SHEPHERD & STEVENSON
[2013] FCCA 110
•24 April 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SHEPHERD & STEVENSON | [2013] FCCA 110 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Independent Children's Lawyer’s costs – opposed by the father – the father’s application for child inclusive counselling – where opposed by the Independent Children’s lawyer and the mother. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, ss.10F, 13C, 60CC, 117 |
| Cases cited: Calvert & Calvert [2008] FMCAfam 101 |
| Applicant: | MR SHEPHERD |
| Respondent: | MS STEVENSON |
| File Number: | SYC 6311 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Kemp |
| Hearing dates: | 13 and 14 March 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 9 April 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 24 April 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr O'Connor |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Self represented |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Blackah |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Miller Goddard Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Independent Children’s Layer: | Mr Guterres |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children's Lawyer: | Hamish Cumming Family Lawyers |
ORDERS
That subject to the orders made on 14 March 2013, there be no further orders for any ongoing counselling for the children, X, born (omitted) 1997 (currently aged 15 years), Y, born (omitted) 1999 (currently aged 13 years), and Z, born (omitted) 2002 (currently aged 11 years), save that the parties do all things reasonably required to encourage the engagement of any of the children with Unifam pursuant to order 10 made on 14 March 2013, if so directed by Unifam in writing.
A copy of these orders and reasons to be made available to Unifam.
That there be no order as to costs between the father and the Independent Children's Lawyer.
That the matter be removed from the active pending cases list.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Shepherd & Stevenson is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYC 6311 of 2011
| MR SHEPHERD |
Applicant
And
| MS STEVENSON |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These are parenting proceedings commenced by the applicant father on 17 October 2011 seeking final parenting orders with respect to the children, X, born (omitted) 1997 (currently aged 15 years)(“X”), Y, born (omitted) 1999 (currently aged 13 years)(“Y”), and Z, born (omitted) 2002 (currently aged 11 years) (“Z”), (“the children”).
The mother filed an amended response on 4 March 2013, which sought orders that the father’s application be dismissed together with an order for costs.
Following the commencement of the proceedings and on 6 February 2012, being the first return date of the father’s application, the Court made various procedural orders and directed that the parties attend a Child Dispute Conference with a family consultant nominated by the Child Dispute Section in this registry on 7 March 2012 and for the purposes of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”), that conference was to be reportable.
Ms B was the family consultant who saw the parties in the Child Dispute Conference. The Court noted the agreement of the parties recorded in the memorandum from Ms B that they had agreed to commence family counselling primarily to attempt to repair the boys’ relationship with the father. It was noted that the child Z, should also be included given that both parents raised concerns about her. The consultant records that the children, especially the boys, have attended upon a Dr P since about 2007. The father did not consent to them seeing this practitioner, but the mother said that the boys had established a rapport with him over the years.
The consultant noted that the mother claimed that the boys did not want to see the father because of his asserted violent and rigid behaviour towards them. The father’s position was that he believed the mother had influenced the boys against him. The consultant noted relevantly, an extremely high level of conflict and acrimony, poor parental communication and estranged relationships between the older two children and the father together with what she described as “adolescent” issues. A recommendation was made for the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer.
On the next return date in Court being 12 March 2012, following the release of the Child Dispute Conference memorandum of Ms B, the Court made an order for the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer for the children. The Court also directed that the parties attend counselling as referred to by Ms B in her memorandum with Relationships Australia and the Court provided for a copy of the said memorandum to be forwarded to Relationships Australia with particular reference to the children attending and that Z should be included, given that both parties raised concerns about her.
The Court also noted the father’s concern that Relationships Australia see the children as part of any counselling exercise and that Relationships Australia should consider appointing a counsellor who has qualifications as a registered psychologist. The proceedings were then adjourned to 1 May 2012.
On 1 May 2012, the Court made orders by consent that neither party was to take the children to anyone who provides psychological services without the consent of all parties. The proceedings were then adjourned to 4 June 2012.
On 4 June 2012, the proceedings were listed for a three day final hearing.
On 22 October 2012, the dates for the final hearing were confirmed as being the 13 to 15 March 2013.
