Shearer and Trotter and Anor (SSAT Appeal)
[2011] FMCAfam 622
•28 June 2011
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SHEARER & TROTTER & ANOR (SSAT APPEAL) | [2011] FMCAfam 622 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Appeal from the Social Security Appeals Tribunal – whether any question of law arose in the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal – whether there was evidence that the appellant received a benefit from the payment of the appellant’s credit card expenses by a company 50% owned by the appellant – whether the Social Security Appeals Tribunal erred in ignoring or misconstruing the evidence of the appellant as to the payment of the credit card expenses – whether the Social Security Appeals Tribunal erred by failing to provide the appellant with procedural fairness. |
| Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), s.110B |
| Shearer & Benson & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 623 Carey v Carey (1994) FLC 92 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81 PJ & Child Support Registrar (SSAT Appeal) [2007] FMCAfam 829 Commissioner for the Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 Bedell & Kastens & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 1250 |
| Appellant: | MR SHEARER |
| First Respondent: | MS TROTTER |
| Second Respondent: | CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR |
| File Number: | SYC 1316 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Emmett FM |
| Hearing date: | 9 June 2011 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 9 June 2011 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 28 June 2011 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Appellant: | Mr Matthew Wong |
| Solicitor for the Appellant: | Mr Steven Ng (Adams & Partners Lawyers) |
| No appearance by the First Respondent |
| Solicitor for the Second Respondent: | Mr Nicholas Gouliaditis (Australian Government Solicitor) |
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Shearer & Trotter & Anor (SSAT Appeal) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES |
SYC 1316 of 2011
| MR SHEARER |
Appellant
And
| MS TROTTER |
First Respondent
| CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) dated 4 February 2011.
Section 110B of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) makes clear that an appeal to this Court in respect of a decision of the SSAT is on a question of law.
The SSAT’s decision arose from objections lodged by the appellant in respect of child support assessments made by the second respondent in respect of the child of the parties, L, born [in] 1994.
The appellant has another appeal in this Court from a decision of the SSAT of the same date in respect of his liability to pay child support to Ms Benson, the first respondent in Shearer & Benson & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 623, in respect of their child D, born [in] 1999. The SSAT heard both matters together and the appellant’s evidence in one was taken to be evidence in the other.
On 4 March 2011, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court from the SSAT’s decision. On 5 May 2011, leave was given to the appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 20 May 2011, the appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal which sought orders, inter alia, that the appellant’s adjustable taxable income be set at $95,000 for the period 1 October 2009 until
20 November 2012.
Both appeals to this Court raise identical issues and the evidence and submissions filed on behalf of the appellant in both proceedings are identical in all material respects, as are those of the second respondent. For those reasons, both appeals were heard by the Court at the same time.
The first respondent elected not to participate in this proceeding. However, the appellant and the second respondent relied on the same evidence and submissions in respect of both appeals.
For the reasons expressed in Shearer & Benson & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 623, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
For the sake of convenience, those reasons for judgment are as follows:
“Introduction
This is an appeal from a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) dated 4 February 2011.
Section 110B of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) makes clear that an appeal to this Court in respect of a decision of the SSAT is on a question of law.
The appellant is the parent liable to pay child support to the first respondent for the child, D, born [in] 1999.
The appellant has another appeal in this Court from a decision of the SSAT of the same date in respect of his liability to pay child support to Ms Trotter, the first respondent in Shearer & Trotter & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 622, in respect of their child L, born [in] 1994. The SSAT heard both matters together and the appellant’s evidence in one was taken to be evidence in the other.
Both appeals to this Court raise identical issues and the evidence and submissions filed on behalf of the appellant in both proceedings are identical in all material respects, as are those of the second respondent. For those reasons, both appeals were heard by the Court at the same time.
Ms Trotter elected not to participate in the appeal. The first respondent, Ms Benson, appeared at the hearing and represented herself.
Background and SSAT decision
On 21 May 2010, a delegate of the second respondent assessed the appellant’s taxable income for child support purposes at $144,600. The delegate found that there was additional income sourced from profits and benefits derived from two companies said to be controlled by the appellant.
