FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2023] FCA 570
Application for leave to appeal from: The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Shaw [2023] FCA 298 File number(s): QUD 145 of 2023 Judgment of: MORTIMER CJ Date of judgment: 1 June 2023 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – where orders made relieving respondent from compliance with Notices to Produce – whether primary decision attended by doubt sufficient to warrant review by full court – whether applicant would endure substantial injustice unless leave to appeal were granted – where primary judge finally determined aspect of applicant’s interlocutory application with respect to which documents were sought – where granting leave would be disproportionate relief – where respondent agreed to produce some of the documents sought – application to be dismissed by operation of orders upon the production of those documents Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 62 Date of hearing: 26 May 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Brown Solicitor for the Respondent: Harris Carlson Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 145 of 2023 BETWEEN: JOHN RASHLEIGH SHAW
Applicant
AND: THE OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MORTIMER CJ
DATE OF ORDER:
1 JUNE 2023
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.The respondent has agreed to produce documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce filed on 28 February 2022, and the respondent has informed the applicant and the Court that any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege will be redacted.
B.The respondent has already informed the applicant that no document exists under paragraph 4 of the first Notice to Produce filed on 28 February 2022.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending production by the respondent of the documents it had agreed to produce; namely documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce, with any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege being redacted.
2.The respondent is to produce the documents referred to in order 1 of these orders on or before 4.00 pm on 8 June 2023.
3.Upon compliance by the respondent with…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 570
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge had adequately considered the evidence and arguments presented by Mr Shaw, and that her reasoning demonstrated that she had listened to and grappled with his submissions. The court held that the primary judge's reasons were proportionate to the substance of the issues raised and that there was no procedural error. Regarding the allegations of bias and prejudgment, the court dismissed these as unfounded, noting that the primary judge had dealt with Mr Shaw's arguments patiently and properly. The court found no basis for the allegation of actual bias and held that the primary judge had not prejudged the matter.
The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending the production of certain documents by the respondent. Upon production of these documents, the application for leave to appeal would be dismissed. The case was re-allocated to another judge for further hearing and determination, and no order was made as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be adjourned pending production by the respondent of the documents it had agreed to produce; namely documents under paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the first Notice to Produce, with any part of a document produced under paragraph 3 that is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege being redacted.
2. The respondent is to produce the documents referred to in order 1 of these orders on or before 4.00 pm on 8 June 2023.
3. Upon compliance by the respondent with order 2 of these orders, the applicant’s application for leave to appeal will stand dismissed by operation of this order.
4. Proceeding VID 361 of 2021 be re-allocated to another Judge of the Court for hearing and determination.
5. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter began as an interlocutory application where Mr Shaw sought to compel the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy to produce certain documents. This was contested by the Official Trustee, leading to a hearing on 14 March 2023. Following this hearing, the primary judge made orders that relieved the respondent from compliance with the Notices to Produce. Mr Shaw was dissatisfied with these orders and subsequently applied for leave to appeal to a full court. The application was heard by a single judge of the full court who reviewed the primary judge's orders and reasons. The application for leave to appeal was argued on the basis of several grounds, including alleged errors in law, denial of procedural fairness, and claims of bias against the primary judge.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court reviewed the application for leave to appeal in Shaw v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, focusing on whether the primary decision was attended by doubt sufficient to warrant review by the full court. The court noted that the primary judge's decision to relieve the respondent from compliance with the Notices to Produce was a discretionary one, which could be subject to review if there was doubt about its correctness. In this case, the court found that the primary judge's decision was attended by doubt, as it involved a complex exercise of discretion that could reasonably be viewed differently by another court.
Regarding the potential for substantial injustice to Mr Shaw if leave to appeal were not granted, the court concluded that Mr Shaw would not suffer such injustice. The court reasoned that Mr Shaw would still have the opportunity to argue his case on the merits, including the issue of legal professional privilege, in the hearing of the vexatious litigant application.
The court also examined whether the primary judge finally determined an aspect of Mr Shaw's interlocutory application with respect to which documents were sought. The court found that the primary judge did make a final determination in this regard, which was subject to review by the full court.
In considering whether granting leave would be disproportionate relief, the court determined that it would not be. The court found that the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, and that the issues raised were significant enough to warrant full court review.
The court addressed the allegation that the primary judge denied Mr Shaw procedural fairness by failing to consider evidence and arguments. The court found that the primary judge had considered all the material and arguments presented, and that her reasons demonstrated this. The court further found that the primary judge's reasons were proportionate to the substance of the issues raised and were consistent with judicial function in interlocutory matters.
Regarding the allegation that the primary judge's orders or reasoning denied Mr Shaw procedural fairness by not applying the law on legal professional privilege and examining the documents in question, the court found that the primary judge had a sufficient probative basis to infer that the documents were covered by legal professional privilege. The court concluded that the primary judge's finding was correct and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.
Finally, the court considered whether the primary judge's background or conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias in determining the fate of the Notices to Produce. The court found that there was no basis for such an allegation and rejected it. The court held that the primary judge's approach to the decision did not cause a reasonable lay observer to think that she might not have brought an impartial mind to the exercise of her procedural discretion.