SIGLEY & SIGLEY
[2018] FamCA 3
•10 January 2018
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SIGLEY & SIGLEY | [2018] FamCA 3 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS CHILD ORDER – Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to have an overseas order registered in Australia – Where the applicants seek to register certain orders made by a Court in the United States of America – Where the children’s birth was facilitated by surrogacy agreement between the applicants and a “gestational carrier” – Where the applicants are the biological parents of the children – Whether the order is an “overseas child order” for the purposes of the Act – Whether the applicants are “proceeding to” Australia – Where the Court is satisfied the overseas order should be registered with this Court. FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the Court seeks to protect the identity of the applicants, the children and gestational carrier – Where any person seeking to search the Court’s file in this matter must first obtain leave from a Judge of this Court. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) | |
| FIRST APPLICANT: | Mr Sigley |
| SECOND APPLICANT: | Ms Sigley |
| FILE NUMBER: Suppressed by Court Order | |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 10 January 2018 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Forrest J |
| HEARING DATE: | By way of Written Submissions |
REPRESENTATION
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr S Page Harrington Lawyers |
Orders
That the Orders of the District Court of L County, State C, United States of America on 18 May 2017, be registered with this Court.
That the full names of the applicants and their occupations, the full name of the children, D and E, this Court’s file number, and any other fact or matter that may identify the children or their parents shall not be published in any way, and only anonymised Reasons for Judgment and Orders (with cover sheets excluding the registry, file number, as well as the parties’ real names) shall be released by the Court to non-parties without further contrary order of a Judge of this Court, it being noted that the applicants will be provided, through their solicitors, with one copy of the orders, one copy of the Reasons for Judgment and one cover sheet of the Reasons for Judgment that includes the file number.
That no person shall be permitted to search the Court file in this matter without first obtaining the leave of a Judge of this Court.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Sigley & Sigley has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
| Mr Sigley |
First Applicant
And
| Ms Sigley |
Second Applicant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By Application in a Case filed on 4 August 2017, the applicants, Mr Sigley and Ms Sigley , ask the Court to register Orders made by a Court in L County, State C, in the United States of America. They have also asked for the matter to be determined on the papers in chambers. The matter was referred to me by a Registrar of this Court for determination. As there are no parties other than the applicants and they have no wish to be heard in open court, preferring to rely on their solicitor’s written submissions already provided, I am prepared to determine the matter in chambers but will publish my judgment in open court.
The applicants each filed an affidavit on 4 August 2017, and rely upon them in support of their application. They are both Australian citizens, and are originally from Victoria. They have been residing in the United States for some years, and met in that country in January 2015. They married in 2015. Mr Sigley is a consultant. Ms Sigley is employed as a professional. The parties currently reside in the US.
Ms Sigley suffers from a medical condition which prevents her from carrying a baby through pregnancy to full-term. As such, the applicants’ twin daughters, D and E, were conceived through assisted reproductive technology by the in vitro fertilisation of Ms Sigley’s ova using Mr Sigley’s sperm, and with the help of another woman into whose womb the embryos brought into existence were transferred. The children were born in 2017.
The children’s birth was facilitated in State C through what the applicants concede was a “commercial” surrogacy agreement between the applicants and the woman who carried the babies through gestation to birth. A copy of this commercial ‘Gestational Surrogacy Agreement’ was adduced into evidence. It provides for payments by the applicants to the gestational carrier (the woman who gave birth to the children) at various stages during the pregnancy and for various things, but it describes them as reimbursement for pregnancy related expenses. It expressly states that the agreement is not an agreement for payment for the children or payment for the relinquishment of parental rights to the children. Nevertheless, as I have just observed, the applicants themselves, and their solicitors, describe the surrogacy agreement as a “commercial” one.
