Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2002] FCA 1226

MIGRATION – Student visa application – application of Condition 8202 as amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000 (Cth) – whether amended condition application retrospective – whether applicant satisfied academic standards criterion for grant of visa.

MIGRATION – Student visa application – privative clause decision – whether decision made in good faith – errors in reasoning do not per se demonstrate lack of good faith

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 31, 41(1), 116, 348, 474(1), 338
Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000 (Cth)
Migration Regulations, reg 2.05, cl 560.213, cl 560.611, condition 8202

Nong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1575 - discussed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Hou [2002] FCA 574 – referred to
Gurung v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 772 - cited

Kwan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 498 - cited

Craig v The State of South Australia (1994-1995) 184 CLR 163 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Modi [2001] FCA 1656 – referred to
Shrestha v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1578 – referred to
Alam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 630 – referred to
Kim v Witton (1995) 59 FCR 258 - discussed
Peng v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1672 - discussed
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 - applied
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 - followed

MOHAMMAD MAHMOOD SIDDIQUE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S.244 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
4 OCTOBER 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.244 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD MAHMOOD SIDDIQUE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 OCTOBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.244 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD MAHMOOD SIDDIQUE
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

4 OCTOBER 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant is a national of India, born on 26 June 1974.  On 26 April 1999 he successfully applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (Student visa) whilst in India.  He entered Australia on 8 September 1999 pursuant to the Student visa then granted to…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1226
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, Siddique, contested the Tribunal's decision regarding his visa application. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was a privative clause decision, and if so, whether the applicant's procedural fairness and compliance with certain legislative provisions were adequately addressed. The court was tasked with determining the applicability of s 474(1) of the Act, which pertains to privative clause decisions, and whether any errors made by the Tribunal amounted to jurisdictional error.

The court examined the definition of a privative clause decision under s 474(2) and found that the Tribunal's decision indeed fell within that definition. The court noted that the Tribunal's decision was neither excluded by s 474(4) nor s 474(5). The court also considered whether the Tribunal's errors constituted jurisdictional error, referencing the decision in NAAV and the principles in Hickman v Campbell. The court concluded that the Tribunal's errors did not amount to jurisdictional error, as they did not infringe upon the jurisdictional limits set by the Act. The court further examined the contentions regarding procedural fairness and compliance with s 359A(1) of the Act, finding no basis to conclude that these principles were breached.

In reaching its decision, the court considered the legislative history and amendments affecting Condition 8202, and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the former or amended condition in reviewing the applicant's visa application. The court found that the Tribunal's application of the amended condition was correct and that any errors did not constitute jurisdictional error.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
The expression “privative clause decision” is defined in s 474(2) in the following terms:“… privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).”The Tribunal’s decision clearly falls within that description. It is not a decision referred to in s 474(4), which identifies decisions under specified provisions of the Act which are not to be privative clause decisions, nor is it a decision referred to in s 474(5) which provides for regulations to specify particular decisions or classes of decisions which are not privative clause decisions. The decision in NAAV indicates, contrary to the applicant’s submission, that contravention of a provision of Dir 5 of Part 5 of the Act dealing with the conduct of reviews by the Tribunal does not give rise to jurisdictional error so as to entitle the Court to set aside the Tribunal’s decision in the face of s 474(1) of the Act. Any reasons for that conclusion are expressed in my reference to NAAV in the preceding paragraphs of these reasons. The decisions to which the applicant drew attention were either decisions on review of Tribunal decisions to which the amendments to Part 8 of the Act, including s 474, did not apply because the application to the Court was made before 2 October 2001 or were decisions made by a single judge of the Court on the scope of operation of s 474(1) which must now be understood in the light of the authoritative ruling of the Full Court in NAAV. Consequently, the applicant’s contentions that failure by the Tribunal to accord him procedural fairness, and to comply with s 359A(1) of the Act, bring his present application outside the scope of operation of s 474(1) must be rejected. I am not persuaded that the errors in the Tribunal’s processes or reasons to which I have referred indicate that it failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness or that it failed to comply with s 359A(1) of the Act. Its errors are of a different kind. But, whatever characterisation of its errors, in my view they do not amount to jurisdictional error, having regard to the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the light of s 474(1) of the Act. Of course, s 474(1) of the Act must be read as being subject to the “Hickman principles”: R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 616 per Dixon J. His Honour said:“But where the legislature confers authority subject to limitations, and at the same time enacts [a privative clause] it becomes a question of interpretation of the whole legislative instrument whether transgression of its limits, so long as done bona fide and bearing on its face every appearance of an attempt to pursue the power, necessarily spells invalidity.”Thus, the effect of s 474(1) is to expand the jurisdiction of the Tribunal so that it commits jurisdictional error susceptible of judicial intervention only if:(a)the Tribunal failed to make “a bona fide attempt to exercise its power”;(b)the Tribunal’s decision does not relate to the subject matter of the legislation; or(c)the Tribunal’s decision is not “reasonably capable of reference to the power given to” the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The balance of the applicant’s further submission concerned contentions of law concerning the proper operation of s 474(1) of the Act, and to the effect that the decision of the Tribunal is not a privative clause decision as defined in s 474(2) of the Act. I will address those contentions in my consideration of the application generally.CONSIDERATION It is appropriate first to determine whether the former Condition 8202 or the amended Condition 8202 applied to the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision. I note the respondent’s suggestion that the amended Condition 8202 may be a consequence of the decision of Katz J in Nong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1575 which took the view that the attendance requirement prescribed in the former Condition 8202 was to be measured against attendance for the whole of the course being undertaken, rather than for particular years or semesters of the course. See also per Conti J in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Hou [2002] FCA 574 at [6]. In Gurung v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 772, Tamberlin J was required to address that issue. In that matter, coincidentally, the visa applicant also held a Student visa which expired on 15 March 2001, and his application for a new Student visa was unsuccessful. The Tribunal determined whether he satisfied criterion 560.213 of Sch 2 to the Regulations by reference to the amended Condition 8202. It was contended that it had erred in so doing. Tamberlin J, having regard to item 4(1) of Sch 4 to the amending Act, but without referring to item 4(6), said at [11]:“Having regard to these statutory amendments which were clearly designed to ensure that this condition was uniform in relation to all student visas, there is no substance in the argument advanced by the applicant on this point. The Tribunal applied the correct form of condition 8202.” In Kwan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 498 (Kwan), Finkelstein J appears to have taken a different view. Again, the Student visa expired on 15 March 2001 and the application before the Court concerned a Tribunal decision refusing to grant a further Student visa. His Honour said at [7] that the visa applicant:“had to show that he had complied substantially with the original condition 8202 while his visa was subject to that condition (that is until 21 December 2000), and thereafter he had to show that he had complied substantially with the new condition. In substance, Mr Kwan was only required to meet the new condition for 10 days, namely from 5 March 2001, when the new academic year commenced, until 15 March 2001, when his previous visa expired.” His Honour found that the Tribunal had erred in assuming that the amended Condition 8202 applied to the visa in force until 15 March 2001 from the time of its grant. His Honour rejected the contention, on behalf of the Minister, that the amended Condition 8202 had retrospective effect, so as to replace the former Condition 8202 as if it had never existed (at least in respect of a visa not expired by 21 December 2000). His Honour’s reasons for so doing appear in the following passage at [9]:“In the first place there is nothing in the language of the amending Act which would produce that result. In the second place, I would not attribute to Parliament such a perverse intention unless I was compelled to do so by unambiguous language. In my opinion not only is the language of the amending legislation not ambiguous in that sense, it is to the opposite effect.”