On 4 June 2012, the Court also made, by consent, orders in accordance with a minute of order document which provided as follows:
1.The children, X, Y and Z are to attend The Anchor Program at Unifam.
2.The parties shall each do all things, sign all documents and attend all appointments and facilitate the children’s attendance as required at Unifam for The Anchor Program.
The Court further ordered that a family report be prepared in contemplation of the final hearing. That family report was prepared by Dr J, a clinical psychologist and Regulation 7 consultant. That report has become Exhibit “Court 1” at the hearing.
On the first morning of the hearing, being 13 March 2013, the father was represented by Mr O’Connor of counsel. The mother was represented by Mr Blackah of counsel. The Independent Children’s Lawyer was represented by Mr Guterres of counsel.
The Court heard from Dr J, who was orally examined by the parties’ legal representatives.
Following the conclusion of Dr J’s evidence, the matter was adjourned to the second day of the hearing. On the second day, being 14 March 2013, the parties very sensibly reached agreement with respect to the final parenting orders. The Court made those orders largely in terms of a minute of order prepared by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. Those orders were to the following effect:
1.All previous parenting orders relating to the children be discharged.
2.The parties shall have equal shared parental responsibility for the children.
3.That the children shall live with the mother.
4.That X and Y shall spend time with the father in accordance with their wishes, and the mother shall do all things necessary to facilitate such time if so requested by either or both X and Y.
5.That Z shall spend time with the father:
5.1 During the school term on a two week cycle as follows:
5.1.1In week one, from after school Thursday until before school Thursday; and
5.1.2In week two, from after school Wednesday until before school Thursday.
5.2 During school holiday, for one half of each school holiday period as agreed and failing agreement, for the first half in even numbered years and the second half in odd numbered years; and
5.3 At any other time by agreement between the parties.
6.That the father shall send a text message to X and Y inviting them to dinner on the day he spends with Z in accordance with order 5.1.2 herein, and advise where and at what time dinner is to be. And should X and/or Y agree to attend such a dinner, the father will do all things necessary to facilitate that attendance including collecting them and delivering them home after dinner, or as they require.
7.That each party keep the other informed of a current address and telephone contact number.
8.That each party keep the other informed of any matter arising in relation to the children’s education and medical treatment.
9.That each party inform the other before taking the children outside the Sydney metropolitan area.
10.That each parent shall attend upon Unifam, as directed by Unifam, for the purposes of receiving feedback from Unifam as to the children’s progress in counselling and advice as to any further steps that each party may take in facilitating and improving the children’s relationship with each parent.
11.For the purposes of these orders, Z’s school holidays shall be deemed to commence at the conclusion of the last day of each school term, and conclude at the commencement of the first day of the following school term at which Z attends school.
12.The independent children’s lawyer shall have leave to provide a copy of these orders to each of the children’s school.
The only outstanding issue then was as to the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s costs. The Independent Children’s Lawyer sought a payment within 14 days of the sum of $4,576.00, inclusive of GST from each party.
The mother consented to the payment to the Independent Children’s Lawyer and an order was made to that effect. The father did not consent. That matter is to be now determined.
The father, in addition, proposed a further minute of order, which has become Exhibit “A”. That minute of order specifically seeks a counselling order. In that document the father did initially propose financial orders which Mr O’Connor then confirmed to the Court were no longer being pressed. Similarly, he no longer sought that the proposed counselling order be considered in lieu of order 10 as set out in paragraph 15 above. In those circumstances, the father seeks the following orders:
1.The Court make an order, pursuant to s.13C of the Act, that the parties to the proceedings attend family counselling.
2.That the counselling be child inclusive for all of the children.
3.That the counselling take place at a frequency as required by the counsellor.
4.That the counselling continue for a period of not less than 12 months.
5.That the parties either agree to a counsellor or if the parties fail to agree to a counsellor, a counsellor be appointed as recommended by Dr J.
The Court allowed Mr O’Connor the opportunity of providing written submissions with respect to the counselling and costs issues.
