FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shingles v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority
[2009] FCA 1211ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – reasonable apprehension of bias – waiver of right to object at hearing – right to object not waived – revival of bias in decision – decision contrived by preconceived view of appellant
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – denial of procedural fairness – issue critical to the decision not put to applicant by Tribunal
Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948 (Cth) ss 51, 53(1A), s 53(1B), s 53(4)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 cited
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 appliedSZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 applied
Re Bos and Defence Forces Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1977) 20 ALR 663 cited
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 citedGRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES v DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
No VID 296 of 2008
FINN J
30 OCTOBER 2009
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 296 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: GRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES
AppellantAND: DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
Respondent
JUDGE:
FINN J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 OCTOBER 2009
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. the appeal be allowed;
2. the decision of the Federal Magistrate be set aside;
3. the appeal to the Federal Magistrate be allowed;
4. the decision of the Tribunal be allowed;
5.the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law; and
6.the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 296 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: GRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES
AppellantAND: DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
Respondent
JUDGE:
FINN J
DATE:
30 OCTOBER 2009
PLACE:
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this matter it has been conceded by the respondent authority that during the hearing of this matter before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal a member of the Tribunal so conducted himself as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. While counsel for the appellant, Graham Shingles, took issue with comments made by the Tribunal Member during oral submissions, the two principal questions which arise in this appeal are, first, whether counsel nonetheless waived his right to object after the determination of the appeal to the Tribunal and, secondly, whether the Tribunal’s decision itself bespeaks grounds…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 1211
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Federal Magistrate's findings that the Presiding Senior Member exhibited bias based on his inherently sceptical attitude towards the appellant's war experiences and capacity to work, which the Magistrate found was influenced by his own experiences in Vietnam. The court considered whether this bias affected the decision and if the appellant had waived his right to object to the Senior Member's participation. Additionally, the court assessed the claim that procedural fairness was denied because the Tribunal did not allow the appellant to respond to allegations of exaggerating his disabilities. The court concluded that although the Senior Member's comments could have caused a reasonable apprehension of bias, the appellant did not waive his right to object. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was not necessarily flawed, but the manner in which it was reached indicated a bias that tainted the decision.
The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Federal Magistrate's decision and reinstating the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the Tribunal's decision bore the appearance of bias due to the Senior Member's comments and attitudes. Consequently, the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the appeal be allowed;
2. the decision of the Federal Magistrate be set aside;
3. the appeal to the Federal Magistrate be allowed;
4. the decision of the Tribunal be allowed;
5. the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law; and
6. the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in an application by Mr Shingles to the AAT for review of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority's decision. The AAT upheld the Authority's decision, leading Mr Shingles to appeal to the Federal Magistrates Court under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Federal Magistrate found no error in the AAT's decision, prompting Mr Shingles to further appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court heard the appeal and assessed the arguments regarding the AAT's alleged bias and procedural fairness failures.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FINN J
As to the Tribunal’s final comment, I would note in passing that, in his affidavit that was before the Tribunal, Mr Shingles noted that:On or about 13/12/73 I lost my driving licence for three years as a result of drink driving. Consideration I will consider first the bias appeal and then will refer briefly to procedural fairness. Though the Federal Magistrate appears to have made a finding of actual bias because of the Senior Member’s comments at the hearing, my own view is that the proper characterisation of the matter at that point in the Tribunal’s review was that the circumstances would have founded a reasonable apprehension of bias in the Senior Member. The parties to the appeal have accepted the appropriateness of this characterisation of the position. Where the parties part company is on the question whether the appellant waived its right to object. The respondent contends that the appellant had reasonable time after the hearing within which to raise the bias issue but did not do so. He was legally represented. He merely waited until the decision was made and, finding it to be adverse, objected. It was too late. The right, it is said, had been waived. The appellant’s case in contrast is that, notwithstanding the Tribunal’s comments at the hearing, counsel did challenge the senior Member who then appeared in the comments he made (at Tr 74) to have retreated. It was in these circumstances not unreasonable not to object to the Senior Member continuing to sit. While it is not strictly necessary for me to express a final conclusion on this difference, my own view accords with the appellant’s submission. The appellant, having raised the issues of Mr Shingles’ credit not having been challenged and of the impropriety of the Senior Member relying on his own knowledge, the response made by the Senior Member was sufficient to make it unnecessary to object to his continuing to sit: cf Vakauta at 587 per Toohey J. The Senior Member’s comments could reasonably be taken to signal a retreat to the confines of what was permissible to an administrative decision-maker. I am in consequence not satisfied that the right to object was waived. I consider the Federal Magistrate erred in so concluding. The fundamental issue raised in Mr Shingles’ bias appeal is whether the Tribunal’s decision, considered in the context of the comments made at the hearing, has the effect of conveying “the appearance of impermissible bias in the actual decision”. I consider that it does. The reasonable and intelligent lay observer might reasonably apprehend, in light of the Senior Member’s comments, commentary and attitudes revealed at the hearing relating to Mr Shingles’ war service, that Mr Shingles’ claim might have been prejudged and that the evidence of this in the decision itself was afforded both in how the Tribunal characterised (disparagingly) Mr Shingles’ own evidence on his obtaining and retaining employment and in the tone of some of the language used to describe his evidence (eg “For a period of months he did not work but contented himself with going to the hotel”). I am satisfied that the decision arrived at might reasonably be said to have been contrived by a preconceived view taken of Mr Shingles with the consequence that the case he advanced might not have been fairly addressed on its merits.