SHOOLBREAD v DRINKWATER - [2004] SASC 267

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
SHOOLBREAD v DRINKWATER
Judgment of The Honourable Justice White
6 September 2004
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - ROAD ACCIDENT CASES - ACTIONS FOR NEGLIGENCE - APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES - INTERSECTION AND JUNCTION ACCIDENTS
Appeal against apportionment of damages - Appellant's vehicle approached intersection with traffic lights - Appellant observed traffic lights change from green to amber - Appellant braked suddenly - Respondent's vehicle hit rear of appellant's - Respondent travelling too close behind appellant - Magistrate apportioned liability in ratio of 85:15 in favour of appellant - Magistrate erred in considering whether appellant had breached duty of care to respondent - Appellant admitted she had not seen lights change from green to amber - Failure to see the lights change did not demonstrate contributory negligence on part of appellant - Appeal allowed - Appellant to recover whole of the damages to be assessed.
Magistrates Court Act 1991, s 40; Road Traffic Act 1961, s 80; Australian Road Rules Rule 57, referred to.
Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd [1951] AC 601; Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424; Stoeckel v Harpas (1971) 1 SASR 172, applied.
Mugford v Ames (2000) 31 MVR 406; Kambouridis v Heyn and TransAdelaide [2000] SASC 361; Commissioner of Railways v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563, considered.

SHOOLBREAD v DRINKWATER
[2004] SASC 267
Magistrates Appeal
WHITE J:
Introduction

This is an appeal, pursuant to s 40 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991, from a decision of a Magistrate apportioning liability for a motor vehicle collision.
The present appellant was the plaintiff in the proceedings before the Magistrate and the respondent, the defendant to those proceedings. It is convenient, in this judgment, to go on referring to them as plaintiff and defendant respectively.
The Magistrate apportioned liability 85:15 in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appeals against that apportionment.
The plaintiff does not really challenge the findings of fact of the Magistrate. It is the inferences and conclusions from those facts which are impugned.
Background Circumstances
On Sunday 25 August 2002 at approximately 10.30 am, a rear-end collision occurred between the plaintiff’s vehicle and the defendant’s vehicle at the intersection of Flagstaff Hill Road and South Road at Darlington. The plaintiff’s vehicle was the lead vehicle and the defendant’s the following vehicle. At that intersection, Flagstaff Hill Road runs almost exactly in a north-south direction. On the opposite side of its intersection with South Road, Flagstaff Hill Road becomes Marion Road, which also runs almost exactly in a north-south direction. Flagstaff Hill Road and Marion Road intersect with South Road at approximately a 45 degree angle so that South Road, at this point, runs in a north-east to south-west direction. As nothing turns on the precise direction of South Road, it is convenient, in this judgment, to speak of South Road running in an east-west direction.
The intersection of Flagstaff Hill Road and South Road is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading SHOOLBREAD v DRINKWATER

Details

AGLC: SHOOLBREAD v DRINKWATER [2004] SASC 267
Case: [2004] SASC 267
Decision Date: 6 September 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Shoolbread v Drinkwater, the appeal was brought before the court regarding the apportionment of damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff, Shoolbread, was involved in a rear-end collision with the defendant, Drinkwater, at an intersection controlled by traffic lights. The plaintiff’s vehicle was leading, while the defendant was following closely behind. The plaintiff, who was travelling on Flagstaff Hill Road, intended to turn right onto South Road. Upon approaching the intersection, the traffic lights changed from green to amber, but the plaintiff did not notice this change and subsequently braked sharply, causing the collision with the defendant’s vehicle.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the assessment of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the proper apportionment of damages between the parties. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff's failure to notice the change in traffic lights constituted contributory negligence and how this should impact the allocation of liability. The Magistrate had apportioned liability in the ratio of 85:15 in favour of the plaintiff but had also found the plaintiff contributorily negligent for not noticing the traffic light change, which the plaintiff admitted.

The court found that the Magistrate erred in considering the plaintiff's failure to notice the traffic light change as contributory negligence. The court clarified that contributory negligence is not determined by the breach of a duty owed to the defendant but rather by whether the plaintiff took reasonable care for their own safety. The court held that the plaintiff's failure to notice the traffic light change did not demonstrate contributory negligence on her part, as it did not contribute to the causation of her injuries. The court concluded that the defendant was the primary cause of the accident due to his failure to maintain a safe following distance.