The applicants annex to their affidavit a certified copy of Orders made by the District Court of L County, State C, on 18 May 2017, two and a half weeks after their twin daughters were born. This order names the applicants as the parents of D and E, and notes that the order is in the children’s best interests. It should also be noted that a previous order was made on 3 March 2017 by the same District Court in State C. That Order was therefore made two months prior to the birth of the children. The Order validated the gestational surrogacy agreement, and declared, ordered and decreed that the applicants would be the parents of children born under the agreement. The Order of 18 May, 2017 is described, on its face, as a Final Order Confirming Parentage under a Validated Gestational Surrogacy Agreement. It is submitted for the Applicants that only the 18 May 2017 orders require registering within this Court.
The applicants petitioned the Court in State C for the Order. The Court ordered that the applicants are the parents of D and E, and that such an order is in the best interests of the children. The Orders were as follows:
[MR SIGLEY] and [MS SIGLEY] , Petitioners, have entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement which was validated by this Court pursuant to Section … of the [State C] Family Court on March 3, 2017.
[MR SIGLEY] and [MS SIGLEY] , Petitioners, have filed with this Court a Notice of Birth of Children not later than the 300th day after the date assisted reproduction occurred pursuant to Section 160.760 of the State C Family Code. Such notices includes that [D] and [E] , female children, were born to gestational surrogate [MS F] and her husband [MR F] on …, 2017, at Medical [Centre G Town], in [G Town, State C]. Such children are in the custody, care and control of the intended parents and petitioners herein, [MR SIGLEY] and [MS SIGLEY] .
No Notice of Termination of the gestational surrogacy agreement has been filed by any party to this agreement with this Court.
Accordingly, this Court FINDS that [D] and [E], children born to [MS F] and her husband [MR F], the gestational surrogate under the validated gestational surrogacy agreement and her husband, are the children of the intended parents [MR SIGLEY] and [MS SIGLEY] under Section 160.760 of the State C Family Code and so DECREES. The Court further DECLARES, ORDERS AND DECREES that the Petitioners [MR SIGLEY] and [MS SIGLEY] are the parents of [D] and [E], female children, born on …, 2017 at Medical [Centre G Town], in [G Town, State C], under the validated gestational surrogacy agreement. The court finds that this order is in the best interests of the children, the subject to this suit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the child [D] shall henceforth have the legal name of [D] .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the child [E] shall henceforth have the legal name of [E] .
Costs of court are to be borne by the party by whom such costs were incurred.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the Clerk of this Court shall, after entry of final orders in this cause, transmit to the State Department of Human Services at City M, State C, certified copies of the Petition to Validate Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, the Order Validating Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, and this final judgment in this case.
Statutory Provisions
Relevant to this application to register the Orders of the State C Court in this Court, ss 70G, 70H and 70J of the Family Law Act provide:
70G Registration of orders
The regulations may make provision for and in relation to the registration in courts in Australia of overseas child orders, other than excluded orders.
70H Effect of registration—general
An overseas child order registered in a court under section 70G has the same force and effect as if it were an order made by that court under this Part.
Note: Division 4 of Part XIIIAA (International protection of children) may affect the operation of a registered overseas child order.
70J Effect of registration on exercise of jurisdiction
(1)A court in Australia that is aware that an overseas child order is registered under section 70G must not exercise jurisdiction in proceedings for the making of a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to the child concerned unless:
(a) each person:
(i) with whom the child is supposed to live; or
(ii) who is to spend time with the child; or
(iii) who is to have contact with the child; or
(iv) who has rights of custody or access in relation to the child;
under the overseas order consents to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court in the proceedings; or
(b)the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the child’s welfare requires that the court exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings.
(2)If a court exercises jurisdiction in proceedings for a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to a child who is the subject of an overseas child order, the court must not make a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to the child unless it is satisfied:
(a)that the welfare of the child is likely to be adversely affected if the order is not made; or
(b)that there has been such a change in the circumstances of the child since the making of the overseas child order that the Subdivision C parenting order ought to be made.
