SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
SHORTMAN v THE KING
[2023] SASCA 60
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)
8 June 2023
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - ROBBERY
The applicant entered a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery. The applicant, with another, robbed a bottle recycling depot. They concealed their identities, armed themselves with bats and threatened two victims.
The applicant appeals that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive as the sentencing Judge erred by applying the sentencing range set out in R v Place. The applicant also contends that the sentencing Judge did not appropriately deal with his criminal antecedents.
Held, per the Court, dismissing the appeal:
1. The sentencing Judge appropriately dealt with the applicant’s criminal antecedents.
2. The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 137; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), referred to.
Adams (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] SASCA 47; Hackett v The Queen [2021] SASCA 32; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Pateras v The Queen (2021) 139 SASR 549; R v Corlett (2017) 128 SASR 521; R v Saleh [2017] SASCFC 75; R v Harradine & Harradine [2012] SASCFC 103; R v Gannon (2012) 113 SASR 1; R v Kelly [2023] SASCA 22; R v Place (2002) 81 SASR 395; R v Wirth (1976) 14 SASR 291; Rendic v The Queen [2021] SASCA 23; Soun v R; R v Soun [2021] SASCA 119; Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, considered.
SHORTMAN v THE KING
[2023] SASCA 60Court of Appeal – Criminal: Lovell, Bleby and David JJA
THE COURT: The applicant, wielding a bat and in company with another, robbed a bottle recycling depot of $2,420. After taking into account the applicant’s plea of guilty and allowing for time spent in custody the sentencing Judge imposed a term of imprisonment of five years three months and two days and fixed a non-parole period of two years and 11 months.
The applicant submits that the sentencing Judge failed to appropriately deal with his prior criminal record and that, in any event, the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive.
Background facts
On 7 June 2021, the applicant and Greaves, the co-accused, robbed a bottle recycling depot of $2,420. The applicant planned the offending to replace money, intended for his daughter’s birthday present which he had spent on purchasing methamphetamine for himself. He had previously worked at the recycling depot and was aware of the time when the takings would be at their highest. The applicant prepared for…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the applicant's criminal history and whether the imposed sentence of five years, three months, and two days imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and 11 months, was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
The Court of Appeal considered the principles of sentencing, particularly in light of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), which mandates that the protection of the community is the primary purpose of sentencing. While acknowledging the applicant's submission that the sentencing judge did not adequately refer to his criminal history after the initial mention, the Court found that the sentencing discretion is broad and involves balancing various factors. The Court noted that the sentencing judge had considered the applicant's personal circumstances, the impact on dependents, and the remorse shown, as well as the mitigating effect of the early guilty plea. The Court affirmed that while appellate courts may indicate expected sentencing ranges, the ultimate sentencing task requires a value judgment to balance incommensurable factors, with the primary purpose being community safety. The Court did not find that the sentencing judge had failed to appropriately consider the relevant factors or that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
That Place should not be rigidly applied was accepted by the plurality in Place itself. Doyle CJ, Prior, Lander and Martin JJ (Gray J agreeing) observed: [9]The critical question is whether the jurisdiction to establish and maintain adequate standards of punishment for crime includes the identification of a standard of penalty by indicating a range of sentences applicable in ordinary cases of particular crimes. As Gleeson CJ pointed out in Wong, there are sound reasons why in exercising the jurisdiction appellate courts may find it useful “to indicate, subject to relevant discretionary considerations, the order of the sentence that might be expected to be attracted by a certain type of offender who commits a certain type of offence”.[9] R v Place (2002) 81 SASR 395 at [20]. In South Australia, the sentencing task is governed by the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘the Sentencing Act’) which was enacted well after Place was decided. The Sentencing Act, as amended, directs the court to treat the protection of the safety of the community as the primary purpose when sentencing.[10] Place has been cited with approval by this court since the Sentencing Act was proclaimed. In R v Kelly,[11] this Court reviewed some recent decisions dealing with the application of Place and nothing in that judgment suggests that the principles enunciated in Place no longer apply. The applicant did not contend to the contrary. However, the applicant submitted, correctly in our view, that what the plurality observed in Place about “discretionary considerations” remains an important matter in sentencing. [10] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 3.[11] R v Kelly [2023] SASCA 22; Soun v R; R v Soun [2021] SASCA 119. In Rendic v The Queen, when considering the operation of the Sentencing Act, Lovell JA (Kelly P agreeing) observed: [12]Traditionally, a court, when sentencing an offender, had regard to the protection of the safety of the community when determining a proportionate sentence. The protection of society was one factor, amongst many, that the court took into account. Sections 3, 4, 9, 10 and 11 of the Act impact on the sentencing task. The combination of sections 3, 4 and 9 directs a sentencing court to treat the protection of the safety of the community as the primary purpose (paramount consideration) of the sentence to be imposed. Other sentencing purposes, namely to punish, to hold to account, to denounce, to deter specifically and generally and to rehabilitate, remain relevant but are referred to as secondary purposes.The sentencing discretion is broad. The sections mentioned do not direct the court as to how it must reach its final sentence; the Act is silent in that regard. The direction is that the sentence finally arrived at must achieve the protection of the safety of the community as its primary purpose. As has been observed, the troublesome nature of the sentencing discretion arises from the unavoidable difficulty in giving weight to the various factors to which the court must have regard when determining sentence. Factors bearing on the determination of a sentence frequently pull in different directions. The discretionary nature of the task means that the process does not lead to a single correct answer. The extent to which any factor bears upon the case is a matter of a value judgment. Administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice. It is the obligation of the court to balance the incommensurable factors and arrive at a just sentence which, in South Australia, ultimately reflects the primary purpose, namely the protection of the safety of the community.…..The sentencing discretion, although broad, is fettered by the Act and common law principles. Section 3 requires that the factors to be weighed be viewed through the prism of the primary purpose. However, provided the final sentence achieves the primary purpose, the weight to be given to the various factors or purposes is a matter for the sentencing court.[12] Rendic v The Queen [2021] SASCA 23 at [6].