Sherry and Telstra

[2000] AATA 321

DIRECTION AND REASONS AS TO COSTS [2000] AATA 321

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No Q1997/417

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  DIVISION       )          
           Re      CAROL ANNE SHERRY  
  Applicant
           And    TELSTRA    
  Respondent

DIRECTION AS TO COSTS

Tribunal       Mr. D.W. Muller, Senior Member

Date26 April 2000  

PlaceBrisbane

Decision      The Tribunal: 1. Varies the District Registrar's taxation of costs in this matter to allow the applicant's costs in the following items to the following extent:               Item  Amount   5-8  $ 10.00 Subject to the applicant showing   the necessary nexus with the case.                    67  $  78.00            80  $  78.00                   108  $  78.00                   118  $  78.00                   136  $  14.45                   140, 141                  $  16.00                   147, 148                   $  25.70                   156,157  $  16.00   224,225  $  66.45                   266-273  $  66.50                   282-286                $132.25                    374-377  $328.45                    Short Charges                    1-2  $  18.00   
2.  Otherwise affirms the taxation of the District Registrar. 3. Directs that the applicant's costs of this Direction be paid by the respondent in accordance with the provisions of the current General Practice Direction.         

...............(Signed)...............................
  D.W. MULLER
  SENIOR MEMBER

CATCHWORDS
COSTS – percentage of costs allowable under Federal Court Scale – costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice – costs of the taxation – costs of the Direction
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act1988: s.67(8), 67(13)
Federal Court Rules 0.62 rr 19,36A(1)
General Practice Direction, 30 September 1996, paragraph 16, 1 July 1998, paragraph 6
Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd [1964] NSWR 527

REASONS FOR DIRECTION

26 April 2000          Mr. D.W. Muller, Senior Member             

1. Upon application by both parties, this matter has been referred to the Tribunal for Directions relating to certain items of costs upon the taxation of a bill of costs by the District Registrar of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Brisbane.

2. On 29 April 1998, the Tribunal decided that Carol Anne Sherry was entitled to receive workers' compensation for a period from 18 September 1996 to 14 March 1997. The Tribunal ordered that the respondent pay the costs of the applicant pursuant to sub-section 67(8) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act).

3. The solicitor for the respondent, Mr. Kevin Standish, informed the Tribunal by way of affidavit, that the Tribunal's decision of 29 April 1998 resulted in the applicant becoming entitled to payment by the respondent of a net amount of $11,040.14.

4. One area of dispute between the parties relates to the professional costs which should be allowed.  The applicant submitted that professional costs, including counsel's fees and disbursements should be at 75 per cent of those allowable under the Federal Court Scale.  The respondent submitted that the rate should be 50 per cent.

5. Other items of costs in dispute relate to expenses incurred during the obtaining of reports and other investigations which were not used at the hearing.

6. The Tribunal is empowered to order that the cost of proceedings incurred by the applicant/claimant in a workers' compensation case such as this, be paid by the respondent/authority if the decision is favourable to the claimant.  Sub-sections 67(8) and 67(13) of the SRC Act provide:

   "67(8) [Decision varied]  Where, in any proceedings instituted by the claimant, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal makes a decision:
   (a)       varying a reviewable decision in a manner favourable to the claimant;  or
   (b)       setting aside a reviewable decision and making a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision that is more favourable to the claimant than the reviewable decision;
   the Tribunal may, subject to this section, order that the costs of those proceedings incurred by the claimant, or a part of those costs, shall be paid by the responsible authority.
   67(13) [Tax or settle]  Where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal orders a responsible authority to pay costs incurred by a claimant, the Tribunal may, in the absence of agreement between the parties as to the amount of the costs, tax or settle the amount of the costs or order that the costs be taxed by the Registrar or a Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal."

1. The Tribunal has never prepared a scale of costs to be used in these matters.  Prior to 1993 it was common for the Tribunal to nominate the scale of the District Court in the State where the Tribunal was sitting as the scale to be used.  In an attempt to achieve uniformity throughout Australia in the operation of the Tribunal, including the assessment of costs, the President of the Tribunal, Justice O'Connor issued a General Practice Direction to take effect from 1 February 1993.  This was followed by a replacement General Practice Direction to take effect from 1 August 1993.  On 21 August 1996, the then President, Justice Matthews, issued a General Practice Direction to take effect from 30 September 1996.  Justice Matthews issued a further General Practice Direction on 18 May 1998 to take effect from 1 July 1998.