The appeal was allowed, and the court ordered that the judgment of the Magistrate be set aside, and the plaintiff recover the whole of the damages from the defendant, to be assessed. The court remitted the matter to the Magistrate for consideration of the costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff does not really challenge the findings of fact of the Magistrate. It is the inferences and conclusions from those facts which are impugned.Background Circumstances On Sunday 25 August 2002 at approximately 10.30 am, a rear-end collision occurred between the plaintiff’s vehicle and the defendant’s vehicle at the intersection of Flagstaff Hill Road and South Road at Darlington. The plaintiff’s vehicle was the lead vehicle and the defendant’s the following vehicle. At that intersection, Flagstaff Hill Road runs almost exactly in a north-south direction. On the opposite side of its intersection with South Road, Flagstaff Hill Road becomes Marion Road, which also runs almost exactly in a north-south direction. Flagstaff Hill Road and Marion Road intersect with South Road at approximately a 45 degree angle so that South Road, at this point, runs in a north-east to south-west direction. As nothing turns on the precise direction of South Road, it is convenient, in this judgment, to speak of South Road running in an east-west direction. The intersection of Flagstaff Hill Road and South Road is controlled by traffic lights. The plaintiff was travelling in a northerly direction, down the relatively steep incline of Flagstaff Hill Road and in its right-hand lane, towards the intersection, at a speed of approximately 30 to 40 km/h. The plaintiff intended to perform a right-hand turn onto South Road at the intersection. The defendant was travelling in the same direction, behind and in the same lane as the plaintiff’s vehicle. As the plaintiff’s vehicle approached the intersection, the traffic lights which had been green in her favour turned to amber. There was evidence that the lights would remain on amber for four seconds before turning red. The plaintiff did not see the change from green to amber but it seems likely that she must have noticed the change of colour shortly after it occurred. The plaintiff then braked sharply, bringing her vehicle to a halt. The Magistrate found that the plaintiff’s vehicle was “pulled up to a dead stop, or a near dead stop, quite abruptly”. The defendant’s vehicle then collided with the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle.The Witnesses at Trial Three persons gave evidence at the trial: the plaintiff, her 16-year-old son, who was a front-seat passenger in her vehicle, and the defendant. The Magistrate did not regard the evidence of any of those witnesses as being altogether reliable. This was not because of a lack of honesty on their part – rather it turned on factors affecting the weight which could be attached to their evidence. The Magistrate said that he regarded the son’s evidence with “a degree of caution and scepticism”. This was because of an admission by the son that it was difficult to remember the precise circumstances, and because of a further admission that he had discussed the circumstances of the accident with his mother on three to four occasions. The Magistrate found that the plaintiff’s estimates of distance to be unreliable. He considered that her evidence was affected by a degree of reconstruction. On the other hand, the Magistrate considered that the defendant’s evidence had “a certain component of inherent improbability” and that, to some extent, the defendant “was being speculative and reconstructive”.The Point of Impact

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the question of whether any want of care by the plaintiff for her own safety was a cause of her injuries. In the circumstances of the present case there must be a real question as to whether the requisite causal relationship exists. I refer in particular to the fact that the defendant, on his own admission, had sufficient space in which to stop, after the lights turned from green to amber, before entering the intersection. Had the defendant acted in compliance with the law and reasonably, this collision would not have occurred. There is much to be said, in my view, for the proposition that the defendant was the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. However, in the light of the conclusion I have reached above, it is unnecessary to express a concluded view about this aspect.Conclusion In my opinion, the appeal ought to be allowed. The order of the Court is that the judgment of the Magistrate that the plaintiff recover 85 per cent of the damages be set aside and in lieu thereof there be an order that the plaintiff recover from the defendant damages to be assessed. Subject to hearing from the parties, I will remit the matter to the Magistrate for consideration of the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Magistrate was influenced as to his finding of contributory negligence by the decision of the Full Court in Mugford v Ames (2000) 31 MVR 406. In that case, Martin J, with whom Prior and Williams JJ agreed, said at 413 [38]:“The duty of a driver in the position of the appellant in a line of traffic requires the driver to drive in such a manner that, if the circumstances of the flow of traffic so require, the vehicle can be brought to a stop without danger to other vehicles. It is foreseeable that if braking is left to the last moment such that emergency braking must be undertaken, with or without impact with the vehicle in front, following drivers will be put at the risk of injury through collision with the rear of the stopping vehicle. It is not uncommon for following drivers to be less than properly attentive and to drive in such a manner that they are unable to avoid impact with the vehicle in front if emergency braking occurs.”See also Kambouridis v Heyn and TransAdelaide [2000] SASC 361 per Gray J.Consideration The Magistrate was correct in finding the defendant in breach of the duty of care which he owed as a following driver. The conclusion that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent is, in my opinion, affected by error. The Magistrate determined the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence by concluding that she was in breach of a duty of care owed by her to the defendant. This is evident from the following passage in the Magistrate’s reasons:“Failure to establish and maintain a proper or timely lookout for other drivers who may have occupied the position or the vicinity of the position of a car in the defendant’s case, the failure to observe a timely and proper manner the changing of the lights controlling the intersection and so lead me to believe the plaintiff did fail to discharge her duty of care towards the defendant. I also find that that failure was contributory to and partially causative of her injuries in addition to the failure, the overwhelming failure, of the defendant to establish and maintain a sufficient distance behind the plaintiff’s car to ensure that a collision such as this would not occur.” Contributory negligence occurs when the plaintiff fails to take reasonable care for his or her own safety and the failure contributes, in part, to the causation of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The existence, and breach, of a duty of care owed to another forms no part of the defence of contributory negligence. In Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd [1951] AC 601 at 611, the Privy Council said:“When contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured person did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury.”See also Commissioner of Railways v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563, per Mason J at 570.