Mr Blackah in turn could respond to those submissions which were to be copied to the Independent Children’s Lawyer and the Independent Children’s Lawyer position was reserved if any further submission was sought to be adduced. The Independent Children’s Lawyer has filed no further submissions.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer opposed the counselling order. The Independent Children’s Lawyer made a number of submissions in support of that opposition. Mr Guterres submitted that there was no evidence to support a counselling order for any of the children. Certainly, given X’s age at 15, it was clear that X did not wish to be compelled to do anything which he saw as potentially engaging the issue of spending time with the father. His views were clearly against that proposition. Dr J, in her recommendations suggested that no order be made in relation to X spending time with the father and indeed, that recommendation has been taken up by the parents in the parenting orders made by consent between them.
Dr J recommends, however that both the father, the mother and the children continue their work with Unifam. She states: “In particular, it is recommended that Unifam work with Mr Shepherd, Ms Stevenson and Y to assist in the reconciliation of their relationship.” At paragraph 54 of Dr J’s report, she states that the child, X, had spoken to “Mr R”, a counsellor at Unifam, about his feelings about the father. Y had also stated that he would be happy to return to see Mr R, but he did not think he had any more appointments scheduled. X says nothing about the issue of ongoing counselling and nor does the child, Z.
Given the relationship reported by Dr J between Z and the father, namely that the child loves the father “a lot” and enjoys spending time with him and given the parenting orders now made, the Court sees no utility in further counselling between the father, the mother and Z.
Given the age of X and given his very clear views expressed, namely, that he did not wish to spend time with the father or speak to him, the Court sees little or no utility in making an order that X attend future counselling.
The issue of concern to the Court is, however in relation to the child, Y. The consultant noted that while Y did not want to be interviewed with the father, he appeared to be slightly curious to see the father, for example, “by peering into the office waiting room when he knew the father and Z were there”. Y said that he did not want to see the father because he felt “worried”. Dr J’s recommendation was for Y to work towards spending time with the father on one regular day a week for lunch or dinner which may coincide with the time that Z is with the father. That order did not end up being made as one of those consented to by the parties.
Mr Guterres submitted that there should be no order for compulsory counselling and that if the parties wished to effect that, they could take it up in the exercise of their equal shared parental responsibility. Mr Blackah opposed the order for compulsory counselling.
Mr Guterres stated that the children have already been involved in an extensive history of counselling be it with Dr P, Ms B at the Court, seeing Dr J and through Unifam. Mr Guterres submitted and the Court accepts, that one of the ongoing issues between the parents was the question of counselling itself. Mr Guterres submitted that coercive orders would in the circumstances of these children, be counterproductive and could amount to “systems abuse”. Further, Mr Guterres submitted that given the history and the degree of acrimony between the parents going back to separation in 2006, that counselling was unlikely to have any positive outcome and indeed would be a focal point for future parental disputation which should be avoided in considering the ongoing best interests of the children. The Court accepts that position.
Further, the Independent Children’s Lawyer considered that in any event, the length of time proposed by the father for counselling was too long given the ages of the children. Further, the Independent Children’s Lawyer submitted that the children’s wishes were not taken up in the order for compulsory counselling and indeed the Court raised that with Mr Guterres as to whether engaging or assessing the children’s wishes would again lead the parents into further conflict as to what was in fact a “true” expression of those views and wishes. Indeed, often children say to one parent what a child believes his or her parent would like to hear. In those circumstances, the Court accepts that an issue such as this could lead to further parental disputation and weight is attached to that.
Dr J, in her oral evidence, indicated that the father had to some extent become preoccupied by the dispute and with the thought that the children should be spending time with him without necessarily putting himself in the shoes of the children. Much of Dr J’s evidence relates to matters that were then in dispute between the parties which have now been resolved as a result of the consent final parenting orders. When asked about counselling, Dr J was of the view that it would not necessarily be of any assistance to X, given his age and that it would not be appropriate to make a coercive order in that regard.
Dr J expressed some further reservations that any orders in relation to Y could potentially cause further parental conflict. In answer to Mr Blackah’s questions, Dr J agreed that the Unifam counselling had not changed anything, even though it had commenced in about June 2012. Dr J was of the view that both X and Y were however positive about the involvement of the counsellor. Her view was that any compulsory counselling had probably reached the end point so far as X was concerned now. Her view so far as Y was concerned was that any future counselling should not be open-ended. Dr J noted that her understanding was that the boys had been going to counselling weekly at least until Christmas 2012. She did not however make any positive recommendation for any “other” ongoing counselling and weight is attached to that.
