Shiraz Nominees Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation
[2003] AATA 1072
•27 October 2003
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 1072
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Nº VT2002/122
TAXATION APPEALS DIVISION
Re: SHIRAZ NOMINEES PTY LTD
Applicant
And: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal: Mr B.H. Pascoe, Senior Member
Date: 27 October 2003
Place: Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
(sgd) B.H. Pascoe
Senior Member
SALES TAX - manufacture of game fishing boat - whether applicant the manufacturer - whether contract manufacture to another - whether manufacture in course of any business - whether deemed to be in course of a business
Sales Tax Assessment Act 1992
Dawson (t/a Goodvibes Yachts) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 56 ALR 367,
84 ATC 4752
The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Totaliser
Administration Board of Queensland (1990) 170 CLR 508
REASONS FOR DECISION
27 October 2003 Mr B.H. Pascoe, Senior Member
This is an application to review a decision of the respondent to disallow an objection against an assessment of sales tax dated 18 March 1999 in respect of the manufacture of a 44 feet game fishing boat "Kiama".
At the hearing the applicant, Shiraz Nominees Pty Ltd (Shiraz), was represented by Mr A. O'Brien, of counsel, and the respondent by Mr C. Sievers, of counsel. Evidence was given by Mr P. Jindra, a director of the applicant, and Mr M. Ericson, a former finance company state manager. In addition to the documents provided by the respondent pursuant to s.37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (T1‑T19), the applicant tendered a large number of documents (Exhibit A1) and the respondent tendered further documents (Exhibits R1‑R2).
The principal issue in this case is whether Shiraz was the manufacturer of the boat Kiama under the Sales Tax Assessment Act 1992 (the Act). If the Tribunal finds that it was, then the second issue is whether the manufacture was in the course of any business or whether s8 of the Act deemed the manufacture to have occurred in the course of a business. Section 5 of the Act defines manufacturer as:
"manufacturer", in relation to particular goods, means the person who (not as an employee) manufactured the goods, whether or not the person owned the materials out of which the goods were manufactured;
Section 16 of the Act provides that Table 1 sets out all the assessable dealings that can be subject to sales tax. The respondent assessed under item AD3b, being goods applied to own use by a person who manufactured the goods in the course of any business.. Section 8 of the Act states:
8(1) In certain circumstances, the manufacture of goods ("the current goods") is treated as having happened in the course of a business even though it did not.
(2) This treatment applies if all the following conditions are met:
(a)the current goods were manufactured on premises that had been sold, leased or otherwise made available to the manufacturer under an agreement entered into for the purpose, or for purposes that included the purpose, of bringing about the manufacture of the current goods;
(b)when the current goods were manufactured, the premises were ordinarily used by any person in the course of carrying on a business in the ordinary course of which goods identical in all material respects with the current goods could reasonably be expected to be manufactured;
(c)more than half of the labour used in the manufacture of the current goods was paid labour.
(3) In this section:
"paid labour" does not include labour provided by the manufacturer;
"premises" includes land or a building or part of a building.
Mr Jindra is an electronics engineer and managing director of Tech Rentals Pty Ltd (Tech Rentals). This company has been successful and, in 1994, forty‑nine per cent of the shareholding was sold to a public company. Shiraz is the trustee of the Jindra Family Trust and owns twenty‑five per cent of the shares in Tech Rental and the family home of Mr Jindra. He said that he was invited on a game fishing trip in 1985 and he so enjoyed the experience that he decided to obtain his own boat for the private use of himself and his family. As a result of the success of Tech Rentals and the sale of shares to the public company, he had a high income and sufficient wealth to pursue his wish to own such a boat. From the early 1990s, he began to investigate the types of boats available and an appropriate boat builder. In October 1992, Mr Jindra received two quotations. A quotation from Charter Craft Marine was for a price of $585,600 including sales tax. The second quotation was from a Mr P. Caterson for $560,870 with no specific mention of sales tax. Mr Jindra said that, after a full investigation, he was most impressed with the work of Mr Caterson who could build a boat to the specification in the design without the use of moulds to form the hull. He said that he was willing to spend in excess of $800,000 to have a boat built to his requirements.