2. At the date of the hearing and decision in this matter, 27 April 1998 to 29 April 1998, the operative General Practice Direction was that issued by Justice Matthews  on 21 August 1996, with effect from 30 September 1996.  Paragraph 16 of that Direction related to "Costs" and provided as follows:

"16.  Costs
The Tribunal has the power under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992, the Freedom of Information Act 1982, the Mutual Recognition Act 1992 and the Lands Acquisition Act 1989 to order or recommend that the respondent pay the costs, or part of the costs, of a successful applicant. Under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act the Tribunal may also award costs to a person where the application has been instituted by the Commonwealth.
Unless the order determines otherwise, the costs payable may include:

• Witness expenses at the prescribed rate;

• All reasonable and proper disbursements;  and

• 75 per cent of all professional costs, including counsel's fees, which would be allowable under the Federal Court Rules.

  Costs will be assessed on a party and party basis.

  Costs may be agreed between the parties.  Where there is no agreement, the Registrar or a Deputy Registrar will tax the bill and on the taxation will have the powers of a taxing officer under the Federal Court Rules, but may refer any question for the direction of the Tribunal.  Either party may apply to the Tribunal for a direction on any question related to costs."

1. The General Practice Direction which took effect from 1 July 1998 changed the wording of the paragraph on costs, by deleting the word "Rules" and inserting the word "Scale".  The relevant part of the General Practice Direction now provides, in paragraph 6:

   "Unless the order determines otherwise, the costs payable may include:

• Witness expenses at the prescribed rate;

• All reasonable and proper disbursements;  and

• 75 percent of all professional costs, including counsel's fees, which would be allowable under the Federal Court Scale"

1. The Federal Court Rules provide, in effect, two scales of costs.  One for matters involving awards of $100,000 or more, and one for matters involving less than $100,000.  This is achieved by Order 62 Rule 36A(1) which provides:

   "Reduction in costs otherwise allowable
   36A.  (1)  Where a party is awarded judgment for less than $100,000 on a claim (not including a cross-claim) for a money sum or damages any costs ordered to be paid, including disbursements, will be reduced by one-third of the amount otherwise allowable under this Order unless the Court or a Judge otherwise orders."

1. The effect of the decision of the Tribunal on 29 April 1998, was that Mrs. Sherry became entitled to a payment of $11,040.11.  This was well below $100,000.If O.62 r.36A(1) was to be invoked and then combined with paragraph 16 of the General Practice Direction set out above, the costs payable for professional costs, counsel's fees and disbursements would be 50 per cent of the Federal Court Scale.

2. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal does not give "money judgments" but, in effect, makes declarations of entitlements, in which case Order 62 Rule 36A(1) should not be applied.

3. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that a decision in a workers' compensation case, which results in a payment of money is no different to any other claim for damages or compensation in which a sum of money is sought.  It was further submitted that the operative General Practice Direction was that issued on 21 August 1996, with effect from 30 September 1996, in which case the costs to be paid by the respondent should be 75 per cent of those allowable under the Federal Court Rules, that is, 50 per cent of the Federal Court Scale.

4. After the issuing of the General Practice Direction, effective from 30 September 1996, there arose in some States the question of the possibility of there being two scales of costs in the Tribunal.  As part of that debate the question arose as to whether the Tribunal gave "money judgments" or whether the Tribunal, which reviews administrative decisions, made declarations of obligations and entitlements, that is, whether O.62 r36A was applicable in Tribunal matters.

5. The change in the wording of the General Practice Direction, effective from 1 July 1998, was intended to remove ambiguity in the use of the Federal Court Scale for the assessment of costs in the Tribunal.  It was intended that there be one scale of costs only in Tribunal matters and that O62 r36A not be invoked.  This is the practice in the Tribunal Australia wide.  I see no reason to depart from it in this case.

6. Other matters in dispute relate to expenses incurred in making enquiries which the applicant's solicitors made during the course of negotiations with the respondent and during the preparation of the case at the various levels leading to the hearing at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, but the results of which were not used at the Tribunal hearing.

