Sigley and De Santis & Ors (No 2)
[2020] FamCA 855
•8 October 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SIGLEY & DE SANTIS AND ORS (NO. 2) | [2020] FamCA 855 |
| PLEADINGS – strike out application brought in respect of the 17th respondent’s counterclaim – trial one week away – counterclaim based on same substratum of facts on which applicant relies – no basis for strike out shown. SUBPOENA – claim to legal professional privilege in five items of correspondence – no factual explanation given to support the claim – trial listed to begin on 15 October 2020 for 12 days – Senior Registrar to inspect impugned documents to determine whether privilege exists and give judgment on 9 October 2020. SHAM TRANSACTIONS – review of key authorities. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 79, 90SL, 90SM |
| Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (No2) (2012) 44 VR 661 Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 564 Divcon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 79 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 James Miller Holdings Ltd v Graham (1978) 3 ACLR 604 Lewis v Condon (2013) 85 NSWLR 99 Marvel v Marvel (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 Pollard & Nordberg [2019] FamCA 365 Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516 Salah v Salah (2016) 56 Fam LR 299 Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1966) 40 ALJR 265 |
| J. D. Heydon & M. J. Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (LexisNexis Australia, 7th ed, 2006) G. Thomas & A. Hudson, The Law of Trusts (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2010) |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Sigley |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Mr De Santis |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Q Pty Ltd as trustee for Q Discretionary Trust |
| THIRD RESPONDENT: | R Pty Ltd as trustee for De Santis Family Trust |
| FOURTH RESPONDENT: | Mr S De Santis |
| FIFTH AND SIXTH RESPONDENTS: | Mr T and Mr U as liquidators of E Pty Ltd (in liquidation) |
| SEVENTH RESPONDENT: | De Santis Family Investments Pty Ltd as trustee for E Superannuation Fund |
| EIGHTH RESPONDENT: | V Partners Pty Ltd (formerly P Partners Pty Ltd) |
| |
| TENTH RESPONDENT: | X Pty Ltd as trustee for Trust for the Children of Mr & Ms De Santis |
| ELEVENTH RESPONDENT: | E6 Pty Ltd |
| TWELFTH RESPONDENT: | Ms De Santis (also known as Ms BB De Santis) |
| THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT: | E Pty Ltd |
| FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Mr AA De Santis |
| FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Ms EE De Santis |
| SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Ms DD De Santis |
| SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Ms AA De Santis |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 9296 | of | 2015 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 8 October 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Wilson J |
| HEARING DATE: | 6 October 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr J. St John QC with Mr P. Agardy |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Peter Szabo Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| COUNSEL FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FOURTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FOURTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIFTH AND SIXTH RESPONDENTS: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIFTH AND SIXTH RESPONDENTS: | Charles Fice Solicitors |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SEVENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SEVENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE EIGHTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE EIGHTH RESPONDENT: | V Partners Pty Ltd |
| |
| |
| COUNSEL FOR THE TENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE TENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE ELEVENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE ELEVENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE TWELFTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE TWELFTH RESPONDENT: | KCL Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Charles Fice Solicitors |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Mr D. Bongiorno |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT: | Berry Family Law |
Orders
I dismiss the applicant’s strike out applications in relation to the 17th respondent’s defence and counterclaim, and the amended defences of the third, fourth, seventh, 10th, 11th, 14th and 16th respondents.
By 2pm on 8 October 2020 Ms Li Rosi must provide a copy by email to Senior Registrar Hoult of the five documents correctly described in her client’s application in a case filed 30 September 2020.
