Sheahan v Frost

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sheahan (Trustee) in the matter of Frost (Bankrupt) v Frost [2011] FCA 356

Citation: Sheahan (Trustee) in the matter of Frost (Bankrupt) v Frost [2011] FCA 356
Parties: JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST) v ALLEN GORDON FROST and PAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON
File number: SAD 185 of 2009
Judge: MANSFIELD J
Date of judgment: 13 April 2011
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – whether the transfer of property was void pursuant to s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where the act of transfer of property was the granting of two mortgages over a matrimonial home alleged to secure payment of legal fees incurred or to be incurred – whether the transferor at the time of the grant of the mortgages was, or about to become, insolvent– whether the property was held absolutely or on trust
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 121
Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment (Anti-avoidance) Act 2006 (Cth)
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 41
Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 29(1)(b)
Cases cited: Pastro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 744 cited
Re Jury; Ashton v Prentiss (1999) 92 FCR 68 considered
Prentiss v Cummins (2002) 124 FCR 67 considered
Re Williams; Williams v Lloyd (1934) 50 CLR 341 cited
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Manuel Jimenez [2002] SASR 225 cited
S v P [2006] 35 Fam LR 88 cited
Date of hearing: 2, 3, 4 and 5 August 2010
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 172
Counsel for the Applicant: G Gretsas
Solicitor for the Applicant: Gretsas & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: G Bigmore QC with G Dart
Solicitor for the Respondents: Paul Richardson Barristers & Solicitors

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 185 of 2009

BETWEEN:

JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST)
Applicant

AND:

ALLEN GORDON FROST
First Respondent

PAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 APRIL 2011

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The solicitors for the applicant do within 14 days draw up and file and serve orders to give effect to the reasons for judgment published this day, in particular as set out in [145] and [170] of the reasons for judgment and for costs as set out in [172].

2.The matter be listed for the making of orders to give effect to these reasons for decision on a date and time to be fixed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 185 of 2009

BETWEEN:

JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST)
Applicant

AND:

ALLEN GORDON FROST
First Respondent

PAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

13 APRIL 2011

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Mr…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 356
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sheahan v Frost, the primary issues were whether two mortgages granted over a matrimonial home by Mr Frost and his former wife to Mr Richardson were void, and whether a property registered in the name of Ambrose Baker and Partners (Holdings) Pty Ltd was held on trust for the Frost Family Trust. The court examined these issues in the context of Mr Frost's bankruptcy and potential insolvency at the time of the mortgages. The decision involved interpreting the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and applying it to the specific facts of the case.

The court identified two main legal issues. The first issue concerned the validity of the two Richardson mortgages granted over the Mayflower Crescent property. The court had to determine whether these mortgages were void under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, given that they may have been intended to prevent Mr Frost’s interest in the property from being divisible among his creditors or to hinder or delay the division of his property. The second issue was whether the Angas Street property was held on trust for the Frost Family Trust or if it was held absolutely, affecting the distribution of Mr Frost's assets upon his bankruptcy.

The court's reasoning focused on the intent behind the granting of the Richardson mortgages and the nature of the property holding in ABPH. The court considered the evidence of Ms Frost and Mr Richardson, giving particular weight to Ms Frost's testimony regarding Mr Frost's state of mind about his solvency. The court found that Mr Frost was likely aware of his financial difficulties and the risk of bankruptcy when the mortgages were granted. The court also examined the implications of the insolvency provisions under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, finding that the Richardson mortgages could reasonably be inferred to have been intended to hinder or delay creditors, thereby rendering them void.

The court concluded that the Richardson mortgages were indeed void under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court determined that the Angas Street property was not held on trust for the Frost Family Trust but was held absolutely, meaning that the share in ABPH held by Mr Frost became part of his bankrupt estate.

The final orders required the solicitors for the applicant to draft and file orders reflecting the court's reasons for judgment and to list the matter for making orders to give effect to the decision. The court also ordered costs to be paid as specified.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The solicitors for the applicant do within 14 days draw up and file and serve orders to give effect to the reasons for judgment published this day, in particular as set out in [145] and [170] of the reasons for judgment and for costs as set out in [172].

