Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2023] FCA 570

Application for leave to appeal from: The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Shaw [2023] FCA 298
File number(s): QUD 145 of 2023
Judgment of: MORTIMER CJ
Date of judgment: 1 June 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – where orders made relieving respondent from compliance with Notices to Produce – whether primary decision attended by doubt sufficient to warrant review by full court – whether applicant would endure substantial injustice unless leave to appeal were granted – where primary judge finally determined aspect of applicant’s interlocutory application with respect to which documents were sought – where granting leave would be disproportionate relief – where respondent agreed to produce some of the documents sought – application to be dismissed by operation of orders upon the production of those documents
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70

Noonan v Kelly [2021] FCA 182

Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Australian Financial Security Authority [2020] FCA 1570

Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Australian Financial Security Authority (No 3) [2021] FCA 1569

Wong v Sklavos [2014] FCAFC 120; 319 ALR 378

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 62
Date of hearing: 26 May 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Brown
Solicitor for the Respondent: Harris Carlson Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 145 of 2023
BETWEEN:

JOHN RASHLEIGH SHAW

Applicant

AND:

THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MORTIMER CJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 JUNE 2023

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.The respondent has agreed to produce documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce filed on 28 February 2022, and the respondent has informed the applicant and the Court that any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege will be redacted.

B.The respondent has already informed the applicant that no document exists under paragraph 4 of the first Notice to Produce filed on 28 February 2022.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending production by the respondent of the documents it had agreed to produce; namely documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce, with any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege being redacted.

2.The respondent is to produce the documents referred to in order 1 of these orders on or before 4.00 pm on 8 June 2023.

3.Upon compliance by the respondent with…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 570
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, the applicant, Mr Shaw, sought leave to appeal against decisions made by the primary judge in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The primary judge had made orders relieving the respondent, The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, from compliance with Notices to Produce certain documents. Mr Shaw argued that the primary judge's decisions were flawed and that he would suffer substantial injustice if leave to appeal were not granted. The central legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's decision was attended by doubt sufficient to warrant review by the full court, and whether Mr Shaw would endure substantial injustice without leave to appeal. Additionally, the court considered whether the primary judge had procedurally erred by failing to consider evidence and arguments, and whether there were any allegations of bias or prejudgment against the primary judge.

The court found that the primary judge had adequately considered the evidence and arguments presented by Mr Shaw, and that her reasoning demonstrated that she had listened to and grappled with his submissions. The court held that the primary judge's reasons were proportionate to the substance of the issues raised and that there was no procedural error. Regarding the allegations of bias and prejudgment, the court dismissed these as unfounded, noting that the primary judge had dealt with Mr Shaw's arguments patiently and properly. The court found no basis for the allegation of actual bias and held that the primary judge had not prejudged the matter.

The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending the production of certain documents by the respondent. Upon production of these documents, the application for leave to appeal would be dismissed. The case was re-allocated to another judge for further hearing and determination, and no order was made as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending production by the respondent of the documents it had agreed to produce; namely documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce, with any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege being redacted.

2. The respondent is to produce the documents referred to in order 1 of these orders on or before 4.00 pm on 8 June 2023.

3. Upon compliance by the respondent with order 2 of these orders, the applicant’s application for leave to appeal will stand dismissed by operation of this order.

4. Proceeding VID 361 of 2021 be re-allocated to another Judge of the Court for hearing and determination.

5. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case involves an application for leave to appeal from an order made in a bankruptcy proceeding. The applicant, Mr Shaw, is a bankrupt who has been involved in a series of legal disputes with the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. The core of the current application for leave to appeal revolves around orders that were made relieving the respondent, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, from compliance with certain Notices to Produce. These notices required the production of specific documents that Mr Shaw believed were necessary for his defence in the proceedings. The documents in question were contested on the grounds of legal professional privilege and relevance. The primary judge eventually decided that some of the documents were covered by legal professional privilege and were not relevant, leading to the orders Mr Shaw now seeks to appeal.

