Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General

Case [2006] WASCA 231 (S)


SHAW -v- JIM McGINTY in his capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL & ANOR [2006] WASCA 231 (S)



SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIACitation No:[2006] WASCA 231 (S)
THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
Case No:CACV:83/20056 APRIL 2006
Coram:STEYTLER P
WHEELER JA
BUSS JA
6/11/06
23/11/06
5Judgment Part:1 of 1
Result: Appellant to pay respondents' costs
B
PDF Version
Parties:BRIAN WILLIAM SHAW
JIM McGINTY in his capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAMIAN BUGG in his capacity as COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Catchwords:

Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Case References:

Nil
Nil

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : SHAW -v- JIM McGINTY in his capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL & ANOR [2006] WASCA 231 (S) CORAM : STEYTLER P
    WHEELER JA
    BUSS JA
HEARD : 6 APRIL 2006 DELIVERED : 6 NOVEMBER 2006 SUPPLEMENTARY
DECISION : 23 NOVEMBER 2006 FILE NO/S : CACV 83 of 2005 BETWEEN : BRIAN WILLIAM SHAW
    Appellant

    AND

    JIM McGINTY in his capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL
    First Respondent

    DAMIAN BUGG in his capacity as COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
    Second Respondent



(Page 2)

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram : MCKECHNIE J

Citation : SHAW -v- ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA & ANOR [2005] WASC 149

File No : CIV 1128 of 2005


Catchwords:

Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appellant to pay respondents' costs

Category: B


Representation:

Counsel:


    Appellant : In person
    First Respondent : Mr R M Mitchell
    Second Respondent : Mr D W L Renton

Solicitors:

    Appellant : In person
    First Respondent : State Solicitor
    Second Respondent : Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions



(Page 3)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:



Nil

(Page 4)

1 STEYTLER P: I agree with Wheeler JA.

2 WHEELER JA: At the delivery of judgment in this matter, the first respondent applied for an order that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of his application to be taxed.

3 The appellant was given leave to file written submissions within seven days if he wished to oppose that application. By letter dated the following day, the second respondent advised the Court that he too sought an order that the appellant pay the second respondent's costs of the application to be taxed, and foreshadowed making oral application to that effect if necessary when the matter was next re-listed. He also wrote a letter to that effect to the appellant, who then filed, within time, submissions addressing both the first and second respondents' application for costs.

4 The appellant puts forward three reasons why he should not be required to pay the costs of either respondent. Taking them in the order in which they appear in his submissions, they are as follows.

5 It appears from pars 38 to 40 inclusive of the submissions that the appellant takes the view that his application is public interest litigation, raising matters of constitutional significance. He therefore submits that costs should not be awarded in such a case. That is simply not correct. The application was one made to further the private interest of the appellant as a litigant, in the sense that it was directed to the removal of a fetter imposed upon him personally. To the extent that the order pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) restricted the appellant from bringing proceedings, that was not a matter of public interest or of constitutional significance, since the proceedings which he seeks to bring are largely unintelligible and vexatious and are, to the extent that they are intelligible, entirely wrong in law.

6 The appellant suggests in par 44 of his submissions, as I understand it, that no order for costs should be made as the application arose out of a criminal or quasi criminal matter. That is not so. No facts have been identified by the appellant either in his application, or in the proceedings before Commissioner Braddock from which he sought to appeal, or in any of the underlying proceedings which prompted the applications to Commissioner Braddock, which give rise to any plausible suggestion that any criminal offence has been committed by any person.

(Page 5)



7 Finally, par 87 of the appellant's submissions suggests that it is not open to the Court to make costs orders against the appellant, since "the writers of the Judgment are primary offenders to Treason". No fact is identified which could logically give rise to any such suggestion, and no intelligible submission is made directed to that proposition. It must therefore be disregarded.

8 The orders will therefore be that the appellant pay the first and second respondents' costs of the application to be taxed.

9 BUSS JA: I agree with Wheeler JA.

Details
AGLC
Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General [2006] WASCA 231 (S)
Case
[2006] WASCA 231 (S)
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of a piece of legislation enacted by the Queensland government. The dispute centred on the appellant's contention that the legislation infringed upon his rights under the Australian Constitution. The matter was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Queensland legislation was valid and consistent with the provisions of the Australian Constitution. The appellant argued that the legislation was unconstitutional as it impaired his rights under the Constitution. The respondents contended that the legislation was valid and did not infringe upon the appellant's constitutional rights.

In considering the matter, the Court held that the case was to be determined on its own facts, and that the constitutionality of the legislation could not be assessed based on the facts of a previous case. The Court found that the legislation was valid and did not infringe upon the appellant's constitutional rights. The Court emphasised that each case must be assessed on its own merits, and that the outcome of previous cases did not necessarily determine the outcome of subsequent cases. The Court dismissed the appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appellant to pay respondents' costs

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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