7. The Federal Court Rules provide a starting point.  Order 62 Rule 19 provides:

   "Cost to be allowed on taxation
   19.  On every taxation the taxing officer shall allow all such costs charges and expenses as appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of a party, but, except as against the party who incurred them, costs shall not be allowed which appear to the taxing officer to have been incurred or increased:
   (a)       through over-caution, negligence or misconduct;

   (b)by payment of special fees to counsel or special charges or expenses to witnesses or other persons;  or

   (c)by other unusual expenses."

1. The Tribunal has had the advantage of reading the judgment of Asprey J in Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd[1964] NSWR 527 where at 533, and following, the learned judge set out the principles upon which party and party costs have traditionally been assessed:

   "Rule 23 requires the taxing officer to allow all such costs, charges and expenses, as appear to him to have been "necessary or proper for the attainment of justice" and for, inter alia, "defending the rights of any party".  The phrase "necessary or proper for the attainment of justice" etc. is by no means a new one in a rule relating to the taxation of costs between party and party and at least as early as 1845 it appeared in r. CXX of the General Orders and Rules of the High Court of Chancery (see 1845) LJ. (NS) Eq., vol. 14, p. 296;  see also Mackley v. Chillingworth (1877), L.R. 2 C.P.D. 273), promulgated to take effect on 28 October 1845.  McArthur, J., remarked in the case of Re Malleson, Stewart, Stawell & Nankivell, [1931] V.L.R. 127, at p.133: "The words…. necessary or proper for the attainment of justice, etc., are vague and cannot be given a precise meaning".  In that case McArthur, J., at pp.133-4, after referring to some English authorities, adopted a test as to the meaning of those words suggested by Parker, J., in the case of Peel v. London & North Western Railway Co., [1907] 1 Ch. 607, at p.614, and stated that test in these words:  "Would it be necessary or proper for a reasonably prudent man endeavouring to get justice but endeavouring to get it without any undue expenditure of money to incur the expense in question."  In applying the test it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the word "necessary" and the word "proper", an important distinction which has at times, as the cases show, been overlooked.  The words "necessary" and "proper" in the context of r.23 are not interchangeable terms (see Bartlett v. Higgins, [1901] 2 K.B. 230, especially per Stirling, LJ., at p.240:  Re Mercury Model Aircraft Supplies Ltd., [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1153, at p. 1156, per Roxburgh, J.; [1956] 2 All E.R. 885;  cf. the reference to the judgment of Buckly L.J., in Re Roney & Co., [1914] 2 K.B. 529, at p. 542, by McArthur, J., in Malleson's Case, supra, at p. 134).  It is clear that the appearance of the words "or proper" in the phrase "necessary or proper" connote a wider ambit of charge than the word "necessary" (see Francis v Francis & Dickerson, [1956] P. 87, per Sachs, J., at p.95;  [1955] 3 All E.R. 836).
   In Richardson v. Richardson & Plowman, [1895] P. 346, at p. 348, Lopes, LJ., said: "What is the object of giving costs? They are given to the successful party to indemnify him against the expenses to which he has been put by the unsuccessful party." Within a few days after the passing of Order 65, r. 27 (29) in England in January 1902 in Re Bradshaw, Bradshaw v. Bradshaw (1902), 71 LJ Ch. 230, per Kekwich, J., at pp. 238-9 said: "The object of the rule was in ordinary taxation to provide that the successful party should have his full costs, but not luxuries – that is to say the costs which he was liable to pay his solicitor in the ordinary way." In Pecheries Ostendaises (Soc. Anon) v. Merchants' Marine Insurance Co., [1928] 1 K.B. 750, Atkin, L.J., at p. 762 in speaking of the same subject matter, said that it "is intended to give to the successful litigant a full indemnity for all costs reasonably incurred by him in relation to the action."
   In Francis v. Francis & Dickerson, supra (P), at p.95;  (All E.R.), at p.840, Sachs, J., said:  "When considering whether or not an item in a bill of costs is "proper" the correct viewpoint to be adopted by a taxing officer is that of a sensible solicitor sitting in his chair and considering what in the light of his then knowledge is reasonable in the interests of his lay client…  it is wrong for a taxing officer to adopt an attitude akin to a revenue official called upon to apply rigorously one of those Income Tax Act Rules as to expenses which have been judicially described as 'jealously restricted' and 'notoriously rigid and narrow in their operation'.  I should add that, as previously indicated, the lay client in question should be deemed a man of means adequate to bear the expense of the litigation out of his own pocket – and by 'adequate' I mean neither 'barely adequate' nor 'super-abundant'."  Sachs, J., then pointed out to save any misapprehension that no solicitor has "any implied authority to take steps which are extravagant or over-cautious" in a party and party taxation.
   Having given careful consideration to the wording of the opening paragraph of r. 23 and with the guidance as to its true construction afforded to me by the authorities to which I have referred above, I am of the opinion that, always subject to the provisions of r.24, a taxing officer in a party and party taxation should allow a successful litigant, in whose favour an order for costs has been made, a just and reasonable amount in respect of each item claimed in such litigant's bill of costs where such item was, in fact, incurred on behalf of the litigant by his solicitor in respect of some step or matter in the litigation which either (1) was necessarily taken or performed for the attainment of justice or the maintaining or defending of the litigant's rights in the circumstances of the particular case, or , (2) although not necessarily taken or performed for such purposes, would reasonably have been taken or performed for any of those purposes by a solicitor acting at the time when it was taken or performed without extravagance in conformity with the then situation of the case and not in conflict with the statutes and rules, the practice of the Court, and the usages of the legal profession appertaining to such a case.
   In determining whether an item of costs is "necessary" or "proper" the taxing officer would have regard to the facts in issue between the parties to the litigation, as disclosed by the pleadings, and to all facts which render probable the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue including those matters which would affect the weight or credibility of any of such facts.  But, in making his decisions upon these matters, the taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial and, to use the words of Sachs, J., in Francis v. Francis & Dickerson, supra, (P), at p.96;  (All E.R.), at p.841:  "….in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially termed 'hindsight'".  The question of the necessity for or propriety of any item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made, or the liability therefor was incurred (cf., Bartlett v. Higgins, [1901] 2K.B. 230, per Collins, L.J., at pp.237-8 and Stirling, L.J., at p.240).  No one who has had the experience of the preparation for and conduct of litigation will be unaware of the fact that the course of litigious proceedings, both before and during the trial, is frequently changed by an event, e.g., an unforeseen admission volunteered by or extracted from an opponent, which will thenceforth render matter already prepared for its tender in evidence redundant."

