Shaw v The Bank of Western Australia Ltd - [2010] SADC 64

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
SHAW v THE BANK OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA LTD & ORS
[2010] SADC 64
Reasons for Decision of His Honour Judge Beazley
12 May 2010
EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - JURISDICTION AND GENERALLY
The plaintiff issued proceedings in 2007 seeking relief pursuant to s10 of the Domestic Partners Property Act, 1996 (SA) - certain properties alleged to form part of the assets of the domestic partnership subject to securities in favour of the Bank of Western Australia Ltd - the plaintiff seeks interlocutory injuction restraining the bank until further order from taking foreclosure proceedings or further encumbering the properties at 51 and 53 Greenock Road Nuriootpa - proceedings delayed by numerous applications for discovery- still not in a position to proceed to trial - whether prima facie case made out for relief against the bank - whether preservation of status quo justified - whether in principle the mortgagee is obliged to have primary recourse to other assets before disposing of subject assets - whether balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction in a case where undertakings have been given by the bank to the plaintiff.
Held: application for injunction against the bank dismissed.
District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 31; Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA) ss 10, 14, 15 and 16, referred to.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee P/L (2007) 230 CLR 89; Price v Schultz [2009] SASC 76; Adelaide Bank Ltd v Lucke [2010] SASC 59; Inglis v C/wth Trading Bank (1972) 126 CLR 16; Andrew Garrett Wine Resorts v National Australia Bank [2004] SASC 348; Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604; Bird v Bird [2010] NSWSC 303; Permanent Mortgages P/L v Andenbergh [2010] WASC 10; Nolan v MBF Investments [2009] VSC 244; Perpetual Trustee Ltd v Baranov [2009] VSC 244, considered.

SHAW v THE BANK OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA LTD & ORS
[2010] SADC 64
Introduction

This is an application, brought by the plaintiff seeking an interlocutory injunction, against The Bank of Western Australia (the fourth defendant) restraining it until further order from “taking foreclosure proceedings or further encumbering or mortgaging 51 and 53 Greenock Road Nuriootpa being the whole of the land contained in Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 5460 Folio 372 and Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 5460 Folio 328”.
This is one of many interlocutory applications brought by the plaintiff against the four defendants in the subject proceedings which have arisen out of the termination of a de facto relationship between the plaintiff and the first defendant, Dominic Stamoulis (“Stamoulis”) in late 2006.
The proceedings were commenced in this court on 19 February 2007, and are still not in a position to be listed for trial. It is the type of case where an order for an early trial ought to have been sought. As will become apparent from these Reasons, the delays have resulted in the accrual of interest payments at a rate of approximately $38,500 per month.[1]
[1] Para 22 of Affidavit of Richard Geoffrey Tucker, sworn 3 February 2010.
The respective parties’ time and resources have almost exclusively been expended upon issues of discovery generally related to determining the value of the assets of Stamoulis. The value of those assets is dependent upon the extent of his interest in the assets held by the respective second and third defendants, Valse No3 Pty Ltd and New Velle Pty Ltd and other associated entities within the Stamoulis Group of Companies. Stamoulis has for some time been self-represented, and has elected not to attend upon interlocutory hearings of the Court. This has, to some extent, frustrated the discovery process. The remaining three defendants Valse No 3 Pty Ltd, New Velle Pty Ltd and the fourth defendant were only joined as parties on 4 August 2009. The court file now exceeds some 4 folders. To fully appreciate the nature of the application it is necessary to detail some of the background of the primary action.
Background
The pleadings
When the proceedings were commenced the plaintiff claimed solely against Stamoulis for orders for the division of property pursuant to Section 10 of the De Facto Relationships Act 1996.[2]
[2] Now the Domestic Partners Property Act 1996
The nature of that claim is for the division of the property of the de facto partners, which may include the sale of such property, and the payment by one partner of a lump sum to the other.
The plaintiff and Stamoulis lived in a de facto relationship for about 13 years until late 2006. There is one child of the relationship, born on 26 June 2000, who resides with the plaintiff at the parties’ family home at 7 Basedow Road Tanunda.
In the proceedings as initially drawn, the plaintiff asserted that Stamoulis had proprietary interests in various properties, and a beneficial interest in certain supermarket businesses owned by Corporate entities controlled by members of his immediate family. In those proceedings the plaintiff identified some six properties allegedly purchased by Stamoulis during the de facto relationship. The plaintiff asserts that, to her knowledge, Stamoulis would register some properties in the name of friends who would hold those properties on trust for him. She concedes that following the commencement of the subject proceedings she had agreed with Stamoulis that three of those properties be sold to reduce debt.[3]
[3] Para 2, Affidavit of Brigid Shaw sworn 25 January 2010.
