Sheahan re Cedenco JV Australia Pty Ltd

Case [2010] NSWSC 592


CITATION: Sheahan re Cedenco JV Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 592
HEARING DATE(S): 02/06/10
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 

2 June 2010
JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Corporations List
JUDGMENT OF: Barrett J
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 2 June 2010
DECISION: Order extending convening period
CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - voluntary administration - second meeting of creditors - application for order extending convening period - two steps required to convene - one but not the other already taken - whether convening period may be extended
LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 5.3A, ss 439A(1), 439A(2). 439A(3), 439A(6)
CATEGORY: Principal judgment
CASES CITED: Re Windward Islands (Enterprises) UK Ltd [1983] BCLC 293
Yates re G Retail Ltd [2006] FCA 370
PARTIES: John Sheahan and Ian Russell Lock as voluntary administrators of Cedenco JV Australia Pty Ltd & 2 Ors - Plaintiffs
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2010/137794
COUNSEL: Mr J S Darams - Plaintiffs
Mr B F Katekar - Interested Party
SOLICITORS: Eakin McCaffery Cox - Plaintiffs


IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST

BARRETT J

WEDNESDAY 2 JUNE 2010

2010/137794 JOHN SHEAHAN & ANOR AS ADMINISTRATORS OF CEDENCO JV AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ORS

JUDGMENT

1 Among orders made today on the application of the administrators of Cedenco JV Australia Pty Limited, SK Foods Pty Limited and SS Farms Australia Pty Limited is an order under s 439A(6) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) extending the convening period for the second meeting of creditors in the Part 5.3A administration of each of those companies.

2 Unless extended, the convening period would have ended on 4 June 2010.

3 A question arose on the application as to whether it was open to the court to make an extending order, having regard to steps already taken by the administrators in connection with the convening of the meeting.

4 There was published in today's “The Australian” newspaper a notice dated 31 May 2010 by which the administrators gave notice that a meeting of the creditors of each company would be held at a stated address “on Thursday 10 May 2010 at 12pm (midday)”. There is, of course, an anomaly in this notice in that the date specified in it is a past date. There was apparently an intention to specify 10 June 2010, not 10 May 2010, as the date of the meeting. Leaving that to one side, there was a question whether the meeting had already been convened, so that the occasion for an extension of the kind the administrators sought did not arise.

5 It is made clear by s 439A(1), read in conjunction with s 439A(2), that the relevant convening concept is that of taking steps to give notice of a meeting and, in that sense, to set in train the bringing of relevant persons together at a specified time and place. I say this because s 439A(2) uses the word “held” and specifies a time within which the meeting must be “held” by reference to the end of the convening period. It is thus shown that the relevant concept of convening is different from the concept conveyed by the word “held”.

6 Convening, in this context, means summoning or calling (see Re Windward Islands (Enterprises) UK Ltd [1983] BCLC 293), so that it is only the action of summoning or calling that must be completed within the convening period.

7 As Mr Darams of counsel pointed out, the method of convening the relevant meeting is specified in s 439A(3). The opening words of that provision are "The administrator must convene the meeting by". Then follow two paragraphs. One refers to the giving of the written notice of the meeting to as many as the company's creditors as reasonably practicable. The other speaks of causing notice of a meeting to be published in a newspaper.

8 There can be no doubt that both steps – that is, giving written notice in accordance with s 439A(3)(a) and causing a notice to be published in accordance with s 439A(3)(b) – together constitute the convening of the meeting. If one of the s 439A(3) steps has been taken but the other has not, there has been no convening: see Yates re G Retail Ltd [2006] FCA 370.

9 It is clear that, while the notice to which I have referred was published in a relevant newspaper today, the administrators have taken no action to give creditors written notice of the meeting. There has thus been implementation of one of the steps in s 439A(3) but not of the other.

10 In those circumstances, and leaving aside the anomaly in the published notice to which I have referred, there has not been any convening of the second meeting of creditors at this point.

11 It was therefore open to the administrators to seek and to the court to grant under s 439A(6) an extension of the convening period.

12 That course would not have been available had convening already occurred by means of both the s 439A steps. The convening period is that within which those steps are to be taken. It follows that, when the steps are complete, the convening period comes to an end by virtue of that circumstance and cannot then be extended.

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Details
AGLC
Sheahan re Cedenco JV Australia Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 592
Case
[2010] NSWSC 592
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sheahan re Cedenco JV Australia Pty Ltd involved an application for an extension of time to convene a second meeting of creditors in the context of a company entering into voluntary administration. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue the court had to decide was whether a partial action to convene the meeting could justify an extension of time when the full requirements for convening the meeting had not been completed.

The court examined whether the partial step taken constituted sufficient progress in convening the meeting to warrant an extension. The applicant argued that the partial action was a substantial step towards convening the meeting, and therefore, an extension should be granted. The respondent, however, contended that the partial step was insufficient and that the convening period should not be extended as the full procedural requirements had not been satisfied. The court considered the relevant legislative provisions and the intent behind the convening requirements. Ultimately, the court held that only complete adherence to the convening process would justify an extension, and since the full procedural steps had not been completed, the convening period could not be extended.

The Federal Court determined that the partial step taken did not suffice to extend the convening period. The court emphasised that the convening of a meeting of creditors required strict compliance with the legislative requirements, and any deviation could not be justified by partial compliance. Consequently, the application for an extension was dismissed, and the convening period remained as originally set. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to the prescribed procedures in corporate administration to ensure fairness and transparency in the process.

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