Section 4 of the Family Law Act defines the relevant terms, “excluded order”, “overseas child order” and “overseas jurisdiction” as follows:
excluded order means:
(a)an interim order; or
(b) an order made in favour of a person where:
(i) the order was made on the application of the person; and
(ii)notice of making the application was not served on any other person; and
(iii) no other person appeared at the hearing of the application.
overseas child order means:
(a)an order made by a court of a prescribed overseas jurisdiction that:
(i) however it is expressed, has the effect of determining the person or persons with whom a child who is under 18 is to live, or that provides for a person or persons to have custody of a child who is under 18; or
(ii) however it is expressed, has the effect of providing for a person or persons to spend time with a child who is under 18; or
(iii) however it is expressed, has the effect of providing for contact between a child who is under 18 and another person or persons, or that provides for a person or persons to have access to a child who is under 18; or
(iv)varies or discharges an order of the kind referred to in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii), including an order of that kind made under this Act; or
(b)an order made for the purposes of the Convention referred to in section 111B by a judicial or administrative authority of a convention country (within the meaning of the regulations made for the purposes of that section).
overseas jurisdiction means a country, or part of a country, outside Australia.
Regulation 23 of the Family Law Regulations provides as follows:
23 Registration of overseas child orders
(1) Subregulation (1A) applies if:
(a) the Secretary receives:
(i) from a prescribed overseas jurisdiction a certified copy of an overseas child order that was made in that jurisdiction; and
(ii) a certificate signed by an officer of a court or by some other authority in that jurisdiction relating to the order and containing a statement that the order is, at the date of the certificate, enforceable in that jurisdiction; and
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that any of the following persons is ordinarily resident in, present in, or proceeding to, Australia:
(i) the child who is the subject of the order;
(ii) a parent of that child;
(iii) a person having the right to have the child live with him or her, or the right of custody of or access to the child, or the right to spend time or communicate with the child.
(1A) The Secretary must send the documents mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) to:
(a) a registrar of the Family Court; or
(b) the registrar of a State Family Court; or
(c) the Registrar of a Supreme Court of a State or Territory.
(2)When the registrar of a court receives from the Secretary the documents referred to in subregulation (1), the registrar shall register the order by filing in the court a certified copy of the order and the certificate relating to the order and noting the fact and the date of the registration on the certified copy.
(3) Where an overseas child order has been registered in accordance with subregulation (2), the order may, on the application of the registrar of a court or a person interested in the order (including the child who is the subject of the order), be registered concurrently in any other court having jurisdiction under the Act.
(4)A certificate by a court that the order has been registered in that court in accordance with subregulation (2) shall be sufficient evidence to enable a concurrent registration to be made.
(5) An overseas child order registered in accordance with this regulation is enforceable throughout Australia until the registration (including a concurrent registration) has been cancelled.
(6)Where it appears to a court that the documents referred to in subregulation (1) have been received by the court other than from the Secretary, the court may, if all other requirements of subregulation (1) are satisfied, register the order.
(7)Where a court exercising jurisdiction under section 70J of the Act substantially varies the order, the registrar of the court shall forthwith forward to the court or to the appropriate authority in the prescribed overseas jurisdiction:
(a) 3 certified copies of the order of the court and the reasons for the order;
(b) a copy of the depositions; and
(c) such further material as the court directs.
(8) This regulation does not prevent a court that has jurisdiction under the Act from receiving evidence of an order made in an overseas jurisdiction (whether or not the jurisdiction is a prescribed overseas jurisdiction), being an order that:
(a) deals with the person with whom a child is supposed to live, spend time or communicate; or
(b) provides for a person to have custody of, or access to, a child.
The applicants have utilized Regulation 23(6), simply sending the documents referred to in Regulation 23(1) to this Court directly through its Brisbane registry. The Registrar who received it in the Brisbane Registry considered that the matter is one for a Judge to determine and brought it to my attention. Given that by subregulation 23(6) this Court has a discretion whether to register the State C Court’s order or not, if all other requirements of subregulation (1) are satisfied, and there is no delegation of this power to Registrars or Deputy Registrars found in Chapter 18 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), I accept that the Registrar’s referral to a Judge is the appropriate course.
Consideration
Regulation 14 of the Family Law Regulations makes it clear that a “prescribed overseas jurisdiction”, as that term is used in s 4(1) of the Family Law Act in the definition of “overseas child order”, is “each country or part of a country” set out in Schedule 1A to the Regulations. The State of C in the United States of America is included in that schedule.