This proceeding is listed before Senior Registrar Hoult for judgment on the notice of objections at 9am on Friday 9 October 2020.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Sigley & De Santis has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 9296 of 2015
| Ms Sigley |
Applicant
And
| Mr De Santis |
First Respondent
And
| Q Pty Ltd as trustee for Q Discretionary Trust |
Second Respondent
And
| R Pty Ltd as trustee for De Santis Family Trust |
Third Respondent
And
| Mr S De Santis |
Fourth Respondent
And
| Mr T and Mr U as liquidators of E Pty Ltd (in liquidation) |
Fifth and Sixth Respondents
And
| De Santis Family Investments Pty Ltd as trustee for E Superannuation Fund |
Seventh Respondent
And
| V Partners Pty Ltd (formerly P Partners Pty Ltd) |
Eight Respondent
And
| |
Ninth Respondent
And
| X Pty Ltd as trustee for Trust for the Children of Mr & Ms De Santis |
Tenth Respondent
And
| E6 Pty Ltd |
Eleventh Respondent
And
| Ms De Santis (also known as Ms BB De Santis) |
Twelfth Respondent
And
| E Pty Ltd |
Thirteenth Respondent
And
| Mr AA De Santis |
Fourteenth Respondent
And
| Ms EE De Santis |
Fifteenth Respondent
And
| Ms DD De Santis |
Sixteenth Respondent
And
| Ms AA De Santis |
Seventeenth Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 6 October 2020 I heard argument in relation to paragraphs one to four of the applicant’s application in a case filed on 15 September 2020.
The trial of this proceeding is scheduled to commence on 15 October 2020. It is expected to run for 12 sitting days.
At this very late juncture, the applicant has sought orders striking out various pleadings and she seeks orders requiring other parties to file other pleadings.
The debate on this application concerned the applicant, for whom Mr St John QC and Mr Agardy appeared and the 17th respondent for whom Mr D. Bongiorno appeared.
As against the 17th respondent, the applicant sought an order that the amended defence of the 17th respondent be struck out as well as the counterclaim of the 17th respondent.
In essence, the applicant asserts that the 17th respondent’s counterclaim is a disparate claim constituting a separate proceeding and is not one arising in the applicant’s proceeding from a common substratum of facts. Mr St John QC submitted that the mainstay of the applicant’s case was for the enforcement of the agreement that Macmillan J ordered to be enforced pursuant to orders dated 14 November 2016. The applicant contended that the jurisdiction of the Family Court to substantively deal with property matters has been ousted. Mr St John QC argued that this court did not have power to make the orders sought in the counterclaim of the 17th respondent. He submitted –
a)the remaining property matters presently extant in this proceeding related to a Part VIIIAB financial agreement “between the parties to the agreement”;
b)for the purposes of s 90SL of the Family Law Act the 17th respondent is not a party to the relevant de facto relationship;
c)pursuant to the court’s associated jurisdiction or its accrued jurisdiction, the court did not possess jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim; and
d)the 17th respondent’s counterclaim constitutes a separate claim appropriate for a separate proceeding and it does not arise from a common substratum of facts.
So far as the content of the 17th respondent’s counterclaim was concerned, Mr St John said it was defective on several grounds. They included –
a)none of the orders sought by the 17th respondent affect or disturb any existing rights of the applicant;
b)at no stage has the applicant held or asserted an entitlement to property at X Street, Suburb FF, (hereafter called “X Street”);
c)the counterclaim names the applicant as the only respondent yet nowhere between paragraphs 1 to 72 of the 17th respondent’s pleading is any material fact alleged against the applicant; and
d)no relief is claimed against the applicant by the 17th respondent.
I was not favoured with written submissions from the 17th respondent. Doing the best I could from the telephone hearing conducted on 6 October 2020, Mr Bongiorno’s submissions amounted to the following –
a)if the court refuses to make the declaration sought to the effect that X Street is held on trust for the fourth, 15th and 16th respondents, then the 17th respondent seeks a declaration that the registered proprietor of X Street holds X Street on a resulting trust for the 17th respondent;
b)on well-known principles of resulting trusts recently extolled in Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd,[1] where a trust fails for any reason the equitable interests purportedly allocated by the failed trust must pass to someone as equity abhors, and will not tolerate, a vacuum in the equitable ownership;[2] and
c)the 17th respondent contributed funds for the acquisition of X Street and so she has an interest in that property pursuant to a resulting trust.
[1] [2010] VSC 564. In the appeal, called Australian Incentive Plan Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (No2) (2012) 44 VR 661, the Court of Appeal did not disturb Croft J’s observations at [18].
[2] G. Thomas & A. Hudson, The Law of Trusts (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2010) at [26.27], J. D. Heydon & M. J. Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (LexisNexis Australia, 7th ed, 2006) 236 at [1205], and James Miller Holdings Ltd v Graham (1978) 3 ACLR 604, 613.
