Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937

Citation: Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937
Parties: KATE SHEA v ENERGYAUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD
File number: VID 289 of 2012
Judge: DODDS-STREETON J
Date of judgment: 5 September 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –– production sought during trial of draft expert reports and expert’s correspondence with solicitors – whether client legal privilege subsisted and if so waived – relevant provisions of Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and applicable legal principles – call for production too late – moreover, evidence indicated that documents had client legal privilege which was not waived
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 4, 118, 119, 122 and 133
Fair Work Act 2009 ss 340(1) and 342(1)
Cases cited: Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1980) 161 CLR 475
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 16 ACSR 438; [2003] FCA 804
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 323
Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 287
Dingwallv Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 39 FCR 521
Linter Group Ltd v PriceWaterhouse [1999] VSC 245
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33
New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258
Traderight v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211
Date of hearing: 2 September 2013
Date of last submissions: 4 September 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Gunst QC with Mr R Millar
Solicitor for the Applicant: KR Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Bourke SC with Mr P O'Grady
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 289 of 2012

BETWEEN:

KATE SHEA
Applicant

AND:

ENERGYAUSTRALIA SERVICES PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

DODDS-STREETON J

DATE:

5 SEPTEMBER 2013

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant, Kate Shea, was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd, on 6 February 2012 on the ground that her position had become redundant. In this proceeding, the applicant alleges that, to the contrary, she was dismissed because she exercised a workplace right by having made five successive complaints (or for reasons including such reason or reasons), that her dismissal was adverse action within the meaning of s 342(1) item 1(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Fair Work Act”) and that the respondent contravened s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act.

  2. The respondent denied the applicant’s allegations, but alternatively challenged her claim to compensation on the ground of failure to mitigate her loss.  In support of that submission, the respondent relied upon two expert reports of Guy Farrow, an executive search consultant and managing partner of Heidrick & Struggles, an executive search and leadership consultancy service provider.

  3. On 2…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 937
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5), the applicant sought production of draft expert reports and correspondence between the expert and the expert's solicitors during the trial. The respondent resisted the call for production, arguing that the application was made too late and that the documents were protected by client legal privilege. The case involved two expert witness reports prepared by Mr Farrow, dated 3 April 2013 and 14 August 2013, for the respondent in proceedings between Ms Shea and EnergyAustralia Services Pty Ltd. The applicant argued that legal professional privilege did not apply as it was waived upon the expert entering the witness box. Alternatively, they contended that client legal privilege was waived due to relevant inconsistency.

The court considered the principles of client legal privilege under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and relevant case law. It was established that the case was governed by the Evidence Act rather than common law principles. The court noted that client legal privilege may apply to draft expert reports and communications between an expert and the client’s lawyers if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services. However, such privilege could be waived if the client acted inconsistently with objecting to the adducing of evidence. The court found that the expert’s testimony did not indicate that the final conclusions were based on any material not disclosed in the reports, thus preserving the privilege. Additionally, there was no evidence to suggest that the privilege was waived.

