FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shaw v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (AMP) [2023] FCA 1582
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Shaw v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (AMP) [2023] FedCFamC2G 412 File number: QUD 181 of 2023 Judgment of: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 7 December 2023 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 140
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 4, 24(1)(d) and 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13 and 35.14(1)
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Harmer v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Limited (2013) 299 ALR 236
Shaw v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (AMP) [2023] FedCFamC2G 412
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 23 Date of hearing: 7 December 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: Ms RC Lawrence Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 181 of 2023 BETWEEN: JOHN RASHLEIGH SHAW
Applicant
AND: NM SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD (AMP) ABN 31 008 428 322
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(DELIVERED EX TEMPORE AND REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)RANGIAH J:
The applicant has applied for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA (Div 2)) in Shaw v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (AMP) [2023] FedCFamC2G 412.
The applicant is self-represented in these proceedings, as he was before the primary judge.
In the course of the proceeding before the FCFCOA (Div 2), the applicant applied for the recusal of the primary judge on the basis of alleged actual and apprehended bias.
In his reasons for judgment, his Honour held that:
The application for recusal has absolutely no merit whatsoever.
Despite ruling that there was no merit in the allegations of bias, the primary judge, somewhat surprisingly, went on to comment:
25It is very obvious to me that the applicant is simply someone who, when he does not get his own way, instead attacks, on a personal level, those persons who are responsible for the decisions. He is not someone who can think, in any way, objectively about matters, and would rather do whatever he could to destroy reputations.
26Having come to the realisation that he has no respect for my Court and was endeavouring to set the Court up in such a false and surreptitious way, means that I do…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1582
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Shaw's application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was justified under the circumstances. The court had to assess the merits of Shaw's application, including whether there were any exceptional circumstances that warranted an extension of time and whether the proposed appeal had a reasonable chance of success. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal was sufficiently explained.
The court dismissed Shaw's application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, finding that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay and that the proposed appeal did not have a reasonable chance of success. The court concluded that Shaw had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the application, and the grounds of appeal did not present a compelling case warranting an extension of time or leave to appeal. Consequently, the application was dismissed with no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal. The applicant had initially lodged his appeal to the AAT which was dismissed. Following this, the applicant sought to appeal the AAT's decision to the Federal Court but filed his notice of appeal outside the prescribed time frame. The court was thus required to consider the applicant's application for an extension of time to lodge his appeal, as well as his application for leave to appeal the AAT's decision. The applicant's application was heard by the court which had to determine whether the extension of time and the leave to appeal should be granted.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicant's application for an extension of time to lodge his appeal should be granted.
2. Whether the applicant's application for leave to appeal the AAT's decision should be granted.
Held
1. The applicant's application for an extension of time to lodge his appeal should not be granted.
2. The applicant's application for leave to appeal the AAT's decision should not be granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Court considered the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal in the context of the Federal Court Rules 2011 and relevant case law. The Court noted that an extension of time to lodge an appeal is not a matter of absolute right, but rather a matter of discretion. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court considered the applicant's delay in lodging the application, the reasons provided for the delay, and whether the delay had caused any prejudice to the respondent. The Court found that the applicant had unreasonably delayed in lodging the application, provided inadequate reasons for the delay, and that the delay had caused some prejudice to the respondent. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for an extension of time.
Turning to the application for leave to appeal, the Court noted that leave to appeal is only granted where there is a real prospect that the appeal will succeed, or where the appeal raises an important point of law or principle. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a real prospect of success on the merits of the appeal, nor had the applicant identified any important point of law or principle that would warrant an appeal. The Court further found that the applicant's arguments were largely rehashed from those previously considered and rejected by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and that there were no new arguments or evidence that would warrant a reconsideration of the matter. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Federal Court will not exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time to lodge an appeal where the applicant has unreasonably delayed in lodging the application, provided inadequate reasons for the delay, and where the delay has caused some prejudice to the respondent. Additionally, the Court will not grant leave to appeal where there is no real prospect of success on the merits of the appeal, and where the appeal does not raise an important point of law or principle. This case follows established principles of appellate practice and procedure and does not depart from any prior authority.