Is the order an “overseas child order”?
In this particular case that question is best determined, in my view, by asking this further question – “However expressed, does it have the effect of determining the person or persons with whom a child who is under 18 is to live or as to which person or persons are to have custody of a child who is under 18?”.
The children were born at the time the State C Court Order in 2017 was made. The Order makes it absolutely clear that it applies to the applicants’ children, D and E; that is the children that were produced by fertilization of an egg from Ms Sigley and sperm from Mr Sigley that were carried by the “gestational carrier”, Ms F.
The Order outlines that the children are in the custody, care and control of the ‘intended parents’, being the applicants. The Order goes on to note the Court’s finding that the children born to the gestational carrier are the children of the ‘intended parents’. Ultimately, the Court declared, ordered and decreed that the applicants are the parents of D and E. The Order notes the Court’s finding that this order is in the best interests of the children.
A certified copy of the State C Court’s Orders and a certificate signed by an officer of that Court are provided in the evidence adduced.
The next requirement of subregulation 23(1) is that there are:
reasonable grounds for believing that any of the following persons is ordinarily resident in, present in, or proceeding to, Australia:
(i)the child who is the subject of the order;
(ii)a parent of that child;
(iii)a person having the right to have the child live with him or her, or the right of custody of or access to the child, or the right to spend time or communicate with the child.
In my judgment, neither of the parents nor the children in this matter are, at the moment at least, “ordinarily resident” in Australia. Whilst the applicants are Australian citizens, they are not living here now. Correspondence sent to the Court on 24 October 2017 by the applicants’ solicitor confirms that the children were granted Australian citizenship on 23 October 2017. The applicants and their daughters currently reside in the US. They are not present here in this country at the moment either.
Are any of them “proceeding to” Australia then?
In his affidavit, Mr Sigley deposes as follows:
25. It is also our intention to return to Melbourne for the children and the United States (sic) to live permanently at some point before [D] and [E] go to school. [Ms Sigley] and I own a house in [Suburb H], Victoria where we will reside. The children have been enrolled at [J School] from 3 years kindergarten onwards.
There is clearly a typographical error in that paragraph. I read it as conveying an intention to return to Melbourne to live with the children before they start school.
In her affidavit, Ms Sigley deposes as follows:
11. [Mr Sigley] and my employment in the United States was always intended to be a temporary arrangement. I was employed by [Company K] to develop an Australian [branch]. Over the last 5 years I have built a strong team and practice for the [business]. We just set up an Australian office for the business in Melbourne approximately 4 weeks ago and I am the director of the Melbourne office. We have also started hiring [staff] in Australia. It is the intention that I will continue to grow the [business] there. [Mr Sigley] and I plan to return to live in Melbourne sometime soon. My extended family and [Mr Sigley’s] extended family both live in or around Melbourne.
…
49. We always intended to return to Australia permanently. We are both on temporary work visas in the United States. Further we do not want to remain in the United States forever. We want our children to grow up around their extended family in Australia. [D] and [E] have been enrolled at [J School] in Melbourne from 3 year old kindergarten onwards.
…
52. Both [Mr Sigley] and I are Australian citizens. We intend to make an application for citizenship by descent for both [D] and [E].
As I have already pointed out, the Court has since been informed that the children have been granted Australian citizenship.
In his written submissions, the applicants’ solicitor, Mr Page, submits:
[The parties’] intention is for themselves and the children to move to Australia soon, but in any event before the children turn 3. Both [Mr and Ms Sigley] own a house in Melbourne and have extended family in Melbourne, and it is therefore likely that they and the children will travel to Australia from time to time in the meantime. [Ms Sigley] comes to Australia for work from time to time. This is likely to continue.
In this regard, I accept that the applicants currently have the intention of returning to Australia in the not too distant future. The question is then, can it be said, in such circumstances that they are “proceeding to” Australia?