The matter began as an interlocutory application where Mr Shaw sought to compel the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy to produce certain documents. This was contested by the Official Trustee, leading to a hearing on 14 March 2023. Following this hearing, the primary judge made orders that relieved the respondent from compliance with the Notices to Produce. Mr Shaw was dissatisfied with these orders and subsequently applied for leave to appeal to a full court. The application was heard by a single judge of the full court who reviewed the primary judge's orders and reasons. The application for leave to appeal was argued on the basis of several grounds, including alleged errors in law, denial of procedural fairness, and claims of bias against the primary judge.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Insofar as this ground touches on the primary judge’s findings I have set out, it is unnecessary to decide. Insofar as this ground is another way of framing the arguments I discuss below, it has no merit and her Honour’s orders and reasoning are not affected by any substantial doubt.Ground 5: Denial of procedural fairness: failure to consider evidence and arguments First, it is important to distinguish between the case management hearing on 30 January 2023, and the hearing of the objection to the Notices to Produce on 14 March 2023. To the extent Mr Shaw complains about events at the former, they are not probative of any error by the primary judge after the second hearing. It was at and after the second hearing that the primary judge listened to the arguments and considered all the material. For example, the short loss of connection during the 30 January 2023 hearing, and a brief exchange between the primary judge and counsel for the Trustee, did not deny Mr Shaw procedural fairness in the exercises of power in respect of the Notices to Produce after the 14 March hearing. The 30 January hearing was nothing more than a case management hearing. Further, I accept the Trustee’s submissions that in the context of these exercises of discretionary power on matters of practice and procedure, the primary judge was not obliged in her Honour’s reasons to refer to each and every one of Mr Shaw’s arguments, or to all of his evidence. Her Honour was not required to summarise those matters. Her Honour was required to consider them. I find her reasons disclose she did this, and the 14 March 2023 transcript demonstrates that her Honour listened to and grappled with what Mr Shaw was saying. It is generally appropriate to deal with interlocutory applications as concisely and economically as possible. Prolixity in evidence and argument on interlocutory applications should not be encouraged; such practices are inefficient and tend to obscure the real issues in dispute between the parties. Attempting to recite or summarise prolix and unnecessarily complex evidence and submissions (whether from a layperson or a lawyer) encourages prolixity in judgments in a way which is not consistent with the judicial function in interlocutory matters, nor with the FCA Act. Reasons should be proportionate to the substance of the issues raised. Her Honour’s reasons were relevantly proportionate. When a party is dissatisfied with an outcome of an interlocutory matter, no matter how fulsome the recitation by a primary judge of the evidence and arguments, it is likely the party can find something that has been missed. It is no part of the proper function of leave to appeal applications to invite a search for omissions of this kind. There should be no encouragement given to unsuccessful parties on interlocutory applications to look for needles in haystacks. That is the antithesis of timely, efficient justice in a court such as this. The FCA Act imposes on parties as well as their lawyers, the need for self-discipline in how matters are presented to the Court, and requires a focus on the core issues in dispute. That is what reasons for interlocutory orders need to address – the core reasons why interlocutory relief was granted or refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground concerns the primary judge’s finding at [42] of her reasons. Mr Shaw contends the primary judge did not apply the law on legal professional privilege, did not examine the documents concerned and denied him procedural fairness in concluding that the documents sought in the third Notice to Produce were covered by legal professional privilege. It is not necessary to set out her Honour’s reasons at [42]; I am satisfied the finding is correct. The documents as described in the third Notice to Produce, read with the affidavit from Ms O’Sullivan that was before the primary judge, provided a sufficient probative basis for the primary judge to infer the documents were covered by legal professional privilege.Ground 6: Allegations of bias and prejudgment Mr Shaw appears through his affidavit material to allege actual bias in the primary judge. An allegation of actual bias in a judge is a serious allegation. There is no basis whatsoever for Mr Shaw’s allegation and I reject it. The transcripts of 30 January and 14 March 2023 demonstrate the primary judge dealt patiently and properly with Mr Shaw. Her Honour’s reasons provide no basis whatsoever for the allegation made. It should not have been made by Mr Shaw without any probative material, no matter how hardly done by he feels. As to apprehended bias, Wigney J set out the applicable principles in Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Australian Financial Security Authority [2020] FCA 1570 at [4]-[17], and I respectfully adopt those statements of principle. If Mr Shaw’s leave application ground refers only to apprehended bias, neither his affidavit material nor his submissions about her Honour’s background, without addressing the admissibility of the factual allegations contained within them, take his argument any further. Her Honour’s background before appointment, apart from being some considerable time ago and in a context wholly unrelated in fact to Mr Shaw or his bankruptcy or the Trustee’s vexatious litigant application, is not capable of raising a reasonable apprehension of bias in the way her Honour determined the fate of the three Notices to Produce. While I have found her Honour erred by going beyond the findings required to decide if the “authority documents” sought (if I may describe them in this way) were relevant, nothing in the way her Honour approached this decision might cause a reasonable lay observer to think her Honour might not have brought an impartial mind to the exercise of her procedural discretion. Rather, her Honour’s error occurred in dealing with a large series of arguments made by Mr Shaw, which were not always easy to follow, which overlapped with one another, and which often invoked irrelevant material or cases. Sifting through those matters can be challenging. Further, Mr Shaw will have ample opportunity to present arguments on the hearing of the vexatious litigant application. He is not prevented from making any arguments about the authority of the Trustee, or the alleged conflict of interest in Mr Hasan participating as an instructor. It is incorrect that any of the primary judge’s orders or reasons, or anything said during the hearings, preclude or prevent Mr Shaw from making these arguments at the hearing of the Trustee’s application, or at the hearing of his own December 2022 application (assuming those matters should be dealt with together in any event).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court reviewed the application for leave to appeal in Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, focusing on whether the primary decision was attended by doubt sufficient to warrant review by the full court. The court noted that the primary judge's decision to relieve the respondent from compliance with the Notices to Produce was a discretionary one, which could be subject to review if there was doubt about its correctness. In this case, the court found that the primary judge's decision was attended by doubt, as it involved a complex exercise of discretion that could reasonably be viewed differently by another court.