The applicant’s allegations about X Street
Very helpfully, the applicant’s legal representatives prepared the applicant’s consolidated amended statement of claim (“CAMSOC”) and filed it on 6 October 2020 to faithfully incorporate amendments up to and including 6 October 2020. The allegations relevant to X Street commenced at paragraph 59 of the CAMSOC. Some important allegations require recital. They include the following –
a)since 20 September 2005, Q Pty Ltd has been the registered proprietor of X Street;
b)JJ Company is the mortgagee;
c)a trust, called the Trust for the children of Mr & Ms De Santis, (which in these reasons I shall simply call “the trust”) was created by deed of settlement dated 24 December 2004;
d)the primary asset of the trust is X Street;
e)the trust is a sham;
f)Q Pty Ltd was deregistered by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission on 20 February 2017;
g)on 1 June 2017 a deed of change was executed pursuant to which the 10th respondent, X Street Pty Ltd, was appointed trustee of the trust;
h)on that date or thereabouts X Street Pty Ltd became the registered proprietor of X Street;
i)on 4 October 2016 X Street Pty Ltd was placed in voluntary liquidation;[3]
j)X Street Pty Ltd was the plaintiff in a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Victoria commenced on 19 February 2019 seeking rectification of a deed of settlement of trust, which proceeding was transferred to this court, and in respect of which the applicant opposes the motion sought in that proceeding; and
k)the applicant contends that any rectification sought will extinguish the applicant’s ability to enforce the obligations under the binding financial agreement on which the applicant relies in this case.
[3] That chronology is curious as it seems to suggest that X Pty Ltd was placed in liquidation prior to the deed of change being executed.
Pausing at that juncture, the applicant’s own pleadings demonstrate the interconnection of X Street Pty Ltd and the applicant. She says she will be gravely, adversely affected by the success of the rectification application because any orders made rectifying the relevant instrument will extinguish the applicant’s claims against the first respondent and in relation to X Street. Given that assertion, it is difficult to see how the applicant can properly contend that the 17th respondent’s involvement in relation to the acquisition of X Street arises out of facts which are not part of the common substratum of facts that apply to the whole of the circumstances in respect of which I am required to make findings at the trial of this proceeding.
The 17th respondent’s allegations in her counterclaim
On 15 June 2020 the 17th respondent filed her counterclaim. In several places the pleading itself is expressed to be a counterclaim against the applicant. Relevantly distilled, the counterclaim included the following allegations –
a)Ms AA De Santis, the 17th respondent, is the mother of Mr De Santis, she was the mother-in-law of Ms BB De Santis, and she is the grandmother of Mr S De Santis, Ms EE De Santis and Ms DD De Santis;
b)Ms AA De Santis paid $59,000 being the 10% deposit for the acquisition of X Street, Suburb FF;
c)Ms AA De Santis intended to buy the property to give Ms De Santis a property in which to live as well as ultimately benefiting the grandchildren, Mr AA, Ms EE and Ms DD;
d)Ms AA De Santis nominated Q Pty Ltd as purchaser;
e)when nominating Q Pty Ltd as purchaser, Ms AA De Santis intended that that company was to hold X Street as trustee for the benefit of Ms AA De Santis’ grandchildren with a right to Ms De Santis for Ms De Santis to live there during her lifetime;
f)Ms AA De Santis paid the balance of the purchase price of $94,286.86;
g)Ms AA De Santis made that payment in the belief that Q Pty Ltd would hold X Street on trust;
h)Ms AA De Santis paid mortgage instalments totalling $468,724;
i)if, as the applicant contends, Q Pty Ltd does not hold X Street on trust then Ms AA De Santis claims that X Street is held by Q Pty Ltd on a resulting trust in favour of Ms AA De Santis; and
j)alternatively, Ms AA De Santis has the benefit of an equitable charge over X Street to secure her payments totalling $622,012.98.
On behalf of Ms AA De Santis, Mr Bongiorno addressed the applicant’s assertions concerning the nature of the sham alleged by the applicant. He relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Lewis v Condon.[4] There, the Court of Appeal applied the observations of High Court in Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,[5] Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd,[6] and Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 2)[7] to the effect that a sham refers to steps which take the form of a legally effective transaction but which the parties intend should not have the apparent, or any, legal consequences. In Lewis v Condon, Leeming JA held that “the sham doctrine is thus one of those relatively rare doctrines in law where legal meaning is given to a document by reference to a subjective intention”. Applying Raftland Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Leeming JA held that a finding of sham requires a finding of an intent to deceive and it requires a cautious approach.
