Sheridan v Warrina Community Co-operative Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sheridan v Warrina Community Co-operative Ltd & Anor [2004] QCA 308

PARTIES:

ANGELA RUTH SHERIDAN
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
WARRINA COMMUNITY CO-OPERATIVE LTD (QC0125)
(first defendant/appellant)
MICHAEL JOHN WALTON
(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5953 of 2004
DC No 50 of 2000

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Toowoomba

DELIVERED ON:

27 August 2004

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 August 2004

JUDGES:

Williams JA and Helman and Dutney JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1. Leave to appeal granted
2. Appeal dismissed with costs

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – RULES OF CONSTRUCTION – WORDS TO BE GIVEN LITERAL AND GRAMMATICAL MEANING – where respondent claimed damages for personal injuries she claimed she sustained in the course of her employment – where claim governed by WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) – where learned trial judge dismissed proceeding – where, under s 325, the court had no power to order costs in favour of WorkCover where the claim was dismissed – where learned trial judge did not award costs to WorkCover – whether the literal meaning of s 325 is so obviously absurd that it could never have been intended by the legislature – whether court should place a different construction on the section – whether leave to appeal should be granted

WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), s 325

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, considered
R v Etteridge
[1909] 2 KB 24, cited
R v Vasey
[1905] 2 KB 748, cited
Salmon v Duncombe
(1886) 11 App Cas 627, cited
Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107, followed

COUNSEL:

D V C McMeekin SC for the applicant
B Laurie for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Moray & Agnew for the applicant
Wonderley & Hall for the respondent

  1. WILLIAMS JA:  This is an application for leave to appeal against the order of a District Court judge refusing to order costs against the respondent in favour of the appellant.

  1. The respondent commenced a proceeding in the District Court at Toowoomba claiming damages for personal injuries she claimed she sustained in the course of her employment.  The first defendant, the present appellant, was her employer and the second defendant was the owner of the property on which the alleged incident occurred.  After a trial Judge Britton SC found in favour of the defendants and dismissed the proceeding.  The defendants were separately represented at the trial, and the trial judge made an order that the respondent pay the second defendant’s costs.

  1. The appellant’s case was conducted by WorkCover and it was clear that the claim against the appellant was governed by the provisions of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (the “Act”); Reprint No 4 was the relevant version. The attention of the learned trial judge was drawn…

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Details
Case
[2004] QCA 308
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Sheridan v Warrina Community Co-operative Ltd, the respondent, Sheridan, sought damages for personal injuries she claimed to have sustained in the course of her employment with the appellant, Warrina Community Co-operative Ltd. The matter was governed by the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). The learned trial judge dismissed Sheridan’s claim and, under s 325 of the Act, found that the court had no power to order costs in favour of WorkCover where the claim was dismissed. The judge did not award costs to WorkCover.

The legal issues the court needed to decide were whether the literal meaning of s 325 was so obviously absurd that it could never have been intended by the legislature and whether the court should place a different construction on the section. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted.

In granting leave to appeal and subsequently dismissing the appeal with costs, the court held that the literal meaning of s 325 was not so obviously absurd as to be incapable of being the legislature’s intention. The court found that the provision was clear and unambiguous, and there was no basis to depart from the literal meaning. The court also held that the legislature intended to limit the court’s power to order costs in favour of WorkCover in cases where the claim was dismissed. As such, the court was not at liberty to place a different construction on the section.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal granted

2. Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Sheridan, was employed by Warrina Community Co-operative Ltd (the respondent) as a care worker. Sheridan claimed damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained in the course of her employment. The claim was governed by the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). Sheridan alleged that during her employment, she suffered a significant back injury due to a workplace incident involving the lifting of a heavy object. The respondent denied liability and the matter proceeded to trial. The learned trial judge dismissed Sheridan's claim and held that the respondent was not liable for the injuries claimed. Under section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), the court had no power to order costs in favour of WorkCover where the claim was dismissed. The learned trial judge did not award costs to WorkCover.

Sheridan commenced proceedings in the District Court of Queensland seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in the course of her employment. The respondent denied liability and the matter proceeded to a trial. The learned trial judge dismissed Sheridan's claim and held that the respondent was not liable for the injuries claimed. The respondent applied for costs under the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). However, the learned trial judge declined to award costs to the respondent, relying on section 325 of the Act, which states that the court has no power to order costs in favour of WorkCover where the claim is dismissed. Sheridan applied for leave to appeal against the decision of the learned trial judge, arguing that the literal meaning of section 325 is so obviously absurd that it could never have been intended by the legislature. The respondent opposed the application for leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the literal meaning of section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) is so obviously absurd that it could never have been intended by the legislature.
2. Whether the court should place a different construction on section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld).
3. Whether leave to appeal should be granted.

Held
1. The court concluded that the literal meaning of section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) is not so obviously absurd that it could never have been intended by the legislature. The court found that the literal meaning should be applied.
2. The court declined to place a different construction on section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). It found that the section should be interpreted in accordance with its literal meaning.
3. The court granted leave to appeal to the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the statutory provision in question, section 325 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld), which limits the court's power to order costs in favour of WorkCover where a claim is dismissed. The respondent argued that the literal meaning of the section was absurd and should not be applied. However, the court rejected this argument, finding that the literal meaning of the statutory language was clear and should be applied as written. The court underscored the principle that statutes should be interpreted according to their literal meaning unless there is an ambiguity that necessitates a broader interpretation. The court also noted that it was not within its remit to rewrite the statute to avoid what it perceived as an absurd result. In this case, the court saw no ambiguity in the language of section 325 and thus adhered to the literal interpretation. Furthermore, the court declined to place a different construction on the section, as it found no grounds for doing so under established principles of statutory interpretation. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply its literal meaning, and it is not for the court to alter the meaning of the statute to avoid what it may perceive as an absurd outcome. The court granted leave to appeal, recognising the significance of the legal issues raised and the potential impact on future cases. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed with costs, reaffirming the application of the literal interpretation of section 325 in this instance.