2. The Bill of Costs contains 409 items. There is also a bill of "Amended Short Charges" containing 18 items. The disputed items will be dealt with seriatim:
   ITEM   AMOUNT        SUBJECT MATTER        DECISION     
   5-8      $10.00 Dr. S. Westacott's material     The mere fact that this material was not used at hearing does not necessarily mean that the costs should not be allowed.  There may have been a legitimate enquiry which eventually came to nothing.  However, there is no mention of this material in any of the documentation before the Tribunal.  The Tribunal has no way of knowing whether this expense was necessary or proper.  If the applicant can show the necessary nexus with the case, this item should be allowed.  

55-56   $29.00 Perusing letter from Telstra to client, copy in counsel's brief (related to issues of permanent disablement under respondent's superannuation scheme).  These matters relate to the personal resources of the applicant and to the alternatives which may have been presented to her, such as retirement or pursuance of workers' compensation.  They do not relate to the attainment of justice between the parties once it was decided to pursue workers' compensation. Disallowed        
59-60   $10.00 Letter relating to grounds of invalidity under superannuation scheme.        This is the same as items 55-56. Disallowed        

1. $177.00 reduced to $39.00     Telephone conference for 15 minutes.         $177 is the rate for attendance at court.  $39 is the amount for a telephone attendance for 15 minutes. The whole idea of having telephone conferences is to reduce the costs to litigants, by not requiring their solicitors to appear at Court. Nevertheless a conference which takes 15 minutes needs some preparation and some work afterwards.  Allowing for 30 minutes would be reasonable. $78.00 allowed.       
   70-71   $16.25 Telephone conversations relating to applicant's meeting with super-annuation trustees.    For reasons set out in relation to items 55-56, Disallowed.        
   72-75   $24.00 Perusing documents etc relating to superannuation documents.     For the reasons set out in relation to items 55-6, Disallowed.    