[4] (2013) 85 NSWLR 99.
[5] (2008) 238 CLR 516.
[6] (2004) 218 CLR 471.
[7] (1966) 40 ALJR 265.
The applicant in this case asserts a sham.
Paragraph 79 of the counterclaim responds to that. Elsewhere in the counterclaim Ms AA De Santis contends that she paid a large amount of money in the belief that X Street was held on trust and that if it transpires that Q Pty Ltd did not in fact hold X Street on trust in the manner she asserts, then she is the beneficiary of a resulting trust.
To my mind, both the sham argument and Ms AA De Santis’ resulting trust argument are perfectly tenable and need to be ventilated. I do not agree that those contentions arise out of disparate facts or facts having no common substratum. If anything, it is desirable for all issues between the parties to be ventilated at the one time before the one judge lest potential issues arise such as a risk of an issue estoppel or the risk of inconsistent decisions.
As to the argument that s 90SL of the Family Law Act does not allow the counterclaim to be advanced in the way it is being advanced and that neither the associated jurisdiction of the court or its accrued jurisdiction provided a jurisprudential basis for the counterclaim, several things must be said. In no order of priority –
a)sophisticated as that argument may be, it is one that ill behoves the applicant to advance in a proceeding that has been on foot for so many years as has this, and the argument is made in the week leading to the commencement of the trial;
b)the general discouragement stated in cases such as Marvel v Marvel,[8] Salah v Salah,[9] Pollard & Nordberg[10] and others in relation to factual findings on interlocutory hearings can legitimately be extended to strike out applications being brought so proximately close to the trial;
c)it is far from uncommon for claims in the nature of a third or fourth party proceedings properly so described to be brought in a s 79 proceeding or in a s 90SM proceeding so long as the claim is brought by an interested party; and
d)the mere fact that Ms AA De Santis is not a party to the de facto relationship does not lead to the conclusion that a counterclaim falls outside of the same substratum of facts as is raised by a party with a sufficient interest in this litigation such that Ms AA De Santis’ claim should not be heard when all other aspects of this litigation are before the court for trial.
[8] (2010) 43 Fam LR 348.
[9] (2016) 56 Fam LR 299.
[10] [2019] FamCA 365.
Issues about the court’s accrued jurisdiction and its associated jurisdiction are legally complex. They will need to be fully articulated at trial. It is not appropriate for the applicant to raise them with a week remaining before the trial begins. It must not be forgotten that the applicant has been pressing with great force and over many months for this trial to begin as an electronic trial. To strike out the counterclaim would inevitably jeopardise the trial.
Turning now to the 17th respondent’s defence, the applicant seeks orders striking out the defence of the 17th respondent and the amended defences of the third, fourth, seventh, 10th, 11th, 14th and 16th respondents. At the vanguard of the submissions advanced by the applicant, Mr St John argued that in breach of rules relating to pleadings, those defences and that defence do not set out material facts in dispute.
It is convenient to address all complaints about the defences at this time.
It is well established that a party in a proceeding governed by pleadings is permitted to advance evidence only in relation to pleaded matters. The corollary of that is the notion that a party is not permitted to adduce evidence in respect of matters not pleaded.
This case was on foot for a very long time before pleadings were ordered. That said, trial affidavits have been prepared since pleadings were ordered so the procedural state of play is that all parties’ pleadings are regularised and their trial affidavits are filed. Whether their evidence corresponds to their pleadings remains to be seen. It may well transpire that sizeable evidentiary debates emerge about a party’s evidence aligning with or being divergent from his or her or its pleadings.
But a cursory examination of each amended defence and, in the case of the 17th respondent, her defence reveals admissions. As is well established, once a party admits an allegation not only is that fact taken to be proved but the adducing of evidence about the admitted fact is forbidden as was held by Beach J in Divcon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd.[11] In the case of the 17th respondent she admits to a large number of allegations. Self-evidently, those admissions are to the benefit of the applicant. On the matter of greatest importance to her, she does in fact set out her allegations in paragraph 58. Where she does not admit certain allegations, she is to be taken to be denying them. A respondent is not required to give particulars of a denial.
