FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shashidhar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 253
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Shashidhar v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2857 File number: VID 1293 of 2016 Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 14 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from summary dismissal – refusal to grant a student visa that was applied for within Australia – whether exceptional reasons for grant of the visa exist under cl 527.227 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – meaning of “exceptional reasons” – insufficient doubt to warrant grant of leave – no substantial injustice – leave to appeal refused Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Baker v R (2004) 223 CLR 513; [2004] HCA 45
Cohn v Hatcher (2005) 146 FCR 275; [2005] FCAFC 199
Décor Corp v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; [1991] FCA 844
Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221; [1936] HCA 67
Fay v Fay [1982] All ER 922
Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425; [2004] FCA 1548
Kim v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 161
Minogue v Williams (2000) 60 ALD 366; [2000] FCA 125
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198
Re Washington [1967] QWN 10
Date of hearing: 9 March 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Friedman of Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs
Table of Corrections 15 March 2017 In the heading above paragraph 17, “circumstances” has been replaced with “reasons”. 15 March 2017 In paragraph 17, “circumstances” has been replaced with “reasons”. ORDERS
VID 1293 of 2016 BETWEEN: VEERA VENKHATA NAGA NANDMA SIDDARUSHI SHASHIDHAR
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the application fixed in the sum of $1,756.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MURPHY J:
INTRODUCTION
In this proceeding the applicant, Veera Venkhata Naga Nandma Siddarushi Shashidhar, seeks leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Circuit Court, which summarily dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate). The delegate refused to grant the applicant an initial Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Subclass 572 visa (the student visa)…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 253
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court considered the meaning of "exceptional reasons" and held that it required a relatively high threshold, potentially including matters such as an improvement in bilateral relations or significant economic benefit to Australia. The Court found that Shashidhar's reasons for the visa grant, while compelling, did not meet this high threshold. Shashidhar's arguments regarding his English proficiency, financial contribution, and personal circumstances were considered but did not constitute exceptional reasons as required by the legislation. The Court held that there was not sufficient doubt about the AAT's decision to warrant reconsideration on appeal, and no substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The Full Court's decision was that the application for leave to appeal was refused, and Shashidhar was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the application in the sum of $1,756. This ruling underscores the stringent requirements for establishing exceptional reasons in the context of student visa applications made within Australia and highlights the importance of meeting the legislative criteria for visa grant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the application fixed in the sum of $1,756.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The application for leave to appeal to this Court is discursive and apparently prepared without the benefit of legal advice. Doing the best I can, and taking a generous view for the applicant, it contains the following proposed grounds of appeal (leaving the errors as they are):(a)Ground 4 which states:Further point, I raised that my father passed away in April 2016 and I could not attend to his funeral because of my Travel rights and my application in the federal circuit court for show cause hearing and to grant me visa on this basis if this reason is an exceptional cause and finally requested to grant my visa along with my arguments.(b)Ground 7 which states:My visa application has been refused on the basis as I wasn’t satisfying the criterion of exceptional reason. I have tried myself to show the reason beyond my control to lodge the application for student onshore.(c)Ground 9 which states:And I have appeared for Pearson test English (PTE), and scored an overall average of 65 out of 90, which clearly indicates that I am a competent user of English and given my visa as requested, I can contribute both economically and financially to Australia in the coming future by developing my skills in communication.(d)Ground 10 which states:And finally I say I do have compelling reasons which may meet the exceptional reasons by obtaining to have a degree from Australian University. I am here by submitting my writing in statement and request you to grant my visa.CONSIDERATIONThe test for a grant of leave to appeal Generally, leave to appeal should not be granted unless the applicant satisfies two tests. First, that in all the circumstances the decision to be appealed from is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. Second, whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. The sufficiency of the doubt in respect of the decision and the question of substantial injustice bear upon each other so that the degree of doubt which is sufficient in one case may be different from that required in another: Décor Corp v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ). Leave to appeal will be more readily granted where, although interlocutory in form, the practical effect of the judgment is to finally determine the rights of the parties: Minogue v Williams (2000) 60 ALD 366; [2000] FCA 125 at [19] (Ryan, Merkel and Goldberg JJ), citing the remarks of the High Court in Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221; [1936] HCA 67 at 225–226 (Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) as follows:… There is one class of case which raises little difficulty. If the interlocutory order…has the practical effect of finally determining the rights of the parties, though it is interlocutory in form, a prima facie case exists for granting leave to appeal. For example, a judgment for either party on a demurrer might, in effect, be decisive of the whole litigation. Although such a judgment would often be interlocutory, it might be final in determining the issue between the parties, and, in such a case, leave would be granted almost as of course.The meaning of “exceptional reasons”