On 27 August 2010, a delegate of the second respondent (“the Delegate”) disallowed the appellant’s objection to its decision and on 23 September 2010, the appellant lodged an appeal with the SSAT.
The SSAT heard the review applications of both Ms Benson and
Ms Trotter together. Although the SSAT gave separate reasons, they substantially similar and Orders made in both reflected the same findings in respect of the appellant’s financial circumstances.
At the heart of the appellant’s submissions to the SSAT was his argument that he should only be assessed as a 50% owner of the companies in respect of which the Delegate had found he owned 100%. These companies were [T] Pty Limited (“[T]”) and [L] Pty Limited (“[L]”). The SSAT noted that it had before it tax returns and various other financial documents relating to the appellant and his companies and accepted his submission that only 50% of the income and resources of the companies should be attributable to the appellant.
In Ms Benson’s SSAT hearing, the SSAT noted the appellant’s written submissions that [T] paid [L] $22,000 for his service during the 2009/2010 tax year and that [L] paid the appellant $60,000. The SSAT noted that it understood the evidence at hearing to disclose other expenses paid on behalf of the appellant. The SSAT therefore found that the total value of the appellant’s services was $72,000 and that this is the value of his labour which should be included in his child support assessment.
Ultimately, the SSAT found that the appellant had an adjusted taxable income for child support purposes comprising the profits / wages that he earned from [L] amounting to $95,041, as well as the benefit of having his private credit card expenses paid by [L]. The SSAT found that the annualised credit card payments made by the companies on behalf of the appellant amounted to approximately $35,000 per year. And that this amount should be added to the appellant’s adjusted taxable income available for child support.
Accordingly, the SSAT set aside the decision of the Delegate and substituted a new decision that the appellant’s adjusted taxable income for the purposes of child support was $130,000 for the period 1 October 2009 until the child support assessment ends.
Appeal to this Court
On 4 March 2011, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court from the SSAT’s decision. On 5 May 2011, the parties attended a directions hearing before me and leave was given to the appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 12 May 2011, the appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal which sought orders, inter alia, that the appellant’s adjustable taxable income be set at $95,000 for the period 1 October 2009 until 20 November 2012.
The grounds of the Amended Notice of Appeal are as follows:
“1. That the SSAT erred in law by finding without evidence or without any adequate evidence that the appellant received a benefit from the payment of the appellant’s credit card expenses by [L] Pty Ltd (“the Credit Card finding”) in circumstances where the evidence from the appellant was that the payments were debited from a “directors’ loan account” and offset by the “wage amount” notionally paid to him in a “paper transaction”.
2. That the SSAT erred in law in ignoring or misconstruing the evidence of the appellant as to the payment of the credit card.
3. That the SSAT erred in law by failing to provide the appellant with procedural fairness in circumstances where the Credit Card finding was not foreshadowed by the SSAT nor was it a contention put forward by the Respondent in evidence or submissions.
4. That the SSAT erred in law in determining that special circumstances existed to depart from the administrative assessment on the basis of the Credit Card finding.
5. That the SSAT’s Credit Card finding is an erroneous finding of such magnitude that it renders its decision perverse, unreasonable and/or illogical.”
The appellant was represented at the hearing before this Court by
Mr Wong of Counsel.
Grounds 4 and 5 of the Amended Notice of Appeal were withdrawn.
Grounds 1 and 2
At the heart of Grounds 1 and 2 are complaints by the appellant that the SSAT’s finding that the payment of his credit card for private expenses should be annualised and added to his adjusted taxable income for child support. The appellant contended that these findings were either against the appellant’s evidence or were made in the absence of any evidence.
