Shingles v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shingles v Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority
[2009] FCA 1211

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – reasonable apprehension of bias – waiver of right to object at hearing – right to object not waived – revival of bias in decision – decision contrived by preconceived view of appellant

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – denial of procedural fairness – issue critical to the decision not put to applicant by Tribunal

Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Act 1948 (Cth) ss 51, 53(1A), s 53(1B), s 53(4)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 cited
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 applied

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 applied
Re Bos and Defence Forces Retirement and Death Benefits Authority (1977) 20 ALR 663 cited
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 cited

GRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES v DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY

No VID 296 of 2008

FINN J
30 OCTOBER 2009
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 296 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

GRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES
Appellant

AND:

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 OCTOBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        the appeal be allowed;

2.        the decision of the Federal Magistrate be set aside;

3.        the appeal to the Federal Magistrate be allowed;

4.        the decision of the Tribunal be allowed;

5.the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law;  and

6.the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. 

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 296 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

GRAHAM JAMES SHINGLES
Appellant

AND:

DEFENCE FORCE RETIREMENT AND DEATH BENEFITS AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

30 OCTOBER 2009

PLACE:

ADELAIDE (HEARD IN CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter it has been conceded by the respondent authority that during the hearing of this matter before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal a member of the Tribunal so conducted himself as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.  While counsel for the appellant, Graham Shingles, took issue with comments made by the Tribunal Member during oral submissions, the two principal questions which arise in this appeal are, first, whether counsel nonetheless waived his right to object after the determination of the appeal to the Tribunal and, secondly, whether the Tribunal’s decision itself bespeaks grounds…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Shingles, the appellant, brought an appeal against a decision made by the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority, the respondent. The dispute centred on the validity of the Tribunal's decision regarding the appellant's eligibility for benefits and the manner in which the decision was reached. The appeal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary legal issues revolved around whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by bias and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's judgment was influenced by an inherent scepticism towards the appellant's evidence, and if the appellant's right to be heard on the issue of exaggerating his disabilities was breached.

The court examined the Federal Magistrate's findings that the Presiding Senior Member exhibited bias based on his inherently sceptical attitude towards the appellant's war experiences and capacity to work, which the Magistrate found was influenced by his own experiences in Vietnam. The court considered whether this bias affected the decision and if the appellant had waived his right to object to the Senior Member's participation. Additionally, the court assessed the claim that procedural fairness was denied because the Tribunal did not allow the appellant to respond to allegations of exaggerating his disabilities. The court concluded that although the Senior Member's comments could have caused a reasonable apprehension of bias, the appellant did not waive his right to object. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was not necessarily flawed, but the manner in which it was reached indicated a bias that tainted the decision.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Federal Magistrate's decision and reinstating the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the Tribunal's decision bore the appearance of bias due to the Senior Member's comments and attitudes. Consequently, the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the appeal be allowed;

2. the decision of the Federal Magistrate be set aside;

3. the appeal to the Federal Magistrate be allowed;

4. the decision of the Tribunal be allowed;

5. the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law; and

6. the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal against a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) regarding the eligibility of Mr Shingles for Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits. Mr Shingles, a former member of the Australian Defence Force, applied for benefits but his application was rejected by the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority. The AAT upheld the Authority's decision. Mr Shingles appealed the AAT's decision to the Federal Magistrates Court, which found in favour of the AAT. He then appealed to the higher court, the Federal Court of Australia. The central issues revolve around whether the AAT's Presiding Senior Member was biased and whether Mr Shingles was afforded procedural fairness during the proceedings.

