Simon Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council

[2025] QCA 66

COURT OF APPEAL

BOND JA

Appeal No 602 of 2025
QIRC No 35 of 2024

SIMON MUTONHORI  Appellant/Respondent

v

MOUNT ISA CITY COUNCIL  Respondent/Applicant

BRISBANE

THURSDAY, 8 MAY 2025

JUDGMENT

BOND JA:  The appellant before this court is the appellant in a proceeding pending in the Industrial Court of Queensland, constituted by Deputy President Hartigan.

On 23 January 2025, the Industrial Court made an interlocutory order in the course of that proceeding in these terms:

“Leave is granted for the Respondent to be legally represented pursuant to section 530(1)(a)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).”

The appellant has, by notice of appeal filed 12 February 2025, sought to appeal to this Court in respect of that order.

There is jurisdiction to appeal to the Court of Appeal from Deputy President Hartigan’s decision, limited to the grounds of error of law or excess or want of jurisdiction.

It transpires, having regard to the written submissions of the appellant and oral submissions made by the appellant today, that the appellant does not, despite his notice of appeal, really complain about the order granting the respondent leave to be legally represented in the appeal with which the Industrial Court is seized.  Rather, the appellant’s complaint concerns observations made in the reasoning of Deputy President Hartigan which the appellant thinks are adverse to the argument he wishes to present on the substantive hearing of his appeal in the Industrial Court.

Appeals are against orders, not reasons.  That proposition is trite law.  For the appeal in this court to succeed, the appellant would need to demonstrate that the discretionary order made by Deputy President Hartigan to permit the respondent to be legally represented was in error and the error would need to be either legal error or jurisdictional error.

No such error has even been identified or seems to me to be arguable in relation to the order made.  And, even if it was, it would be necessary, because the appeal is on a matter of procedure, to persuade this court, before it would interfere with such an order, that allowing the error to go uncorrected would cause the appellant  a substantial injustice.

It is difficult to conceive of how there could be any merit in an argument that the decision to allow the respondent to be legally represented in the proceeding with which the Industrial Court is presently seized, which decision was made on the justification that it would enable the proceeding to be dealt with more efficiently having regard to its complexity, could possibly cause any substantial injustice, and no suggestion to that effect was made before me by the appellant.

Insofar as it is appropriate to have regard to the prospects of the appeal in dealing with the matter which is formally before me, I express the view that it is almost inevitable, barring some extraordinary circumstance that I cannot presently foresee, that the appellant will fail on the appeal to this Court.

The remarks I have made…