Shugg v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW)

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read
57 CLR 485

THE COMMISSIONER FOR ROAD TRANS-

PORT AND TRAMWAYS (NEW SOUTH

RESPONDENT. WALES)

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES. Transport-" Officer "-Casual employee-Bank holiday-Leave-Transport Act

1930 (N.S.W.) (No. 18 of 1930), secs. 101, 123.

Held, by Latham C.J., Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. (Starke J. dissenting), that the word " officer" in sec. 123 of the Transport Act 1930 (N.S.W.) includes a casual employee appointed under sec. 101 of that Act, and, therefore, such an employee (by Dixon J., if employed continuously or indefinitely), is entitled to the leave provided for by sec. 123.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Shugg V. Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways, (1937) 54 W.N. (N.S.W.) 33, reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

In a special case stated under the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act 1899 (N.S.W.) it was shown that the plaintiff, Harold Robert Shugg, since 6th March 1933, had been continuously employed in the service of the defendant, the Commissioner for Road Trans- port and Tramways of New South Wales, as a body builder. Immediately prior to his appointment he was examined by the

57 CLR 486

commissioner's Staff Board and by its medical officer, and he signed a memorandum acknowledging that, in accepting employment in the motor omnibus service of the commissioner, he understood that the work was purely of a temporary character, and that he was appointed as a casual employee under sec. 101 of the Transport Act 1930 (N.S.W.).

On 5th August 1935, which was observed throughout New South (N.S.W.).

Wales as a bank holiday, the plaintiff was required by the commis- sioner to work and he did in fact work the full eight hour shift, for which he was duly paid the sum of 17s. lld., the award rate for a day's work. The plaintiff claimed that he was an "officer" within the meaning of sec. 123 of the Transport Act 1930, and that he was entitled to leave on full pay for one day in lieu of the bank holiday on which he had worked.

The question reserved in the special case for the opinion of the court was:

Whether the plaintiff on 5th August 1935 was an officer within

the meaning of sec. 123 of the Transport Act 1930 ? For the purposes of the special case it was agreed between the parties that (a) if the answer to the question were in the affirmative there should be a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of 17s. lld. but with costs on the highest scale, and (b) that if the swer were in the negative there should be a verdict for the def 'ant with costs on the highest scale.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales answered the question in the negative, and, accordingly a verdict was entered for the defendant: Shugg v. Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways 1.

From…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Shugg v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1937] HCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Shugg v. Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Harold Robert Shugg, was a casual employee of the Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways, employed continuously as a body builder since March 1933. He claimed entitlement to a day's leave on full pay in lieu of a bank holiday on which he was required to work, asserting he was an "officer" within the meaning of section 123 of the Transport Act 1930 (NSW). The Supreme Court had ruled against him, finding he was not an officer for the purposes of that section.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether a casual employee, appointed under section 101 of the Transport Act 1930, qualified as an "officer" for the purposes of section 123 of the same Act, which provided for annual leave and entitlement to leave on public holidays. The definition of "officer" in section 4 of the Act was broad, encompassing any person employed or appointed by the Commissioner, unless the context or subject matter indicated otherwise. The court had to determine if the specific context of section 123, or the nature of casual employment under section 101, necessitated a narrower interpretation of "officer" that would exclude casual employees.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ., held that the word "officer" in section 123 did include casual employees, provided their employment was continuous or indefinite. They reasoned that the broad definition in section 4 should apply unless there was a clear indication to the contrary in the context or subject matter of section 123. The court found no such impediment, concluding that the provisions for leave in section 123 could be practically applied to casual employees who had completed sufficient service. While acknowledging that casual employees could be dismissed at any time under section 101, this did not preclude them from having a statutory right to leave under section 123, as all employees, including permanent ones, held office at pleasure. Starke J. dissented, finding that the provisions of section 123 contemplated continuity of employment appropriate to permanent staff and were therefore inappropriate for casually or intermittently employed persons.

The High Court allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the Supreme Court. The court ordered that the question posed in the special case be answered in the affirmative, finding that the plaintiff was an officer within the meaning of section 123. Consequently, a verdict was entered for the plaintiff.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established