The matter originated in an application by Mr Shingles to the AAT for review of the Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits Authority's decision. The AAT upheld the Authority's decision, leading Mr Shingles to appeal to the Federal Magistrates Court under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Federal Magistrate found no error in the AAT's decision, prompting Mr Shingles to further appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court heard the appeal and assessed the arguments regarding the AAT's alleged bias and procedural fairness failures.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
The Tribunal’s reasons and decision were heavily influenced by its view of the appellant’s credibility. The Federal Magistrate’s Decision An appeal from the Tribunal’s decision was made to the Federal Magistrates Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Relevantly for present purposes, the Federal Magistrate found that the judgment of the Presiding Senior Member was affected by bias in that he was, from an early stage, inherently sceptical of Mr Shingle’s evidence about his experiences both in Vietnam and as to his capacity to work in Australia. In the Tribunal’s reasons, para 47, his Honour considered the Senior Member’s bias about that evidence was based “upon his own experiences in Vietnam”. His Honour went on to observe that the Senior Member’s experience overbore his better judgment and objectivity. Nonetheless, his Honour concluded that notwithstanding the Senior Member’s comments to which I will later refer were such as to cause reasonable apprehension on the part of the lay observer that his judgment would be affected by bias, the appellant waived the right subsequently to object. Further, the bias was not “repeated” in the Tribunal’s decision itself. The claim that Mr Shingles was denied procedural fairness because he was not given the opportunity to be heard on the question whether he exaggerated his capacity to retain employment was rejected by the Federal Magistrate. His Honour was of the view that the Tribunal’s conclusions were ones it was entitled to reach following consideration of the material and that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to put each and every proposition to a witness as the evidence proceeds, not least because the Tribunal may only arrive at its conclusions once the evidence is concluded.The Appeal The principal grounds of appeal in this matter were that the learned Federal Magistrate erred in both his bias and procedural fairness conclusions. In order to illuminate the basis upon which the appeal is being prosecuted, it will be necessary to refer in a little detail to particularly the transcript of the evidence before the Tribunal. It is only by reference to what was said there that the underpinning of the bias claim is manifest. The denial of procedural fairness appeal has three bases: (1) the Tribunal decided the matter on the basis of the appellant’s credit when this was not attacked by the respondent but rather was expressly disavowed; (2) the Tribunal found the appellant’s account of his service in Vietnam was exaggerated and that he exaggerated the facts of his disabilities on his capacity to obtain and retain employment when this was not part of the respondent’s case and was not put to the appellant in cross-examination; and (3) the Tribunal relied on its own knowledge and experience about Vietnam which was not in evidence and was not put to the appellant.Applicable Principles(a) Reasonable Apprehension of Bias There is no controversy between the parties as to the principles to be applied. The inquiry is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question it is required to decide: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]. The development and application of the test of reasonable apprehension of bias avoids the need for a court:“to attempt some analysis of the likely or actual thought processes of the decision-maker. It objectifies what otherwise would be a wholly subjective inquiry and it poses the relevant question in a way that avoids having to predict what probably will be done, or to identify what probably was done, by the decision-maker in reaching the decision in question: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [184].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

As to the Tribunal’s final comment, I would note in passing that, in his affidavit that was before the Tribunal, Mr Shingles noted that:On or about 13/12/73 I lost my driving licence for three years as a result of drink driving. Consideration I will consider first the bias appeal and then will refer briefly to procedural fairness. Though the Federal Magistrate appears to have made a finding of actual bias because of the Senior Member’s comments at the hearing, my own view is that the proper characterisation of the matter at that point in the Tribunal’s review was that the circumstances would have founded a reasonable apprehension of bias in the Senior Member. The parties to the appeal have accepted the appropriateness of this characterisation of the position. Where the parties part company is on the question whether the appellant waived its right to object. The respondent contends that the appellant had reasonable time after the hearing within which to raise the bias issue but did not do so. He was legally represented. He merely waited until the decision was made and, finding it to be adverse, objected. It was too late. The right, it is said, had been waived. The appellant’s case in contrast is that, notwithstanding the Tribunal’s comments at the hearing, counsel did challenge the senior Member who then appeared in the comments he made (at Tr 74) to have retreated. It was in these circumstances not unreasonable not to object to the Senior Member continuing to sit. While it is not strictly necessary for me to express a final conclusion on this difference, my own view accords with the appellant’s submission. The appellant, having raised the issues of Mr Shingles’ credit not having been challenged and of the impropriety of the Senior Member relying on his own knowledge, the response made by the Senior Member was sufficient to make it unnecessary to object to his continuing to sit: cf Vakauta at 587 per Toohey J. The Senior Member’s comments could reasonably be taken to signal a retreat to the confines of what was permissible to an administrative decision-maker. I am in consequence not satisfied that the right to object was waived. I consider the Federal Magistrate erred in so concluding. The fundamental issue raised in Mr Shingles’ bias appeal is whether the Tribunal’s decision, considered in the context of the comments made at the hearing, has the effect of conveying “the appearance of impermissible bias in the actual decision”. I consider that it does. The reasonable and intelligent lay observer might reasonably apprehend, in light of the Senior Member’s comments, commentary and attitudes revealed at the hearing relating to Mr Shingles’ war service, that Mr Shingles’ claim might have been prejudged and that the evidence of this in the decision itself was afforded both in how the Tribunal characterised (disparagingly) Mr Shingles’ own evidence on his obtaining and retaining employment and in the tone of some of the language used to describe his evidence (eg “For a period of months he did not work but contented himself with going to the hotel”). I am satisfied that the decision arrived at might reasonably be said to have been contrived by a preconceived view taken of Mr Shingles with the consequence that the case he advanced might not have been fairly addressed on its merits.