Mr Jindra said that he questioned Mr Caterson on the accuracy of his estimate of price and was told that Mr Caterson was unsure of the accuracy of his costing. He said that Mr Caterson gave him a large shoebox full of invoices relating to the manufacture of other boats. Mr Jindra went through the documents and constructed a spreadsheet showing the costing and cash flow for the manufacture of a boat. He said that this showed a figure significantly higher than the quotation by Mr Caterson, but within the amount that Mr Jindra was prepared to pay. He provided a copy of this spreadsheet to Mr Caterson.
Mr Jindra said that Mr Caterson insisted that the basis of building a boat would be that the owner would pay all costs as incurred over the period of the building of the boat. This involved Mr Caterson issuing weekly invoices for the labour of himself and his employees, all other contractors who worked on the boat would issue invoices to Shiraz and all materials would be invoiced to Shiraz for direct payment or would be paid to Mr Caterson from a separate bank account established and funded by Shiraz. The landlord of the premises in which the boat would be built would invoice Shiraz for rent of the premises and share of the telephone and electricity. Under the arrangements with the landlord where more than one boat is being constructed on the premises, the landlord negotiates with Mr Caterson to divide the rent, telephone and electricity between the owners. For the labour costs, the invoice from Mr Caterson required payment for his own labour to be paid to his personal bank account and for his employees to be paid to a business bank account.
Mr Jindra said that he agreed with Mr Caterson for him to build a boat but did not enter into any written contract. As Mr Caterson was then involved in building other boats, he was not able to work on a boat for Mr Jindra for some time. In 1993, Mr Jindra said that he decided to have a boat properly designed by a marine architect and he contracted with a Mr R. Simpson to prepare a design. Work on the boat commenced in April 1996. Mr Jindra said that Mr Caterson suggested that the boat should be built to survey and a marine surveyor, Mr C. Masters, carried out a survey in April 1997.
Mr Jindra maintained his spreadsheet and entered all costs as they were incurred and compared them with his budget. He maintained that his only direct involvement with the building of the boat, other than regular visits to the premises to inspect progress, was the direct supply of certain items. These consisted of the engines which were ordered direct from the manufacturer by Shiraz, engine room cooling fans which Mr Jindra made in his own workshop and a switch for the refrigeration unit which Mr Jindra designed and built himself. Mr Jindra said that, in addition, he allowed a contractor to use his home workshop and tools to make some small items of furniture for the boat.
Mr Jindra said that, shortly before the boat was completed, Mr Caterson suggested that, in order to give the boat a thorough testing, it would be a "good idea" to charter it to a Mr Parker. It was said that this was agreed to so as to quickly and thoroughly test the boat for any defects which would be rectified by Mr Caterson. Mr Jindra said that the charter was a loose arrangement under which Shiraz paid Mr Parker and his crew and to receive a proportion of any profit from using the boat for fishing charters. After the first year, Mr Parker commenced to pay a lease fee for each day the boat was used on charter and was responsible for all expenses. The use by Mr Parker commenced on 1 August 1997 and this appeared to be the boat's maiden voyage. In January 1998, Mr Parker prepared a list of defects. Mr Jindra said that all defects were rectified by Mr Caterson or by the relevant sub‑contractors or suppliers at no further cost to Shiraz.
In August 1996, Mr Jindra approached Capital Commercial Finance Ltd seeking to arrange $700,000 in finance to fund the construction of the boat. The file note of the then state manager of the finance company, Mr Ericson, stated that Mr Jindra had originally proposed to construct the boat out of his personal cash flow but, as he had received advice that the vessel may be involved in charter work, there would be taxation advantages in borrowing the funds. The loan facility agreement was signed on 12 November 1996. A condition precedent requiring a copy of the construction contract between Shiraz and P. Caterson was deleted, as was the assignment of the borrower's rights under a construction contract initially included as the security to be provided. Mr Ericson said that these were deleted at the request of Mr Jindra who had told him that the vessel was being constructed on an owner builder basis and that the specialist boat builder had been employed for that purpose. He said, also, that Mr Jindra had told him that he, Mr Jindra, would be personally responsible for much of the interior timberwork in the boat as an experienced timber craftsman.