In support of the Amended Notice of Appeal, the appellant tendered a transcript of the SSAT hearing. The relevant extracts of the transcript with respect to the grounds of appeal are as follows:
“MS BENSON: The residence, it indicates on the Depreciation schedule document page 306, shows that there are various items purchased by [L] which benefit Mr Shearer. The items are a plasma TV, fridge, furniture, BBQ and numerous other things. That would in fact imply that Mr Shearer lives in a furnished home, so the rent would be somewhat more in that case. [L] also pays the mortgage rates, etcetera; [T] pays phone, utilities. Any income that Mr Shearer receives is just for food and entertainment, [L] pays the credit cards and in fact $17,000 in credit card payments have been made in the last three months. Mr Shearer would have had to have the income to make these payments.
The subcontractors that were referred to on A251, I don’t get that I’m afraid. When you have two employees, supposedly two employees, paid $60,000 a piece, I don’t see how they could be possibly making those payments to subcontractors. And, with the industry being what it is, I don’t get that, I am afraid. I don’t know if I can say something like that.
…
TRIBUNAL MEMBER (“TM”): This is the opportunity for you, Ms Benson, to have things clarified.
MR NG (appellant’s solicitor): That’s what the subcontractors are; it’s a payment across. The idea is in the structure is to rather than that additional profit received by the company being paid out as a dividend, you are reducing tax, in essence, to send it to – as it is paid to subcontractors, get the money into [L]. If [L] owes assets it assists more with payments of other things, thus reducing taxable income. That’s the idea about that.
With reimbursements as to her contribution, the reimbursement that Ms E (the appellant’s wife) receives is the same as
Mr Shearer receives is the payment of assets by [L], payment by [L] in support of all their assets; paying off their rent, paying off their credit card, paying off their motor vehicle expenses. That’s the reimbursement she receives rather than a cash figure out if [L] pays for ---
TM: So what you are saying is that the amount paid, $31,800, for example, is what she is paid as a wage.
MR NG: Yes
TM: And then to reimburse her for what she should be paid as a wage in terms of the level of work she does---
MR NG: Correct.
…
TM: Okay. I understand.
MR SHEARER: Can I say something in regards to the company paying the credit card?
MS SMITH: Can I just clarify which credit card you were referring to Ms Benson?
MS BENSON: In this one it was ---
TM: Just so that we know what we are talking about when we hear you. Is this a Westpac altitude platinum credit card that starts at page A375? Is that the credit card you were referring to? Take your time.
MS BENSON: Yes.
TM: Okay, all right then. Yes, Mr Shearer, what would you like to say about that?
MR SHEARER: Basically, the main structure of the company is that there is no actually wage paid. It’s a paper transaction. It’s set down as a director’s loan. So, yes, the credit card payments are made from the company’s account but it is debited from the director’s loan account. Obviously, if the company was paying for personal credit cards, that would be fraud, tax fraud.
TM: So it basically just increases the shareholders’ loan account balance.
MR SHEARER: Basically that’s right, it’s a paper transaction where the loan account is increased by whatever the wage amount is and as we require the money we draw from that account. So yes, the money is coming from the company’s bank account, but it’s a director’s loan repayment.
TM: Okay.” (Emphasis added).
In its decision record, the SSAT dealt with this evidence as follows:
“56. Based on the financial accounts of [L] for 2010 the tribunal considered that the wages and benefits which should be brought to account for child support purposes in respect of the applicants are:
Net Profits before tax: $102317.61
Add: benefits stated above $15765.43
$118083.04
Less: Value for applicant’s services $72000.00
$46083.04
Applicant’s 50% share $23041.02
Add: Value of Applicant’s services $72000.00
$95041.00
57. Evidence was given at hearing that the companies pay a variety of expenses which would ordinarily be considered the private expenses of the applicant and his family. Specifically, attention was drawn to the statements for a Westpac Altitude Platinum credit card in the applicant’s name, covering the period 11 August 2010 to 12 December 2010, which was provided by the applicant following pre-hearing directions given (folios A375 to A386). The descriptions of the transactions in the statements have been redacted by the applicant in their entirety, leaving only the amounts of debits and credits in view. At hearing it was conceded that the company pays this account for private expenses incurred by the applicant and his family.