2. The matter be listed for the making of orders to give effect to these reasons for decision on a date and time to be fixed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Sheahan’s claim gives rise to two discrete issues. These two issues will be elaborated upon later, but for now can be simply stated in the following terms: (1)First, whether two mortgages granted by Mr Frost and his former wife, in favour of Mr Richardson, in January 1999 and in February 2000 (the Richardson mortgages), each securing a sum of $50,000 over their matrimonial home at Mayflower Crescent, Hallett Cove (the Mayflower Crescent property) should be declared void pursuant to s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act), primarily because (it is alleged) they were granted to prevent Mr Frost’s interest in that property from becoming divisible amongst his creditors or to hinder or delay the process of making his property available for division amongst his creditors (the first issue). (2)Second, whether a property at 225 Angas Street, Adelaide (the Angas Street property) registered in the name of Ambrose Baker and Partners (Holdings) Pty Ltd (ABPH) is held on trust, relevantly as property of the Frost Family Trust (FFT). Alternatively, is it held absolutely, so that the one of two issued shares in ABPH held by Mr Frost at the time of his bankruptcy and which became part of his bankrupt estate entitles Mr Sheahan as trustee of that estate to the value of that share and so, in effect, to one half of the value of that property (the second issue). BACKGROUND Much of the background is uncontested. However, a careful consideration of the particular facts of this case is required since a proper determination of the abovementioned issues primarily depends upon the making of certain factual findings. I will briefly set out the background facts to the current proceedings. Mr and Ms Frost married in 1974, and shortly afterwards in the capacity of joint tenants bought the Mayflower Crescent property as a land and house package. It is common ground that, by reason of s 58 of the Act, following Mr Frost’s bankruptcy on 4 September 2000, the joint tenancy was severed and Mr and Ms Frost (with Mr Frost’s interest in that property vesting in Mr Sheahan as trustee of the Bankrupt estate) held the Mayflower Crescent property as tenants in common. The Mayflower Crescent property is presently valued at $290,000. The Mayflower Crescent property is subject to a first registered mortgage to Australian Investment Co Pty Ltd (AIC) presently securing repayment of a debt of some $185,000 (the secondary AIC mortgage). The validity of the secondary AIC mortgage is not in issue. On 14 August 1992, the Angas Street property was purchased and registered in the name ABPH. That became the office of Mr Frost. Relevant to the second issue identified above in paragraph [2], it is claimed that ABPH purchased the Angas Street property as trustee for the FFT. There is another AIC mortgage over the Angas Street property securing the same indebtedness as the secondary AIC Mortgage. The indebtedness arose as part of the funding to acquire the Angas Street property (the primary AIC mortgage). It has been assumed, and it is clear enough from the evidence, that the primary AIC mortgage will be discharged from funds realised on the sale of the Angas Street property, so that the secondary AIC mortgage does not really reduce the equity in the Mayflower Crescent property. The Angas Street property is presently valued at $500,000.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

