FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937
Citation: Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937 Parties: KATE SHEA v ENERGYAUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD File number: VID 289 of 2012 Judge: DODDS-STREETON J Date of judgment: 5 September 2013 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –– production sought during trial of draft expert reports and expert’s correspondence with solicitors – whether client legal privilege subsisted and if so waived – relevant provisions of Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and applicable legal principles – call for production too late – moreover, evidence indicated that documents had client legal privilege which was not waived Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 4, 118, 119, 122 and 133
Fair Work Act 2009 ss 340(1) and 342(1)Cases cited: Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1980) 161 CLR 475
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 16 ACSR 438; [2003] FCA 804
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 323
Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 287
Dingwallv Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 39 FCR 521
Linter Group Ltd v PriceWaterhouse [1999] VSC 245
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33
New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258
Traderight v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211Date of hearing: 2 September 2013 Date of last submissions: 4 September 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 71 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Gunst QC with Mr R Millar Solicitor for the Applicant: KR Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Bourke SC with Mr P O'Grady Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 289 of 2012
BETWEEN: KATE SHEA
ApplicantAND: ENERGYAUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
DODDS-STREETON J
DATE:
5 SEPTEMBER 2013
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Kate Shea, was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd, on 6 February 2012 on the ground that her position had become redundant. In this proceeding, the applicant alleges that, to the contrary, she was dismissed because she exercised a workplace right by having made five successive complaints (or for reasons including such reason or reasons), that her dismissal was adverse action within the meaning of s 342(1) item 1(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Fair Work Act”) and that the respondent contravened s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act.
The respondent denied the applicant’s allegations, but alternatively challenged her claim to compensation on the ground of failure to mitigate her loss. In support of that submission, the respondent relied upon two expert reports of Guy Farrow, an executive search consultant and managing partner of Heidrick & Struggles, an executive search and leadership consultancy service provider.
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 937
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles of client legal privilege under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and relevant case law. It was established that the case was governed by the Evidence Act rather than common law principles. The court noted that client legal privilege may apply to draft expert reports and communications between an expert and the client’s lawyers if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services. However, such privilege could be waived if the client acted inconsistently with objecting to the adducing of evidence. The court found that the expert’s testimony did not indicate that the final conclusions were based on any material not disclosed in the reports, thus preserving the privilege. Additionally, there was no evidence to suggest that the privilege was waived.
The court concluded that it was inappropriate to order the production of the draft expert reports and related correspondence. The privilege in the communications between the expert and the legal advisers was not lost, and there was no evidence of a waiver. Therefore, the application for production was denied.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ball J concluded that in the case before him, privilege in the communications between the expert and the legal advisers was not lost as there was nothing to indicate that the expert’s conclusions were not her own or were based on material which the report did not disclose (at [23]).CONSIDERATION In this case, the questions whether relevant documents are the subject of client legal privilege and whether, if so, the privilege has been waived, are to be determined under the Evidence Act. The cognate principles of common law legal professional privilege are, to the extent of any inconsistency with the Evidence Act, inapplicable. The concept of implied waiver discussed by the High Court in Mann v Carnell, although enunciated in relation to common law legal professional privilege, is applicable to the loss of client legal privilege under s 122(2) of the Evidence Act. In the light of the above, statements of principles in decisions of this court which were made in relation to common law legal professional privilege, rather than client legal privilege under the Evidence Act, or which depart from, or do not take account of the reasoning in Mann v Carnell, must be qualified accordingly. The provisions of the Evidence Act do not support the absolute and diametrically conflicting propositions initially advocated by each party. Drafts of expert reports, and commentary and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers, are not ipso facto the subject of client legal privilege. Nor, in my opinion, is such privilege in draft expert reports and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers automatically waived by reliance on the final report, whether by its service, the expert witness’ entry into the witness box or otherwise. Rather, draft expert reports and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers will attract client legal privilege if, inter alia, they satisfy the conditions of s 119 of the Evidence Act, in that they are confidential and were prepared or made “for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services in relation to an Australian overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court) or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party” (“the specified purpose”). In my opinion, as White J accepted in New Cap, “professional legal services” encompasses representing the client in legal proceedings. The means of establishing that documents and communication were prepared or made for the specified purpose may vary according to the context. Client legal privilege subsisting under s 119 may be waived under s 122(2) if the client or party acted inconsistently with objecting to adducing evidence because it would result in a disclosure of the relevant documents or communications. An example of such inconsistency relevant to the present case is contained in s 122(3) (that is, where the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party), which invokes the doctrine of imputed consent applicable to common law legal professional privilege.