One of the properties retained by them, and not the subject of any mortgage to the fourth defendant, is the family home at 7 Basedow Road Tanunda. Accordingly the subject application does not call into question whether in principle a mortgagee is obliged to have primary recourse to other assets before seeking to enforce a security against a family home.[4]
[4] See Nolan v MBF Investments [2009] VSC 244. Contrast Perpetual Trustee Ltd v Baranov [2010] VSC 18.
Relevantly in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim the plaintiff alleged that a property at 51 Greenock Road Nuriootpa (51 Greenock Road) was purchased by the first defendant in 2004, which property was the subject of a mortgage granted to The Bank of Western Australia Limited in December 2005. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant transferred that property to the third defendant New Velle Pty Ltd, a company controlled by the first defendant’s mother, on 10 July 2006, for no monetary consideration pursuant to a deed of assignment.
In the Statement of Claim, as initially drawn, there was no reference to the property at 53 Greenock Road Nuriootpa.
Amended Statement of Claim
In an amended Statement of Claim filed pursuant to the order of a Master on 4 August 2009, the plaintiff now pleads that 51 Greenock Road was purchased by Stamoulis who registered it in the name of a cousin pursuant to a Deed of Trust. It was further pleaded that the said property was subject to a mortgage to the National Australia Bank in the sum of $96,000 as at the 18^th day of March 1988. It was asserted that the cousin ultimately transferred the said property to Stamoulis on 4 February 2004. That transfer is said to have been made without consideration pursuant to a Deed of Trust.
In paragraph 16 of the Amended Statement of Claim the plaintiff refers to both of the 51 and 53 Greenock Road properties as having been registered in the name of Stamoulis. She pleaded that on 1 January 2005 Stamoulis contracted to sell 51 Greenock Road to the second defendant Valse No 3 Pty Ltd, and, on 10 January 2006, mortgaged the property to the fourth defendant, at the request of Valse No 3 Pty Ltd. She asserts that on 6 February 2006, Valse No 3 Pty Ltd assigned all its right, title and interest as purchaser of 51 Greenock Road to the third defendant New Velle Pty Ltd. Finally, she asserts, that on 10 July 2006, the transfer from Stamoulis to New Velle Pty Ltd, for no consideration, was registered, at which time the mortgage from Stamoulis to the fourth defendant was discharged and effectively replaced by another from New Velle Pty Ltd to the fourth defendant.
Again the plaintiff’s pleadings only deal expressly with the 51 Greenock Road property
The plaintiff’s claim against the second, third and fourth defendants is that the subject transactions were entered into to defeat or have the effect of defeating an order or anticipated order for the division of property, so that they should be set aside pursuant to Section 14 of the Domestic Partners Property Act 1996.
In the alternative it is asserted that it would be unconscionable for the fourth defendant to deal with the property without recognising a trust in favour of the plaintiff.
The facts not in dispute
Various affidavits were filed by the plaintiff and her solicitor Mr Heffernan in support of the application for the grant of the injunction against the fourth defendant. Much of what was contained in those affidavits was argumentative as contrasted with evidence in support of the application. No point however was taken in respect of the same.
Affidavits sworn by Richard Geoffrey Tucker, Anthony Luke Wright and its solicitor, Mr Barrett, were tendered on behalf of the fourth defendant.
In my opinion, putting to one side the argumentative material, there is no relevant dispute as to the facts; but only the inferences to be drawn from those facts.
Although the subject application relates to the two Greenock Road properties the respective mortgages of the fourth defendant form part of a wider loan facility of $4.25 million provided by the fourth defendant to Stamoulis, Valse No 3 Pty Ltd, New Velle Pty Ltd and other related entities known as the Stamoulis Group.
The plaintiff concedes that her pleadings related specifically to 51 Greenock Road rather than 53 Greenock Road. She deposed in her affidavit sworn 25 January 2010 to her belief at the time the pleadings were drawn that there was only one title to both properties. She now understands that 53 Greenock Road is contained in a separate title, and accordingly seeks relief in respect of both properties.
The plaintiff asserts in her affidavits that the family home at 7 Basedow Road Tanunda has an equity of only about $150,000. She asserts that the respective Greenock Road properties have a total unencumbered value of approximately $800,000. Her claim therefore is that the Greenock Road properties, if, unencumbered, would constitute the bulk of the de facto property to be the subject of an order for division under ss 10 and 11 of the Domestic Partners Property Act 1991(SA). (+Lc Act)
The facts about which there can be no real dispute are:
·On 9 November 2005 the fourth defendant agreed to provide a $4.25 million facility to Valse No 3 Pty Ltd upon condition that members of the Stamoulis Group would provide security.