The Court notes that previous final parenting orders were made in the Family Court of Australia at Sydney by consent on 21 August 2007 before Judicial Registrar Johnston (as he then was). Those orders provided for equal shared parental responsibility for the children to live with the mother and for the children to otherwise, live with the father during defined periods of time. There were no specific counselling orders made at that time.
The father submits that:
(a)The older children, Y and X have no relationship with him at all due, to a significant degree, from an environment of negativity that has been fostered by the mother towards him. The mother disputes that and says that there is no evidence of parental alienation.
(b)Dr J thought that without the intervention of the Court, neither Y nor X would have any contact with the father in the short to medium term which she considered was not in their best interests.
(c)If orders for some form of family counselling are not made by this Court, the probability is that Y and X will have little, if any, meaningful contact with the father.
(d)Dr J thought that the father acknowledged that he was not faultless and had at times behaved in ways that had hampered rapprochement with the boys. The mother says that Dr J was only able to identify in relation to the father’s said acknowledgement the circumstances surrounding the passport applications for the boys.
(e)Dr J thought that the mother’s denials that she had not in any way encouraged the boys’ negative attitudes towards the father were unlikely, given that she considered that it was likely that the mother had not encouraged the children’s relationship with the father either overtly or more subtly due to her own antagonistic feelings towards him.
(f)Dr J did not accept that the mother had been entirely neutral in the children’s interaction with the father and was of the view given the ages of the boys, that she had negatively influenced them in their attitude towards the father.
(g)Dr J was further of the view that it was not good parenting to allow for the children themselves to determine whether or not they wished to maintain a relationship with the father.
(h)Dr J was of the view that the child, Z had a good relationship with the father.
(i)Dr J was of the view that the mother’s expressed concerns about the father’s time with Z were inconsistent with her continuing willingness to allow her daughter to enjoy her current level of contact with the father. The Court notes that the mother has not conceded that she currently has any of the same concerns that she appears to have historically expressed.
(j)Dr J regarded it as simply impractical to force X to spend time with the father against his will. The father says that he has accepted this position.
(k)Dr J recommended that “Mr Shepherd, Ms Stevenson, X, Y and Z continue with their work with Unifam”.
(l)Dr J recommended that Unifam work with the parties and Y to assist in the reconciliation of their relationship.
(m)That Y’s position was of particular concern given that while he stated that he did not wish to be interviewed with the father, Dr J noted that “he appeared to be slightly curious to see his father, for example peering into the office waiting room when he knew his father and Z were there…”
Further, Dr J reported that “Y is still relatively young and there may be more scope for therapeutic intervention to assist in the repair of his and his father’s relationship. The family are engaged with Unifam who should be able to assist in this process.”
(n)Further, while the mother submits that counselling would be of little value or that the father had some agenda other than a therapeutic resolution to the rift between himself and his sons and that the boys were likely to see that as a process whereby the father was trying to wear them down until they eventually gave in to his demands that they spend time with him, Dr J was however of the view that:
“I didn’t get the sense that they sort of felt that they were being worn down. I mean, I felt that they both seemed quite positive about the counsellor that they saw, but I think they felt that, you know, they had been able to say what they felt and I don’t think there was any sense in them thinking they had been sort of – they were being forced to do anything or their views were being worn down.”
and accordingly, there was no real basis for counselling not to continue simply because of the effluxion of time.
(o)The father conceded that counselling should not be indefinite.
(p)The father was critical of the Independent Children’s Lawyer who he said had given no real reason for any objection to ongoing counselling other than it had been tried and failed at the Anchor Counselling Centre and did not investigate any particular reason as to why it was said that that failure had occurred. The father was also critical that the Independent Children’s Lawyer chose not to make any distinction between the children, given Dr J’s statements about Y’s position referred to in (m) above.
