Simpson v The Queen - [2001] HCATrans 182

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S180 of 2000

B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY LLOYD SIMPSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 5 JUNE 2001 AT 2.58 PM

MR J.C. PAPAYANNI: If your Honours please, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Jeffreys & Associates)

MR A.M. BLACKMORE: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by S.E. O’Connor, Director for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales))

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Papayanni.

MR PAPAYANNI: If the Court pleases, this is an application for special leave and in somewhat unusual circumstances. The applicant pleaded guilty before his Honour Justice Studdert and ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ: As a result of which he was not put on trial for murder.

MR PAPAYANNI: Well, I think the Crown accepted the plea of manslaughter.

GLEESON CJ: Yes.

MR PAPAYANNI: Then the matter was put before the Court of Criminal Appeal that on the facts as appeared that as to whether there was – the crime of manslaughter had been committed. The Court of Criminal Appeal did not look into the law and decided it according to law, except to say that it was a dangerous act and in similar circumstances – and what is submitted here is that manslaughter usually does not get very much attention and the last really prominent decision was that of Wilson in 1984, which was in relation to an unlawful and dangerous act, and although in Wilson they referred to the fact of the criminal negligence, there is no real decision in relation to criminal negligence except the one in Victoria of Nydam which was referred to by his Honour.

The situation, of course, was that in Nydam they reviewed the law in relation to criminal negligence and his Honour accepted that and although in Nydam’s Case the question as to whether there was a subjective or objective test was decided in favour of the subjective test.

GLEESON CJ: But whatever is the question, it was admitted by the plea.

MR PAPAYANNI: Yes, that is correct.

GLEESON CJ: If we are going to review the law on manslaughter, we would be better to do it in a case in which somebody pleas not guilty, would we not?

MR PAPAYANNI: Yes. Well, all I am asking here, your Honour, is the question as to the facts, whether they constitute the crime of manslaughter ‑ ‑ ‑

GLEESON CJ: Whether they could have constituted the crime of manslaughter.

MR PAPAYANNI: Yes.

GLEESON CJ: Because if they could have constituted a crime of manslaughter, the plea of guilty admitted that they did.

MR PAPAYANNI: Well, admitted the facts, but it did not admit the law in relation to it and his Honour did not refer to the law in relation to a trespasser and his Honour,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Simpson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Simpson v The Queen [2001] HCATrans 182
Case: [2001] HCATrans 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Simpson v The Queen* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia by the applicant, Simpson, against his conviction for murder. The dispute arose from the applicant's assertion that the trial judge had erred in law by failing to direct the jury adequately on the issue of self-defence.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge's summing up to the jury sufficiently explained the elements of self-defence, particularly in relation to the applicant's perception of the threat and the reasonableness of his response. The court was required to consider the adequacy of the directions given concerning the subjective and objective aspects of self-defence as established in Australian criminal law.

The High Court, comprising Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, found that the trial judge's directions were inadequate. Their Honours reasoned that the summing up did not sufficiently convey to the jury the importance of considering the circumstances as they appeared to the accused at the time of the incident, and the reasonableness of his actions in those perceived circumstances. The legal principle applied was that a proper direction on self-defence must clearly articulate both the subjective belief of the accused and the objective assessment of the reasonableness of their response, allowing the jury to properly consider whether the defence had been made out. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed.

Orders