The court concluded that it was inappropriate to order the production of the draft expert reports and related correspondence. The privilege in the communications between the expert and the legal advisers was not lost, and there was no evidence of a waiver. Therefore, the application for production was denied.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent resisted the call for production. It primarily contended that the application was made too late and should not now be entertained. Alternatively, it submitted that the application should be rejected because the relevant documents and/or communications were the subject of legal client privilege which had not been waived.BACKGROUNDThe expert reports Mr Farrow prepared two expert witness reports for the respondent dated 3 April 2013 (“the April report”) and 14 August 2013 (“the August report”) respectively. In each report, Mr Farrow stated that he had read, understood and complied with the Federal Court Practice Note CM7 for Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia. In each report, Mr Farrow stated that he was engaged by Minter Ellison lawyers to prepare an expert witness report pertaining to a legal proceeding between Ms Shea and EnergyAustralia Service [sic] Pty Ltd. The April report stated that it addressed issues set out in the terms of reference contained in the letter of engagement. The April report then discussed a number of topics under headings apparently derived from the letter of engagement. The letter of engagement was not, however, attached or identified by reference to a date. The August report stated that it addressed issues set out in cl 2.1 of a request for supplementary information dated 17 July 2013. The August report annexed seven documents, including a letter of instructions and related documents dated 18 March 2013 and a second letter of engagement to Heidrick and Struggles dated 17 July 2013.Cross-examination of Mr Farrow On 2 September 2013, in cross‑examination, senior counsel for the applicant asked Mr Farrow how many drafts he had made of the April report. Mr Farrow replied that he believed that he prepared one draft prior to the final draft, which he sent to Minter Ellison and received comments back. Senior counsel for the applicant asked if Mr Farrow had made changes to the April report in consequence. That question was met with the respondent’s objection that such matters were covered by legal professional privilege. In relation to the August report, senior counsel asked Mr Farrow how many drafts he had prepared, whether there was correspondence with Minter Ellison in relation to the drafts and whether changes were made in consequence. Those questions were met with the respondent’s objections based on legal professional privilege. Under cover of the objections, Mr Farrow stated that there were three drafts, one of which merely entailed a change of date. Mr Farrow further stated that there were suggested changes, which he recalled were “more around editing than substantial or significant changes of content”.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS The applicant submitted that legal professional privilege did not attach to any such drafts of the expert reports and related correspondence because it was well established that such privilege was implicitly waived upon the entry of the witness in the witness box. Subsequently, the applicant submitted that client legal privilege under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Evidence Act”) was waived pursuant to s 122, as relevant inconsistency was established.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Lindgren J’s statement of the common law principles of legal professional privilege have been endorsed in a number of authorities, including, recently in Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 33 at [44] and Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 287 at [8]. In Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Ltd (No 14) [2013] NSWSC 211 Ball J observed (at [14]-[16]) that Lindgren J’s statement of common law principles has been frequently approved and provides context for subsequent decisions. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, the principles set out in ASIC v Southcorp must be modified in cases governed by the Evidence Act and in the light of the analysis in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 (“Mann v Carnell”)Client legal privilege under the Evidence Act The present case is not governed by common law principles of legal professional privilege but rather is governed by the Evidence Act (see s 4(1) of that Act). The Evidence Act in Pt 3.10 Div 1 ss 117-126 deals with client legal privilege. It relevantly provides:…118 Legal adviceEvidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a)a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or (b)a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the client; or (c)the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by the client, lawyer or another person; for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal advice to the client.119 LitigationEvidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing the evidence would result in disclosure of: (a)a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or (b)the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was prepared;for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.…122 Loss of client legal privilege: consent and related matters (1)This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence given with the consent of the client or party concerned. (2)Subject to subsection (5), this Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence if the client or party concerned has acted in a way that is inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in section 118, 119 or 120. (3)Without limiting subsection (2), a client or party is taken to have so acted if: (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party. (4)The reference in paragraph (3)(a) to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee or agent of the client or party or of a lawyer of the client or party unless the employee or agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure. (5)A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because:(a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed:(i)in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or(ii) as a result of duress or deception; or(iii) under compulsion of law; or(iv)if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law—to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or (b)of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person; or(c)of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court. (6)This Division does not prevent the adducing of evidence of a document that a witness has used to try to revive the witness’s memory about a fact or opinion or has used as mentioned in section 32 (Attempts to revive memory in court) or 33 (Evidence given by police officers).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, Mr Farrow, although he gave no evidence about the nature of any changes made to the April report, expressly testified that the changes to the August report were in the nature of editing rather than matters of substance.CONCLUSION It was inappropriate to order production of the draft expert reports of Mr Farrow and correspondence between Mr Farrow and Minter Ellison concerning said drafts.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ball J concluded that in the case before him, privilege in the communications between the expert and the legal advisers was not lost as there was nothing to indicate that the expert’s conclusions were not her own or were based on material which the report did not disclose (at [23]).CONSIDERATION In this case, the questions whether relevant documents are the subject of client legal privilege and whether, if so, the privilege has been waived, are to be determined under the Evidence Act. The cognate principles of common law legal professional privilege are, to the extent of any inconsistency with the Evidence Act, inapplicable. The concept of implied waiver discussed by the High Court in Mann v Carnell, although enunciated in relation to common law legal professional privilege, is applicable to the loss of client legal privilege under s 122(2) of the Evidence Act. In the light of the above, statements of principles in decisions of this court which were made in relation to common law legal professional privilege, rather than client legal privilege under the Evidence Act, or which depart from, or do not take account of the reasoning in Mann v Carnell, must be qualified accordingly. The provisions of the Evidence Act do not support the absolute and diametrically conflicting propositions initially advocated by each party. Drafts of expert reports, and commentary and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers, are not ipso facto the subject of client legal privilege. Nor, in my opinion, is such privilege in draft expert reports and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers automatically waived by reliance on the final report, whether by its service, the expert witness’ entry into the witness box or otherwise. Rather, draft expert reports and communications passing between an expert and the client’s lawyers will attract client legal privilege if, inter alia, they satisfy the conditions of s 119 of the Evidence Act, in that they are confidential and were prepared or made “for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services in relation to an Australian overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court) or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party” (“the specified purpose”). In my opinion, as White J accepted in New Cap, “professional legal services” encompasses representing the client in legal proceedings. The means of establishing that documents and communication were prepared or made for the specified purpose may vary according to the context. Client legal privilege subsisting under s 119 may be waived under s 122(2) if the client or party acted inconsistently with objecting to adducing evidence because it would result in a disclosure of the relevant documents or communications. An example of such inconsistency relevant to the present case is contained in s 122(3) (that is, where the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party), which invokes the doctrine of imputed consent applicable to common law legal professional privilege.