Shumack v Australian Federal Police

[2006] FCA 369

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shumack v Australian Federal Police [2006] FCA 369

PETER JAMES SHUMACK V COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

ACD 30 OF 2005

BENNETT J
30 MARCH 2006
CANBERRA

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY	ACD 30 OF 2005

BETWEEN:	PETER JAMES SHUMACK APPLICANT
AND:	COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE RESPONDENT
JUDGE:	BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:	30 MARCH  2006
WHERE MADE:	CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   leave to appeal from a decision of Gyles J of 13 October 2005 be refused.

2.   the applicant pay the respondent's costs..

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY	ACD 30 OF 2005

BETWEEN:	PETER JAMES SHUMACK APPLICANT
AND:	COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE RESPONDENT

JUDGE:	BENNETT J
DATE:	30 MARCH  2006
PLACE:	CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Mr Shumack seeks leave to appeal from a decision of Gyles J of 13 October 2005.  His Honour heard a motion brought by the respondent requesting orders that Mr Shumack’s proceedings be dismissed pursuant to O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules. His Honour dismissed Mr Shumack’s proceedings, with costs.

2. Mr Shumack’s proceedings were commenced by an application, which was in ‘hopelessly inadequate form’.  Gyles J said at [3] that: ‘I am quite satisfied that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed and that the proceeding on its face is vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court.’  His Honour also pointed out, at [6], that if Mr Shumack could isolate causes of action known to the law and express them in a way which could be recognised as such and which could be dealt with by a respondent, then it may be that he will be able to pursue claims here or in some other Court. 

3. The decision of Gyles J is interlocutory in nature and leave is required to appeal the judgment (Hall v The Nominal Defendant (1996) 117 CLR 423; Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177). Generally, the two considerations before the Court in cases in which leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is sought are whether in all the circumstances the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong (Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397). It is for the applicant seeking leave to appeal to satisfy the Court as to both these matters (Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275).

4. When the matter came before me this morning, Mr Shumack gave some detailed submissions in support of extensive written submissions that he had filed in the Court and numerous affidavits that he had filed in relation to his numerous complaints against various parties which include the respondent.  As part of his submissions, he confirmed that the proceedings relate to an email sent by Mr Shumack to the Deputy Registrar of the High Court of Australia.  He made a series of allegations with respect to persons in the High Court, the respondent and various other parties which, he said, amounted to "political repression".  Many of Mr Shumack’s allegations were of quite a serious nature, were made in global terms and seemed to have no relation to the application actually before his Honour.

5. The draft notice of appeal does not disclose an error of law.  Rather, it raises a series of grievances in relation to the police and the conduct of the law firm representing the respondent, as well as numerous other matters, some of which were repeated in submissions before me.  I have read the written submissions and affidavits for Mr Shumack. None of them identify any error on the part of his Honour at all, nor indeed do they refer back to the form of the application that his Honour held did not conform to the Federal Court Rules.  I have looked at the application before Gyles J myself and I agree with his Honour's observations. 

6. In my opinion, Mr Shumack has not identified any arguable ground of appeal and any appeal would be futile.  I agree with Gyles J that it may be that if Mr Shumack can identify and draft in an appropriate document a cause of action known to the law, that he may be able to proceed, but that has not occurred to date.  I also support his Honour’s suggestion that Mr Shumack should seek some legal guidance as to whether or not he does have a cause of action and if so, seek some legal assistance in putting the matter into proper form.  I note that Mr Shumack has said to me that he has attempted to get some legal assistance and has not been able to do so. 

7. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Bennett.

Associate:

Dated:             30 March  2006

The Applicant appeared in person.

Counsel for the Respondent:	Purnell SC
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Minter Ellison
Date of Hearing:	30 March 2006
Date of Judgment:	30 March 2006