58. The tribunal notes from this evidence that over the four month period covered by the statements, payments and credits have totalled $23,315.63. Annualised, this figure becomes $69,946.89. The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to halve this benefit, to reflect the applicant’s 50% interest in the companies. This equals a (rounded) additional annual benefit of $35,000, which the tribunal considers should also be assessed for child support purposes.
59. While there is nothing untoward about how the applicant and his wife have structured their business and investment operations, it is clear that this structure serves to provide benefits to them which are not reflected in the taxable income ordinarily to be used in the applicant’s child support assessment.
60. The tribunal considers that the applicant’s adjusted taxable income used in the formal assessment does not represent an accurate reflection of his ability to provide child support and that consequently, a reason to depart from the assessment has been established in relation to him. The legislative basis of this is sub-paragraph 98L(a) of the Assessment Act.
61. The tribunal makes the following additional findings of fact:
·The applicant’s current wife, Ms E is the sole director/secretary/shareholder of [T]. The applicant undertakes duties for that company as [omitted], which is the main business of the company. Ms E undertakes administrative/clerical duties for the company. The contribution each makes to the company’s functioning is qual and complementary.
·[T] pays [L] for the applicant’s services, as well as for the service provided by Ms E. The applicant and
Ms E are the directors of [L] and each holds 50% of the issued shares in the company.· [L] is an investment vehicle which trades shares and owns assets used by [T] and for which [T] pays hiring fees. [L] also owns the home in which the applicant and his family reside, as well as its contents. The applicant rents this furnished premises from [L] for $400 per week.
·There is private expenditure incurred by the applicant and Ms E which is paid for by the companies, including payment of personal credit card bills.
·The applicant and Ms E have two children aged 8 and 5 years who attend a state school. They also have court-ordered care of Ms E’s nephew [Z], for whom they receive an allowance from DocS, The health of the family is generally good.”
In the SSAT’s decision in the Trotter, the SSAT noted that it put specific questions about the financial accounts of both companies to the appellant and his solicitor, Mr Ng. The SSAT noted that, inter alia, the response that “the company” ([L]) pays the personal credit card bills of the appellant but that such amounts were then debited back to the director’s loan account (being that of the appellant) which increased its balance. The SSAT noted that these were stated to be “paper transactions” only.
That summary by the SSAT is accurate in respect of the evidence given by the appellant and Mr Ng.
Financial accounts of [L] for the year ending 30 June 2009 and the year ending 30 June 2010 were tendered to the Court by the appellant and marked Exhibit “1A”.
However, the appellant was not able to identify any particular item in Exhibit 1A that supported and clarified the appellant’s contention that his director’s loan account was debited with credit card payments made by [L] on his behalf for private expenses.
On the other hand, the SSAT had before it the relevant credit card statements and the appellant’s concession that the credit card was used for private expenses.
A fair reading of the SSAT’s decision makes clear that it referred to the appellant’s oral evidence regarding the nature of the credit card payments by “the companies”. I am satisfied that reference to payment of the appellant’s credit card by “the companies” was a reference to payment by [L].
The SSAT correctly noted that it was not required to undertake a major audit or investigation into the affairs of the parties, but only needed to be reasonably satisfied on the balance of probabilities as to the state of their income, property and financial resources.
The SSAT also correctly noted that when a person conducts their business through an intermediary company or trust, it is proper to lift the corporate veil to that person with regard to the determination of a parent’s income for child support purposes (Carey v Carey (1994) FLC 92-489).
A fair reading of the SSAT decision record makes clear that it understood the nature of the appellant’s evidence with respect to the credit card payments by [L].
However, the SSAT was ultimately not satisfied on the evidence and material before it that the credit card payments by [L] should be treated in the way contended for by the appellant. The SSAT had the concession of the appellant that [L] paid for private expenses incurred on his credit card. As stated above, there was nothing in the financial records of [L] either before the SSAT or in Exhibit 1A before this Court to support the appellant’s contention.