·As at 9 November 2005 (that is during the currency of the de facto relationship) 51 Greenock Road was registered in the name of Stamoulis. By contrast 53 Greenock Road was registered in the name of Valse No3 Pty Ltd. Both properties were offered as security to enable the Stamoulis Group of Companies to obtain finance from the fourth defendant totalling $4.25 Million.
·On 24 November 2005 Stamoulis executed a mortgage over 51 Greenock Road in favour of the fourth defendant.
·Also on 24 November 2005 Valse No 3 Pty Ltd granted to the fourth defendant a mortgage over 53 Greenock Road.
·On 22 May 2006 following the assignment of 51 Greenock Road from Stamoulis to New Velle Pty Ltd the latter granted a mortgage to the fourth defendant.
·On 13 March 2009 a judge of this court granted the plaintiff an interlocutory injunction against New Velle Pty Ltd in the following terms:-
Until further order New Velle Pty Ltd or by its agents or employees be restrained from taking any steps to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber the said property at 51 Greenock Road Nuriootpa in the State of South Australia being the whole of the land situate at Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 5460 Folio 328.
·On 9 November 2009 by letter from its solicitors the fourth defendant provided to the plaintiff an undertaking not to take possession of 51 Greenock Road without providing at least ten business days’ written notice to the plaintiff. That undertaking has also been extended by the fourth defendant in respect of 53 Greenock Road.[5]
[5] see para 10 of the Affidavit of Richard Geoffrey Tucker sworn 3 February 2010.
·On 16 November 2009 the plaintiff lodged Caveat No 11291572 over the title of Valse No3 Pty Ltd to 53 Greenock Road.
·On 17 December 2009 the fourth defendant issued a formal demand against Valse No 3 Pty Ltd seeking repayment of sums due and owing by the Stamoulis Group in the sum of $4,084,926.19.
·On 19 January 2010 the fourth defendant appointed receivers and managers to some only of the assets of Valse No 3 Pty Ltd and an associated entity but did not appoint receivers and managers to the subject properties at 51 Greenock Road and 53 Greenock Road.
·By Affidavit sworn 3 February 2010 Mr Tucker has referred to various assets which are subject to the receivership, some of which have been placed for auction shortly. In respect of the subject properties Mr Tucker deposed that:
“the bank while fully preserving its position, presently intends to
realise other assets secured in its favour being the properties under
the control of the receiver and manager and the Queensland property
before considering whether it needs to exercise any rights under the
security it holds over the properties”.
Mr Tucker also deposed to the fact that interest continues to accrue on the sums outstanding under the facility to the Stamoulis Group at the rate of approximately $38,573.40 per month.
The principles of law
The principles upon which a court should act in respect of an application for injunctive relief are not in doubt.
In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill,[6] Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to the principles explained in the Beecham Group Ltd case in which the court addressed the two main enquiries –
“The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains at it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief … The second enquiry is … whether the inconvenience of injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.”
Their Honours then explained: “By using the phrase ‘prima facie case’ their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument. With reference to the first enquiry, the court continued in a statement of central importance for this appeal again:
‘How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights (the plaintiff) asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks’.
[6] (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 65.
In addition to those “two main enquiries” is the question whether, in the circumstances of the subject application, an order for damages is not an adequate remedy.
There is no doubt that this court has jurisdiction to grant such an injunction against non parties in a case primarily based upon relief under the Domestic Partners Property Act. I do not need to consider whether that jurisdiction is vested pursuant to s 14of the Act, or s 31 of the District Court Act 1991. See Price v Schultz [2009] SASC 76, and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Lucke [2010] SASC 59.
Is there a sufficient likelihood of success?
The plaintiff’s claim against the fourth defendant raises complex questions of law.
The plaintiff asserts that at all relevant times Stamoulis held his interest in the properties at 51 and 53 Greenock Road on trust for himself and the plaintiff. It is then asserted that the fourth named defendant ought to have been put on notice from the circumstances surrounding the various transfers that Stamoulis was acting in breach of trust. It is alternatively submitted by the plaintiff that the fourth defendant “wilfully and recklessly” failed to make such enquiries as a reasonable person would have made in the circumstances.
In the subject case the plaintiff is not the mortgagor. Although it is not clear from the pleadings, one may assume that the plaintiff’s case is that both 51 and 53 Greenock Road ought to be unencumbered by any mortgage. In fact the respective properties had been subject to a mortgage to the National Bank which had been paid out to enable the refinancing arrangement to be provided by the fourth defendant.