[11] [1996] 2 VR 79.
Chaos would be occasioned to the trial of this case proceeding next week if I were to strike out pleadings one week prior to trial, even if I were persuaded (which I am not) that merit existed in the strike out applications.
The evidence will fall to be admitted or rejected by reference to the pleadings each party has chosen to advance.
I dismiss the applicant’s strike out applications in relation to the 17th respondent’s defence and counterclaim, and the amended defences of the third, fourth, seventh, 10th, 11th, 14th and 16th respondents.
The subpoena debate
In accordance with consent orders made by me on 25 September 2020, all relevant parties filed and served all submissions on which each wished to rely by 4 pm on 2 October. I told the parties on 16 September 2020 that I would give judgment on the papers. These are my reasons for that.
On 27 August 2020 the applicant issued a subpoena to the managing partner of Berry Law. Relevantly in five numbered paragraphs, the applicant identified the documentations she sought. The documents sought were as follows –
2.All correspondence with KCL Lawyers (and any other solicitor) representing Ms BB (also known as “Ms”) De Santis from 1 September 2018 to the date of this subpoena in proceedings MLC 9296 of 2015 and / or MLC 11947 of 2018. (NB: No document already provided to Peter Szabo Family Law is required to be produced).
3.All correspondence, e-mails, text messages, telephone memoranda or like communications had with Mr De Santis, (or any person acting on his behalf or in his interest), from 1 October 2015 to the date of this subpoena.
4.All notes of interviews and / or conferences attended by Mr De Santis, (whether face-to-face, by telephone, video-link or other electronic means).
5.Documents disclosing the ordinary residential address(es) of Mr De Santis during the period from 1 October 2015 to the date of this subpoena.
6.The entire file and associated documents of FF Lawyers, solicitors, when it acted in the conveyance of the real property at GG Street, HH Town.
By notice of objection dated 9 September 2020 and filed 10 September 2020, the 12th respondent objected to the production and inspection of five items of correspondence in respect of paragraph 2 of the subpoena. The ground of objection was legal professional privilege.
By application in a case filed 30 September 2020 on behalf of Ms De Santis, she applied to amend the description of three of the documents about which she objected to produce and offer inspection. In paragraphs 4(b), (c) and (d) of her application in a case she sought amendment of the corresponding descriptions in the notice of objection altering “letter” to “email” and the recipient and sender reversed. Ms Li Rosi, an experienced practitioner representing Ms De Santis, made an affidavit on 28 September 2020 in support of her client’s objections to the production and inspection of the documents the subject of the subpoena. In the relevant portions of Ms Li Rosi’s affidavit, in substance she deposed to the following –
a)at all times her client, Ms De Santis instructed her to claim legal professional privilege; and
b)it was implicit in her communications with Berry Law that those communications were confidential.
When this issue of privilege was first raised before me in late September 2020 I told the parties that frequently the judge physically examines the impugned documents to form a view about whether the document does or does not contain confidential communications of the sort in respect of which privilege is claimed. The relevant documents had not been offered for my consideration.
Ms Li Rosi has asserted that she is bound by an obligation of confidentiality in respect of each of the five documents under consideration.
Written submissions passing between the applicant’s legal representatives (Mr St John QC and his instructor Mr Szabo) and Ms De Santis’ legal representatives (Mr Mark Wilson and Ms Li Rosi) traded punches about the alleged deficiencies in Ms De Santis’ contentions about the existence of legal professional privilege.
In Mr Wilson’s written submissions dated 5 October 2020 he sensibly embraced the suggestion I offered weeks ago of having a judicial officer physically examine each of the five documents over which privilege has been claimed. Mr Wilson said it should not be me.
To that end I have made enquiries with Senior Registrar Hoult who has very graciously agreed to undertake that task. The Senior Registrar has agreed to give judgment on that issue at 9am tomorrow morning. I therefore direct that by 2pm today Ms Li Rosi provides a copy by email to Senior Registrar Hoult of the five documents correctly described in her client’s application in a case filed 30 September 2020. I also direct that this proceeding is listed before Senior Registrar Hoult for judgment on the notice of objections at 9am on Friday 9 October 2020.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Wilson delivered on 8 October 2020.
Associate:
Date: 12 October 2020
0
6
1