FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sheahan (Trustee) in the matter of Frost (Bankrupt) v Frost [2011] FCA 356
Citation: Sheahan (Trustee) in the matter of Frost (Bankrupt) v Frost [2011] FCA 356 Parties: JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST) v ALLEN GORDON FROST and PAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON File number: SAD 185 of 2009 Judge: MANSFIELD J Date of judgment: 13 April 2011 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – whether the transfer of property was void pursuant to s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where the act of transfer of property was the granting of two mortgages over a matrimonial home alleged to secure payment of legal fees incurred or to be incurred – whether the transferor at the time of the grant of the mortgages was, or about to become, insolvent– whether the property was held absolutely or on trust Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 121
Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment (Anti-avoidance) Act 2006 (Cth)
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 41
Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 29(1)(b)Cases cited: Pastro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 744 cited
Re Jury; Ashton v Prentiss (1999) 92 FCR 68 considered
Prentiss v Cummins (2002) 124 FCR 67 considered
Re Williams; Williams v Lloyd (1934) 50 CLR 341 cited
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Manuel Jimenez [2002] SASR 225 cited
S v P [2006] 35 Fam LR 88 citedDate of hearing: 2, 3, 4 and 5 August 2010 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 172 Counsel for the Applicant: G Gretsas Solicitor for the Applicant: Gretsas & Associates Counsel for the Respondents: G Bigmore QC with G Dart Solicitor for the Respondents: Paul Richardson Barristers & Solicitors
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 185 of 2009
BETWEEN: JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST)
ApplicantAND: ALLEN GORDON FROST
First RespondentPAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 APRIL 2011
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The solicitors for the applicant do within 14 days draw up and file and serve orders to give effect to the reasons for judgment published this day, in particular as set out in [145] and [170] of the reasons for judgment and for costs as set out in [172].
2.The matter be listed for the making of orders to give effect to these reasons for decision on a date and time to be fixed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 185 of 2009
BETWEEN: JOHN SHEAHAN (TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF ALLEN GORDON FROST)
ApplicantAND: ALLEN GORDON FROST
First RespondentPAUL ANTHONY RICHARDSON
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
13 APRIL 2011
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 356
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court identified two main legal issues. The first issue concerned the validity of the two Richardson mortgages granted over the Mayflower Crescent property. The court had to determine whether these mortgages were void under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, given that they may have been intended to prevent Mr Frost’s interest in the property from being divisible among his creditors or to hinder or delay the division of his property. The second issue was whether the Angas Street property was held on trust for the Frost Family Trust or if it was held absolutely, affecting the distribution of Mr Frost's assets upon his bankruptcy.
The court's reasoning focused on the intent behind the granting of the Richardson mortgages and the nature of the property holding in ABPH. The court considered the evidence of Ms Frost and Mr Richardson, giving particular weight to Ms Frost's testimony regarding Mr Frost's state of mind about his solvency. The court found that Mr Frost was likely aware of his financial difficulties and the risk of bankruptcy when the mortgages were granted. The court also examined the implications of the insolvency provisions under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, finding that the Richardson mortgages could reasonably be inferred to have been intended to hinder or delay creditors, thereby rendering them void.
The court concluded that the Richardson mortgages were indeed void under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court determined that the Angas Street property was not held on trust for the Frost Family Trust but was held absolutely, meaning that the share in ABPH held by Mr Frost became part of his bankrupt estate.
The final orders required the solicitors for the applicant to draft and file orders reflecting the court's reasons for judgment and to list the matter for making orders to give effect to the decision. The court also ordered costs to be paid as specified.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The solicitors for the applicant do within 14 days draw up and file and serve orders to give effect to the reasons for judgment published this day, in particular as set out in [145] and [170] of the reasons for judgment and for costs as set out in [172].
2. The matter be listed for the making of orders to give effect to these reasons for decision on a date and time to be fixed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I do not place much weight on Mr Richardson’s evidence where it unsupported by independent documentation or other independently established acts. He closely associated himself empathetically with Mr Frost’s circumstances exhibited by his use of the plural “we” in describing decisions made or points of view held. I do not think he was an untruthful witness, but, for whatever reason, his evidence was not routinely reliable. CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUESThe First Issue: The Validity of the Richardson Mortgages For purposes of applying s 121 of the Act, while it is necessary and appropriate to consider each of the Richardson mortgages separately, simply because they were entered into at different times, many of the facts and evidence referred to above are relevant to an assessment of the validity of both of the Richardson mortgages. I will consider the validity of both mortgages concurrently, but will nonetheless flag when considerations are relevant to only one of the two Richardson mortgages. With respect to s 121 of the Act (its terms are set out above in paragraph [27]) there is no dispute about the elements required to be satisfied, nor their substantive content. The grant of a mortgage constitutes a transfer of property for the purposes of s 121 of the Act: Pastro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 744 and Mr Frost is a person who later became bankrupt. Prima facie, both Richardson mortgages are void if the criteria in s 121(1)(a) and (b) are established. For purposes of criteria (a), I am satisfied that the Mayflower Crescent property would probably have become part of Mr Frost’s estate and been available to his creditors but for the transfer of that property. The principal question then is whether Mr Frost’s main purpose in granting the Richardson mortgages falls within either of the two purposes enumerated in s 121(1)(b). The transferor’s main purpose is said to be deemed to be that described in s 121(1)(b) if s 121(2) is satisfied: that is if it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, Mr Frost was or was about to become insolvent: s 121(2). The formulation of the test expressed in s 121(2) was considered by the Full Court in Re Jury; Ashton v Prentiss (1999) 92 FCR 68 (Ryan, Heerey and Katz JJ). Their Honours at [55] said that the formulation is not synonymous with the expression “if the transferor was insolvent”. They continued:The statutory provision, as a matter of ordinary language, leaves open the possibility that it may also reasonably be inferred that the transferor was solvent. In other words, it is sufficient if the inference of insolvency is reasonably open. An analogy is the leaving of a case to a civil jury. If it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that the defendant was negligent, or that the publication complained of was defamatory of the plaintiff, then the matter must go to a jury. Nevertheless, the jury is not required to draw the relevant inference and may not do so.