There is a long standing principle that a mortgagor in default seeking the assistance of a Court of Equity to restrain a mortgagee from exercising a power of sale, must pay into court the funds owed, or such lesser sum as the court may order in the circumstances. See Inglis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1971) 126 CLR 161, and Wilby v St George Bank (2001) 80 SASR 404 at [77]. There are, or course, exceptions to the principle which generally relate to disputes as the validity of the title of or the power of the mortgagee to effect a sale. See Andrew Garrett Wine Resorts Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank [2004] SASC 60 at [41].
It is trite that a mortgagee, such as the fourth defendant, upon registration of its mortgage, cannot have its title defeated if the mortgagee is not a party to nor privy to the fraud of another. See Vassos v The State Bank of South Australia [1993] 2 VR 316. Its title cannot be defeated simply because another party, here Stamoulis, may have acted in a way which had the effect of defeating the interests of the plaintiff. The title, however, may be defeated in circumstances where there was fraud or knowledge of the fraud by the mortgagee. See Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604.
In an entirely different context in Bird v Bird [2010] NSWSC 303 the Court summarised the relevant principles with respect to fraudulent conduct which causes loss to a cestui que trust as follows:-
The Plaintiff asserts that the cause of action pleaded against her by the cross-claim is, essentially, a cause of action referred to as the first limb of Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244. In that case Lord Selborne LC in the Court of Appeal in Chancery (with whom James and Mellish LJJ agreed) said, at 251,
Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.
In Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89, the High Court of Australia (in the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) accepted the correctness of the foregoing passage of Lord Selborne, saying, at 140,
The form of liability referred to in the first part of the last sentence is often called the “first limb” of Barnes v Addy, and the form of liability referred to in the second part of the last sentence is often called the “second limb”...
It has become common to describe the first limb as involving “knowing receipt” and the second limb as involving “knowing assistance”. Lord Selborne LC did not use the expression “knowing receipt”. It seems to have been employed first in 1966 by the editors of Snell’s Principles of Equity (26 ed, p 202)... However, in 1972 Brightman J adopted the expression in Karak Rubber Co Ltd v Burden [No 2] [1972] 1 WLR 602 at 632 - 633. He said that the labels “knowing receipt or dealing” and “knowing assistance” employed by Snell were “an admirable shorthand description of their different natures”. Those labels have been commonly used since then. In contrast, Lord Selborne LC’s expression was “receive and become chargeable” (at 251). Persons who receive trust property become chargeable if it is established that they received it with notice of the trust.
It will be appreciated that in the instant case the relevant property was not trust property as such, but was property that was allegedly dealt with and received pursuant to a breach of fiduciary duty. The extension of the principles of third party liability to property to which fiduciary obligations were attached and breached has not been questioned in the authorities (see Farah Constructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited, [113]).
In Farah Constructions, supra, the High Court of Australia had occasion to consider instances in which a constructive trust will operate as an in personam exception to indefeasibility. Their Honours said, at 171,
The essential point on which Ashley A-JA differed from the majority in Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998] 3 VR 133 at 166 was put thus:
The proposition that an equity may be recognised and enforced so long as it involves no conflict with the indefeasability [sic] provisions has not prevented the High Court from imposing constructive trusts so as to recognise equities in cases where the transfer of real property was effected at different stages in the course of events giving rise to the equities.
It should be emphasised that nothing in Bahr v Nicolay [No 2], Muschinski v Dodds, Baumgartner v Baumgartner or Farah Constructions derogates from the principles of indefeasibility enunciated by the High Court of Australia in Breskvar v WallI [1971] HCA 70; (1971) 126 CLR 376 (and also by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569, as was recognised by Tadgell JA (with whom Winneke P concurred) in the Court of Appeal in Victoria in Macquarie Bank v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd, at 279.
That the Plaintiff is not alone in falling into this error has been recognised by J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (2006), 283, [1334] where the learned authors, in considering the effect of Barnes v Addy say,
The resultant tendency has been to treat the two limbs of Barnes v Addy as an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which a third party may become accountable as a trustee. Plainly this is not so... [T]here was well established authority at the time Lord Selborne spoke whereunder third parties who had not received trust property as agents and who had not as agents participated in a fraudulent design within the second limb and who had not acted as trustees de son tort, were held accountable as trustees. That is, whatever the required mental state for a third party who participates in a fiduciary’s breach, it is not necessary to establish that the fiduciary was behaving dishonestly. That has now been affirmed by the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] UKPC 4; [1995] 2 AC 378 at 384-385.