Mr Jindra denied saying that he was building any part of the interior of the boat. He consistently maintained that Mr Caterson directed all of the construction of the boat, chose all sub‑contractors and ordered all materials other than the engines. He said that the engines were in accordance with Mr Caterson's requirements.
On 20 April 1998, the respondent wrote to Shiraz seeking information relating to the manufacture of the boat. By letter of 26 May 1998, Steven Dossis & Associates, accountants, provided a response to the respondent's letter and provided the following answers to some of the questions:
…
(a)Q12. What role did Shiraz Nominees P/L have in the manufacture/ownership of the boat? A. Shiraz Nominees Pty Ltd had the boat designed, costed, planned, ordered main engines, supervised, design circuitry, tested machinery, paid for, tookup finance and insured the boat.
(b)Q13. Who built the boat? A. The boat was built by Shiraz Nominees Pty Ltd with the cooperation of contractors.
(c)Q14. Who supervised the manufacture of the boat? A. Paul Jindra and Clem Masters, Government Licensed Surveyor.
(d)Q15. What part did you carry out in the manufacture of the boat? A. Designed, costed, planned, decided on specifications, chose/decided on engines, communication equipment, designed and build electronic circuit, DC current, supervised, tested machinery, organised insurance, organised finance, paid contractors, paid main suppliers.
(e)Q20. Give details of the activities that each of the subcontractors carried out in the construction of the boat. A. Ken Caterson Marine - Head subcontractor erecting the frame and wooden structure.
Descriptions and names and addresses of other sub‑contractors were provided. The total cost of the boat was shown as $832.996. Mr Jindra denied that he had regarded Shiraz as the builder of the boat and sought to use the analogy of building a house where one might use that term, although a professional builder is building the house under contract.
In his written statement provided prior to the hearing, Mr Jindra stated that (at para 41):
…Mr Caterson made it known to me that he (Mr Caterson) believed that the arrangements he insisted upon resulted in him (Mr Caterson) having no sales tax liability. I was sceptical on this point, but considered it was Mr Caterson's business. Mr Caterson also insisted that other boat builders operated in exactly the same way.
In his oral evidence, Mr Jindra said that he wanted to know whether he was liable to sales tax and spoke to his accountant and to other customers of Mr Caterson. He said that, in the presence of his accountant, Mr Dossis, he telephoned the sales tax enquiries number and, after providing full details relating to the construction of the boat, was advised that no sales tax was payable except that included in the price of any taxable materials purchased. Mr Jindra said that he would not have proceeded if he had expected to be liable to pay twenty per cent sales tax.
Prior to the hearing, the applicant's representative sought and had summonses issued by the Tribunal to Mr Caterson and another person who had used the services of Mr Caterson to attend and give evidence at the hearing. Neither person was, in fact, called to give evidence. The respondent tendered a statutory declaration by Mr Caterson who described his occupation as project manager.. He stated that he was employed as a project boat manager operating out of premises in Labrador, Queensland. He said that he was not a tenant and paid no rent for the premises with the boat owner responsible for the rent. He said that materials are either paid for direct by the owner or from funds deposited in his bank account by the owner. He maintained that he followed the plans of the designer under the supervision of the marine surveyor, Mr Masters, was not responsible for insurance or any loss by fire and did not provide any warranty with any subsequent rectification done on the basis of pride in his work. Mr Caterson stated that he operates on the basis of …if I am not paid for any services on the Friday then I do not show for work on the following Monday, it is the owner's responsibility for ongoing rent and his services can be terminated at any time. As Mr Caterson was not called to give direct evidence or be subject to cross‑examination, his statutory declaration has limited evidentiary weight, particularly as it could be seen that, if the applicant is successful, the liability for sales tax could rest with him and it is in his interest to argue that he was not the manufacturer of the boat.
It was submitted for the applicant that Shiraz was not the manufacturer of the boat Kiama. It was said that the applicant contracted with Mr Caterson to manufacture the boat and neither Mr Jindra nor any other employee of Shiraz carried out any of the processes of manufacture of the boat. Much of the argument was directed at the absence of any indicia of employee/employer relationship with Mr Caterson and the fact that he utilised his own skills and that of his employees in constructing the bulk of the boat, engaging other contractors and ordering all materials other than the engines and some minor components. It was strongly argued that Mr Caterson was the manufacturer. Alternatively, it was submitted that the boat was not manufactured in the course of any business carried on by Shiraz and s8 of the Act did not deem the manufacture as having happened in the course of a business.
