[1999] TASSC 8
PARTIES: SIMS KNIPE MAVER & PEREIRA PTY LTD
v
VINCE, Sheila Jean
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: APPELLATE
FILE NO/S: LCA 66/1998
DELIVERED: 10 February 1999
HEARING DATE/S: 3 February 1999
JUDGMENT OF: Evans J
CATCHWORDS:
Workers Compensation - Proceedings to obtain compensation - Determination of claims - Costs - Generally - Unfettered discretion conferred by statute - Discretion to be exercised in accordance with recognised principles - Ordinarily, costs "follow the event" - Weight given to irrelevant matters by Commissioner.
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), ss25(1)(b), 25(1A), 59.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [155]
Farrow v State of Tasmania (1997) 7 Tas R 127, applied.
Unilever Australia Limited v Gunn and Another 143/1998; Lowrie v State of Tasmania (Education Department) 109/1998, considered.
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, discussed
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: I L Hallett
Respondent: S Taglieri
Solicitors:
Appellant: Page Seager
Respondent: Phillips Taglieri
Judgment category classification:
Judgment ID Number: [1999] TASSC 8
Number of pages: 4
Serial No 8/1999
File No LCA 66/1998
SIMS KNIPE MAVER & PEREIRA PTY LTD v SHEILA JEAN VINCE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT EVANS J
10 February 1999
By application dated 24 March 1997, the respondent worker applied to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal for a determination that she was entitled to worker's compensation in respect of a disease which arose out of and in the course of her employment on or about 20 January 1997. She alleged that she suffered from an "adjustment disorder" caused by matters which occurred at her workplace over a period of time.
The learned Commissioner found that the worker suffered from an adjustment disorder as a consequence of a number of matters which arose out of and in the course of her employment. He was accordingly satisfied that she suffered from a disease for the purposes of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the Act"), s25(1)(b). The learned Commissioner then considered whether the worker was denied compensation because her disease arose substantially from the employer's reasonable actions, decisions and the like as detailed in the Act, s25(1A). Relying on the decision of the High Court in Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 519, the learned Commissioner approached this aspect of the claim on the basis that the burden of proving the disentitling matters was on the appellant employer. He concluded that the disentitling matters had been established, that is, that the worker's disease arose substantially from matters which were encompassed by the Act, s25(1A), and accordingly the worker was denied compensation.
The learned Commissioner ordered that each party bear their own costs of the application to the Tribunal. The employer has appealed against that order.
Pursuant to the Act, s59(1), the learned Commissioner had an unfettered discretion as to costs. The exercise of that discretion required the application of established principles. I adopt the following passage from the decision of Underwood J in Farrow v State of Tasmania (1997) 7 Tas R 127 at…
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- [1999] TASSC 8
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centered on the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner regarding costs under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The court had to determine whether the Commissioner correctly exercised his discretion and if there were any circumstances warranting a departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event.
The court held that the Commissioner erred in his exercise of discretion. The Commissioner considered irrelevant matters, such as the employer's failure to concede the employee's entitlement to compensation, the employer's burden of proof on the exclusion provision, and the beneficial nature of the legislation. The court clarified that these factors were not relevant in the exercise of the discretion to award costs. The Commissioner also erred in giving weight to the reasonableness of the employee's conduct in pursuing her claim, which did not entitle her to avoid paying costs. The court concluded that there were no grounds to deny the employer its costs, and the appeal was allowed. The order for costs was set aside, and the employee was ordered to pay the employer's costs of the reference to the Tribunal, including the costs of the application for costs.
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