IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P18 of 2017
B e t w e e n -
SHIRE OF KELLERBERRIN
Applicant
and
EMSON NYONI
First Respondent
DARREN FRIEND
Second Respondent
STAN McDONNEL
Third Respondent
FRANK PECZKA
Fourth Respondent
PETER MITCHELL
Fifth Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO PERTH
ON FRIDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 2018, AT 12.01 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR B. DHARMANANDA, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS C.V. WREN for the applicant. (instructed by DLA Piper Australia)
MR D.I. STAR, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR R. CHAILE, for the first respondent. (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)
NETTLE J: Mr Dharmananda.
MR DHARMANANDA: Your Honour, four points of principle, we submit, arise from the majority decision of the Full Court. We say there were four errors of law made. May I deal with each of them in turn? The first point is that Mr Friend, the CEO of the Shire, did not exercise power attaching to public office. The majority said at paragraph 103 in application book 136 that it is inherent in the performance of the most senior executive of a local government authority that he must communicate on its behalf. The majority found that Mr Friend, as CEO of the Shire, used a power of his office to make an official complaint, and that is at paragraphs 113 and 138.
We submit the tort of misfeasance in public office is committed only if the impugned act is an act attaching to that public office and not every act of a public officer has that characteristic. The starting point for that proposition is Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] 1 AC 1228. At 1240 Lord Bridge said that the act must be done by the public officer in the exercise:
of some power or authority with which he is clothed by virtue of the office he holds ‑ ‑ ‑
NETTLE J: Is this point resolved down to one of fact as to whether or not he was acting in office because he was in such close contact with other councillors?
MR DHARMANANDA: In our submission, the point does descend into a fact issue. However, there is a point of principle as to what is involved in the issue of what attaches and does not attach and, in a sense, the way in which the Full Court approached that topic submerged that inquiry by simply saying an officer can communicate on behalf of the Shire. Whenever that occurs, it must be attaching. In our submission, determining whether it attaches or not is ‑ ‑ ‑
NETTLE J: It is a fact question.
MR DHARMANANDA: It is a fact question informed by a principle.
GORDON J: The principle is right. It is a question…
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- Case
- [2018] HCATrans 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Full Court had erred in law in its findings regarding the tort of misfeasance in public office. Specifically, the Court needed to consider whether the CEO's communications constituted an exercise of power attaching to his public office, whether an intention to harm was sufficient for the tort without knowledge of unlawful conduct, whether damage could be presumed in such cases, and whether the Shire could be held directly liable for the CEO's actions. These questions involved the interpretation and application of established legal principles relating to the tort of misfeasance in public office.
The applicant argued that the tort of misfeasance in public office requires the impugned act to be one that attaches to the public office itself, not merely any act performed by a public officer. They contended that the Full Court's finding that the CEO's communications were inherently part of his role was an error of principle, and that the factual findings were insufficient to support this conclusion. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the tort requires both an intention to harm and knowledge of the unlawful nature of the act or abuse of power, and that the Full Court's acceptance of intention to harm alone was contrary to authority. The applicant also argued that actual damage, not presumed damage, must be proven, and that direct corporate liability for the CEO's actions was not established.
The application for special leave to appeal was refused. The Court did not provide detailed reasons for this refusal in the provided transcript, but the arguments presented by the applicant and the responses from the respondent's counsel indicate that the High Court was not persuaded that there were errors of law or points of principle of sufficient importance to warrant granting special leave. The respondent argued that the Full Court's findings were correct and that the applicant's arguments involved a departure from established authority or were based on a mischaracterisation of the factual findings.
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