In the circumstances, it was open to the SSAT to find that, on the evidence before it, credit card payments of $23,315.63 had been made over a four month period. It was open to the SSAT to annualise that figure in seeking to assess the appellant’s adjusted taxable income for child support purposes.
Having annualised the figure, the SSAT halved the benefit to reflect the appellant’s 50% interest in [L], leaving a rounded additional annual benefit of $35,000. The SSAT found that amount should be added to the appellant’s income of $95,041, as reflected on the financial accounts of [L] for 2010, for child support purposes.
In the circumstances, there was adequate evidence to enable the SSAT to find that the payment by [L] of the appellant’s private credit card expenses was capable of being annualised into an amount to be added to his income of $95,041 as adjusted taxable income available for child support purposes.
The SSAT found that there was nothing untoward about the way in which the appellant had structured his finances and that he clearly had knowledge of the affairs of his company. The SSAT simply came to a different conclusion on the evidence and material before it.
A fair reading of the transcript makes clear that the appellant was given an opportunity to put information and submissions to the SSAT in support of his interests. As stated above, in the circumstances, it was open to the SSAT not to be persuaded by that evidence and submissions where the appellant’s evidence was no more than his assertions to the SSAT. This is particularly so, where the SSAT had found that the appellant had knowledge of the affairs of the companies and had provided financial records of the companies to the SSAT, none of which, supported the appellant’s assertions and that he clearly had knowledge of the affairs of [L].
Further, the SSAT did not ignore the appellant’s oral evidence that the credit card payments were debited from a director’s loan account and offset by the wage amount notionally paid to him in a paper transaction.
The explanation given by the appellant was in circumstances where he had sought an opportunity to explain about the credit card payments and was given that opportunity.
The appellant’s, Mr Ng, also gave evidence. Mr Ng’s evidence was somewhat obscure and lacked clarity and detail.
Neither the appellant nor his solicitor sought any further opportunity to provide further detail or supporting evidence.
In the circumstances, it was open to the SSAT, in the absence of any further evidence or supporting financial material, not to accept the appellant’s assertion. In other words, the evidence given by the appellant and his solicitor about [L]’s payment of his credit card private expenses was not sufficient to persuade the SSAT.
In the circumstances, the SSAT’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
The SSAT was not obliged to disclose to the appellant its proposed findings in respect of the credit card payments by [L]. Moreover, the SSAT was entitled to analyse those payments in the way it did in seeking to determine the appellant’s adjusted taxable income available for child support payments.
Accordingly Grounds 1 and 2 are not made out.
Ground 3
In support of Ground 3, counsel for the appellant submitted that the SSAT did not foreshadow to the appellant that it was going to make an adverse finding in relation to the appellant’s credit card payments by [L] and did not foreshadow to the appellant the methodology it was going to use to determine the quantum of the benefit of the credit card.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that in failing to do so, the SSAT denied the appellant natural justice. In support of that proposition, counsel for the appellant referred to Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81 at 32 where Mason J stated that:
[34]. Where the decision in question is one for which provision is made by statute, the application and content of the doctrine of natural justice or the duty to act fairly depends to a large extent on the construction of the statute. In Mobil Oil Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 41; (1963) 113 CLR 475, Kitto J. pointed out (at pp 503-504) that the obligation to give a fair opportunity to parties in controversy to correct or contradict statements prejudicial to their view depends on "the particular statutory framework". What is appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject matter, and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting (Reg. v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group [1969] HCA 10; (1969) 122 CLR 546, at pp 552-553; National Companies and Securities Commission v. The News Corporation Ltd. [1984] HCA 29; [1984] HCA 29; (1984) 58 ALJR 308, at pp 314, 318; [1984] HCA 29; 52 ALR 417, at pp 427-428, 434).
[33]. In this respect the expression "procedural fairness" more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations (cf. Salemi (No. 2), at p.451, per Jacobs J.). (Emphasis added).