The Macquarie Dictionary defines the verb “proceed” as “to move or go forward or onwards, especially after stopping” and “to go on with or carry on any action or process” and “to go on (to do something)” and “to go or come forth.”
The factual circumstances set out in the applicants’ affidavits, particularly their expressed intention to return to Australia permanently, their Australian citizenship, years of being ordinarily resident in Victoria prior to relocating to the US, the residence of members of their family in Australia, their temporary work visas in the United States and enrolment of their children in a Melbourne school for the commencement of kindergarten give me reasonable cause to believe the applicants when they say they intend returning to Australia in the future.
Given that a Judge of this Court deciding the question of whether an overseas child order should be registered in the Court or not is going to be within the jurisdiction (ie this country) whenever undertaking this discretionary exercise pursuant to subregulation 23(6), I am satisfied that the particular meaning to be attributed to “proceeding to” in the circumstances must be one of “coming to” or “travelling to” Australia, whether that be for a visit or to live here and whether that person be currently on their way here or simply planning to come here sometime soon.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Sigley , Ms Sigley and their daughters, D and E, will be coming to Australia at some point in the future, such that they can be considered to be “proceeding to” Australia for the purposes of the regulation. Accordingly, I consider the requirements of subregulation 23(1) to be satisfied and the discretion given in subregulation 23(6) enlivened.
Should the discretion to register the overseas child order be exercised?
There is no list of matters set out in subregulation 23(6) to have regard to when exercising the discretion to register the overseas child order or not. The Full Court has not set out a list of such matters in any decision on the point either. Notwithstanding the absence of such direction, the discretion must nevertheless be exercised judicially.
In a previous judgment in a matter similar to this, decided by me in December 2016, I expressed the following view:
Whilst an overseas child order that came into existence as a consequence of a commercial surrogacy agreement might have difficulty attracting a favourable exercise of the discretion to register it in this Court for public policy reasons, I do not consider that applies in this matter.
In that matter, I set out my reasons for not considering the surrogacy agreement that applied to be a “commercial” one. Then, in another similar matter decided by me last year, the parties and their solicitor (the same solicitor who acts for the parties in this matter) made it clear that the parties had entered into a “commercial” surrogacy agreement, but that they still sought registration of their overseas child order.
I was clearly required to give more careful consideration to the view I had expressed in 2016. I did and nevertheless decided to register the overseas child order. I set out in my reasons the matters that particularly influenced me to exercise my discretion in favour of registering the overseas child order notwithstanding the fact that it was a “commercial” surrogacy agreement that the parties had entered into for the purposes of becoming parents. Those things were:
·the unique circumstances of this couple and their inability to biologically parent and carry their own baby;
·the well-regulated nature of the surrogacy arrangements entered into between the applicants and the surrogate, notwithstanding its commerciality;
·the judicial oversight to the arrangements given by the Court in the USA, including the procedural fairness offered thereby to the woman who carried the baby for the applicants;
·the acceptance by the Australian Government of that US jurisdiction as a prescribed jurisdiction for the purposes of the registration of ‘overseas child orders’ made in Courts of that jurisdiction, thereby, I am satisfied, signifying the Australian Government’s satisfaction with the standard of the judicial processes that would have occurred in the making of the order; and
·the fact that the arrangements entered into, regardless of their nature, brought into the world a child who is the biological child of at least one of the applicants, the legal child of both of them, who is being loved and raised as their child, who as an Australian citizen, like her parents, will be coming back to live in Australia in the near future, and who has every right to expect that the legal nature of her relationship with both of her parents is appropriately recognised in this country of hers.
This is another case where the parties and their solicitor inform the Court that the surrogacy agreement entered into in the USA was a “commercial” one.
