Sharp v Glass

[2004] QDC 318

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Sharp v Glass [2004] QDC 318
PARTIES:	JOHN MICHAEL SHARP (appellant) v HOWARD GLASS (respondent)
FILE NO/S:	Appeal No 18 of 2003
DIVISION:	Civil
PROCEEDING:	Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:	Magistrates Court, Gatton
DELIVERED ON:	17 September 2004
DELIVERED AT:	Ipswich
HEARING DATE:	13 August 2004
JUDGE:	Judge Richards
ORDER:	Appeal dismissed
CATCHWORDS:	Drink driving – professional driver – disqualification
COUNSEL:	Mr R Davies for the appellant Mr C May for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	Director of Prosecutions for the respondent

1. John Michael Sharp was involved in a single vehicle accident at 6.50 am on 22^nd June 2003 when he left the road at Dip Road Helidon, went through a fence and came to rest against some trees on private property.  He suffered some minor injuries, was taken to the Toowoomba Hospital and was breathalysed. His blood alcohol reading was .230 which is almost five times the legal limit. 

1. He pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of liquor or a drug in the Gatton Magistrates Court on 14 October 2003. He was disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers license for a period of 16 months and fined $2000.  He had a relevant traffic history including one very old previous conviction in 1991 of a similar offence with a reading of .06 and more recently speeding offences. 

1. Mr Sharp had no intention of drinking and driving on the night in question intending to stay at his friends house. Unfortunately his brother-in-law arrived and he felt he had to leave.  Apart from the appellant no-one was injured in the accident. As a result of being charged and sentenced, he suffered financially by loosing his employment as a truck driver.  He has been a professional driver for most of his working life.

1. Mr Sharp has appealed his sentence on the basis that the disqualification period imposed was manifestly excessive in circumstances where the disqualification  meant that the appellant was bound to lose his employment and suffer significant financial hardship as a result.  This argument would be stronger were it not for the fact that at the time of the hearing the magistrate was given a reference from his employer which said that he could only keep his position open for six months before refilling it.  There is a mandatory six months disqualification associated with this offence. Therefore, the loss of employment was inevitable. 

1. It is submitted on behalf of Mr Sharp that the appropriate sentence would be one whereby the disqualification period was reduced to ten months and the fine reduced to $1200 to $1400.

1. I have been referred to a number of cases which point out that given the nature of the employment of a person, a driver’s license suspension may be more severe than in normal cases and this is undoubtedly the case with this appellant.  However, this is not Mr Sharp’s first offence of this nature and he still has employment, albeit less lucrative. Further, if it were imperative that Mr Sharp recover his license one might have expected that he would have made some effort to bring this appeal on quickly. The matter remained dormant from 8 November 2003 until a request for a hearing date was made in August 2004.

1. The appellant chose to drive when he was extremely drunk. He was aware that his livelihood depended on possession of a current licence.  His driving was such that he was involved in an accident.

1. There is a significant amount of concern in the community regarding drunken drivers and the daily papers chronicle the damage that drunken drivers cause.  Whilst it is true that the appellant did not cause damage to anyone on that particular occasion, one can imagine a situation where more tragic results could have followed.  General deterrence is an important sentencing consideration in cases where there is a significant blood alcohol reading.  In my view there is nothing which would indicate that the learned Magistrate has erred in the exercise of his sentencing discretion.  

1. The sentence imposed is not manifestly excessive.

ORDER

The appeal is dismissed.