Shumack v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shumack v Commonwealth of Australia

[2009] FCA 775

PETER JAMES SHUMACK v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

ACD 17 of 2009

RARES J
17 JULY 2009
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 17 of 2009

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES SHUMACK
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JULY 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 17 of 2009

BETWEEN:

PETER JAMES SHUMACK
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

17 JULY 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from orders of the Federal Magistrates Court, dismissing the applicant’s application to that court on the ground that Peter Shumack had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceedings he had brought:  Shumack v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FMCA 428 at [25]. The federal magistrate was exercising jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings before him summarily under s 17A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth). That is a cognate provision with s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

  2. Mr Shumack has not filed a draft notice of appeal with his application for leave.  Instead, he has filed an affidavit that makes a range of assertions about matters that do not identify any question or finding in his Honour’s judgment.  On an earlier occasion, I had directed Mr Shumack to file written submissions in support of his application for leave to appeal, and he complied with that order.  I have read his written submissions and remain unable to detect any identification there of an error by the trial judge.

  3. The requirements for an applicant to satisfy a court to obtain a grant of leave to appeal are well established.  The applicant for leave must establish that the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave and must also show that substantial injustice will result from a refusal of leave to appeal:  Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ.

  4. During the course of today I sought to inquire of Mr Shumack what error or errors of a legal or factual nature he claimed the trial judge had made.  Mr Shumack made generalised assertions of bias and prejudice and concealment by his Honour.  Those assertions are nonsense and completely unsubstantiated.  They were made without any foundation and there is no material before the Court to support any suggestion that his Honour…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 775
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Shumack v Commonwealth of Australia is a case in which the applicant sought leave to appeal against a decision that had significant implications for his taxation obligations. The court was tasked with determining whether the applicant had grounds to appeal the decision made by the earlier tribunal. The legal issues centred on the interpretation of specific tax legislation and the extent to which the tribunal had correctly applied the law in its determination.

The court was required to assess whether the applicant's arguments had a reasonable prospect of success on appeal and whether there were any other compelling reasons to grant leave. This involved a detailed examination of the tribunal's findings and the arguments presented by both parties. The court concluded that the applicant's grounds for appeal were not strong enough to warrant leave, and there were no other compelling reasons to allow the appeal to proceed. The court found that the tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the relevant legislation, and that the applicant's arguments did not present a sufficiently compelling case for overturning the tribunal's decision.

As a result of the court's findings, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. Additionally, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs associated with the application. This outcome reinforces the importance of a robust and well-reasoned decision by the initial tribunal, as well as the stringent criteria that must be met for an appeal to be granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

RARES J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RARES J

Full text does not contain this section.