Counsel for the appellant also referred to PJ & Child Support Registrar (SSAT Appeal) [2007] FMCAfam 829 where Riethmuller FM stated that:
“[37] The processes of the tribunal are clearly intended to operate on an inquisitorial rather than adversarial model. This places the obligation of identifying the issues upon the tribunal. Unlike a court, the tribunal must make its own decisions as to what evidence to seek or gather to enable it to properly carry out its function, particularly in cases where it is not simply refusing an application, but making a change that affects the interests of a party.
[38] The only right of review of a decision of the SSAT is an appeal “on a question of law” to the courts: s 110B. In LDME & JMA (SSAT Appeal) [2007] FMCAfam 712 at [17]–[44], Halligan FM identifies many cases on the nature of an appeal on a question of law. Most significantly, such an appeal does not allow for a review on the merits. As a result, it is important for the tribunal to provide appropriate reasons. This will usually entail careful findings of fact and clear explanations of the reasons for any decision, particularly where it involves the exercise of a discretion such as altering a child support amount.”
For the reasons below, the SSAT’s decision was made in accordance with the principles enunciated in the cases above.
Counsel for the appellant also referred to Bedell & Kastens & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 1250 in which Sexton FM found that the SSAT was in error in calculating an appellant’s income by adding back various company expenses without giving the appellant the opportunity to provide documentary or other evidence that he may have been in the position to access to explain the expenses. However, in that case, the Social Security Appeal’s Tribunal found that the company’s accounts were false.
In the case before this Court, the SSAT did not make any such finding of falsity. Rather, the SSAT was simply not persuaded by the explanation of the appellant as to the manner in which the payment by [L] of his personal credit card expenses should be treated.
The SSAT specifically found that there was nothing untoward about the manner in which the appellant had structured his affairs. It also accepted the accuracy of the financial material, so far as it went, and accepted the appellant’s contention that he was only a 50% owner of [L] and [T], whereas the Delegate had found that he was a 100% owner.
It is clear that a person likely to be affected by an administrative decision to which requirements of procedural fairness apply, as in this case, can support his or her case by appropriate information but can not complain if it is not accepted. What is important is that a decision maker advise a party of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. A decision maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question. (see Commissioner for the Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 592)
A fair reading of the transcript of the SSAT hearing and the SSAT decision make clear that the appellant was aware of the extent of the financial material before the SSAT in respect of the companies of which he was found to be a 50% owner.
The transcript referred to above makes clear that the appellant clearly understood that Ms Benson was asserting that he was using the company to pay private credit card expenses.
The appellant would have been aware that his evidence before the SSAT in support was no more than his relatively brief assertions. The appellant knew the credit card expenses paid by [L] were for his private expenses. It is not usual that private credit card expenses are paid by a company. The appellant provided his evidence orally and took the issue no further. The SSAT considered his oral evidence, but did not accept it. The appellant was also familiar with the records of [L] which did not support his oral explanation.
As stated above, he sought and was given an opportunity to address that issue.
As stated above, he offered a brief explanation and his solicitor offered a further, somewhat obscure, explanation.
As stated above, neither the appellant nor the solicitor sought any further time to provide any further explanations or evidence in support of the assertions. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that the appellant or his solicitor sought to provide further material or explain the financial accounts of [L] to support their assertions.
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the appellant was aware of the concern raised by Ms Benson that [L] was paying his private credit card expenses. The clear implication was that this facility showed that there was further income or financial assets available to the appellant for child support purposes. His explanation was inadequate to satisfy the SSAT. As stated above, the SSAT’s findings were open to it on the evidence and material before it.
The appellant had every opportunity to explain more fully and in more detail the manner in which he received income and financial benefits from [L]. The fact that he failed to provide sufficient evidence does not mean that he was denied the opportunity to do so.
In the circumstances, the SSAT’s adverse conclusion in respect of the credit card payments was a conclusion which was obviously open on the known material and was an obvious and natural evaluation of that material.
In the circumstances, there was no denial of procedural fairness or natural justice to the appellant.
Accordingly, Ground 3 is not made out.
Conclusion
The appeal does not raise a question of law and should be dismissed with costs.”
I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM
Date: 28 June 2011
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