It was submitted for the respondent that Shiraz was the manufacturer of the boat. It was said that the information provided prior to the assessment in response to the questions asked by the applicant demonstrated that it was the manufacturer. It was submitted that the evidence of Mr Jindra given after the assessment was issued was an attempt to deny liability where the arrangement was initially entered into in a manner intended to escape liability for sales tax. It was further submitted that whether Mr Caterson was acting as an employee was not relevant in that he was one of the sub‑contractors engaged by the applicant to provide labour for the construction of the boat.. The respondent considered that Shiraz was carrying on a business in that it received management fees in the year ended 30 June 1996 and a guarantee fee in the year ended 30 June 1997. It was argued that, in any event, s8 of the Act applied to deem the manufacture to have taken place in the course of business. In addition, the respondent maintained that the documents demonstrated that, from an early stage in its construction, the boat was intended for use as a charter vessel.
I am left in no doubt from the evidence of the response to the questionnaire from the respondent, the evidence of Mr Jindra, the evidence of Mr Ericson and the statutory declaration of Mr Caterson that, at the time of entering into the arrangement with Mr Caterson, the applicant intended to be the builder of the boat and avoid the imposition of sales tax on the wholesale value of the completed boat. The quotation from Charter Craft Marine clearly showed the additional cost of sales tax in a quotation from a boat builder. This was a reasonably detailed quotation with a firm price. The letter of quotation did suggest that Mr Jindra discuss with his accountant ways of minimising the sales tax, as …it is a gray [sic] area with different ways of applying it.. On the other hand, the letter from Mr Caterson provided an …estimate for the construction of a 42 foot Game fishing vessel with no reference to sales tax. It may well be relevant that the Act, described as simplified or streamlined sales tax legislation and which replaced several former Acts, commenced on 28 October 1992. It is clear that the preliminary discussions held by Mr Jindra with Mr Caterson were held prior to this date with a possible lack of awareness of the new provisions, particularly those of s8 of the Act.
One of the difficulties in this case is that there was no contract entered into by Shiraz relating to the construction of the boat. It is clear from the evidence that the initial estimate by Mr Caterson was an approximation of the possible total cost. Mr Jindra prepared the estimate by use of a spreadsheet and it is relevant to note that the spreadsheet showed labour as one item, separate lines for each category of material such as paint, stainless steel, timber, freezers, light fittings etc and separate items for overheads such as rent and rubbish removal. As construction proceeded, Mr Jindra maintained such spreadsheets noting the amounts budgeted for each item and the actual expenditure on each item. Clearly, there was no price provided by Mr Caterson for the cost of building the hull or any other part of the boat. Weekly invoices were provided by him showing the hours spent on the particular boat by himself and his direct employees and the accumulation of these weekly invoices represented the cost of using Mr Caterson's services.
The applicant relied on the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Dawson (t/a Goodvibes Yachts) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 56 ALR 367, 84 ATC 4752. In that case, the taxpayer carried on a business as a boat builder. Under his normal method of operation, a customer hired the moulds and the premises from a third party and purchased the materials from which the yacht hull and deck were constructed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer entered into a contract with a customer setting out the cost of labour and material separately and noting that the cost of materials were estimates and subject to adjustment for cost increases and quantities. There was a requirement for progress payments. All materials were ordered by the taxpayer and then invoiced to the customer. The Court held (at p373) that:
…It is clear from the description of his business functions in the affidavit quoted above and from the typical “agreement” exhibited thereto, that the appellant was no mere artisan or labourer, nor was he a contractor of labour to a manufacturer. He was the organizer of the construction project. He determined what materials were needed and ordered them or arranged for them to be ordered. He provided the knowledge, skill, experience and organizing services, as well as the labour, which resulted in the materials being converted into a yacht hull and deck. The hull and deck constituted an “article…which is commercially distinct” from the materials which were combined to form the hull and deck. The process therefore falls within the words of the definition of manufacture as well as within the ordinary concept of manufacture. By means of his knowledge, labour, skills, and organizing services, he was responsible for “the combination of parts…whereby an article…is formed which is commercially distinct from those parts”. The process in which the appellant engaged therefore answers the description of “manufacture”.