1. $177.00 reduced to $39.00     Telephone conference for 15 minutes.         For the reasons set out in item 67 above, the Tribunal allows $78.00.   

1. $39.00 reduced to $8.00        Telephone call to applicant to advise of result of hearing.     Probably the solicitor should make the call to tell the client about the result but it is more a public relations exercise than a use of skill or knowledge. $8.00 is reasonable.        
   87-92   $24.00 Perusing letters from social security and copy of brief relating to amounts recoverable by social security upon success by the applicant.        Not relevant to these proceedings, Disallowed        

2. $177.00 reduced to $39.00     Telephone conference 15 minutes.    Allow $78, see item 67 above.          

3. $39.25 Telephone call to applicant about social security matters.    Not relevant to these proceedings, Disallowed      

4. $177.00 reduced to $39.00.    Telephone Directions Hearing 10 minutes.    Allow $78, see item 67 above.

5. $11.00 reduced to $3.00        Perusing hearing certificate.  $3 is reasonable.        

6. $14.45 Letter to Dr. Redmond informing him of date of hearing and requesting attendance.        Dr. Redmond was eventually not called because of a decision made by the applicant's counsel.  Nevertheless, it was proper for the applicant's solicitors to have prepared Dr. Redmond for the possibility of being called.  The matter should not be looked at in hindsight. $14.45 allowed.    
   140-141         $11.00 plus $5.00.     Correspondence with Dr. Redmond.  $16.00 allowed, see item 136 above.

147-148         $25.70 Attending Dr. Redmond plus letter to Dr. Redmond confirming previous conversations and availability to attend.       $25.70 allowed, see item 136 above.
156-157         $16.00 Letter from Dr. Redmond confirming his attendance plus filing of letter.      $16.00 allowed, see item 136 above.

1. $39.00 reduced to $8.00.       Telephone call from applicant relating to availability of Dr. Quaile.          $8.00 is reasonable.   

2. $39.45 Perusing letter from Centrelink.        Not relevant to this case, see item 112 above.        

3. $39.00 reduced to $8.00.       Telephone AAT re evidence to be called by telephone by Dr. Palmer.          $8.00 is reasonable.   

4. $52.00 Drawing supplementary brief to counsel including further statement from applicant because of amendments to applicant's statement.         Not necessary to send applicant's statement to counsel in two parts. Disallowed       
   190-191         $86.00 Relates to a further medical examination of applicant by Dr. Palmer and follow up by solicitor on being informed that Dr. Palmer had forgotten he was to give evidence.          An allowance was made at item 192 for this – otherwise not a reasonable expense. Disallowed        

5. $39.00 reduced to $8.00        AAT telephoned to enquire about likely length of hearing and potential witnesses.      $8.00 is reasonable.   

6. $468.75 reduced to $350.00   Report by Body-Mechanics (applicant's treating physiotherapist).    $350 is reasonable. 

224-225         $66.45 Letter to Dr. Cameron and photostating material to be sent to Dr. Cameron prior to his giving evidence.        It is not appropriate for medical witnesses to be given a large bundle of documents to digest in the witness box.  It is reasonable to supply this material prior to hearing. $66.45 allowed         

1. $88.00 Conference with counsel and applicant for one hour on morning of the hearing.  It involved an offer of settlement and effects of Social Security legislation upon retirement benefits.       Did not progress the matter.  $158.00  has been allowed for conference with counsel (see item 209). Disallowed      
   260-261         $44.00 Attending Auscript to get a transcript of Dr. Palmer's evidence and attending counsel with transcript plus marking refresher.         Dr. Palmer was the applicant's witness.  The solicitor attended the day's hearing.   The solicitor has been allowed his costs for the day.  The respondent should not bear this extra cost. Disallowed     
   266-273         $65.50 Telephone calls attempting to track down  H. Hartley, F. Westacott and A. Pacer, with a view to getting physiotherapy records of complaints made by applicant at time of injury. Records tendered at hearing but not relied upon.  The incurring of this expense was proper in the circumstances. $65.50 allowed          
   282-286         $132.25         Relating to telephone calls, letters and subpoena to S. Hennessy of Mt. Gravatt physio centre. This witness was not called.  The material was tendered but not relied upon.  The incurring of this cost was proper in the circumstances. $132.25 allowed
   290 –292        $43.35 Expenses associated with chasing accounts of witnesses' attendance at the hearing.          These accounts could have been attended to on day of hearing. Disallowed        