Regarding the potential for substantial injustice to Mr Shaw if leave to appeal were not granted, the court concluded that Mr Shaw would not suffer such injustice. The court reasoned that Mr Shaw would still have the opportunity to argue his case on the merits, including the issue of legal professional privilege, in the hearing of the vexatious litigant application.

The court also examined whether the primary judge finally determined an aspect of Mr Shaw's interlocutory application with respect to which documents were sought. The court found that the primary judge did make a final determination in this regard, which was subject to review by the full court.

In considering whether granting leave would be disproportionate relief, the court determined that it would not be. The court found that the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, and that the issues raised were significant enough to warrant full court review.

The court addressed the allegation that the primary judge denied Mr Shaw procedural fairness by failing to consider evidence and arguments. The court found that the primary judge had considered all the material and arguments presented, and that her reasons demonstrated this. The court further found that the primary judge's reasons were proportionate to the substance of the issues raised and were consistent with judicial function in interlocutory matters.

Regarding the allegation that the primary judge's orders or reasoning denied Mr Shaw procedural fairness by not applying the law on legal professional privilege and examining the documents in question, the court found that the primary judge had a sufficient probative basis to infer that the documents were covered by legal professional privilege. The court concluded that the primary judge's finding was correct and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

Finally, the court considered whether the primary judge's background or conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias in determining the fate of the Notices to Produce. The court found that there was no basis for such an allegation and rejected it. The court held that the primary judge's approach to the decision did not cause a reasonable lay observer to think that she might not have brought an impartial mind to the exercise of her procedural discretion.