I am, as I considered I was in the earlier decision, clearly required to give consideration to the public policy context within which my discretion is being exercised. That context includes the fact that in Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory entry into “commercial” surrogacy arrangements abroad by persons ordinarily resident in those jurisdictions is a criminal offence. Of course, I have already observed that Mr and Ms Sigley reside in the USA and not one of those jurisdictions. Whilst they currently intend to return to live in Australia at some time in the future, it is not in one of the three jurisdictions just mentioned, but rather the State of Victoria. Nevertheless, they have entered into a commercial surrogacy agreement and they seek the registration in this Australian Court of the American Court Order that gives them the parenting rights over their child. If they were “ordinarily resident” in Queensland, New South Wales or the ACT, they would have, prima facie, committed a criminal offence. However, as the applicants’ solicitor points out in his submissions, Victoria allows intended parents to enter into commercial surrogacy arrangements overseas and has not sought to criminalise such behaviour. Entry by the applicants into the “commercial” surrogacy agreement was lawful in the USA, particularly in the State of State C where it was done and the Australian Government has not determined to criminalise entry by Australian citizens or residents into commercial surrogacy agreements overseas as, arguably, it could do.
Having given the matter my consideration, I am satisfied for all the same reasons as I set out in my earlier decision (quoted above) that the commercial nature of the surrogacy agreement alone in this particular case should not determine the exercise of discretion against the applicants. Different from that case though, in this case there are two children who were brought into life through the surrogacy arrangements and both of those children are the biological children of both of the applicants. Their gestational “mother” was their carrier who assisted their biological parents bring them into the world. The two children are both Australian citizens now as well, with legitimate expectations that the legal nature of their parent-child relationship with both of their loving parents is appropriately recognised in this country of theirs.
In my previous judgments in this type of matter, I have considered the fact that Division 4.2.8 of the Family Law Rules expressly applies to an application for a parenting order in relation to a child who was born under a surrogacy arrangement. The rules in that Division set out certain evidence that must be included in the evidence given in support of the application. It includes evidence from the applicant or applicants, a copy of the surrogacy agreement, evidence from the surrogate mother, evidence about the child’s identity and evidence about the relevant law in the child’s birth country.
Some of that evidence, but not all of it, has been given in support of the request for registration of the State C Court’s order. Is that sufficient reason to exercise the discretion not to register it? I did not determine that it was in the earlier cases and I maintain the same position in this case.
I accepted that this division does not apply as the applicants are not applying for “a parenting order” as that term is defined in s 64B of the Family Law Act. Rather, they are applying for the registration of an overseas child Order under s 70G. The gestational carrier was a party to the proceedings in the State C Court, along with both the applicants. That Court, by its first Order, was clearly satisfied that the applicants should have all parental rights, responsibilities and obligations relating to the children then being carried by the gestational carrier transferred or conferred upon them. The evidence put before that Court in support of that application clearly satisfied the Court that the Order it made was the appropriate one to make. By its second Order, after the birth of the children, that Court confirmed its earlier satisfaction as to the parental rights of the applicants.
As I said in the earlier decisions, I do not consider that there is now any obligation upon the applicants to adduce all of the evidence that would be required if one or both of them was applying to the Court for a parenting order pursuant to Part VII of the Act. I do not consider the discretion should be exercised against registering the overseas child order in this Court because of these provisions of the Rules that relate to a different type of application.
I have also said previously:
It is trite to say that every matter that comes before this Court must be considered on its own merits having regard to the application of the current statutory and regulatory provisions and the established authoritative principles to the unique set of facts each matter presents. Clearly, whilst that might result in a discretionary determination to register a particular overseas child order in one case, a different case might not produce the same discretionary outcome.
In this case, I am satisfied that the Order of the State C Court made on 18 May 2017 should be registered with this Court pursuant to those statutory and regulatory provisions that provide for that to happen and I will so order. The applicants are the de jure and biological parents of D and E. The children live in the applicants’ day to day care in the US. I have not been able to identify any reason why they should not be entitled to the registration of that State C Court’s Order in this Court so that their parent-child relationship with D and E is recognised appropriately in this country as they desire and for the children’s sake.
I will also make Orders protecting the identity of the applicants, the children and the gestational parent, most particularly by making an order that no person be allowed to search this Court’s file in the matter without first obtaining the leave of a Judge of this Court.
I make the orders set out at the commencement of these written reasons.
I certify that the preceding forty-one (41) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 10 January 2018.
Associate:
Date: 10 January 2018
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