The plaintiff submits that the series of transactions entered into by Stamoulis resulting in the security being taken by the fourth defendant over the two Greenock Road properties was so unusual that the fourth defendant ought to have been put on notice. One may ask rhetorically, notice of what? At the time the refinancing occurred, the property as 51 Greenock Road was registered in Stamoulis’ name. It is not clear to me as to how it could be asserted that the fourth defendant ought to have been on notice as to the existence of a trust in favour of the plaintiff. Even if the fourth defendant ought to have been on notice on 22 May 2006 at the time of the assignment from Stamoulis to the New Velle Pty Ltd, the question remains what consequence arises from an order setting aside that assignment. In the absence of any knowledge imputed to the fourth defendant as at November 2005, it would not affect the security of the fourth defendant which was already in place. The plaintiff also faces significant factual hurdles to establish its case against the fourth defendant – in particular establishing what the fourth defendant knew at the time. Prima facie there is nothing unreasonable in the financier seeking as much security as possible and before approving a loan of some $4.2 million.
In addition it is notable that it is only the 51 Greenock Road property which involved the series of transfers which the plaintiff asserts ought to have placed the fourth defendant on notice. Yet that property had been encumbered by a mortgage to the National Bank in 1988 and had been encumbered by a mortgage to the fourth defendant since 24 November 2005, well before the transfer to New Velle Pty Ltd. I repeat that the refinancing arrangements involve all of the Stamoulis Group of Companies. The arrangements were entered into well before the termination of the subject de facto relationship. It would be difficult for the plaintiff to establish that the relatively low valued properties at Greenock Road were included so as to defeat the plaintiff’s claim.
I do not however propose to further consider whether the plaintiff has made out a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending trial. This is because for other reasons, in my opinion, the application for such an injunction must be refused.
BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
In essence the plaintiff submits that the effect of the injunction which she seeks is simply to formalize the loose arrangement already in place.
She submits that the fourth defendant has expressed its intention to deal with other assets of the Stamoulis Group before disposing of the Greenock Road properties. If that status quo were to remain, then the sale of those other properties may discharge the debt due to the fourth defendant.
I readily accept the logic of that submission – indeed it is recognised by the fourth defendant. However, this may be unfair to the owners of those other properties who will observe that interest continues to accrue while the Greenock properties could be easily sold. See Perpetual Trustee Ltd v Baranov [2009] VSC 244 at [51]. The question is whether the fourth defendant ought to be so restrained at law. The Receivers and managers have placed the major assets up for auction. It may be that they will not be sold. Interest continues to accrue at an alarming rate. The fourth defendant has undertaken to the plaintiff that it will not deal with the Greenock Road properties until it gives 10 days notice to the plaintiff.
I repeat that this is not a case which involves a choice of assets which includes a family home, as was the case in Nolan v MBF Investments [2009] VSC 244.
The plaintiff continues to reside in the family home at 7 Basedow Road Tanunda. She is not in possession of the Greenock Road properties. The nature of her claim is that those subject properties are the relevant “property” of the de facto partnership between the plaintiff and Stamoulis.
Ultimately her claim against him is for a division of that property on terms which are just and equitable.
It is probable that if the plaintiff was successful in her respective claims, she would receive a lump sum of money. Further in the subject case any undertaking as to damages proffered by the plaintiff would be of little or no utility.
In Adelaide Bank Ltd v Lucke [2010] SASC 59 at [37], Gray J said:
“Neither the fact of an undertaking as to damages, nor proof of its sufficiently to cover all contingencies, are immutable requirements of an injunction, particularly in circumstances such as the present where the potential destruction of a party’s proprietary interest in land is in issue”.
The facts of that case are distinguishable from those in the subject case. In my opinion, even if it could be said that there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s claim for final relief, the balance of convenience would not favour the grant of the injunction, as an award of damages is, prima facie, an adequate remedy.
An early trial of the action would be a factor in favour of the grant of an injunction. See Adelaide Bank Ltd v Lucke, supra.
While the delays in this case cannot be allowed to continue, the parties are still not in a position for an early trial to be ordered. In the meantime interest continues to accrue. The limited undertaking of the fourth defendant to give 10 days notice remains in place. In my opinion there is no basis at this time for the grant of an interlocutory injunction.
Conclusion
For these reasons I order that the plaintiff’s claim for an interlocutory injunction against the fourth defendant be dismissed.
I will hear the parties as to the costs of the plaintiff’s application for the injunction. I otherwise stand the proceedings over to the Master’s list for hearing this day.