck's conduct was immoderate or irrational and whether his application to represent the plaintiff was opposed by the defendant. The court found that Mr Struck's submissions, though not without fault, were not so devoid of merit as to warrant personal liability for costs. The court further held that there was no evidence of bad faith or improper purpose on Mr Struck's part.
The court dismissed the defendant's application for a costs order against Mr Struck personally, noting that Mr Struck had been granted leave to represent the plaintiff without opposition. The court found that Mr Struck's advocacy, while not meeting the standards of a legal practitioner, was reasonable given his lack of legal training and the absence of notice or guidance. The court also noted that the plaintiff's application to set aside the statutory demand, though unsuccessful, was not so devoid of merit as to warrant personal liability for costs. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the action, subject to the defendant reimbursing Mr Struck's costs related to the application for costs against him.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The defendant’s application for an order that the plaintiff and Mr Desmond Struck be jointly and severally liable to pay the defendant’s costs is dismissed.
2. Subject to the order in paragraph 3, the plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the action.
3. The defendant is to pay the costs of Mr Struck of and incidental to the defendant’s application for an order for costs against him personally.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The application for an order for costs against Mr Struck personally was made without notice to him. In the circumstances, I afforded Mr Struck the opportunity to obtain advice in relation to the application and to file written submissions in respect of it.CONSIDERATION Mr Struck acknowledges that the principles explained by the High Court in Knight are applicable. I accept Mr Struck’s submission that on an application for costs to be awarded against a person who is the sole director and sole shareholder of a corporate litigant it will not be sufficient to point merely to the circumstance that the person has an interest in the subject matter of the proceedings, or has played an active part in them in those capacities. Such a person, at least in his or her capacity as a director of a corporate litigant, must ordinarily play an active part in the legal proceedings. To proceed otherwise may constitute a breach of the duties the person owes to the corporation. Although Mr Struck appeared as the plaintiff company’s representative at the hearing of its application, I take into account the circumstance that his application to represent the company was not opposed by the defendant, nor did the defendant take issue with Mr Struck’s assertion, made from the bar table, that legal representation was not affordable for the plaintiff. In those circumstances, I afford very little weight to the fact that Mr Struck acted as the plaintiff’s representative. Absent a legal representative, he was the most appropriate person to make submissions on the plaintiff’s behalf. There is some merit in the defendant’s contention that Mr Struck’s written and oral submissions were, in part, immoderate in their tone. However, that circumstance is to be weighed against Mr Struck’s status as a non-lawyer. Where leave is granted to a non-lawyer to represent a company, it is to be expected that the advocacy of the non-lawyer may not display the same standard of professionalism and circumspection that is to be expected of an admitted legal practitioner, at least in circumstances where the non-lawyer (as in the present case) has been given no notice, warning or guidance as to those standards. In those circumstances, I received Mr Struck’s submissions alleging “ransom and coercion” as amounting to a submission that the statutory demand procedure was utilised by the defendant as a wrongful means of recovering a genuinely disputed debt. Although I rejected that submission, it does not follow that the substance of the submission was irrelevant or irrational. The manner in which Mr Struck conducted the proceedings does not, of itself, justify the making of a costs order against him personally. Further, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff’s application to set aside the statutory demand was so devoid of merit that it could not possibly have succeeded and that Mr Struck acted “irrationally” in continuing to prosecute the action as the plaintiff’s representative. As I have said in my reasons for dismissing the plaintiff’s application to set aside the statutory demand, the case was one in which the evidence adduced in support of the plaintiff’s case was framed at a level of generality or abstraction that was insufficient to persuade the Court that the dispute alleged by the plaintiff was “genuine” within the meaning of the Act. The evidence was prepared and filed at a time when the plaintiff company was legally represented. Whilst that circumstance might be relevant to the costs order that ought to be made as between the parties themselves, it weighs heavily in the balance in my consideration as to whether Mr Struck should be personally liable to pay the defendant’s costs. I am satisfied that there is no suggestion of any bad faith or improper purpose on Mr Struck’s part in the conduct of the proceedings as a whole.