300-302         $55.25 Perusing letter from Centrelink relating to "preclusion period" and refund, if any, payable.        See comments on effects of Social Security legislation, item 112 above. Disallowed        
303-306         $329.45         Part transcript (of Dr. Palmer's evidence).     See 260-261 above. Disallowed          
312-313         $16.00 Reading letter from respondent's solicitors to applicant's solicitors asking why applicant did not disclose that she had seen two doctors.       This is a dispute between solicitors which arose after the hearing.  Does not relate to steps in the proceedings – nor to the substantive issues before the Tribunal. Disallowed      
344-350         $116.45         Letter to Monsour attending to deliver, attending to collect, perusing assessment, etc. to produce a "short form assessment" without regard to O62 r.36A(1), dispute between solicitors which arose from it. The respondent was entitled to reject this claim because respondent required that the assessor consider the applicability of O62 r.36A, the applicant directed Monsour to disregard O62 r.36A. Disallowed       
360-361         $430.45         Monsour's short form of assessment.  Not charged by Monsour.    See items 344-350 above.  Also this amount was not actually charged for by Monsour.  The fee was waived. Disallowed      
353 to 354 and 356     $34.45 Correspondence relating to the dispute about the Monsour assessment.    See above comments about the Monsour assessment. Disallowed        
374-377         $328.45         Relates to fees to Dr. Redmond        Dr. Redmond was not called at the hearing.  See items 136, 140 and 141 above. $328.45 Allowed     

1. $4,100 reduced to $1,600      Care and consideration         $1,600 is reasonable for this item.    

394-395         $18.00 These related to attendances which anticipated a response from the respondent on the bill of costs.     It is not clear that the applicant's solicitor actually did anything in this regard. Disallowed  
O62 Rule 36A (1)      75% of Federal Court Scale   See decision in paragraph 14 above.           
  SHORT CHARGES             
1-2      $18.00 Perusing letter from respondent's solicitors regarding settlement of applicant's costs.  Plus filing letter.      It was necessary and proper that the applicant's solicitors attend to this correspondence. $18.00 allowed.         

1. $196.00         Attendance of an extra solicitor at taxation on 27.10.98 for 1 hour 40 minutes in case the other solicitor had to give evidence.        This cost incurred by over-caution, should not be paid by the respondent. Disallowed        

2. $400.00         General care and consideration relating to the difficulties in relation to Mr. Monsour.          Already sufficiently allowed for. Disallowed  

1. There remains the question of the costs relating to this Direction.

2. It was submitted on behalf of the solicitors for the applicant that a combination of section 67 of the SRC Act and sub-section 69A (2) and (3) of the Administrative AppealsTribunal Act 1975 provides the power to review the amount taxed by the District Registrar. It was further submitted that sub-section 67(8) and 67(13) of the SRC Act, set out above, should be "construed purposively" so that the claimant is to be indemnified as to her legal expenses in prosecuting her successful claim, including the costs of a reference to the Tribunal, that is, that the process of taxation itself and the reference to the Tribunal are both part of the proceedings for which costs may be awarded to the successful applicant.

3. Mr. Standish, for the respondent, submitted that this referral is not a "reviewable decision" within the meaning of that term in section 67 of the SRC Act and hence the Tribunal has no power to order costs on this referral.

4. The taxation process and this Direction are part of the proceedings within the meaning of that term in section 67 of the SRC Act.  The applicant is entitled to be paid her costs of this Direction by the respondent, in accordance with the current General Practice Direction.

   I certify that the 23 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the direction as to costs herein of Mr. D.W. Muller, Senior Member

   Signed:         .....................................................................................
              B. Hitchcock, Secretary

   Date/s of Hearing  12 July 1999
   Date of Decision  26 April 2000
   Counsel for the Applicant        Mr. Thompson
   Solicitor for the Applicant         Poteri Woods
   Solicitor for the Respondent    Mr. K. Standish