(q)That the Anchor program was not a suitable counselling solution to the present problem given that it was geographically removed from where both parties lived and that in a 9 month period X had attended 6 sessions and Y only 5 and that that has not been productive of any time with the father. The father says that the type of counselling that is to be ordered must reflect that reality, with its goal to be “remedying the child’s developmental deficits, transforming the child’s distorted “good/bad” views and polarizing feelings towards both parents into more realistic ones”, Parental Alienation: the facts and the fiction; Dr T Altobelli; 15th National Family Law Conference, 2012; page 12. That suitable counselling he submitted, would necessarily include a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who has some specialty dealing with children who have become alienated from one parent and, in that regard, Dr J could recommend a suitable practitioner.
(r)That it would also be beneficial for any counselling to be supervised and monitored by the Court notwithstanding any preference for finality. See Calvert and Calvert [2008] FMCAfam 101.
(s)That if the Court declines to make an order for family counselling that is inclusive of all of the children, then any order should at least focus on reconciling the relationship between the father and Y as a priority.
The view expressed by Dr J recorded in paragraph 32(j) is inconsistent with the father’s proposal to force X to attend counselling. However, Dr J in paragraph 32(k) recommended that the parties and the children continue their work with Unifam. Dr J in paragraph 32(l) above also concentrated in this regard on the child, Y. However, order 10 as agreed by the parties did not specifically require the children to be engaged in counselling with Unifam.
The mother submits that:
(a)The Court has no jurisdiction to make an order that the children who are not parties attend counselling pursuant to s.13C of the Act. The Court accepts that submission. The Court further accepts that it may however require a party to “encourage the participation of specified other persons” (relevantly in these proceedings, the children).
(b)If family counselling was ordered, it should not continue beyond June 2013, as recommended by Dr J. The mother says that while Dr J did not elaborate on her reasons for that, it should be noted that Y will reach the age of 14 on (omitted) 2013.
(c)If the Court was to order family counselling, it should be undertaken by a family dispute resolution practitioner as defined in the Act. The Court notes that a family dispute resolution practitioner as defined in s.10F of the Act relates to persons involved in family dispute resolution under Division 3 of Part II and not in family counselling under Division 2 of Part II of the Act.
(d)That on the father’s own concession the family’s engagement with Unifam pursuant to orders made on 4 June 2012 has not been successful as he asserts as reported by Dr J, that: “the therapeutic process at Unifam has stalled because I refuse to concede that I need to take responsibility for my violent past, as there was no violent past, no more than in any other relationship”. Further, that as the father has not and is unlikely to acknowledge the extent of any past asserted family violence, that any further family counselling would also probably stall.
(e)The quotation from Dr J’s report in paragraph 32(m) above says no more than that there “may” be more scope for therapeutic intervention in the case of Y and the word “may” does not mean “should” and could equally mean “may not”. Further, the Doctor’s use of the word “slightly” was also an “underwhelming” proposition. Those matters were a slim platform for the imposition of further family counselling upon the mother and to also require her to encourage Y to also participate.
(f)That it is probable that Y would regard any order requiring his further participation in family counselling as another example of the father trying to impose on him a relationship that he does not want.
(g)That the observed healthy relationship between the father and Z contra indicates any allegations of disparagement by the mother which were in any event, disputed by her.
(h)That the matters raised by the father as against the mother including his belief that she suffers from a personality disorder would militate against the utility of further family counselling. This position, however, contradicted the parties’ consent to order 10, referred to above.
(i)That any attack by the father on the integrity of the Independent Children’s Lawyer was irrelevant and the Court accepts that proposition.
(j)That given Dr J’s recommendations it was not put to her that Unifam was unsuitable or inappropriate. It only appears to be so from the father’s perspective given that it has not produced the results that he wishes for. Indeed, the Court notes her recommendations are underpinned by her view that Unifam’s involvement was indeed appropriate and this is given weight to ground the Court’s proposed order referred to below.
(k)That the father’s reference to the paper delivered by Altobelli FM (as he then was) which describes “distorted” views and speaks of polarizing feelings into more realistic ones, assumed that X and Y have such distorted and unrealistic views and feelings and that each of X and Y have given detailed reasons as to why they have withdrawn from the father, including one that the mother says was conceded by the father, namely his behaviour at a time when the mother was wanting to renew their passports. Again, the Court notes that no findings of fact can now be made where such matters are otherwise disputed.