He also called Ms Frost. Ms Frost’s Evidence Ms Frost’s evidence was brief. She was aware of a family trust established by Mr Frost shortly after their marriage in 1974. She was not closely involved with it, or indeed with the financial affairs of the family. She signed what documents Mr Frost asked her to sign without any real understanding of the legal nature and effect of those documents. She was not, I find, specifically aware of being a director of ABPH. She did not recall seeing the Deed of Retirement and Appointment of Trustee of 28 August 1998, although she signed it. I accept she did so without fully understanding it, and because Mr Frost asked her to do so. She does not recall the name Ecrosay. At no time did she play any active role as a director of Ecrosay, ABPH (under either name) or Aaronden, whether as trustee for the FFT or in any other way. She was aware that in the early 1990s the Angas Street property was to be purchased with finance partly secured by a mortgage over the Mayflower Crescent property. She was not aware of the purchasing entity. She does not recall any discussion about it being purchased for or by the family trust, or signing any documents in relation to it. She assumed the Angas Street property was held in the names of Mr Frost and herself. Ms Frost became aware that Mr Richardson rented a room in the Angas Street property to operate his legal practice. She was only aware in a very general way of the Supreme Court proceedings. She recalled that in about 2000, and at Mr Frost’s request, she signed the two Richardson mortgages. Mr Frost told her that “it was to lessen the value of the property in case anything happens”, and that she should not worry as Mr Richardson would never want “to claim them”. She was told by Mr Frost the property would then be less attractive in any bankruptcy proceeding. She thought the mortgages were signed by her on the one occasion, but I find she was mistaken about that. Mr Frost later gave her the signed Discharge of Mortgages in relation to each of those mortgages. They were undated. She was told to hold them “in case anything ever happened to [Mr Frost] or Paul Richardson”. In May 2005 she unsuccessfully tried to have the Discharge of Mortgages registered. I have no hesitation in generally accepting Ms Frost’s evidence. It was frank and credible. I do not entirely accept what she said on all matters of detail, simply because she did not at material times have reason to focus on it. However, her evidence does generally reflect her trust in how Mr Frost was managing the family’s financial affairs. It is also generally consistent with the sequence of events regarding the acquisition of the Mayflower Crescent property and the Angas Street property. In two significant respects, I give particular weight to her evidence. The first concerns Mr Frost’s state of mind about his solvency at the time of the two Richardson mortgages, which is relevant to the resolution of the first issue identified above at paragraph [2]. Ms Frost’s evidence suggests that, at least at about the time of the second Richardson mortgage, Mr Frost was alert to the risk of being declared bankrupt. There is no evidence of any significant indebtedness other than that arising out of the Supreme Court proceedings. Her evidence supports the conclusion that, at about this time, notwithstanding Mr Frost’s professed optimism that the High Court would grant special leave to appeal from the orders of the Full Court in the Supreme Court proceedings, he recognised that he was likely to be called upon to pay, but would not be able to pay, debts arising from those judgments. The timing of the relevant events, including the incurrence of the judgment liability and the grant of the Richardson mortgages, suggests that perhaps Mr Frost appreciated that the Richardson mortgages would significantly remove the Mayflower Crescent property from becoming divisible amongst his creditors or would hinder or delay that property from being available to them.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I do not place much weight on Mr Richardson’s evidence where it unsupported by independent documentation or other independently established acts. He closely associated himself empathetically with Mr Frost’s circumstances exhibited by his use of the plural “we” in describing decisions made or points of view held. I do not think he was an untruthful witness, but, for whatever reason, his evidence was not routinely reliable. CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUESThe First Issue: The Validity of the Richardson Mortgages For purposes of applying s 121 of the Act, while it is necessary and appropriate to consider each of the Richardson mortgages separately, simply because they were entered into at different times, many of the facts and evidence referred to above are relevant to an assessment of the validity of both of the Richardson mortgages. I will consider the validity of both mortgages concurrently, but will nonetheless flag when considerations are relevant to only one of the two Richardson mortgages. With respect to s 121 of the Act (its terms are set out above in paragraph [27]) there is no dispute about the elements required to be satisfied, nor their substantive content. The grant of a mortgage constitutes a transfer of property for the purposes of s 121 of the Act: Pastro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 744 and Mr Frost is a person who later became bankrupt. Prima facie, both Richardson mortgages are void if the criteria in s 121(1)(a) and (b) are established. For purposes of criteria (a), I am satisfied that the Mayflower Crescent property would probably have become part of Mr Frost’s estate and been available to his creditors but for the transfer of that property. The principal question then is whether Mr Frost’s main purpose in granting the Richardson mortgages falls within either of the two purposes enumerated in s 121(1)(b). The transferor’s main purpose is said to be deemed to be that described in s 121(1)(b) if s 121(2) is satisfied: that is if it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, Mr Frost was or was about to become insolvent: s 121(2). The formulation of the test expressed in s 121(2) was considered by the Full Court in Re Jury; Ashton v Prentiss (1999) 92 FCR 68 (Ryan, Heerey and Katz JJ). Their Honours at [55] said that the formulation is not synonymous with the expression “if the transferor was insolvent”. They continued:The statutory provision, as a matter of ordinary language, leaves open the possibility that it may also reasonably be inferred that the transferor was solvent. In other words, it is sufficient if the inference of insolvency is reasonably open. An analogy is the leaving of a case to a civil jury. If it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that the defendant was negligent, or that the publication complained of was defamatory of the plaintiff, then the matter must go to a jury. Nevertheless, the jury is not required to draw the relevant inference and may not do so.