It was submitted for the applicants in this case that the circumstances of the arrangement between Shiraz and Mr Caterson was identical in all material respects with the facts in Dawson and that case should be followed. For the respondent, it was submitted that the decision in Dawson should be distinguished from this matter. It was said that the Court in Dawson focussed on who was in control of the manufacture, distinguished between the builder and …a mere artisan or labourer or contractor of labour and could determine the question by reference to the terms of the contract. Here there was no contract and, in the view of the respondent, it was the applicant who controlled the manufacture of the boat.
In my view, the decision in Dawson can be distinguished from the facts of this case. Here there was no contract with Mr Caterson for the construction of the boat or any particular part of the boat. There was no price given or accepted for the work to be done by Mr Caterson. The cost of his and his direct employees' services was the accumulation of the number of hours spent at the relevant hourly rates, which varied, depending on the individual, from $16 to $27 per hour. I accept that Mr Caterson was involved in recommending other sub‑contractors, supervising their work and ordering much of the materials used in the boat. However, he could be seen as the agent of Shiraz in performing such tasks with Shiraz, through Mr Jindra, being in control of the manufacture of the boat. It is clear that Mr Jindra had spent considerable time and effort in researching the building of a suitable boat. He has the technical knowledge and understanding of costing and monitoring of costs. A document prepared by Mr Ericson in October 1996 (T18) stated:
…
Utilising his engineering background and skills, Paul Jindra researched every aspect of the vessel development ie design, construction methods and materials, engines, power (including gear boxes/propeller/electrical systems etc).
In the same way as it was appropriate to have reservations about the information provided by Mr Caterson in his statutory declaration, it is appropriate also to have reservations against accepting the whole of the evidence of Mr Jindra. His evidence was that there was no intention to charter the boat until Mr Caterson suggested such a course shortly before completion of the boat. However, the notes prepared by Mr Ericson in August 1996, nearly twelve months prior to completion, refer to an expectation of the boat being involved in charter work. Mr Jindra, in his evidence, sought to use the analogy of a person speaking of building a house when, in fact, a contract had been entered into with a building contractor, in seeking to explain his references to building a boat or being an owner‑builder in discussions with Mr Ericson and correspondence with the respondent. However, in a memo of Mr Ericson of 13 November 1996 (T18, p.12), he states:
…
Jindra has clarified that the vessel is actually being constructed on an "Owner builder" basis. Whilst a specialist boat builder has been "employed" to construct the vessel, it is on an employer/employee basis. The reason is that there are substantial Sales Tax savings available to Jindra under this construction method, which would be lost if the boat builder was "contracted" to build the vessel.
If we stay with the analogy of building a house, it is clearly possible for an owner builder to manufacture the house by contracting with different tradesmen to perform certain tasks such as framing, brick laying, roofing, electrical, plumbing etc. Clearly not one of these contractors could be said to be the manufacturer of the house. Such a person may engage another person to be the project supervisor. The position, which Mr Jindra arranged, appears to have been on a similar basis. Various contractors, including Mr Caterson, were engaged to perform specific tasks in the manufacture of the boat with Mr Caterson acting, also, as project supervisor. I am satisfied that the information provided to the respondent by letter of 26 May 1998 was the more accurate description of the manufacture of the boat.
Two other areas of the evidence of Mr Jindra were of concern. He sought to convince the Tribunal that his spreadsheet of estimated cost, prepared in 1992, was the basis of a verbal contract with Mr Caterson to build a boat within the parameters of that estimated cost. However, it was not until 1993 that a marine architect designed the particular boat to be built. Mr Jindra maintained that this was solely to have proper paper drawings by an architect and that there was unlikely to be any significant difference in the likely cost, being a design similar to previous boats with which Mr Caterson had been involved. It is difficult to accept this evidence. In relation to the charter arrangements, Mr Jindra said that it was a loose arrangement in the first year, but a more formal arrangement involving a lease fee thereafter. In a statutory declaration of Mr Parker (Exhibit A1, p117), he refers to the extensive use of the boat during the 1997 charter season and then states:
…
Mr. Jindra's boat "Kiama" is moored at Kawana Waters on the Sunshine Coast where I maintain the boat free of charge and in return take some of my friends fishing occasionally. The only other use the boat gets is when Mr. Jindra and his family fly in and I take them away on extended trips.