(l)That the strongly held views of X and Y, given their ages, should be given substantial weight.
Given that there has been no cross-examination of the parties, the Court is unable to accept or reject either the mother or the father’s assertions as to what was said or not said to the children or any of them or make findings as to any of the disputed allegations of fact. Similarly, unless there is agreement to the facts upon which Dr J relied, then any matters of fact which are disputed and which have been assumed by the Doctor for the basis of any view, cannot be accepted as supportive of such a view which would in those circumstances, be given little or no probative value. Allegations that the father, during the course of the hearing, laughed or did not and any matter flowing therefrom cannot be determined at this stage.
Accordingly, having regard to the factors under s.60CC(2) and (3) of the Act for the determination of the children’s best interests, the Court is of the view that the evidence before it does not support the making of the order for further counselling as proposed by the father, given in particular, the clearly stated views of X and Y, the existing good relationship between the father and Z, the absence of any evidence as to specific benefit for in particular Y, the need to ensure a consistent approach for all of the children, the need to minimise the opportunity for further areas of parental disputation and the need to bring a conclusion to any further proceedings in relation to all of the children. The Court is therefore of the view that no specific further counselling order should be made in the best interests of the children. However, the Court is of the view that, given the recommendations of Dr J concerning Unifam’s involvement, to which weight is attached and given the parties’ consent to order 10 as set out in paragraph 15 above, there should be an order that the parties do all things reasonably required to encourage the engagement of any of the children with Unifam pursuant to that existing order provided Unifam are of that view and so direct the parties in writing. That will enable Unifam to consider the issue accordingly. A direction in writing is considered appropriate in order to avoid any parental disputation as to what Unifam otherwise require. A copy of these reasons and orders should be made available to Unifam.
Independent Children’s Lawyer’s Costs
The issue so far as the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s costs was concerned, Mr Guterres submitted that the Court could have regard to the financial statement of the father e-filed on 13 February 2012. That financial statement showed an average weekly income of some $300 from his (omitted) business, with an expenditure of some $340 weekly. On the face of that document, the father’s expenses exceeded his income. His property consisted substantially of some small amount of monies in a bank of $284.87, a Toyota LandCruiser worth $10,000.00 and an interest in a business estimated at $10,000, with household contents of $2000 and other personal property of $8000. He had small superannuation of some $11,000.
The father also referred to loans to a Ms J of some $130,000 and credit card expenses to (omitted) Bank of $30,000 and (omitted) Visa of $18,000.
On the face of the father’s financial statement (which was not tested), he would be unable to afford any costs. Notwithstanding that, the Independent Children’s Lawyer submitted that the father was employed, that the children were attending private schools and that significantly, the Legal Aid Commission should not bear the costs of the parties to the family law disputation as these would otherwise be borne by the community.
With respect to costs, s.117(1) of the Act states that each party to proceedings under the Act shall bear his or her own costs, unless there are justifying circumstances pursuant to s.117(2A) of the Act. Pursuant to s.117(3) of the Act, the Court may make an order as to costs against a party in favour of the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
However, the Court accepts that pursuant to s.117(5) of the Act it must disregard the fact that the Independent Children’s Lawyer is funded under a legal aid scheme, notwithstanding the submission of Mr Guterres.
Further, pursuant to s.117(4) of the Act the Court must not make an order as to costs against a party in relation to the costs of the Independent Children’s Lawyer if:
(a) a party to the proceedings has received legal aid in respect of the proceedings; or
(b) the court considers that a party to the proceedings would suffer financial hardship if the party had to bear a proportion of the costs of the independent children's lawyer.
The father submits that in relation to costs that he has no means by which to pay for the costs of the Independent Children’s Lawyer and that the Court would have regard to the fact that he was unrepresented until the final hearing.
The Court accepts that any costs order as against the father as sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, given his financial circumstances, as referred to above, is likely to cause him to suffer financial hardship.
For this reason, the Court is of the view that there should be no order for costs as between the Independent Children's Lawyer and the father.
For the above reasons, the Court is of the view that, save for the final orders made on 14 March 2013, as amended by the Court’s proposed order, as set out above, there should be no further orders for any ongoing counselling for the children.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Kemp
Date: 24 April 2013