While the current use of the boat is not necessarily of major consideration for the purpose of deciding this matter, the apparent conflict of evidence leads to questions of the reliability of the evidence of Mr Jindra.
Having considered all of the evidence, I find that Shiraz was the manufacturer of the boat Kiama. Having come to that finding, it is then necessary to consider whether an assessable dealing under Table 1 to the Act occurred and this, in turn, depends on whether it can be said that the manufacture was in the course of any business of the manufacturer.
The evidence does not satisfy me that Shiraz carried on any business in any of the relevant years. It is accepted that, in the year ended 30 June 1996, it received in excess of $210,000 in management fees and paid out $33,337 in wages. In the year ended 30 June1997, it received $59,534 as a guarantee fee. Neither of these, apparently one‑off, transactions persuade me that a business was being carried on. The subsequent chartering of the boat did not, in my view, amount to the carrying on of a business. In any event, I am of the view that the manufacture of the boat was not in the course of any business. I accept that the expression does not restrict its operation to a person whose business is manufacturing (see The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Totaliser Administration Board of Queensland (1990) 170 CLR 508), but I do take the view that the manufacture to be in the course of any business, has to have a relationship and a connection with that business. I see no such connection in this case.
However, it is then necessary to consider whether s8 of the Act deems the manufacture as having happened in the course of a business, even though it did not. Here premises, being a building or part of a building in which the boat was manufactured, were made available to Shiraz under an agreement entered into for the purpose of bringing about the manufacture of the boat. Through the agency of Mr Caterson, Shiraz entered into a rental agreement with the landlord of the premises in which the boat was manufactured. I accept that it did not have exclusive occupation, other boats were being constructed at the same time as Kiama. Mr Jindra did not have a key and had no direct contact with the landlord. Nevertheless, rent was paid regularly during the whole period of construction against invoices addressed to Shiraz. A letter from the landlord (T13) confirms that the responsibility for payment of rent lies with the owner of a boat being constructed. Consequently, I find that s8(2)(a) of the Act is satisfied. It is clear, also, from the evidence of Mr Jindra that these premises were ordinarily used by either Mr Caterson or other owner builders in the manufacture of goods identical in all material respects with the boat Kiama. It is recognised that s8(2)(b) refers to the premises being used by any person …in the course of carrying on a business in the ordinary course of which goods…could reasonably be expected to be manufactured. There is no convincing evidence either way as to whether Mr Caterson or any other owner builder used the premises in the course of carrying on a business in which boats were manufactured. However, a finding that Shiraz was the manufacturer of the subject boat does not preclude an assumption that Mr Caterson was carrying on a business in the premises either as a project manager and sub‑contractor in the construction of boats or in relation to some other boats as the manufacturer. It is clear that these were the premises in which Mr Caterson regularly worked and it is clear that, in the course of carrying on his business, boats could reasonably be expected to be manufactured. Consequently, I find, also, that s8(2)(b) is satisfied. There is no question that more than half the labour used in the manufacture of the subject boat was paid labour so as to satisfy s8(2)(c) of the Act.
Given the foregoing, I find that Shiraz was the company who manufactured the boat Kiama in the course of a business and applied the goods to its own use so that sales tax is assessable pursuant to item AD3b of Table 1 of Schedule 1 to the Act. No submissions were made or evidence led relating to the calculation of the amount of sales tax, credits for sales tax paid on purchases for use in manufacture or the penalty imposed.
Consequently, the decision under review should be affirmed.
I certify that the twenty‑seven [27] preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
Mr B.H. Pascoe, Senior Member
(sgd) Catherine Thomas
Clerk
Date of Hearing: 8 and 9 September 2003
Date of Decision: 27 October 2003
Counsel for the applicant: Mr A. O'Brien
Solicitor for the applicant: Nil — William Buck, Chartered Accountants
Counsel for the respondent: Mr C. SieversSolicitor for the respondent: Ms E. Moore, Australian Taxation Office
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